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This study concerns what it means to be a person and the role the law plays in 
bestowing the status of person.  The purpose of this dissertation is to further our 
understanding of how courts in the U.S., and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have 
defined ―person‖ as a legal construct within Constitutional law.  In order to achieve this, 
court decisions concerning the personhood of key entities with a claim to personhood are 
analyzed and compared in order to yield a more meaningful understanding of the word 
―person.‖ The entities studied include slaves, corporations, fetuses, and higher-order 
animals.  
To focus the study, several theoretical dichotomies are presented that unite the 
scholarship of personhood as it pertains to each of these entities. These include the 
dichotomy between a human being and person; property and person; and inclusion or 
exclusion in a community of persons. Each of these entities is then thoroughly examined 
in terms of the theories of personhood that are applicable to that entity, the particular 
historical and political circumstances that surround each entity, and finally the court 
decisions that determined that entity‘s status as a person. 
 
 
Through careful analysis of court documents, the study tests to see if the legal 
decisions reflect the dichotomies between person and human being or person and 
property. Further, these legal decisions are compared in order to determine if the courts 
have been consistent in the bestowal of personhood. Through a thorough analysis of 
judicial decisions concerning personhood combined with a theoretical foundation of the 
interdisciplinary discussions that inform and affect judicial and moral personhood, this 
study seeks a more concrete answer to the question, ―Who is a person and why?‖ 
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Theories of Personhood 
 
 
 I think I am a person, and I am pretty sure you, the reader, are a person too.  We 
are both human beings.  We are not property owned by someone else.  We are rational, 
able to consider our own futures, and able to communicate.  Thus, I conclude that we are 
persons.  Were we always persons?  When I was just a fetus, did I count towards 
anything resembling personhood?  If I were to fall into a terminal coma with no ability to 
think or speak, would I retain my status as a person?  If I am someone‘s slave and 
someone has ownership rights over me, do I lose my personhood?  If I join a group which 
takes on a personality of its own, is this group a recognized person in its own right?  
What about my dog Baxter?  He seems to be pretty rational: he obeys commands, shows 
emotions, and appears to consider options.  Is Baxter deserving of any recognition or 
protection for his own sake?   
 What exactly is a person or, in other words, who exactly can claim personhood 
under the law?  The word ―person‖ is used in a variety of contexts and has a diversity of 
meanings depending upon the context.  In colloquial conversation, ―person‖ might simply 
mean a human being.  In ethical discussions, focus shifts to the rights and duties ascribed 
to persons as moral agents.  In the world of psychology, mental functioning and 
continuity is significant, while in biology, concerns range from DNA to functioning of 
specific organs.   
It seems that the word ―person‖ has a variety of meanings none of which is 
definitive.  Scholars have been studying the meaning of this term for centuries without 
reaching concrete conclusions as to what criteria is necessary for the status of person. 
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While theorists continue to debate this topic, in one arena, an understanding of 
personhood may be more settled. The law has had to wrestle with the topic of personhood 
in a number of cases that have been adjudicated within the American legal system.  In 
these cases, justices and judges have had to adjudicate what constitutes a person who 
subject to rights and duties. Thus, perhaps in order to reach a more concrete answer to 
who is a person, it would be wise to turn to the law.  
The law helps sets the standards by which society conducts itself, and in doing so 
helps a society define who matters and why.  The law‘s definition of personhood can be 
considered foundational for determining who qualifies as a person.  The U.S. 
Constitution and its Amendments use the word ―person‖ or ―persons‖ fifty-two times and 
the word ―people‖ ten times.  Certainly, a term used so many times in the founding 
document of the Nation‘s government would be defined in the law.  Surprisingly, the 
Constitution does not authoritatively define persons or personhood.  The Supreme Court 
has only explicitly ruled on the meaning of ―person‖ twice – in Santa Clara v Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company 118 U.S. 394 (1886) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
but as this thesis demonstrates, neither of these Supreme Court decisions was conclusive 
in defining personhood.  The fact that ―person‖ remains a nebulous term in the law seems 
unbelievable since many of the rights and responsibilities conferred by the Constitution 
are given to ―persons.‖  In order to know to whom these rights and responsibilities are 
given, it is critically important to understand the meaning of ―persons.‖    
While the law has not definitively declared an absolute legal meaning of ―person‖ 
or ―personhood,‖ the courts have had opportunities to adjudicate the meaning of 
personhood in respect to a variety of different entities and have had concrete things to say 
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about each of these entities.  Therefore, though studying what the courts have to say on 
personhood through a variety of cases, perhaps something significant and unique could 
be contributed to the understanding of personhood. While the topic of personhood has 
been studied by scholars for centuries, this approach has the potential to add significantly 
to the scholarship. 
 
This study examines the notion of personhood through the eyes of the courts in a 
variety of political conflicts that are adjudicated by courts. For instance, if a comatose 
human being loses his or her ―personhood‖ when brain capacity ceases, then it may be 
possible to euthanize the human being with impunity.  If fetuses are persons, then the 
argument against abortion is much stronger.  Because slaves were not considered 
―persons‖ under the law, they did not possess any inalienable rights.  Corporations have 
attained the status of ―persons‖ and based on this status have attained legal standing and 
other privileges such as Fourth Amendment protection.  With these significant issues at 
stake, understanding the legal conception of ―persons‖ is vitally important.  In order to 
know who is bound by the law, we must know what ―person‖ in the law means.  
Although the Supreme Court has not provided a compact definition of ―person,‖ through 
its history of decisions, the Court has deemed certain entities to be persons and has 
deemed that other entities do not fall under the category of persons.  Perhaps by 
comparing various decisions where the Court has deemed certain entities to be persons, 
we can gain some clarity on the term. 
When this nation was founded, slaves were a category of humans that were not 
considered persons.  They were human beings that were property and did not possess the 
rights conferred upon persons.  Yet, even though they did not have rights as persons, they 
4 
 
were still culpable for crimes as persons.  The abolishment of slavery ended the property 
status of many African Americans, but it would take a long struggle that continues today 
for African Americans to gain all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law.   
While former slaves were struggling to gain the rights guaranteed to persons, 
railroads were fighting their own battle through the courts to attain personhood for 
corporations.  Ostensibly, the state granted the corporate charter in order to ease the 
difficulty of doing business for individuals working as a group.  The corporate charter 
granted limited liability for its shareholders and granted the entity unlimited life to do 
business.  While these privileges proved to be essential for the corporation to do business, 
they seemingly were not enough as far as many corporations were concerned.  
Corporations began to bring cases to the Supreme Court claiming that as persons, they 
had a right to further privileges under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  The issue 
came to a head when numerous railroad corporations began to swamp the Court with 
personhood claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.  By 1886, the Supreme Court 
declared that the corporations were included under the word ―person.‖  The Fourteenth 
Amendment very quickly became the ―liberator‖ of the corporation rather than the 
African slave.   
A very current conflict over the meaning of ―person‖ concerns the status of the 
fetus.  In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court ruled that fetuses were not persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead the Court decided that the fetus was a ―potential‖ 
human life that the state had an interest in protecting once it reached viability.  This 
ruling left many issues open to interpretation and thus the debate over the status of the 
fetus rages on and is arguably one of the most divisive political conflicts in the U.S.  
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Does a potential person merit any rights or protections?  It is not entirely clear that an 
infant who is not able to rationalize, communicate coherently, and self-reflect is truly a 
person, either.  If an infant and/or a small child do not have the capacities we equate to 
persons, do they have any protected rights?  Not only are the rights of the fetus at stake, 
but so are the rights of privacy and bodily integrity of the woman.  If the woman does not 
have control over her own body, is she diminished as a legal person?  If a criminal act is 
committed against a pregnant woman and her fetus is killed, is the perpetrator guilty of 
murder or homicide against this entity which is not a person?  All these questions are 
important considerations involving the Court‘s determinations of the personhood status 
for the fetus.   
Finally, a quickly emerging sector of jurisprudence involves animal rights.  To 
what extent are animals protected from harm?  Scientists have shown that certain 
primates such as chimpanzees and apes have the mental capacity to reason, recognize 
themselves, and communicate with humans.  In fact, they seem to have the mental 
capacity of a three-year-old human.  Does this mental capacity entitle certain animals to 
protection under the law and further, does it entitle them to be considered as ―persons?‖  
It might seem paradoxical that an animal should be considered a person, but if the 
definition of a person does not necessarily mean human being, it may be possible to 
include certain primates within the category of persons.   
Each of these four entities (slaves, corporations, fetuses, and certain animals) has 
a claim to personhood that is debated in both the theoretical and legal understandings of 
personhood.  Through a number of judicial decisions involving these four entities, the 
law interpreted the meaning of personhood and defined who matters in the law and in 
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society.  The law has absorbed, reflected, and expressed ideas from a variety of political 
theories in its effort to explain why some entities are granted personhood and why others 
are denied personhood.  A hallmark of the American precedent-based legal system is that 
it should promote consistency throughout its body of jurisprudence in order to promote 
universal understandings of important definitions, relationships, rights, and obligations.  
Thus, by analyzing the political theory of personhood for each of these entities and the 
corresponding legal jurisprudence in which the legal system has offered opinions on 
personhood, a more complete understanding of personhood should be attained.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to further our understanding of how courts in 
the U.S., and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have defined ―person‖ as a legal 
construct within Constitutional law.  The focus of this thesis is a study of what it means 
to be a person and the role the law plays in bestowing the status of person.  Who or what 
should the law recognize as a person and who or what should be excluded?  An account 
of the American legal system‘s interpretation of this word will shed light on the evolving 
meaning of the word.  Thus, my thesis is a comparative examination of a variety of 
important court decision involving the personhood of various entities should provide a 
better understanding of this legal and moral term. By looking at what the courts had to 
say in these cases, how the decisions compared, what criteria was used, and what 
consistencies exist, I will be able to gain clarity on what the Courts consider to be a 
person.  
While the principal purpose of this study is an examination of how the courts have 
adjudicated and interpreted the meaning of ―person,‖ there is a vast body of scholarship 
that examines personhood from a theoretical standpoint. These theoretical underpinnings 
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are rich and influential, and without examining this theoretical foundation that influences 
judicial decision makers, an analysis of the law would be incomplete. A foundation in 
theory helps elucidate the court opinions.  The background of the political theory of 
personhood helps provide continuity and clarity to the wide range of court decisions that 
are examined in this thesis. This study brings together two sets of literature – a literature 
grounded in political theory and philosophy that discussed the essence of a person as well 
as the judicial literature created by the courts that discussed what a person means in the 
law.   
Theorists have studied the concept of personhood for centuries as scholars have 
analyzed what is really means to be a ―person.‖  These theorists have tried to determine 
what sets a person apart from human beings and other animals; what criteria is needed to 
qualify as a person; and what the status of person signifies in a political society.  
Volumes have been written about personhood with the most influential of these 
arguments influencing the way society understands personhood.  These influential studies 
of personhood form what I consider to be a core theory of personhood that influences 
how the law adjudicates personhood.  
My first hypothesis is that there is a core body of political theory concerning 
personhood that influences the law.  This core has its roots in the liberal tradition and is 
based on the seminal works of John Locke and Immanuel Kant.  Within this tradition, 
many modern scholars continue to study issues of personhood that are relevant to the 
law‘s interpretation of the word ―person.‖  Through a review of what I consider to be the 
most important theories of personhood in the liberal tradition, I will develop a core theory 
of personhood that forms the basis of how law makers contemplate personhood.  I will 
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then explore the extent to which and the conditions under which judges and justices 
utilize this body of political theory when developing opinions concerning the meaning of 
personhood. 
While this hypothesis is important in setting up this study, the core theory of 
personhood that I develop is very broad and diverse even though it has a foundation in 
Locke and Kant.  Therefore, while the political theories of personhood augment a legal 
understanding, due to the depth of the core theory, it is possible to find echoes of the core 
theory in many legal interpretations of personhood if one looks carefully enough.  
Therefore, while this hypothesis is important as a starting point, it is not the most 
important avenue of discovery for this study.  In order to dig deeper into conceptions of 
personhood, I turn to my second hypothesis.  
Much of the core theory, including the seminal works of Locke and Kant, 
conceptualizes ―person‖ by distinguishing ―person‖ from ―human being‖ and ―property.‖  
My second hypothesis is that the judicial opinions will reflect the dichotomy between 
person and human being and the dichotomy between person and property and will utilize 
this dichotomy as a method of defining ―person.‖  Are judges and justices consistent in 
their legal understanding of the meaning of person as opposed to human being and 
property, or do opinions diverge?  Further, when analyzing cases concerning various 
categories of persons such as slaves, corporations, fetuses, and great apes, do judges and 
justices rely on a particular standard comparison to human beings or property, or are 
comparisons inconsistent among the categories?  What accounts for consistencies or 
inconsistencies?  Analyzing the meaning of ―person‖ through this type of 
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conceptualization should allow a deeper understanding of the legal interpretation of 
―person.‖ 
The judicial system, both Supreme Court and lower courts, have had many 
opportunities to expound on the meaning of personhood through a wide range of 
decisions.  I am particularly interested in examining cases that fall into four distinct 
categories: slavery, corporations, fetuses, and great apes.  Each of these entities has 
distinct claims to personhood within both moral theory and legal theory.  However, each 
of these entities also has properties that would seemingly exclude them as candidates for 
personhood.  Hence, a body of jurisprudence exists for each of these categories as these 
entities fought (or had someone fight on their behalf) to attain personhood status under 
the law.  Because the underlying theme in the jurisprudence concerning these entities is a 
claim to personhood, I would expect that there are underlying constitutional constructs, 
precedents, and theory that are consistent for each category.  Thus, my third hypothesis is 
that the case law pertaining to the personhood slaves, corporations, fetuses, and great 
apes should be consistent in its basis in political theory and constitutional constructs. 
I contend that through studying these diverse categories of jurisprudence, I will 
find consistent themes including the tendency to define ―person‖ in contrast to both 
human beings and property.  I expect to find that the case law is indeed patterned on a 
core political theory; that this theory defines personhood in relation to the ―other‖ – 
human being and property; and that the consistencies within the core theory and 
jurisprudence lead to a better understanding of the meaning of ―person‖ in the law and 
common understanding.   
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Thus, this dissertation will seek to integrate various theories of personhood and 
various bodies of caselaw into a more coherent whole in order to see if a more concise 
meaning of personhood emerges.  These hypotheses lead to a bevy of research questions 
that I hope to answer through the course of my work.  Although the Constitution does not 
define ―person‖ nor has the Supreme Court specifically defined the term, can we derive 
some sense of what ―person‖ means by looking at various entities that the Supreme Court 
(and lower courts) have included and excluded as persons?  When the Court confers the 
status of personhood, is the Court consistent with the theoretical underpinnings as 
understood in the disciplines of philosophy, political science, or psychology?  The 
Supreme Court, as well as many lower courts, has examined the entities of slaves, 
corporations, fetuses, and great apes largely in isolation from each other.  Are Supreme 
Court decisions concerning various ―person‖ entities even coherent as a whole?  Has the 
Court been consistent in declaring some entities to be included in the designation of 
persons while other entities are not included?   Finally, after examining each of these 
entities, can we conclude that the judicial system has correctly included some entities 
while excluding others?  What does the future hold for entities who might seek 
personhood? 
 
Overview of Proposed Study 
In order to complete this study, I will assess the scholarship concerning the 
theories and issues related to the meaning of personhood in academic and common 
understanding.  This body of scholarship forms the core political theory that I will then 
use to conduct an analysis of a body of legal jurisprudence dealing with issues of 
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personhood.  This study builds upon the work of Ronald Dworkin who studies the 
concept of ―personhood‖ in light of the debate over abortion and euthanasia, Davies and 
Naffine who study the concept of self-ownership in current legal debates, and other 
scholars who study the entwined theoretical and legal aspects of personhood.
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My analysis of the theoretical and legal dimensions of personhood is a 
comparative analysis of a variety of judicial opinions concerning personhood in order to 
determine both the consistencies and inconsistencies in the bestowal of personhood.  In 
order to make this determination, I propose to study the case law pertaining to four 
entities whose status as persons has been debated in the judicial system.   
 Slaves – entities that at the founding of the Constitution were considered property 
but were restored to persons through the Civil War and the passing of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 Corporations – entities that are property in that they are owned by stockholders and 
are traded on the stock market, but have been deemed legal persons by the Supreme 
Court for the ease of doing business. 
 Fetuses – entities that straddle the line between human being and persons.  
Although the Supreme Court has declared that fetuses are not persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, they have been deemed ―potential life‖ and thus are 
entitled to some state protection. 
 Great apes– entities that are not human but have the mental capacities equivalent to 
a three-year-old human.  Great apes and other animal pets have been historically 
considered property, but a growing body of very current literature argues great apes 
should be granted personhood status for some circumstances.   
 
This study is unique in that it brings together a wide breadth of literatures and 
judicial decision-making.  While much of the scholarship in the theoretical disciplines 
comments on judicial decisions, these decisions are not analyzed in terms of a coherent 
body of literature from other disciplines.  For instance, while Locke and Kant provide the 
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foundations for much of our understanding of personhood, decisions such as Roe v. Wade 
are not often studied from a Lockean or Kantian perspective.  Further, while there is a 
substantial amount of scholarship examining personhood of slaves, corporations, fetuses, 
and great apes, very few scholars examine these entities together to compare and contrast 
their claims to personhood.
2
  Similarly, court opinions that concern one type of entity 
rarely refer to cases concerning other entities vying for personhood.  For example, the 
opinions concerning fetal personhood do not often reference corporate personhood or the 
personhood of the slave. This study integrates these various bodies of scholarship and 
wide range of judicial opinions into a more coherent whole.   
I have chosen these four categories because they represent four diverse entities 
that have all faced legal battles to determine their status as persons.  Slaves were 
unarguably human beings yet they were excluded from the ―We the People‖ of the 
Constitution and denied all political rights and freedoms.  An entire ―science‖ tried to 
prove that Blacks were inferior intellectual beings and thus were not worthy as rational, 
self-aware entities deserving personhood.  Although human, they were classified as 
property and thus denied personhood.  The dichotomy between person and property is 
clearly seen as slave owners used every conceivable method to preserve the property 
status of their human slaves.  Further, the personhood of slaves came into question when 
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slaves were accused of crimes as persons but were simply property in the law.  Because 
the slave was both person and property, the courts faced a unique and confusing entity 
that did not fit within property law.  Cases involving slaves generally considered only the 
economic value of the slave as property to the master.  The slave, as an alienated being, 
was not recognized as an agent to be compensated for harm.  In many instances, slaves 
were treated in the same way as cattle because both were the master‘s property.  When a 
slave was killed or harmed, the master would collect restitution for his property.  In fact, 
the ―person‖ of the slave was rarely considered except in cases considering the 
culpability of a slave in criminal suits.  In these instances, a slave was generally treated as 
a rational, sentient being capable of defending himself and committing crimes.   
The Constitution uses the word ―person‖ twenty-two times but never uses the 
word ―slave‖ or ―slavery.‖  During the Constitutional Convention, slavery was already a 
point of contention.  Thus, the Constitution did not use the word ―slave‖ or ―slavery‖ 
because the Founding Fathers were reluctant to tarnish the great document with a word 
that many of the Founders believed represented an evil institution. However, slavery is 
referenced in several key areas – the Three-Fifths Clause, the Migration or Importation 
Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause.  Each time slavery is referenced, the word 
―person‖ is used although it is qualified with ―other‖ or ―such.‖  Although these 
references to qualified ―persons‖ still had a malevolent meaning, the word ―person‖ was 
vague enough that it did not sully the Constitution.  Southern justices, who often 
personally disagreed with slavery, justified their decisions by claiming that positivism 
prevented the interjection of their beliefs.  By clinging to this justification, Southern 
justices were able to uphold the abhorrent practices of slavery under a Constitution that 
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claimed liberty and freedom.  In the face of antislavery demand, the justice was able to 
respond, ―I cannot‖ thereby attempting to placate antislavery supporters while still ruling 
in favor of Southern plantation owners.  Legal scholar Robert Cover argues that the 
Constitution itself provided a remarkably powerful symbol of judicial fidelity to positive 
law.  Cover argues that justices did not choose between liberty and slavery.  Instead, they 
chose between liberty and federalism; liberty and the limits on judicial function; liberty 




The Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments ended slavery and ostensibly restored the personhood of former slaves.  
However, the effects of denying personhood to this group of humans were long lasting.  
Even though Blacks were persons, they were not full persons in the sense of status, rights, 
or liberties.  Thus, although the Fourteenth Amendment ostensibly granted all persons 
―privileges and immunities‖ and the right of ―life, liberty, and property,‖ Blacks as a 
degraded class of persons still faced many of the same injustices that they faced when 
their status was mere property. This was indeed the plight of the newly freed slaves.  
Their newly gained status of personhood did not automatically entitle the free man to a 
bevy of political and civil rights.  Their status as ―persons‖ was still much lower than 
whites as ―persons.‖ Thus, personhood was seen as a matter of degree.  Further, freedmen 
also faced a battle to achieve the political rights of citizens which was not guaranteed to 
them via personhood.  Blacks were not accepted as full persons, and the aftershocks of 
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University Press, 1975]. 
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slavery persisted as African Americans were (and arguably still are) systematically 
denied rights and protections as citizens.   
The corporation‘s legal personality is quite unique in that the corporation is not a 
rational, self-determined human being that is easily recognized as a candidate for 
personhood, yet the corporation claimed rights of legal personality before former slaves 
attained their political rights. Corporations are not human beings but are organizations of 
humans who have joined together for business purposes.  Just as slaves, their status 
straddles the line between person and property.  The corporation is at the same time both 
a person and property in that it is both the subject of property rights and the object of 
property rights.  As a person, a corporation may own things such as goods, equipment, 
stocks and bonds, and even other corporations.  At the same time, human beings own the 
corporation; it is a commodity on the stock market as humans buy and sell shares of it.  
Thus, the corporation is neither person nor property, but legally endowed as both.  Thus, 
the entity of the corporation is tied up in the same anomaly as the slave.  The distinction 
between human and person is even more complex.  A corporation is not a human being 
nor is it a rational creature.  However, as an organization composed of rational human 
beings, corporations have successfully claimed personhood status. 
The corporate charter granted limited liability for its shareholders and granted the 
entity unlimited life to do business.   While these privileges proved to be essential for the 
corporation to do business, they seemingly were not enough as far as many corporations 
were concerned.  Corporations began to bring cases to the Supreme Court claiming that 
as persons, they had a right to further privileges under the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.  The issue came to a head when numerous railroad corporations began to swamp 
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the Court with personhood claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment very quickly became the ―liberator‖ of the corporation rather than the 
African slave.   
Charles and Mary Beard allege that the word ―person‖ was deliberately used in 
the Fourteenth Amendment in order to include corporations.
4
  Although this theory has 
never been completely proven, several of the Congressional leaders who framed the 
Fourteenth Amendment were also lawyers arguing for the railroads in Supreme Court 
cases. Corporations were formally granted personhood in the clerk‘s notes of Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific R.R. 118 U.S. 394. There has been much historical and 
academic debate over the validity of the case as a precedent for corporate personhood.  
Regardless of the controversy over the opinion, the Santa Clara case effectively granted 
corporate personhood and has been cited ever since in cases referring to Fourteenth 
Amendment rights for corporations.  As Santa Clara and its judicial progeny granted 
corporations personhood, corporations continued to use the judicial process to gain more 
rights as persons including First Amendment protections of Free Speech, Fourth 
Amendment protections from search and seizure, and the Fifth Amendment‘s right to 
remain silent in criminal cases. Corporate personhood has had far reaching consequences 
for the legal, social and economic arenas.  
Although in some parts of the world slavery still exists, in the United States, 
slavery has been abolished unequivocally and humans of all races have been declared 
persons.  And although the seemingly limitless power of corporations is protested around 
the globe, in the U.S., the status of corporations has been decided in favor of personhood.  
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In contrast, the status of the fetus and animals such as great apes is very much contested 
in current judicial and political debates.  As a human being, the fetus has a potential claim 
to personhood.  However, this claim is in contention with the woman whose right to 
control over her body is a component of her rights as a person.  In Roe v. Wade, the 
Supreme Court ruled that fetuses were not included in the meaning of ―persons‖ for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.  If the Court had found that the fetus is a person 
with a corresponding right to life, abortion would necessarily be first degree murder and 
illegal.  However, the Court‘s ruling that abortion is permissible and that the fetus is not a 
person under the Fourteenth Amendment did not completely resolve the issue.  The Court 
also found that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the ―potential‖ life of the 
unborn and that this interest grows as the woman approaches full term.  As potential 
persons, the status of the fetus is still nebulous.  
Fetuses are undoubtedly Homo sapiens and it is widely agreed that they are 
human beings.  However, as humans who do not have the status of person, potential 
rights and duties towards these entities is uncertain.  The question of personhood for the 
fetus presents the dichotomy of person versus human being in stark contrast.  The fetus is 
certainly a biological human being, but it lacks many of the criteria needed for 
personhood such as rationality and second order volitions.  However, as the Roe Court 
noted, the fetus has the potential to develop these capacities, and indeed has brain activity 
in as few as eight weeks.  Further while the fetus is not a rational agent, neither is an 
infant nor the comatose.  Fetal personhood also demonstrates the dichotomy of the person 
versus property.  If a woman has a property right over her body, she has the right to make 
decisions concerning her body.  While the fetus is an entity that, as a biological human 
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being, may deserve a certain amount of respect and protection, the mother is also a 
person whose rights must be upheld.  Does a property right to one‘s own body include the 
right to evict the fetus living within the body? 
The abortion debate is the most visible arena where the status of the fetus is at 
stake as the potential rights of the fetus compete with the rights of bodily integrity of the 
woman.  While abortion is the most obvious issue caught up in fetal personhood, other 
legal issues are involved as well.  For instance, the law has long recognized that the fetus 
has rights to inherit given that it is subsequently born alive.  A more pressing issue is 
involved when a crime is committed against the mother and subsequently harms the fetus 
resulting in death or injury.  At least thirty-six states currently have fetal homicide laws 
and fifteen of these laws apply during early stages of development.  Some of these laws 
imply and others explicitly state that for the purpose of the statute, the fetus is a person.
5
  
Great apes are certainly not Homo sapiens and not human beings.  However, their 
ability to reason at a fairly high level gives pause to concerns over their status.  Studies of 
chimpanzees reveal that they are capable of self-recognition in a mirror, display some 
signs of self-awareness, and have long-term memory.  Chimpanzees and orangutans have 
DNA that is 96 percent the same as humans.  Should our nearest biological cousins have 
rights as persons?  Animal rights activist and Utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer argues 
that denying rights to animals simply because they are not human is a type of arbitrary 
discrimination called ―speciesism.‖
6
  Legal scholar Steven Wise questions why 
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humanness is a prerequisite for legal rights.
7
  He argues that primates who have the 
mental abilities of some humans should, at minimum, have basic legal rights such as 
bodily integrity.  These rights preclude invasive medical research and captivity.  Wise 
contends that without personhood, animals are invisible to the law. 
There are valid reasons for seriously considering the personhood of great apes and 
considering the proposition that primates should have standing in a court of law.  Once 
again, the discussion over personhood for animals can be framed in terms of person 
versus human being and person versus property.  While animals are clearly not human 
beings, the intellectual capacities of certain animals are greater than those of many 
mentally handicapped humans.  The person versus property distinction is particularly 
salient because animals are almost universally considered property in Western culture.  
Domesticated animals are indisputably property under the law.  Wild animals pose a 
more complicated problem.  While the designation ―wild‖ connotes something that is not 
the property of another, wild animals are generally seen as objects for human use.  Once 
captured or hunted, these animals are the property of the humans who caught them.  Even 
wild animals that are protected by statutes such as endangered species lists or other 
conservation programs are not generally protected for their own sake.  Rather, these 
statutes protect animals for the benefit of humans who enjoy observing them.  As 
property, the law denies animals any rights or privileges accorded to humans and 
therefore animals do not qualify for standing in the courts.  Animal rights and their status 
as persons are avant-garde in political debates and promises to be widely contentious in 
future debates over the entities included as persons.  
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The four entities I have chosen represent two (slaves and fetuses) are human, 
while apes are decidedly not human and corporations are unique in that they are 
organizations of humans.  All four entities raise the distinction between person and 
property.  Slaves were owned by their masters.  Corporations are owned by the 
stockholders.  Fetuses, it can be argued, are ―owned‖ by the mother who has a property 
right in her own body.  Finally, animals, including primates, are generally considered 
human property or, at the very least, objects for human use.  Thus, in choosing these four 
entities to compare and contrast, there is a fairly wide diversity that will shed light on the 
meaning of person as understood within the law.   
Although I will assess these four entities, there are other categories of beings that 
also have claims to personhood that would be interesting to study.  For instance, the law 
has deemed that a ship is a person under the law in certain circumstances even though it 
is a non-human entity and the property of the ship owner.  There is a sizeable amount of 
literature concerning denial of personhood to women in American law.
8
  The corpse 
presents an anomaly of a human being whose mental capacities and bodily functions have 
ended but whose intentions extend past the grave in the form of a legal will.  The 
physically and mentally disabled have endured a long legal and political battle to gain 
rights and immunities as persons under the law.  Yet, when mental capacity is at issue, 
their rights can be legally limited.  For those who argue that mental capacity is the 
primary criterion for granting personhood, comatose or brain dead humans no longer 
possess the status of personhood.  In the same way, it can be argued that children who are 
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not able to fully reason and make independent decisions are not fully persons.  To some 
extent, the issue of children will be addressed in the discussion of fetuses.  A recent trend 
in Hollywood is to insure and copyright one‘s own image. By doing so, the famous 
individual has asserted a property right on his own self.  This would seem to confuse the 
distinction between person and property.  Although each of these entities merits further 
discussion, they will need to wait for my next project.   
 
Methodology 
My methodology for this study will primarily consist of contrasting various 
Supreme Court cases in these four categories and applying existing theories of 
personhood to these cases.  The law of persons is not a discrete branch of law such as 
criminal law or property law but instead is an underlying concept in many fields.  In 
order to select the cases most relevant to a discussion of personhood, I will survey a 
variety of branches of the law and choose cases that explicitly discuss the meaning of 
personhood.  These cases will span the fields of criminal law, torts, property law, and 
other areas where issues of personhood are discussed.  
These cases, including the supplementary documents, such as head notes and 
briefs, will then become my data for analysis.  I will analyze the language and the 
concepts of personhood used in decisions of personhood.  I will compare the opinions, 
concurrences, and dissents to see if they are consistent within each category, consistent 
among the four categories, and consistent with the core political philosophy.  Within each 
category, I suspect that the same language and concepts are quite similar.  Among the 
four categories, I suspect that I will find more variation especially since each of these 
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categories is particular to a specific time period with its unique courts and political 
circumstances which influence legal outcomes.  The historical and political 
circumstances of each decision therefore must be considered.  However, basic constructs 
from the Constitution as well as the distinctions between persons, human beings, and 
property should be present.   
Because each entity I will be studying must be understood within its political 
context, I will need to provide some historical background for each category and some of 
the surrounding political arguments and legislation. For instance, the records of the 
debates over the Constitution and over the Fourteenth Amendment give insight to why 
the Founders chose the word ―person.‖ These arguments are necessary for understanding 
the original intent of the law as well as the ways in which the legal concept of ―person‖ 
has evolved.  In order to facilitate understanding these categories within their historical 
perspective, I will address them in the order that they were first considered within the 
judicial system.   
I will also address the political circumstances in which the personhood of each of 
these entities is debated and the influence of the political elites who either promoted 
personhood or opposed the personhood of each entity.  Politically powerful slaveholders 
were successful in blocking personhood for slaves in order to sustain the enterprise.  At 
the same time, business elites were successful in convincing lawmakers that corporations 
have a legitimate claim to personhood.  In the realm of fetal personhood, advocates for 
reproductive rights activists have campaigned against fetal personhood while opponents 
of abortion have lobbied for the fetal personhood.  The analysis of fetal personhood 
demonstrates that the political power struggles over this issue are not fully resolved.  So 
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too, the political struggles concerning personhood for animals is not settled.  Animal 
rights activists have presented cogent arguments for the personhood of great apes, and 
these arguments have had some mainstream exposure.  However, these arguments are so 
revolutionary that neither the public nor the political elite have endorsed the concept.  
These political issues are important in understanding the influences contemporary power 
politics have on the decisions justices and judges render.  
Just as the historical and political context is important, so is a review of the 
scholarship for each of these entities. I have found that each of these entities is usually 
not considered in relation to the others.  The scholarship on corporations does not 
reference fetuses or great apes, and vice versa.  Thus, each of my categories has a vast 
literature that needs to be considered in order to provide the context for Court decisions.  
I will assess the relevant scholarship for each of these categories in conjunction with the 
historical background.  The relevant scholarship for each category will be analyzed in 
conjunction with my broader analysis of the core political theory concerning personhood. 
I will analyze the four categories in historical order beginning with the issue of 
slavery and the history of American ascriptive inegalitarianism that allowed these human 
beings to be considered property rather than persons in American law.  I will analyze 
various Supreme Court and lower court decisions, as well as Constitutional debates, that 
speak to the issue of the personhood of slaves.  About the same time that freedmen were 
fighting for the rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, corporations entered 
legal battles asserting their rights as legal persons.  I will analyze corporate personality in 
light of the core theory as corporations pose interesting issues concerning distinctions 
among persons, humans, and property.  Building upon my analysis of slavery, I will also 
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attempt to discover how the legal system that systematically denied rights to newly freed 
slaves could quickly grant personhood to corporations.   
After studying slavery and corporations, I will turn to the more modern issue of 
the status of the fetus.  The core theory includes a discussion of the mental capacities a 
person needs in order to qualify as a rational agent and a person.  Fetuses do not possess 
the mental capacities to be rational agents, and yet the Supreme Court acknowledged 
their potential to become persons.  I will also examine the issue from the point of view of 
the woman whose personhood is arguably diminished when her rights over her body are 
restricted.  This modern issue will be compared to the battles over personhood faced in 
the contexts of slavery and corporations.   
 Finally, I will discuss the burgeoning field of animal rights and the possibility of 
personhood for certain animals such as great apes.  Building upon the distinction between 
persons and property illustrated in the case of slavery, animal rights activists argue that 
animals are ―enslaved.‖  Building upon the distinction between person and human being, 
great apes have the capacity of a three-year-old and thus have a claim to personhood as 
rational agents.  All the issues of personhood discussed in the core theory culminate in 
this very current issue of personhood for certain animals.   
I examine each of these four entities in turn and devote a chapter to each.  
Because the political and historical contexts are important for each of the entities, the 
analysis in each chapter is extensive.  Each chapter covers theories of personhood that are 
particular to the entity as well as the dichotomies of personhood that lend themselves to 
an understanding of personhood.  Further, the particular historical circumstances are 
reviewed in order to better understand how the concept of personhood developed and 
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evolved.  Finally, relevant political circumstances are analyzed to determine how political 
power dynamics affects determinations of personhood.  After this background analysis, I 
delve into the judicial opinions that elucidate the legal personhood of the entity.  By a 
careful scrutiny of the court documents, I determine what criteria and circumstances led 
the courts to bestow or withhold personhood for the entity.  While each chapter stands 
alone in terms of the analysis of personhood for each entity, each chapter is tied together 
through the common concepts of personhood that are developed in each.  This extensive 
analysis of each entity is necessary to fully understand how the nuanced concept of 
personhood is applied to each entity.  This allows a full comparison of the personhood 
pertaining to four entities which occurs in the final chapter.   
Each of the four case studies will build upon the others, and through assessing the 
similarities and differences in each of the four case studies, this study will provide insight 
to the meaning of ―persons.‖  After analyzing each of the four categories in turn, I will 
bring the scholarship together through a detailed analysis of the judicial documents 
utilized in the four topical chapters. I will analyze the concepts, language, ideas, and 
theories used and note similarities and differences.  In the final analysis, I will assess the 
consistencies and inconsistencies in Court cases and the understanding of legal 
personhood they convey.   
To facilitate this process, I will conduct a content analysis of the cases I have 
chosen to analyze to determine if there are certain words or phrases that are common 
among all these cases concerning personhood.
9
  My data set will consist of court 
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opinions, dissents, appellate briefs, and amici curiae briefs.  The most basic analysis will 
assess the degree to which ―person,‖ ―personhood,‖ ―human being,‖ and ―property,‖ are 
consistently used in all cases.  My content analysis will then search for dominant 
language trends across the cases.  Automated content analysis provides an unbiased 
review of the terms that reoccur among the court documents.  By using a statistical 
program to compare cases concerning slaves, corporations, fetuses, and animal rights, I 
will discover consistently used words and phrases that I might not otherwise discover 
manually.  It also reveals the frequency with which justices use certain terms across all 
four types of cases. These frequencies will help pinpoint where the law perceived 
overlapping issues of personhood.   Through careful analysis of court documents, I will 
be able to better determine if the judicial system followed the concepts in the core theory 
and if legal constructs reflect the dichotomies between person and human being or person 
and property.  I will also be in a better position to determine how the cases compare 
across all four categories and how an understanding of personhood is developed in the 
law.   
  Through a thorough analysis of judicial decisions concerning personhood 
combined with a theoretical foundation of the interdisciplinary discussions that inform 
and affect judicial and moral personhood, this study seeks a more concrete answer to the 
question, ―Who is a person and why?‖  The comparison of jurisprudence in my four 
chosen categories will bring to light various factors that have been applied consistently in 
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a definition of personhood and those that are not used consistently.  By the conclusion, a 
better understanding of the nebulous concept of ―person‖ will be achieved.   
As a first step towards this goal, we begin with a review of the relevant literature, 
from a variety of disciplines, concerning personhood that informs and influences legal 
thought. While I expect that the jurisprudence is consistent with this core political 
philosophy, I do not necessarily expect that an opinion will quote Kant or Locke.  
Instead, the basic language and concepts used in terms of rights, autonomy, and 
distinctions between persons and things that are found in the political theory provide a 
foundation for thinking about the personhood of these four diverse entities.  The 
conceptualizations of personhood that are found in the core theory are reflected in the 
law.  Thus, the core theory allows a richer understanding of a complicated philosophical 
and legal concept and provides the background needed to understand the personhood 
throughout the study.   
 
Theories of Personhood 
The literature pertaining to general personhood is vast and spans the disciplines of 
philosophy, psychology, and political science.  My goal is to review those works that 
significantly lend themselves to a legal understanding of persons and help tie together 
these disparate conceptions of personhood.  This will form the core political theory that I 
provides a foundation for understanding personhood.  It might be argued that an 
understanding of the core theory is unnecessary to understanding legal personality.  As 





  A ―legal person‖ can be understood to mean simply the ability to participate 
in legal relations.  This is the definition favored by legal positivists.  This argument is 
quite common in the literature concerning corporate personhood.  Accordingly, there is 
no difference between a corporation as a legal person and a human being as a legal 
person – both are subjects of legal relations.  With this line of logic, the law could 
determine that a human, an organization, an idol, or an ape is a person within the law.  
There is no doubt that the courts can bestow personhood on some entities and deny it to 
others – they have exercised this power many times.   
The problem with this definition of legal personhood is that it is simplistic.  It is a 
formal and abstract definition, a legal construct, designed for legal expediency.  It does 
not include any considerations of moral personhood or humanity which are entwined with 
the legal understanding of personhood.  This conception of personhood cuts the debate 
short and does not consider the vast ramifications of legal personhood on moral theory.  
Considerations beyond those of formal legalism are what make the concept of legal 
personality interesting and important.  Judicial decisions are not decided in a vacuum; 
rather, the dominant moral theories of personhood have a profound influence on judges 
and justices as they wrestle with subjects such as the beginning of life, who is eligible for 
rights and duties, and ask the fundamental question of ―For whom is the law designed?‖  
Judicial decision makers must consider more than legal technicalities when trying 
to decipher ―For whom is the law designed?‖ because the answer to this question 
involves more than just a legal answer.  Judges and justices commonly consult their own 
understanding of personhood which includes knowledge gleaned from biology, 
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philosophy, religion, sociology, political science, psychology, and any other disciplinary 
paradigm with which the judge or justice is familiar.  Judicial decision makers consult a 
wide variety of theoretical conceptions because adjudicating personhood is a weighty 
matter.  Entities that are considered to be persons in the law generally are considered to 
have moral weight.  The legal concept of personhood and the moral concept are closely 
aligned because what is said to have moral standing is generally thought to have legal 
standing and vice versa.  This is why animal rights activists argue for legal personhood 
for great apes and abortion foes argue for personhood for fetuses – it is believed that legal 
standing will allow moral standing.
 11
  Many of the theories considered in this study 
concern moral personhood and the implications on the law.  Both the moral and legal 
understanding of personhood are largely based on the idea of a person as a rational agent 
who is intrinsically valuable in his or her own right.  As justices and judges consider 
important issues involved in personhood, they consider the interdisciplinary discussions 
of personhood that are part of the core theory.  The following chapters will illustrate how 
the core theory is utilized in judicial decisions.  
 
Dichotomies of Personhood 
As I have researched the concept of person in both moral and legal literature, I 
have discovered two reoccurring themes.  First, there is a distinction between being a 
―human‖ and being a ―person.‖  Human generally refers to a biological entity that is a 
Homo sapien and has the physical attributes commonly associated with such an entity.  In 
contrast, a person generally refers to something more – an entity with an intellectual and 
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moral capacity.  For example, some philosophers argue that, while someone who is 
comatose is human, the loss of mental capacities means that this being is no longer a 
person.  This claim is highly controversial.  Other scholars claim that all human beings 
are automatically persons by virtue of their being human.  This claim is also controversial 
because it suggests that fetuses who are biologically human should automatically be 
considered persons.  In ordinary conversations and even in many policy related 
documents, the words ―person‖ and ―human‖ are used interchangeably as synonyms.  
This adds to the confusion over the meaning of these terms.  Therefore, the core theory 
will shed light on some of the nuances distinguishing humans from persons.   
The second recurring theme in the core theory is the seemingly direct opposition 
of person and property: i.e. a person by definition cannot be property.  Persons, as 
Kantian ends in themselves, cannot be owned by another person.  This argument is the 
crux of the argument condemning slavery.  In order to be free, a person cannot be 
subjected to the whims of another, and it is considered an abomination for one person to 
own another.  Thankfully, the Congress abolished slavery through the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and thus slavery is no longer recognized in the United States.  
However, the person/property distinction surfaces in other contexts as well.  In some 
sense, a person owns his body and his self.  An actress may take out an insurance policy 
on a body part, and a scientist may copyright his intellectual property.  In fact, it is argued 
that in order to fully be a person, control over and a property right in one‘s own body is 
required.  Thus, although person and property are in one sense diametrically opposed, in 
other ways, they are intricately linked.  The core theory will illuminate this paradox in 
order to inform an understanding of this dichotomy in the law.   
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The dichotomies of personhood, person versus human being and person versus 
property, are best demonstrated in the works of John Locke and Immanuel Kant whose 
influential philosophies of personhood form the basis of the core political theory on 
which many later theorists base their work on personhood.  For Locke, a person is a 
mental entity who is self aware or conscious of his actions and has a memory of the past.  
Locke defines a person as a ―thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it 
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, as it seems to 
me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he 
does perceive.‖
12
  Locke stresses the distinction between a person and man (or in modern 
terms ―human‖).  He distinguishes a person from a human whom he categorizes with 
animals in the sphere of living things.  A human is a living entity of a particular shape.  In 
contrast, only reflective, thinking agents can rightly be called persons.   
Locke stresses the importance of the mind over the body.  The body is a substance 
and is important as a vessel that houses the person, but the body is not the essence of 
personhood.  Locke argues that a person has a property in his body and limbs so that what 
is produced by the labor of his body is rightly his.  The context in which Locke discusses 
personhood is his concern for the Last Judgment Day when God will hold all persons 
accountable for their sins.  In this regard, Locke argues that it is just that persons be held 
accountable only for actions that they remember, because if a person is not conscious of 
past actions, it is not fair to blame him.  By separating man or the physical self from 
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person or the mental self, it is possible for a person to have a different body at 
resurrection and still be the same person.  
Locke‘s discussion of persons seems incoherent unless it is interpreted within his 
overall discussion of the Last Judgment.  Indeed, Locke himself states that the term 
―person‖ is a forensic term.  Numerous scholars have pointed out the many 
inconsistencies in his argument.  Despite this, his theories have inspired entire paradigms 
focusing on the meaning of personhood.  Many contemporary scholars have their basis in 
Locke‘s theories of psychological continuity, the criteria of self-awareness or second 
order volitions, and consciousness.    
Like Locke, Kant‘s definition of persons relies upon mental capacity.  For Kant, 
persons are rational agents, and the capacity to reason bestows an absolute value to 
human persons.  ―Only rational agents or persons can be ends in themselves.  As they 
alone can have an unconditioned absolute value, it is wrong to use them simply as means 
to an end whose value is only relative.‖
13
  Thus, every person must be treated as an ―end 
in itself‖ rather than an instrument in someone else‘s plans.  Because a person cannot be a 
means, and property is a means to fulfilling ends, Kant reasons that a person cannot be 
property.  ―A person cannot be property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned for 
it is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the property.‖
14
  At the 
foundation of being a person is the ability to own property.  To say that a person could 
own another person contradicts this basic principle.  Kant‘s arguments against 
commodification of persons are the basis for subsequent arguments that persons and 
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property are categorically exclusive of each other.  To be a person is specifically not to be 
property; one concept negatively defines the other.   
 Locke and Kant set the groundwork for much of the scholarship concerning 
personhood in philosophy, psychology, and political science.  Their concepts center on 
individual autonomy and mental criteria of consciousness, self-identity, and rationality 
needed for entities to be considered persons.  In contrast to scholars who equate persons 
with physical human beings, their constructions rely on mental capacity rather than 
human bodies.  They argue that persons are the opposite of things: Locke contrasting 
persons with substances, and Kant contrasting persons with property.   
 
Human Beings versus Persons 
The seeds of Locke‘s and Kant‘s philosophies are found in most contemporary 
theories of personhood that concern the distinction between human beings and persons.  
The predominant paradigms of personhood in philosophy, psychology, political science, 
and law retain the individual as the primary actor and stress the importance of rationality 
and autonomy as criteria for persons.  One of the legacies of Locke is his emphasis on the 
importance of the individual.  America‘s foundation of ―liberal individualism‖ can 
largely be attributed to Locke‘s scholarship.  America‘s liberal traditions and their 
influence on American jurisprudence will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.   
However, it is important to note that some early scholars disagreed with the 
importance placed on rationality and individualism.  Perhaps the most influential were 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill whose philosophies of Utilitarianism relied upon 
sentience rather than rationality and the good of the group rather than the individual.  For 
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Utilitarianism, the happiness of a mentally incompetent is as valuable as the most rational 
individual.  Further, Bentham minimized the distinction between the importance of an 
animal and a person.  He wrote, ―The day may come when the rest of the animal creation 
may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the 
hand of tyranny…. The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can 
they suffer?‖
15
  This argument has been foundational for contemporaries who argue for 
increased legal rights for animals.   
In the late 1800s to early 1900s as issues of corporate personality began to 
flourish, many theorists made a distinction between natural and artificial persons.  For 
instance, the legal theorist Bouvier, writing in 1880, argued that a natural person was a 
man who held a certain rank in society in respect to the rights to which he was entitled 
and the duties these rights imposed.  A slave, who was not subject to rights and duties, 
was not a person.  Likewise, he questioned the status of an illegitimate child or an infant.  
An artificial person was a body of men that the law associates as one and thus confers 
certain rights and duties to this ―artificial person.‖
16
  A unique political and legal theory 
developed in respect to artificial persons and will be covered in great detail in Chapter 
Three‘s treatment of corporate persons.  
Many modern theorists have built upon the scholarship of Locke and Kant to 
construct their own theories of personhood based on rational criteria.  One of the most 
useful theories is that of Daniel Dennett, a noted philosopher of science, biology, and the 
mind.  Following in the footsteps of Locke, Dennett creates a definition of personhood 
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stemming from six criteria that he argues are necessary in a person who is a thinking, 
rational being.  Dennett‘s six conditions of personhood, based on mental capacities, are 
frequently cited by other scholars as criteria for personhood.  His conditions include 1) 
persons are rational beings, 2) they are conscious, 3) they are considered persons by 
others, 4) they can reciprocate, 5) they have the capacity for verbal communication, and 
6) they are self-consciousness or self-aware.
17
  Dennett‘s argument pertains primarily to 
human beings, but in actuality, apes have shown to possess all but condition four.  
According to these criteria, the mentally handicapped, comatose, fetuses, and children 
under the age of two would not be considered persons.   
 Fellow philosopher of the mind, Harry Frankfurt, relying on Kantian ideas of self 
awareness, argues that what sets persons apart from other humans and animals is the 
capacity to be self reflective and evaluate first order desires.  A conscious person is able 
to assess her desires and form preferences about her desires or second-order volitions.  
He argues that humans have the unique ability to do this, and thus all other animals are 
precluded from personhood.  He also argues that humans who do not have the mental 
capacity for second-order volitions, including the very young or the mentally 
incapacitated, do not qualify for personhood.  This would rule out fetuses, but leaves 
open the question of corporations whose rationality is in the form of the collective.
18
 
 Self-awareness and the ability to evaluate one‘s actions and motivations allow 
persons to be the subjects of blame and innocence.  This brings a moral component to 
personhood.  Locke argues that only those who remember their actions can justly be held 
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accountable.  This prompted scholarship concerning the status of humans with total 
amnesia or future scenarios when it may be possible to perform brain transplants.  Claims 
of culpability for persons are important for legal scholarship as moral persons, who are 
subjects of blame and innocence, are also the subjects or rights and duties.  As Locke 
stated, ―person‖ is largely a forensic term.  Philosopher S. F. Sapontzis employs this 
theory to argue that legal persons must be human, moral subjects.
19
  However, other legal 
scholars such as Bryant Smith disagree arguing that any subject that can take part in legal 
relations qualifies as a legal person even if not a natural person.
20
   
Smith‘s conception would seemingly include corporations but also raises the 
question of who should be punished when a corporation is found guilty of a crime.  Who 
is to blame for corporate crime – the board of directors, the employees, the shareholders?  
And, is the subject of blame the same entity who ultimately is punished for crimes?  This 
is one of the most important concerns when considering corporations as persons.  
Sapontzis argues that only humans can be considered persons.  Indeed, it seems strange to 
blame a lion who attacks and eats a human.  If some animals such as great apes are 
serious contenders for personhood, must they be subjects of moral and legal culpability?  
To what extent are advanced animals capable of being held accountable for their actions?  
Some of the most interesting legal personhood issues in terms of culpability arose with 
slavery.  Slaves were denied all human and political rights because they were not 
considered persons and thus were not subjects of rights.  However, when a crime was 
committed, the courts had to decide if an entity that was not a subject of rights could still 
be the subject of blame.  The courts did not reach a consensus on this issue but instead 
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waffled by sometimes holding the slave owner accountable and sometimes punishing the 
slave.    
Another theory of personhood that relies on human rationality is the argument that 
persons are those who have the ability to plan, pursue their own projects, and have social 
relationships with other persons.  Libertarian theorist Loren Lomasky uses these criteria 
to differentiate humans from persons. He finds that small children who are not yet project 
pursuers do not qualify as persons.  However, he contends that these potential project 
pursuers as well as those on the other side of the developmental spectrum who are no 
longer project pursuers such as the Alzheimer‘s patients, still have moral weight.  
Injuring an infant is harmful to the extent that it diminishes its eventual success as a 
project pursuer.  Lomasky is not so certain in assessing the moral status of fetuses, the 
comatose, severely retarded persons, and animals.
21
  Lomasky‘s arguments concerning 
potential project pursuers echo the Supreme Court‘s dilemma over the status of potential 
persons in Roe v. Wade and other cases relating to abortion.  
Individuals of a certain mental capacity have the ability to enter into social 
relationships with fellow mentally competent individuals.  As a collective, they form a 
society of persons.  Dennett‘s fourth condition is that persons can reciprocate, and his 
third condition is that persons are accepted by other persons into the community of 
persons.  Indeed, the ability to engage socially and be accepted as a part of the group is 
one of the most important benchmarks of persons.  Acceptability into the community of 
persons plays a vital role in determining the personhood of all four entities in this study.  
Political scientist Rogers Smith avers that the importance of the social community played 
a large role in condoning slavery.  For instance, Federalist #2 uses ascriptive conceptions 
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of American identity – the myth of divinely favored people – to argue that Americans 
formed one united people from the same ancestors, with the same religion, and with 
similar customs. This conception excluded Blacks, Indians, and all groups that were 
considered ―other.‖  White citizens considered their exclusive group to form a 
―peoplehood‘ and this led many Americans to claim that they were a superior culture and 
a ―master race.‖  It was easier to ignore the atrocities of slavery because Blacks were not 
included the community of persons.  Corporations had a large lobby of prominent 
business people who convinced lawmakers that corporations should be included in the 
legal conception of personhood.  Some abortion proponents argue women who do not 
wish to carry their fetus to term do not have a social relationship with their fetus.  Thus, 
the fetus does not fulfill the social relationship criterion and does not qualify as a 
person.
22
  Environmental ethicist Peter Wenz, relying on the criteria of social 
relationships, argued that animals are obviously capable of forming bonds with humans 
and other animals and thus satisfy this criterion for personhood.
23
   
Scholars following in the tradition of Locke and Kant tend to treat personhood as 
a condition based upon various criteria that must be met: rationality, ability to 
communicate, social acceptance, and so on.  With this approach, the problem is defining 
the criteria.  What exactly qualifies as a rational agent and what constitutes self-
awareness?  Who is in the position to decide the members of the ―peoplehood‖ or 
community of persons?  Philosopher David DeGrazia maintains that personhood is a 
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―cluster concept‖ which consists of complex capacities, but the precise definitions and 
necessary degrees of capability are unclear.  Thus, personhood remains imprecise and 
difficult to analyze.
24
  Further, by analyzing personhood through an atomistic list of parts, 
it easy to lose sight of personhood itself.  For instance, we do not evaluate a work of art 
by the parts such as the paint, frame, canvas, etcetera without losing the immediacy of 
―art.‖  So too with personhood.  By analyzing a list of criteria, we may lose sight of what 
a person is in and of itself.  When making the jump from an academic exercise to legal 
jurisprudence and then to human vernacular, the various criteria tend to lose their 
significance.  While someone may agree wholeheartedly with Dennett‘s list, when faced 
with issues in life‘s context, his or her opinion may change.  For instance, a study of 
college students found that a majority believed a clinically brain-dead individual to exist 
as a person.  An ape‘s cognitive abilities are marvelous, but to consider personhood for 
these animals is a leap that many citizens cannot make.   
 
Property versus Persons 
 The preceding scholarship concerning the criteria for personhood primarily 
distinguishes persons from human beings.  Another paradigm, following Kant‘s idea that 
persons must never be a means to an end, distinguishes persons from property.  Each of 
the four categories of persons I consider is caught up in the distinction between person 
and property.  Slaves were the property of their masters, yet as rational human beings, 
they were also persons.  The law‘s treatment of slavery ultimately concerns how to 
reconcile these competing claims.  Corporations, as persons, may own things such as 
                                                 
24 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996]. 
40 
 
goods, equipment, stock, and even other corporations.  At the same time, human beings 
own the corporation; it is a commodity on the stock market as humans buy and sell shares 
of it.  Thus, the corporation is neither person nor thing, but legally endowed as both.  
Japanese economist Katsuhito Iwai argues that this dual role is really the heart of the 
controversy over the status of corporations and why the debate over corporate essence 
remains unresolved.
25
  Fetuses are human beings and yet are not considered persons by 
the law.  One of the arguments in support of abortion is that a woman has a property right 
to her own body and, as a part of her body, she also has a property right to her fetus.  This 
right allows her to choose abortion.  However, if the fetus as a potential person is allowed 
some protection, this might outweigh any property rights of the mother.  Finally, with 
few exceptions, the law considers animals as property. For the majority of the world‘s 
human population, it is acceptable to hunt and eat animals.  Thus, animals are seen as a 
means to an end rather than ends in themselves.  It is contrary to common understanding 
to consider animals, despite their mental capabilities, as anything more than this.   
 Much of the literature analyzing what it means to be a person considers the 
concept of property either in opposition to personhood or considers the right of 
ownership as an essential aspect of personhood.  Therefore, property and personhood are 
often bound together in the literature.  However, there is a school of thought arguing that 
property and personhood need not be linked.  In the early 1900s, legal positivists began to 
assert that property is not instrumental for self-determination within the law.  Legal 
scholar Wesley Hohfeld popularized the notion that property was nothing more than a 
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bundle of legal rights and obligations between persons.
26
  Thus, property‘s moral or need-
based attachments were irrelevant to the law.  Legal positivism receives greater treatment 
in Chapter Three‘s section on corporate personality.  Despite the arguments of legal 
positivists, the idea that property is simply a bundle of legal rights under the law is not so 
simple.  The following theorists demonstrate that considerations of the self are often 
bound to the property one has.  Further, traditional theorists such Kant negatively define 
personhood as that which is not property.  The understanding of person and property is 
complex and requires careful consideration beyond the school of legal positivism.  
 Just as the literature analyzing the difference between person and human had its 
basis in the works of Kant and Locke, the body of literature analyzing the separation of 
person and property also has its basis Kant and Locke.  In arguing that a person can never 
be a means to an end, Kant argues that a person cannot be considered property because 
property is something that is used as a means to an end.  Thus, slavery is unacceptable.  
While Kant‘s argument that a person cannot own another person is now almost 
universally accepted, the remaining question is whether a person has a property interest in 
himself.  Does a person‘s interest in his body or his thoughts amount to a proprietary 
interest in himself?  Kant argued that a person does not have a property interest in himself 
because property is a thing and a person cannot be a thing.  Kant writes, ―Man cannot 
dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property; to say that he 
is would be self-contradictory; for in so far as he is a person he is a subject in whom the 
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ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own property, he would be a thing 
over which he could have ownership.‖
27
 
 Locke, on the other hand, explicitly argues that we own ourselves.  ―Though the 
Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in 
his own Person.  This no body has any Right to but himself.  The Labor of his Body, and 
the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.‖
28
  Hence, while Locke would agree 
that slavery is wrong because this allows a person to own another person, Locke‘s 
interpretation leaves room for a person to claim a proprietary interest in his intellectual 
capabilities and apply for patents on his ideas, a celebrity to insure her body against 
harm, or a mother to claim that a fetus, as part of her body, is her property.   
 Locke emphasizes the importance of property rights throughout his many 
philosophical treatises and thus his interpretation of a person‘s rights to her own body as 
a property right is not surprising.  Locke had a great influence on American political 
culture and law.  American political scientist Louis Hartz contends that much of 
America‘s political foundation of liberal individualism has its basis in Locke‘s 
philosophy.
29
  Locke‘s emphasis on property rights is reflected in the Federalist papers, 
which repeatedly defend the need for a solid government to protect economic and 
proprietary interests.  Indeed, Federalist #54 states, ―Government is instituted no less for 
protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals.‖  America‘s foundation and 
subsequent political and legal history developed and matured in a society where 
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economic values were ubiquitous.  The ―American Dream‖ was and is rooted in 
economic achievements.  People define themselves and relate to each other in terms of 
property and wealth.  It is not surprising therefore, that the concept of property is 
intimately related to the meaning of the word ―person.‖  
Legal theorists Davies and Naffine point out the paradox in modern liberalism.  
While the immediate distinction between persons and property is that to be a person is 
precisely not to be reduced to the property of another, yet many liberal thinks have 
pointed out that a person owns himself which necessitates a view of the person as one‘s 
own property.  ―To be a person is to be a proprietor and also to be property – the property 
of oneself.‖
30
  Despite this apparent paradox, the person as a self-owning individual is 
deeply ingrained in Western political culture.  Davies and Naffine argue, ―The claim of 
property in oneself is an assertion of self-possession and self-control, of a fundamental 
right to exclude others from one‘s very being.  It is a means of individuating the person, 
of establishing a limit between the one and the other: between thine and mine; between 
you and me.‖
31
  However deeply ingrained, the review of law and politics undertaken in 
this study will show the extension of this principle beyond white men or to those whose 
personhood is questioned has been reluctant at best.   
 While American political society‘s foundations are based in liberal individualism, 
an assessment of the relationship between person and property would be remiss without 
mentioning Karl Marx.  Like liberal thinkers, Marx saw the world as socially constructed 
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in economic terms.  However, for Marx, this economic foundation for the world leads to 
the tyranny of capitalism rather than the prosperity of the free market.  Economic activity, 
in Marx‘s view, transforms persons into social beings because it requires social 
cooperation and creative energy.  A person laboring to achieve his own projects allows a 
person to express his humanity and gain dignity as a member of society.  In this sense, 
the work of a person‘s labor rather than his rationality is instrumental to his self-identity 
as a person.  However, private property alienates a person from himself and the social 
world because it commodifies labor and thus violates the creative process.  By forcing 
people to work for a wage in uncreative and thus meaningless employments, labor loses 
its value as a self-constructing activity.  Marx‘s solution of the abolition of property 
allows people to return to labor as purposive and social activity and restores the humanity 
of the individual.   
 Marx‘s theories did not revolutionize American liberal individualism.  Instead, 
Locke‘s theories of the importance of private property have maintained their foundations 
in American thought while Marx‘s work serves as a framework for critiquing the 
dominant paradigm.  American political culture has retained the idea that private property 
is essential for personal sovereignty.  The person, as an individually self-determining 
entity, has the right to private property as a way define herself, shape her destiny, and 
engage in public life.  Property, as semantically derived as being properly or belonging to 
a particular person, allows a person to distinguish himself from others while giving him a 
means to relate to others in a social and political context.  Private property forms a 
boundary against interference from the state and other people and in this respect is 
essential for human freedom.   
45 
 
 Political philosopher Robert Nozick brings Kant and Locke together in his 
Entitlement Theory.  Nozick agrees with Kant that people must be treated as ―ends in 
themselves‖ because people are unique entities that have the ability to rationally make 
decisions about their futures.  Thus, persons differ from commodities or animals that do 
not have this ability and therefore can be treated as ends.  Nozick argues that treating 
persons as ends is equivalent to saying that a person owns himself.  Self-ownership 
requires that neither the state nor another person may use a human being without his 
consent.
32
   
 Clearly the importance of property for individual sovereignty has greatly 
influenced Western political institutions.  English scholar of the law William Blackstone 
defined property as ―the sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the word, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual 
in the universe.‖
33
  Blackstone‘s definition reflects the importance of property in defining 
persons as distinct and self-determining individuals.  
 Margaret Radin, a contemporary legal scholar specializing in property law, argues 
that property in things other than oneself is essential to personhood.  She calls this 
―property for personhood.‖  She writes, ―The premise underlying the personhood 
perspective is that to achieve proper self-development – to be a person – an individual 
needs come control over resources in the external environment.  The necessary 
assurances of control take the form of property rights.‖
34
  Radin‘s theory is based on an 
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interpretation of Hegel who said that a person only realizes her true self by asserting 
herself in the external world through the public and social property relationship.  Radin 
argues that in order to achieve self-development and truly be a person, an individual 
needs a modicum of control over the things in her external environment.  Property for 
personhood is that which a person uses for her self-development and self-identity.  
Examples of such property are wedding rings, a home, or a portrait – things that are so 
bound up with a person that they seem a part of the person.  Radin sees the body as the 
quintessential personal property because it literally constitutes personhood.  This allows a 
property theory for the tort of assault or battery.  However, she is hesitant to grant too 
much latitude for the body as property because she recognizes that certain boundaries 
between the person and thing should not be crossed.  For example, she disapproves of 
surrogacy, the sex trade, the sale of newborns, and the sale of body parts as an 
inappropriate commodification that threatens the very meaning of the person as separate 
from a thing.  
 The social implications of commodification are currently a contested political 
issue.  Commodification, which reduces a person to a thing, allows the market to decide 
the meaning of personhood.  Whoever controls the terms of the sale is able to determine 
what objects, and in this case which persons, are available for sale.  Generally, those who 
are commodified are the subordinated class of the poor and marginalized.  Those who 
control the terms of commodification secure their position as the political elite.  Markets 
create and reinforce social relations.  Davies and Naffine point out that humans have been 
denied personhood and objectified based on race, gender, and class. They argue that if 
personhood is enhanced by the ownership of external things, those who own more will 
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have an enhanced personality.  The wealthy will have more personality while the poor are 
valued less as persons.   
 The commodification of persons as objects is relevant for an understanding of the 
law‘s treatment of persons because contested domains of property versus personhood 
have become quite common.  Several cases concerning surrogacy have hinged upon 
whether the woman who bears the child or the man and woman who supplied the sperm 
and egg have an ―ownership‖ right over the child.
35
  The Supreme Court of California has 
heard many cases concerning whether the use of a celebrity‘s image without permission 
is a violation of the person‘s property right in his or her own self.
36
  While the sale of 
plasma is condoned, the sale of other body parts, such as blood, is illegal with few 
exceptions.   
 Among the most cited cases concerning the property of one‘s own person is 
Moore v Regents of the University of California 793 P 2d 479 (Cal 1990).  John Moore 
was treated for hairy cell leukemia at the Medical Center of the University of California.  
While undergoing treatment, Moore provided extensive amounts of blood, bone marrow 
aspirate, and other bodily substances.  At the recommendation of his physician, David 
Golde, Moore had his spleen removed and made several follow up visits to the Medical 
Center where additional blood, skin, and other bodily fluids were taken.  While Moore 
was undergoing treatment, Golde was actively using Moore‘s body parts for research. 
Golde knew that Moore‘s particular blood products had great scientific and commercial 
value.  Without Moore‘s knowledge or consent to Golde‘s research, Golde established a 
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cell line from Moore‘s T-lymphocytes and regents from the University of California 
applied for a patent on this cell line listing Golde and his research partner Quan as the 
inventors.  Golde and the regents then negotiated a commercial agreement with Genetics 
Institute for exclusive access to the cell line in return for monetary and stock 
compensation.  When Moore learned of Golde‘s use of his tissues, he brought suit 
claiming a lack of informed consent and conversion.  The court found that Moore did 
have a fiduciary claim, but his request for conversion was denied because the court found 
that Moore did not have a property right to his discarded cells nor to any profits from 
them.  Once Moore consented to the medical procedure he lost any rights of self-
ownership.    
  The concepts of person and property are very much intertwined.  As Radin 
argues, persons relate to the world through owning things and thus property is essential 
for persons. As the Moore case illustrates, modern conceptions of property confuse the 
distinction between person and property.  Borderline cases such as disputes over a 
person‘s genetic code, body parts, and image are difficult to adjudicate using a strict 
delineation between person and property.  The distinction between person and human is 
also complex.  Children, fetuses, humans with mental disabilities, and animals are in an 
ambiguous position of having certain rights and immunities but are still subject to the 
legal control of others.  Slaves, despite being undeniably human beings with verifiable 
mental capacities, were categorized as property while corporations, who are not human 
beings but simply collectives owned by humans, are deemed persons with many rights 
including the right to own property.   
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 As can be seen, the concepts of personhood and property are highly intertwined as 
are the concepts of persons and human beings.  The dichotomies between person and 
property as well as between person and human being add structure to a study of how 
judicial decision makers interpret ―person‖ and ―personhood.‖  A quick glance over some 
of the most important judicial decision of personhood can give the impression that judges 
and justices are haphazardly using terms and defining personhood with little awareness of 
other judicial decisions involving the same issues of personhood.  The underlying 
concepts of personhood are not completely clear until one steps back and reflects on these 
decisions in light of the core theory of personhood which helps structure and organize the 
concept of personhood across a variety of judicial decisions.  The core theory combined 
with a rigorous study of how the law has defined personhood in actual practice in four 
unique entities provides a more comprehensive understanding of personhood in the law 
and in common practice.  My research detailing the law‘s interpretation of personhood 
for slaves, corporations, fetuses, and apes will reveal both consistencies and 
inconsistencies in the law‘s interpretation of personhood and will highlight the nuanced 
meanings of ―person‖ in the law.   
 The following chapter provides an in-depth study of the personhood of slaves 
beginning with a review of the most influential literature pertaining to the personhood of 
slaves followed by an analysis of the factors which caused judges and justices to 
ultimately deny the personhood of the slave.  Chapter Three discusses corporate 
personhood including the theories under which the corporation could qualify as a person 
and the judicial cases that ultimately granted corporate personhood.  Chapter Four 
investigates the criteria by which a fetus might qualify for personhood as well as the 
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criteria that would exclude fetal personhood.  This leads to a discussion of the law‘s 
effort to adjudicate this politically difficult issue.  Chapter Five concerns personhood for 
animals with a focus on great apes to analyze whether there are any circumstances under 
which a non-human might claim personhood.  Chapter Six compares and contrasts the 
personhood of each of the four entities in order to reveal both consistencies and 
inconsistencies in the legal bestowal of personhood.  The chapter will bring to light the 




We the “Other” People:  
Reconciling the Slave’s Status as both Person and Property 
 
The Federal Constitution ... decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it 
views them in the mixt character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true 
character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live. 
— ―Publius‖ [James Madison], Federalist No. 54  
 
 
 This quote from Madison accurately describes the legal status of the African slave 
until the Thirteenth Amendment.  The issue of slavery is perhaps the most important 
example of the conflict between person and property.  As rational, moral, decision-
making agents, slaves qualify for personhood according to the criteria of person listed by 
most theorists.  Slavery, which subjects one person to the complete domination of 
another, violates Kant‘s imperative that a person cannot be used as an end.  According to 
Kant, persons are beings whose interests cannot be sacrificed for someone else‘s ends and 
are distinguished from property which is simply a tool.  Therefore, Kant argues that 
slavery violates the basic maxims of a just and moral society.  However, in the American 
chattel slave system, the slave was a human being who was indisputably property.  In 
order to confirm the slave‘s status as property, the slave was denied personhood.  Thus, 
there was an irreconcilable conflict between the slave‘s status as both person and 
property.  
Slavery also represents the conflict between human beings and persons.  Slaves 
were irrefutably human beings yet they were denied personhood.  An entire ―science‖ 
tried to prove that blacks were inferior intellectual beings and thus were not worthy as 
rational, self-aware entities deserving personhood.  Further, through a process of social 
alienation, slaves were denied admittance to the political community of persons, which 
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made denying slaves‘ personhood easier to accept.  Thankfully, slavery was abolished, 
and in many respects, this is a dead issue.  However, the aftershocks of denying 
personhood to racial minorities were felt long after the Civil War in the many debates 
over citizenship, and can still be felt today with the many legitimate claims of racial 
discrimination.   
 This chapter will consider the history of American chattel slavery and the debate 
over the personhood of slaves from its British roots to the writing of the Constitution, the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and finally through the case law 
produced at both the state and national level that solidified the slave as human property.  
The dichotomy between person and property is clearly seen as slave owners used every 
conceivable method to preserve the property status of their human slaves.  The system of 
slavery completely excluded the slave from the social system and polis.  Slaves were not 
part of the ―We the People‖ for whom the American Nation was founded and who had 
rights and privileges.  In most court cases, the courts consistently held that a slave was 
property and completely denied personhood to slaves.  The slave could be sold, traded, 
and abused just like any other sentient property such as horses or mules.  However, even 
those who supported slavery could not deny the humanity of the slave.  The slave was a 
rational being and met the cognitive requirements of personhood.  A systematic 
examination of case law reveals that the courts did recognize this in certain situations 
such as when a slave was accused of a crime or negligence.  In these circumstances, the 
court did not hesitate to recognize the rationality of the slave and considered the slave a 
person.   
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 The legal status of slaves as persons was largely formed through the judicial 
branch of government as courts tried to fit slaves into a system that did not readily 
accommodate entities that were neither wholly person nor thing.  Within this system, a 
slave was considered simply a good available for trade.  However, because slaves were 
human and possessed the abilities to reason and express sentiment, as a commodity they 
posed special problems.  The Southern slave system was based primarily on social 
relations where the master had total control of the slave including religious and family 
life.  Further, deeply engrained feelings of racism dictated that blacks be reduced to the 
lowest of all social standings.  Thus, the Southern courts had to accommodate both the 
economic and social systems when creating a system of slave law.  The economic 
interests of slaves as property and the sentiments of racism provided the two most 
important controlling factors as the judicial system struggled to create a legal place for 
slaves as human objects.  In order to appreciate the difficulties faced within the judicial 
system in deciphering the person and property aspects of the slave, it is helpful to review 
some of the political theories of personhood and slavery.   
 
Political Theories of Slavery 
 As Chapter One illustrated, personhood is often defined in contrast to a human 
being and to property.  Although slaves were human, they were not granted full 
personhood.  By the same token, even though slaves were human, they were still 
considered property rather than persons.  A review of some of the prominent political 
theories concerning slavery sheds light on these dichotomies.    
 Aristotle, one of the most important Western philosophers to influence modern 
democracy, incorporated both the dichotomies in his theory of natural slavery.  Aristotle 
54 
 
argued that some humans are slaves by nature because they lack the rational abilities to 
engage in virtuous activity or philosophical contemplation which are necessary activities 
for eudemonia.  In Aristotle‘s words, ―the slave is entirely without the faculty of 
reason.‖
37
  Because a slave suffered from a deficiency in the reasoning part of his soul 
which rendered him incapable of autonomy and independence, Aristotle relegated the 
slave to the lowest rung on the social ladder above only non-human animals.  Because the 
slave did not have full cognitive and rational capabilities, the slave was human but did 
not qualify for personhood. 
 According to Aristotle, a slave‘s best hope in life was to fulfill his potential under 
a master who would protect him and harness his capacities for household service.  In 
Politics, Aristotle wrote, ―One who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself 
but to another is by nature a slave; and a person is a human being belonging to another if 
being a man he is an article of property, and an article of property is an instrument for 
action separable from its owner.‖
38
  Therefore, the slave‘s inability to reason justified 
treating the slave as property rather than a person.  Aristotle provided a foundation that 
allowed the master to completely strip the slave of his personhood and instead hold the 
slave as property.  He justified the complete control of the master and the absolute 
degradation of the slave. 
In contrast to Aristotle, John Locke believed in political equality and in most of 
his writing, he was opposed to the idea that a person could be enslaved to another.  Locke 
believed that slavery was contrary to nature and was an extended state of war pitting the 
                                                 
37
 Aristotle, Politics, Translated by Benjamin Jowett , [340 BCE]: Book I, available from 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.7.seven.html, accessed February 27, 2010.   
38




conqueror against the conquered.  In his First Treatise, he opens with the sentence 
―Slavery is such a vile and miserable estate of man, and so directly opposite to the 
generous temper and courage of our nation; that 'tis hardly to be conceived, that an 
Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for't.‖
39
  However, in his Second 
Treatise, Locke returns to the subject of slavery providing justification for slavery in a 
just war.
40
  He helped write a colonial document called the Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina which had several clauses condoning slavery.  Locke was also involved in the 
African slave trade and profited from the Royal African Company as a stockholder.  
Therefore, there lies a fundamental contradiction in Locke‘s personal ideology.  How 
could the architect of natural rights based liberty and individualism be involved in the 
slave trade?  Many scholars have written about this contradiction in Locke‘s writing.
41
 
 Enlightenment philosopher Richard Popkin explained that in Locke‘s reasoning, 
everyone was created equal and endowed with the natural rights of life, liberty and 
property.  However, Africans (and American Indians) were not properly mixing their 
labor with the land and not creating property which turned their land into wasteland.  The 
Europeans conquered them in a just war and rightly enslaved any resistors.  Locke 
attributes the personal failings of Africans to a lower level of rationality.
42
  Lockean 
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scholar Martin Seliger agrees that Locke justified American slavery by characterizing it 
as an acceptable punishment in a just war.  However, Seliger qualifies this by stating that 
Locke did not believe that prisoners taken in European wars should become slaves.  
Seliger argues that it is implied in Locke‘s writing that only a certain part of mankind is 
acceptable for human slavery.
43
  While neither Popkin nor Seliger accuse Locke of 
racism or blatant hypocrisy, Leon Poliakov argues that Locke did believe in white 
superiority and the prejudices that were common in European society during his lifetime.  
Locke was part of a society that saw Africans as naturally inferior, and Locke likely 
harbored some of these beliefs while still arguing for natural rights and freedoms.
44
   
 The reality is that Locke‘s views on slavery are contradictory.  He was a 
champion of rights and freedoms which influenced the Founding Fathers as they created 
American‘s foundation of democracy and liberalism.  At the same time, Locke was a 
participant in the ―vile and miserable estate‖ of slavery.  This contradiction is witnessed 
again when examining the views of American‘s Founders.  Beyond this contradictory 
evidence, Locke‘s theories of rationality were influential in determining the status of 
human slaves.  Like Aristotle, Locke adhered to the importance of rationality in 
distinguishing persons from other beings.  According to Locke, what sets persons apart 
from mere human beings is cognitive capability.  Locke‘s requirement for personhood is 
―an intelligent being that has reason and reflection.‖
45
  Locke established psychological 
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or cognitive criteria for personhood, and this paradigm has been followed by many more 
scholars within the psychological tradition such as Daniel Dennett, Harry Frankfurt, and 
G.E. Scott whose theories are reviewed in Chapter One.   
Slaves certainly were human beings with the capacity for reason and reflection 
under Locke‘s criteria of rational and cognitive capacities.  Slaves also satisfied 
Dennett‘s conditions of personhood that develop Locke‘s concept – persons are rational 
beings, are conscious, can reciprocate, and are capable of verbal communication.
46
  
Enslaved Africans in the American system of slavery were unquestionably persons in this 
regard despite any attempts by southern slaveholders to deny the mental capabilities of 
the African slaves.  And there were pseudo-scientific attempts to deny rationality to 
African Americans.  
 In the Nineteenth
 
Century, a scientific debate arose around the concept of 
polygenism that held that there were various lineages of the human race.  Some 
anthropologists used this concept to develop a scientific racism.  They argued that 
polygenism created a hierarchy in the ―Great Chain of Beings,‖ and Africans were 
located between white men and primates due to inferior mental capabilities.  Samuel 
George Morton, the founder of this field, analyzed skulls, cranial capacity, and brain size 
to determine that the ―Ethiopian‖ was inferior to the Caucasian.
47
  Morton‘s followers 
continued this work.  The United States Sanitary Commission during the Civil War 
conducted autopsies based on whites, blacks, mulattos, and American Indians.  Their 
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findings showed that blacks had physical statures closer to anthropoids with smaller brain 
weights and weaker physical abilities.  Morton attempted to prove that Africans were 
biologically inferior in rational capabilities which justified denying their personhood. 
 This school of anthropologists did not deny that the African was a human being.  
Rather, they argued that Africans were a different type of human belonging to the same 
genus but belonging to a different species or subspecies.  Samuel Cartwright, a prominent 
Louisiana physician explained,  
It is not intended by the use of the term Prognathous to call in question the black man‘s 
humanity or the unity of the human races as a genus, but to prove that the species of 
genus homo are not a unity, but a plurality, each essentially different from the others – 
one of them being so unlike the other two – the oval headed Caucasian and the pyramidal 
headed Mongolian – as to be actually Prognathous, like the brute creation; not that the 
negro is a brute, or half-man and half brute, but a genuine human being, anatomically 
constructed, about the head and face, more like the monkey tribes and lower order of 




At the time, the scientific rigor of work these anthropologists in Morton‘s school was 
universally acclaimed which testifies to the fact that while the humanity of the slave was 
not necessarily in question, as a different type of human, many people of the antebellum 
period, both scholars and citizens alike, were able to deny personhood on a scientific 
basis to a group of humans that did not qualify as persons.  
 Modern science proved these race-based theories were nonsense.  However, 
Morton‘s work illustrates the fervor to deny slaves personhood and distinguish slaves as a 
separate category of beings.  Dennett‘s third condition of personhood states, ―Whether 
something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a 
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stance adopted with respect to it.‖
49
  Epistemologist Jay Rosenberg agrees with Dennett‘s 
third condition arguing that personhood is a bestowed status.  He writes, ―The existence 
of persons will be a matter of the existence of a community of beings who regard 
themselves and each other as persons.‖
50
  Rosenberg contends that the crux of 
personhood is the recognition and acknowledgement by others in the community of 
persons.  When the community of persons acknowledges that a being is a fellow person, 
that being is granted the rights and privileges of personhood.  
Slaves did not qualify as persons in this respect because the rest of white society 
did not acknowledge slaves as persons.  Despite the rational ability of slaves, the 
Founding Fathers did not include slaves as part of the political community of persons and 
citizens that they were building with the Constitution.  White, slaveholding society in the 
South did not acknowledge the personhood of slaves and thus denied slaves any rights 
and privileges.  The slave population was socially alienated from the status of persons.  
Thus, Dennett‘s third condition – persons are beings who are considered and 
acknowledged as persons by others – is the critical criterion that dooms the slave 
population.  Because white society did not consider slaves to be fellow persons, they 
were effectively socially alienated from the realm of personhood. 
Orlando Patterson, who has studied slavery in societies throughout the world and 
in multiple periods, concludes that social alienation is the common phenomenon in 
almost all slave-holding societies.  Patterson finds that a slave is a being that is ―socially 
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dead.‖  A slave has no familial claims to parents, ancestors or descendents, his sexual 
unions have no binding force, and he can have no custodial or hereditary relationships 
with his children.  His alienation allows the master to deprive him of any social claim to 
personhood with a legitimate position in any social order.  Patterson argues that 
belonging to a social order and a position in an inherited social reality are necessary for 
all persons.  As an excluded being, the slave is a non-person.
51
   
 The Southern slave system deliberately alienated the slave in order to deprive him 
or her of personality.  A significant step in this process was renaming the slave with a 
European and often biblical name.
52
  Slaves also could not form family bonds.  Slaves 
could not marry without the express permission of their master and the slave had no 
claim to his or her children.  Slave children belonged to the master as his property.  In 
1835, Alexis de Tocqueville compiled his observations of American society.  Tocqueville 
observed the social death of the southern slave first hand.  
In one blow, oppression has deprived the descendants of the African of almost all the 
privileges of humanity.  The United States Negro has lost even the memory of his 
homeland; he no longer understands the language his fathers spoke; he has abjured their 
religion and forgotten their mores.  Ceasing to belong to Africa, he has acquired no right 
to the blessings of Europe; he is left in suspense between two societies isolated between 
two people; sold by one and repudiated by the other; in the whole world there is nothing 




In the American social system, the social alienation of the slave led to exclusion of the 
slave from the social and political community.  Even if the slave was conceived of as a 
―person,‖ he was not a part of the ―people.‖   
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The social position of the slave can be compared to that of the infant.  Newborn 
infants do not have the rational capacities to qualify them as persons.  Yet, infanticide is a 
moral taboo in American society because infants are included within the social 
community and are looked upon as beings in need of protection.  Societal mores mandate 
that infants receive the care and upbringing they need to flourish.  In contrast, although 
the slave did have rational capacities, the slave was not part of the social community and 
thus was not protected by the sympathies extended to infants.  Southern slaveholders 
needed a distinguishing factor to justify their exclusion of slaves from the community of 
persons.  The method these slave holders chose was exclusion based on race.   
While other slave societies, such as that of the Greeks and Romans, enslaved 
humans from many ethnicities and races, the American slave system primarily relied on 
slaves of African descent.  Although there is evidence of Native Indian and even white 
slavery in America, by the mid 1800s, southern slaves were almost exclusively imported 
from Africa or were descendents of African imports.  Their dark skin physically set them 
apart from their white masters and provided a simple way to alienate an entire subset of 
the population.  The color of one‘s skin was the badge of slavery.  Social alienation based 
on race was convenient and accepted.  
Racism allowed slaveholders to accept the paradox that all men were free and 
equal as stated in the Declaration of Independence, but as one Louisiana slaveholder put 
it, ―niggers and monkeys ain‘t.‖
54
  While racism did not owe is existence to the legal 
process; the law enforced the concept.  As legal historian Paul Finkelman states, ―If 
blacks could be perceived as inferior, basically uneducable and inherently venal, it might 
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be intellectually less self-condemnatory to relegate them because of their ‗lower status‘ to 
a subordinate role – either for their own good or as one judge had the audacity to express 
it, for the good of the total society, whites and blacks alike.‖
55
  Pervasive racism plagued 
all of American society, and was especially dominant in the South.  The dividing line 
between white and black was so stark that race became the most administratively useful 
classifying device.  Many times, the law was not able to create a dividing line between a 
free black and a slave because whites would not tolerate free blacks being in the same 
political category as whites.  Thus, free blacks, although free, were not included in 
citizenship and associated rights.  They were still treated as ―wards‖ in most cases and as 
inferior humans in almost all respects.  Racism contributed to the exclusion of blacks, 
both slave and free, from being part of ―We the People‖ as stated in the Constitution‘s 
Preamble.  Further, it influenced colonial and antebellum law as the courts struggled to 
reconcile the person and property of the slave.
56
   
 While slave society could not effectively deny the personhood of slaves based on 
cognitive criteria, the American slave system was very effective in denying personhood 
based on inclusion within the community.  Social alienation is directly related to the 
slave‘s status as property.  The master denies the personhood of the slave in order to 
objectify the slave and place the slave as a commodity on the market.  Martin Klein, a 
historian of West African slavery, argues, ―Social death and natal alienation derive from 
the master's desire to use the slave.  The slave is fully exploitable only when he has been 
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removed from any existing social matrix.‖
57
  Thus, social alienation was an attempt to 
erase the personhood of the slave and replace it with an exploitable commodity.  Social 
alienation enabled the dual person and property status of the slave. 
 According to Kant, a person cannot be property – the two categories are mutually 
exclusive.  Kant spent much of his life‘s work distinguishing persons from property.  
Kant wrote, ―Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his 
own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory; for in so far as he is a person 
he is a subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own 
property, he would be a thing over which he could have ownership.‖
58
  Kant‘s argument 
stemmed from his belief that persons, as rational beings, have an intrinsic moral worth 
and dignity that must be upheld.  Hence, each person must be treated as an ―end in itself‖ 
rather than as an instrument to be used for someone else‘s purposes.  As autonomous and 
rational agents, persons may not considered property.   
 Slavery violated Kant‘s imperative to the extreme extent – the slave lost his claim 
to an ―end in itself‖ and was relegated to a simple piece of property, a chattel, to be used 
at the master‘s whim.  The process of social alienation which stripped the slave of all 
human ties, allowed this to happen.  Of course, slavery is not the only extreme example 
of denying personhood in order to justify abuse of a human being.  Nazis also denied the 
personhood of Jews, Slavs, and other victims instead claiming that only Aryans were 
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―true persons.‖  This denial helped assuage any emotional trauma and moral guilt felt 
when subjecting other humans to horrific treatment.
59
 
 The reality of the southern slave system was that slaves were primarily considered 
as chattel property to be used at the discretion of the master rather than considering slaves 
to be persons.  As property, the slave was a tool used to further the financial goals of the 
master and the slave‘s personhood, stemming from his humanity and rational capabilities, 
was denied.  George Stroud, a judge and prolific legal commentator during the 1800s, 
analyzed antebellum slave laws in twelve states and published his work from 1827 to 
1856 in order to expose the nature of American slavery.  According to Stroud, a slave 
was truthfully considered a thing rather than a person.  Stroud wrote, ―The cardinal 
principle of slavery – that the slave is not to be ranked among sentient beings, but among 
things, as an article of property, a chattel personal – obtains as undoubted law, in all these 
[slave-holding] States.‖
60
  Abolitionist writer William Goodell, a contemporary of 
Stroud, affirms that slaves were treated as articles of property rather than human beings 
or persons.  William Goodell stated,  
If slaves were ‗deemed, reputed, and adjudged in the law‖ to be ‗sentient beings,‘ and not 
‗things,‘ then their relation to society and to civil government would be the relation of 
HUMAN BEINGS.  But this is directly the opposite of the fact,  ―Slaves‖ are ‗deemed, 
sold taken, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal, in the hands of their owners and 
possessors, their administrators and assigns,  to all intents, construction, and purposes 
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 It is painfully clear that the slave was very seldom regarded as a ―person.‖ 
Instead, the economic value of the slave was upheld repeatedly.  Classics scholar Moses 
Finley emphasizes the fact that a slave‘s humanity did not prevent the slave from 
becoming simple chattel property.  Finley states,  
Some sociologists and historians have persistently tried to deny the significance of the 
simple fact, on the ground that the slave is also a human being or that the owner‘s rights 
over a slave are often restricted by the law.  All this seems to me to be futile: the fact that 
a slave is a human being has no relevance to the question whether or not he is also 
property; it merely reveals that he is a peculiar property, Aristotle‘s ‗property with a 
soul.‘
62
   
 
Because the slave was considered property just like non-human animals, in many early 
legal cases the slave was considered closer in form to a horse than a human being.  As 
Tocqueville observed, ―European is to men of other races as man is to animals.  He uses 
them so serve his convenience and when he cannot bend them to his will, he destroys 
them.‖
63
   
 The economic system of slavery placed a dollar value on all types of property 
including human property.  The slave‘s value became quantifiable even though a human 
was involved.  In fact, the human abilities to emote and reason, which are hallmarks of 
personhood, instead were often seen as value-added traits of the slave property with 
intelligent slaves garnering a higher price.
64
  Cases involving slaves generally considered 
only the economic value of the slave as property to the master when adjudicating harms 
to the slave.  The slave, as an alienated being, was not recognized as an agent to be 
compensated for harm.   
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 The social and economic structures of the American slave system determined the 
legal structures of slave society.  Courts tried to reconcile a slave‘s non-person status 
with a criminal and civil code that recognized slave actions.  In a court of law, the slave 
had no claim to dignity and was a nonperson.  In most instances, slaves were treated in 
the same way as cattle because both were the master‘s property.  When a slave was killed 
or harmed, the master would collect restitution for his property.  Nevertheless, at the 
same time, a slave was treated as a rational, sentient being capable of defending himself 
and committing crimes.  Delicts against slaves were penalized to protect the master‘s 
property rather than the dignity of the slave.  Thus, the social system of slavery is 
completely bound to the legal system.  Because the slave was both person and property, 
the courts faced a unique and confusing entity that did not fit within property law or the 
laws of persons.  
 
Historical Conditions 
 The American system of slavery and the corresponding judicial code of slavery 
were not conceived in a vacuum.  Slave societies existed throughout the world for 
millenniums including ancient Greek and Christian societies.  Greek philosophy, as a 
cornerstone of democratic thought, and the Bible as a cornerstone of Christian thought, 
provided legitimacy for slavery.  Both ancient Greek and Christian philosophy and 
societal values contributed to the American concept of slavery.  As previously discussed, 
Aristotle advocated for a natural system of slavery and condoned slave societies.  Most 
prominent early American scholars and lawmakers would have been familiar with 
Aristotle‘s writings and his justification of slavery.  However, the average colonists did 
67 
 
not need to study the works of ancient Greece in order to justify slavery.  They only 
needed to reference the very familiar stories of the Bible.   
In early Christian times, slavery was an accepted part of the Roman Empire, and 
therefore the Bible and other Christian writing addressed the subject.  Much of the early 
Christian philosophy addressed slavery metaphorically and did not justify or condemn the 
legal system of slavery.  However, both abolitionists and advocates of slavery invoked 
Biblical references to justify their arguments.   
For early Christian philosophers, slavery was most importantly a condition of the 
spirit and not of the body.  The Evangelist Paul gives a carefully reasoned and relatively 
thorough treatment of slavery.  The important distinction among men was their 
relationship to God.  Paul believed that all men were essentially slaves to God who was 
master.  Thus, true slavery was a state of the soul.  Paul wrote, ―There is neither Jew nor 
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female in the sight of God.‖
65
  Many of Paul‘s Biblical 
writings reference man‘s enslavement to God and the rewards to those who are obedient, 
spiritual slaves.  Paul also references legal slavery, which can be confusing because it is 
difficult to know when Paul is speaking metaphorically.  He says that slaves should obey 
their masters just as if their master was Christ, and their service will be rewarded.  
Further, slaves should not view their status with resentment because it makes no 
difference to Christ whether one is slave or free.  Masters must be fair to their slaves 
knowing that they too have a master in heaven.   
Although Paul‘s writing was primarily metaphoric and not a defense of legal 
slavery, his teaching became important as Christian churches in the South related the 
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Bible to both slaves and master.  Early Christian and Biblical justifications are especially 
important for those in the American South where their Puritan and Southern Baptist roots 
would encourage them to seek out Biblical justifications for slavery.  Jefferson Davis 
wrote, ―[Slavery] was established by decree of Almighty God...it is sanctioned in the 
Bible, in both Testaments, from Genesis to Revelation...it has existed in all ages, has been 
found among the people of the highest civilization, and in nations of the highest 
proficiency in the arts.‖
66
  Antebellum Biblical scholars, following the paradigm of 
anthropologists who argued there were various species of humans, discussed whether 
there was a separate creation of blacks versus whites.
67
  
 While Roman law provided a detailed slave code, there is little evidence that the 
colonists utilized it in forming their own slavery codes.  In America, slave society 
evolved into a highly racist system whereas race was not a factor in Rome.  Furthermore, 
slavery as a widespread institution did not exist in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
England.  Therefore, the colonists had very few precedents from which to draw legal 
expertise. 
 Although England provided the legal framework for most early American law, 
England‘s slave law had limited influence because the situation was vastly different.  
England did not rely on a plantation system, and boatloads of slaves were never imported 
into the country.
68
  For Americans, slavery was a social and economic fact that became a 
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racial fact.  For Great Britain, like Rome, slavery was a geographically, not racially, 
conceived system.  In Great Britain it was easier to dismantle slavery because there was a 
smaller slave labor force, involved less property, and was not encumbered by racial 
attitudes.
69
  England viewed itself as an island of liberty in a world filled with slaves even 
though England‘s colonies were heavily involved in plantation slavery.  
England‘s most influential scholar, William Blackstone, addressed the status of 
slaves as property within English law.  Blackstone argued against slavery and criticized 
those who would deny baptism to a slave in order to prohibit liberation.  However, he 
firmly defended the property right of the master in his slaves.  Thus, Blackstone argued in 
the same breath that the spirit of liberty was deeply implanted in the common law but that 
a master‘s right to his former slave‘s service could continue even after the slave was 
free.
70
   
And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our 
very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the 
protection of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman; though the master's right to his 




For Blackstone, preservation of property rights was essential.  Blackstone supported the 
idea of property rights in another person: apprentices, servants, wives, and children were 
all subject to a property right by their superiors.  Thus, although the common law 
―abhorred‖ slavery and did not condone the buying and selling of persons, it did support 
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the more general principle that a person could have a property right to another.
72
  Most 
American lawyers after the 1770s studied Blackstone‘s Commentaries as the basis of 
their legal education and would have understood his emphasis on property rights.
73
  
In England‘s most important case on slavery, Somerset v. Stewart which was 
decided in 1772, the buying and selling of humans like cattle was one of the strong 
images invoked against slavery.  At issue in Somerset was the status of James Somerset, 
the slave of a British customs official.  Somerset, who had been brought to England from 
Virginia, claimed that by landing on British soil, he was free and could not be returned to 
Jamaica as a slave.  Many Britons were very much against slavery and therefore 
Somerset had a receptive audience for his complaint.  Lord Mansfield, the judge in this 
case, wrote that slavery ―was so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but 
positive law.‖  He further wrote, ―The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is 
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only positive law‖ 
(Lofft 1, 98 E.R. 499, 82).  Mansfield decided that because there was no statute in 
England that expressly allowed slavery, slavery did not exist within Great Britain and 
Somerset was free.  Mansfield‘s opinion in favor of Somerset gave the impression that 
any slave in England was permanently freed.  Mansfield however seemed to favor 
permanent ambiguity as the resolution to the dilemma of the slave‘s status.
74
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 Mansfield‘s opinion is complicated because it did not rely on statute.  Where no 
statute existed, Mansfield looked to natural law and concluded that common law rested 
on the liberty that is found in nature.  However, Mansfield‘s Somerset opinion did not say 
that slavery was illegal or that all slaves on British soil were immediately free.  A black 
slave reverted to the status of slave if taken back to the colonies.  Despite this, the 
opinion helped end slavery within Great Britain as slaves left their masters with no 
enforcement of the master‘s property rights.  Slavery withered away in Great Britain by 
the beginning of the 1800s.   
 Mansfield was aware that condemning slavery would call property rights into 
doubt.  However, if Mansfield ruled in favor of Charles Stewart, the master, he would be 
effectually stating that the American laws of slavery were binding in Great Britain.  
Mansfield reaffirmed the supremacy of municipal law while upholding the practice of 
slavery within England‘s colonies.  This opinion highlighted two conflicting versions of 
liberty within the common law.  Blackstone‘s Commentaries stressed the fundamental 
right to absolute ownership of property.  In this sense, a slave‘s value as property was 
absolute.  At the same time, Mansfield appealed to natural law, the moral demands of a 
property-less claim to personhood, and the value of humanity.  Mansfield does not 
reconcile the conflict between property rights found in positive law and the value of 
humanity in natural law.  Thus, a legal confusion arose in which slavery was popularly 
criticized as an insult to humanity but interpreted and attacked in common law courts 
through real property.
75
  Parliament‘s 1807 decree that banished the slave trade but 
continued to support slavery in the West Indian colonies furthered this confusion. 
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This legal confusion was also felt in the colonies as the Founders struggled to 
reconcile the humanity of the slave with the value of property.  Somerset was important 
for its ideological rather than practical effect.  Reflecting on the importance of the case, 
A. Leon Higginbotham praised Mansfield‘s opinion for its long-lasting effects on 
American jurisprudence.  Higginbotham was a civil rights activist and federal appeals 
court judge during the 1970s and 1980s, and he felt that Mansfield‘s opinion influenced 
the judicial policy making of his contemporaries and of America‘s Founding Fathers.  
Higginbotham commented, ―He synthesized most of the essential ingredients or rationale 
for future generations to eradicate slavery. … For his generation he was a giant in the 
cause of human freedom and a significant contributor to the ultimate abolition process.‖
76
  
Decided just four years before the Declaration of Independence, the case reminded judges 
of the disparity between slave law and the moral principles of legal order.  This disparity 
was very much on the minds of the Founding Fathers as they struggled to reconcile the 
natural right of liberty for every person and the fundamental right to own property, which 
included slaves.   
 
The Founding Fathers 
 The Founding Fathers were in a very difficult position regarding slavery.  
Philosophically, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were testaments of 
freedom and liberty.  However, the economy of the southern states depended on the 
denial of freedom and liberty to a large percentage of the population.  The fledgling 
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country depended on the plantation economy to purchase diplomacy from other nations.  
Both the internal and external stability of the nation depended upon the southern slave-
based economy.  
At the same time that the colonists were using tobacco produced by slave labor to 
buy favor with other nations, especially France, the colonists were accusing England of 
treating its colonial subjects as slaves.  Colonist and member of the Constitutional 
Convention John Dickinson of Pennsylvania stated, ―Those who are taxed without their 
own consent, expressed by themselves or their representatives, are slaves.  We are taxed 
without our own consent, expressed by ourselves or our representatives.  We are 
therefore slaves.‖
77
  Ironically, when Dickinson published these words in Letters from a 
Farmer in Pennsylvania: To the Inhabitants of the British Colonies, from 1767 to 1768, 
his family had a large number of slaves.  To his credit, Dickinson did free his slaves in 
1777.  
John Dickinson‘s vehement protest of England‘s treatment of the colonists as 
slaves while holding slaves himself on his family plantation is indicative of the paradoxes 
many of the Founding Fathers faced in respect to slavery.  The paradoxes faced by the 
Founding Fathers are the same as those faced by John Locke – a belief in freedom and 
liberalism but sanction of the slave trade.  Despite their protests against England, many 
colonists did not take the small step of recognizing that they were unjustly treating certain 
groups of people by perpetrating the evils of slavery within their own societies.  Some of 
the Founding Fathers justified slavery by arguing that they must support the practice in 
order to keep the union intact although they did not own slaves themselves.  However, 
                                                 
77
 John Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies 




other members of the Constitutional Convention such as Dickinson as well as Thomas 
Jefferson, George Washington, and James Madison, owned slaves themselves.  Although 
the writings of Jefferson, Washington, and Madison reveal inner conflict over the issue of 
slavery, the fact is that these Founding Fathers did own slaves at one time.  Perhaps one 
of the ways these leaders justified their actions to themselves was by reminding 
themselves that African slaves were legal property and not persons with rights and 
immunities.  There is a strong argument to be made that some of the Founders simply did 
not consider the human being as slave to be a person.  These political leaders accepted 
the foundational liberal principle that ―persons‖ are entitled to rights and immunities, but 
they did not acknowledge that the slave, or in many cases the African in general, was a 
―person.‖
78
  On the other hand, perhaps they did recognize the evils of slavery but the 
economic benefits and the stability of the Nation outweighed any guilt they experienced. 
 As American historian William Freehling states, ―The master passion of the age 
was not with extending liberty to blacks but with erecting republics for whites.‖
79
  The 
Founding Fathers‘ primary motivation was to construct a stable union.  Thus, whenever 
abolitionist sentiment appeared that angered southern delegates and threatened the union, 
southern delegates were placated.  The Founding Fathers valued the Union more than 
abolition, and their inherent racism allowed their commitment to property to prevail over 
the value of liberty for all humans.  In order to further explore irony of slavery and 
                                                 
78 Arthur Riss, Race, Slavery and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century American Literature, [Cambridge 
University Press, 2006]: 34. 
 
79





America‘s early leaders, it is worthwhile to explore the philosophies of both James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson.   
Madison, like his good friend Jefferson, left a troubled legacy in respect to 
slavery.  Many of his speeches deplore slavery as unjust and immoral.  Yet, he supported 
Virginia‘s right to maintain slavery and held slaves on his estate in Monticello without 
ever manumitting them.  An analysis of Madison‘s trouble legacy reveals some of the 
inner conflicts felt by many Founding Fathers.   
 The quote opening this chapter reveals Madison‘s true sentiment concerning 
slavery.  ―The Federal Constitution ... decides with great propriety on the case of our 
slaves, when it views them in the mixt character of persons and of property.  This is in 
fact their true character.  It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which 
they live.‖
80
  Madison agreed that legally, slaves were both persons and property, and he 
helped broker the Three-fifths Clause agreement in the Constitution to recognize both 
statuses of slaves.  He argued that slaves could not be admitted as ―persons‖ for purposes 
of representation yet he lamented that the law failed to recognize that slaves were human 
beings.
81
  As a member of Virginia‘s slave holding elite as well as a man who spent 
considerable time contemplating the meaning justice and equality, Madison recognized 
both the slave‘s status as property and a person. 
 In order to appreciate Madison‘s inner conflicts concerning slavery, it is important 
to acknowledge that during Madison‘s time the system was entrenched, and Madison was 
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born into the master class of Virginia gentry.  Madison‘s family had a long history of 
slavery, and slave labor was instrumental to the success of the Madison family 
plantations.  At the same time, he wrote many letters and speeches in which he professed 
to abhor the practice of slavery.  During the Constitutional Convention, Madison said 
about slavery, ―We have seen the mere distinction of color made in the most enlightened 
period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over 
man.‖
82
  His wife Dolly came from a family of Quakers, and Dolly‘s father freed his 
slaves and moved his family from Virginia to Philadelphia in order to avoid systemic 
slavery.  Madison however was not prepared to go as far as his wife Dolly‘s family in 
protesting slavery.  Although he spoke out against it, he did not free his own slaves even 
on his death bed as George Washington did.   
 At his death, Madison held over 100 slaves which he bequeathed to his wife.  
Scholars argue over the ethics of Madison‘s decision to retain his slaves while at the 
same time working for justice and liberty in the new republic.  To many scholars, 
Madison was hypocritical and his action unforgiveable.  However, historian Drew 
McCoy defends Madison‘s actions claiming that Madison was worried about the fate of 
the slaves if they were freed.  At the time, Virginia law mandated that freed slaves had to 
leave Virginia.  Perhaps Madison worried about their fate in a society filled with violent 
prejudice and in a land where the slaves would be hard pressed to survive financially 
away from the home they had known for generations.  McCoy writes,  
But it is also plausible to infer that Madison may have had been more 
interested in the actual welfare of his slaves than he was either in clearing 
his conscience or in using them to make a political statement.  …  
Contrary to appearances, by providing for his slaves as he did, Madison 
may have given greater evidence of his concern and respect for them than 
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he would have, had he merely released them into a hostile white world, or 
for that matter, subjected them to involuntary deportation.
83
   
 
To be sure, McCoy gives a very charitable interpretation of Madison‘s failure to manumit 
his slaves.  However, McCoy may be at least partly correct.  Records show that Madison 
was a very benevolent master.  Madison‘s personal slave, Paul Jennings, wrote in his 
memoirs, ―I never saw him in a passion, and never knew him to strike a slave, though he 
had over a hundred; neither would he allow an overseer to do it.  Whenever any slaves 
were reported to him as stealing or ‗cutting up‘ badly, he would send for them and 
admonish them privately, and never mortify them by doing it before others.‖
84
  From the 
large body of Madison‘s writing, it does not seem that Madison harbored the deep seated 
racial prejudices that Jefferson had.  However, in his references to free blacks, his writing 
was often laced with contempt and at one point calling free blacks ―idle and depraved.‖
85
  
This comment reveals that Madison had some latent racial prejudices but overall, it seems 
that Madison was benevolent towards slaves and free blacks and did not harbor the 
vitriolic prejudices that were common with his contemporaries.   
 However benevolent Madison was towards his slaves, Madison was certainly 
motivated in his actions by financial concerns as well as compassion.  Madison worried 
about Dolly‘s fate after his death and knew that she needed labor to run the plantation.  
Further, Madison truly believed in the financial value of slaves and repeatedly argued at 
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the Constitutional Convention and through his correspondence that if the Federal 
Government were to free the slaves, then owners had to be compensated for their loss of 
property.  In a letter to Robert J. Evans, Madison explained that any plan for 
emancipation should be gradual, equitable, and satisfactory to the individuals concerned, 
and consistent with the existing prejudices of the nature.  In respect to equitable and 
satisfactory, Madison further elaborated that the slave must agree that the state of 
freedom is preferable to that of bondage.  For his part, the master must be compensated 
for the loss of property as guaranteed by the law and the Constitution.
86
   
 The reality of Madison‘s thoughts on slavery was that he was very much 
conflicted between the status of property and person.  He treated his slaves benevolently 
as appropriate to their status as human beings.  However, he did not waver from his views 
that slaves were legal property and that masters needed to be compensated for any loss of 
property through manumission.  He did not waver from his loyal Virginian views that 
southern states should be allowed to maintain slavery.   
 Another critical reason that Madison refrained from calling for the complete 
abolishment of slavery was that he was very much afraid that the Union would dissolve 
over the highly contested issue.  Although Madison spoke of the moral evils of slavery, 
he felt that dissolving the Union over the matter was a much greater evil.  In a speech at 
the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison stated, ―Great as the evil is, a dismemberment 
of the union would be worse.  If those states should disunite from the other states, not for 
indulging them in the temporary continuance of this traffic, they might solicit and obtain 
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aid from foreign powers.‖
87
  Thus, the problem of slavery for Madison was a seemingly 
irreconcilable issue.  He recognized the moral harm of slavery but was not able to find a 
way to abolish slavery without violating economic interests and endangering the Union.   
 Madison‘s biographers conclude that slavery weighed heavily on Madison‘s 
mind.  McCoy wrote ―The dilemma of slavery undid him.‖
88
  Historian Scott Kester 
wrote, ―The issue of slavery haunted James Madison.  Liberty and justice were high on 
his list of concerns, so how, in a government of the people, could some people own other 
people? … Madison himself owned many slaves, about one hundred at the time of his 
death, and the dilemma probably tormented him.‖
89
  Both McCoy and Kester offer 
sympathetic interpretations of Madison‘s dilemma – he was a product of his Virginia 
upbringing, dedicated to the Union, and mindful of the economic benefits of slavery.  Yet 
he understood that the institution was contrary to the very freedoms he authored in the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  The most honest and dispassionate assessment of 
Madison‘s legacy comes from Sidney Howard Gay who was an American journalist and 
abolitionist.  Gay lived from 1814 to 1888, and thus was a late contemporary of Madison 
but was also able to write about Madison‘s views with some hindsight.  In summing up 
Madison‘s legacy, Gay wrote, ―Madison‘s responsibility for this result was that of every 
other delegate – no more and no less.  Neither he nor they, whether more or less opposed 
to slavery, saw in it a system so subversive of the rights of man that no just government 
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  Gay further concluded, ―Upon the subject of slavery he thought 
much and wrote much and always earnestly and humanely.  How to get rid of it was a 
problem which he never resolved to his own satisfaction.  Though it was one he always 
longed to see through, it never occurred to him that the way to abolish slavery was – to 
abolish it.‖
91
  Gay seems to provide a fair assessment – Madison was indeed a product of 
his times and did treat his own slaves well.  Yet despite his own better moral judgment, 
he did not take the step of rectifying his actions by freeing his slaves nor did he call for 
the outright abolishment of slavery.  Madison was not able to truly reconcile the slave‘s 
dual status as both person and property.   
While James Madison is known as the Father of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, Thomas Jefferson is known as the Father of the Declaration of Independence.  
However, Jefferson did not believe in a Declaration of Independence for all humans – 
slaves were decidedly not included within the persons for whom the Declaration was 
written, and he did not include blacks within his words, ―all men are created equal.‖  
Jefferson, like many politicians and scholars of his age, deeply questioned whether the 
word ―men‖ in the Declaration just like ―person‖ in the Constitution included blacks.  It 
was not obvious that it did.  Similar to Madison, many of Jefferson‘s journals speak of 
the evil of slavery.  At the same time, as a plantation owner, he owned many slaves and 
refused to free them.  As Madison‘s biography illustrated, reluctance to free one‘s own 
slaves was not uncommon among the Founders, especially those from the South.  
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However, Jefferson‘s views on slavery go beyond those of Madison revealing deeply 
entrenched racial prejudices.   
Jefferson‘s position on slavery can be explained by his conception of race and 
national identity.  Jefferson‘s deeply entrenched racist theories of black inferiority 
allowed him to view Africans as a separate people.  His conception of the American 
nation did not provide space for an inclusive national identity that included blacks.  In the 
―Great Chain of Being‖ Jefferson placed blacks next to the orangutan.
92
  Further, 
Jefferson‘s boundaries were entirely based upon the color of one‘s skin.  He believed that 
European immigrants could be properly socialized and become a part of the population 
without ―blot in our country‖ while natural boundaries existed between whites and blacks 
that would forever prevent their integration.
93
  Instead, he favored sending blacks to 
Africa where they would form their own nation.   
While the American Revolution was fought in the name of self-determination for 
all peoples, blacks were not included in this ―people.‖  When explaining his plan for 
returning blacks to Africa, Jefferson proved that his primary goal was not providing 
justice for enslaved Africans as individuals.  He wrote that to separate a black mother 
from her infant was ―straining at a gnat.‖
94
  Instead, he was preoccupied with preserving 
the racial purity and the associated national identity of his beloved Virginia and the new 
nation.  Onuf writes, ―For Jefferson, all the people in Virginia did not constitute the 
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  Jefferson‘s attitude was an example of failing to bestow 
personhood based on Dennett‘s third condition which is that persons are acknowledged to 
be persons by others.  Because Jefferson and other prominent politicians did not view 
slaves as part of the ―people‖ of the new nation, they did not feel obligated to bestow the 
rights and privileges of persons included in the nation.  
 All the Founders felt the tension Jefferson felt as they struggled to create a 
national identity for the fledgling country.  However, in creating a national identity, 
Jefferson purposefully excluded slaves and free blacks from the concept of the American 
people.  As property rather than persons, these human beings were not acknowledged.  
Legal scholar Rogers Smith argues that the most important task for the Founders was to 
create a civic myth that would unite disparate groups of white settlers.  A sense of 
legitimacy was needed in the new nation, and political elites sought to foster this 
legitimacy by creating a new and unique civic identity for the American nation.  Most of 
the colonists saw themselves as British subjects, and most believed that only British 
subjects with certain ethnic, religious, and class traits were entitled to political privileges.  
However, the Founders needed to go beyond the sense of British identity if the new 
nation were to survive as a united republic.  Smith states, ―Beginning with political and 
religious views of themselves as bearers the ‗famous English liberty‘ they increasingly 
argued that Americans were a superior new breed, and possibly mankind‘s ‗redeemer 
nation.‘  The result was a complex conception of American nationality within which the 
colonist‘s seemed for a time miraculously to cohere.‖
96
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Knowing that many non-British immigrants from other European countries had 
settled in the America and forming a cohesive political society might prove difficult, the 
Founders went even further to argue that America had the best of all European nations 
and formed a brotherhood of Christians.  Thomas Paine encouraged the colonists to unite 
in their grievances against Great Britain and realize that the colonists formed a new 
people in the new land.  In his influential pamphlets Common Sense Paine wrote, 
―Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America. This new world hath been 
the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of 
Europe. … [W]e claim brotherhood with every European Christian, and triumph in the 
generosity of the sentiment.‖
97
  Such strong admonishments were needed because the 
conception of unity and an American people was fragile.  Personal attachments to 
religion, native ties to the home countries of Europe, and even local ties to particular 
states or region were beloved. 
 This new identity that Founders were trying to forge excluded women and 
Catholics from the body politic.  Furthermore, this identity absolutely excluded Africans.  
While the colonists came from various European countries and had different 
backgrounds, they knew what they were not – they were not black.  Higginbotham writes, 
―So, trapped between the very real memory of the limitations of the Old World and still 
unfulfilled hope of the possibilities of the New World, the white colonists may not have 
understood at the time who and what they were as a people.  They were, however, at least 
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able to say who and what they were not: they were not blacks; they were not inferior.‖
98
  
Thus, skin color came to represent a distinguishing and uniting factor.  The African was 
the ―other‖ from whom the superior race could distinguish itself.  The African slave was 
used to unite the white Europeans and enable political cohesion.  When the Founders 
wrote ―We the People,‖ most were not including Africans in any sense.  Thus, the early 
history of the Nation reflects the exclusive meaning of the words ―people‖ and ―persons.‖  
Politically, ―We the People‖ was significant because it was interpreted to absolutely 
exclude a large sector of humans.  Judicially, ―persons‖ is significant because slaves were 
largely excluded as legal persons.  This brief analysis of the historical events leading to 
the establishment of the Constitution provides necessary background for understanding 
the inegalitarian origins of America‘s founding document.   
 
Constitutional Origins 
 The Constitution provided the foundation for American law, and thus the courts 
relied on this document to facilitate slave law.  However, the Constitution is vague in its 
references to personhood and slaves.  The Constitution uses the word ―person‖ twenty-
two times but never uses the word ―slave‖ or ―slavery.‖  During the Constitutional 
Convention, slavery was already a point of moral contention.  Thus, the Constitution did 
not use the word ―slave‖ or ―slavery‖ because the authors were reluctant to tarnish the 
great document with a word that many of the Founders believed represented an evil 
institution.
99
  James Madison commented, ―They had scruples against admitting the term 
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‗Slaves‘ into the Instrument.  Hence the descriptive phrase ‗migration or importation of 
persons;‘ the term migration allowing those who were scrupulous of acknowledging 
expressly a property in human beings, to view imported persons as a species of 
emigrants.‖
100
   
Slavery is referenced in several key areas of the Constitution, and each instance, 
slaves are specifically referred to as ―persons.‖  However, although the Founders used the 
word ―person,‖ this did not necessarily mean that they chose the word ―person‖ to 
indicate that the slave enjoyed rights and freedoms.  This is clearly evidenced in the fact 
that each time the word ―person‖ is used in reference to a slave, the word is carefully 
qualified with a preceding ―other‖ or ―such.‖  Qualifying adjectives conveyed the 
limiting meaning of ―persons‖ in this context and implied a vague enough reference to 
slavery that the word ―person‖ did not sully the Constitution.   
The first reference to slavery is the Three-Fifths Clause, which dealt specifically 
with slaves within the topic of representation.  This was a highly contentious issue during 
the Convention because if the South were allowed to count their slaves for representation 
purposes, the population of the Southern states would rival that of the North giving the 
South much greater power in the federal government.  Thus, ironically, in this situation it 
behooved the South to treat slaves as persons.  Some Southerners argued that a 
government instituted to protect property should account for the value of slaves by 
allowing slaves to be counted for representation.   As a measure of wealth, the slave was 
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  Of course, Northern delegates would not agree to a measure that 
would significantly weaken their power.  Again, ironically in this situation, many North 
delegates who abhorred slavery argued that slaves were simply property and not persons.  
William Paterson of New Jersey asserted ―Negroes are no free agents, have no personal 
liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary are themselves property, and 
like other property entirely at the will of the master.‖
102
  In order to pacify both camps, 
the Three-Fifths Clause was agreed upon.   
Under this clause, slaves were referred to as ―other‖ persons and were to be 
counted as a three-fifths fraction of a ―legitimate‖ person.  Although slaves were not 
considered to be a literal 3/5 fraction of a white man, the qualifying word ―other‖ 
signifies that the Founders did not consider slaves as ―persons‖ in the full sense of the 
word.  Although some Southern delegates wanted to include slaves for purposes of 
representation, other Southern delegates saw the potential effects of allowing slaves to be 
counted as persons for certain circumstances.  George Mason of Virginia did not agree 
because he could not ―regard them as equal to freemen and could not vote for them as 
such.‖
103
  Mason recognized the confusing nature of the dual person/property status and 
further understood that by allowing slaves to be counted as ―persons‖ for representation, 
a Pandora‘s Box would be opened in which slaves could be considered for all rights and 
privileges accorded ―persons.‖  Thus, although Mason was from a slave state, he argued 
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against slaves being classified as persons for representation.  The Three-Fifths Clause in 
its unspoken acceptance of slavery, confirmed the status of the slave as property.   
 Article 1, Section 9, Clause 1, often called the Migration or Importation Clause, 
expressly allowed the importation of slaves until 1808.  The clause does not use the word 
―slave‖ but instead refers to ―such persons.‖  Again, the qualifying word ―such‖ clearly 
separates slaves from the ―full persons‖ within the law.  The clause, which was a 
compromise between pro and anti slavery advocates, allowed the slave trade to continue 
but provided a potential twenty-year moratorium on the practice.  Congress eventually 
passed a law outlawing the slave trade that became effective on January 1, 1808.  Despite 
this, by 1808, slaves were naturally reproducing at high enough rates that further 
importation was not necessary to sustain the industry.  
The Fugitive Slave Clause is the last explicit mention of slavery in the 
Constitution.  This clause requires states to return escapees to their original state and 
master.  Interestingly, this clause received very little debate in the convention.  Passed 
without contention, it would prove to be highly problematic when states enforced the law.  
Although in the text of the Constitution the slave is referred to as a person, the clause 
firmly cemented the slave‘s status as the property of the master because it mandated that 
when an owner lost his slave property, his property must be restored.   
 These three clauses provided the national legal foundation for the laws of slavery.  
It established that the members of the Constitutional Convention formally sanctioned 
slavery and considered slaves to be ―other‖ persons who were not bearers of rights and 
duties.  It also established that the Founders were ready to compromise the concept that 
all men are created equal.  General Charles Cotesworth Pinkney, a delegate from South 
88 
 
Carolina and a strong supporter of slavery, summarized the Constitution‘s stance on 
slavery saying, ―In short, considering all circumstances, we have made the best terms for 
the security of this species of property it was in our power to make.  We would have 
made better if we could; but on the whole, I do not think them bad.‖
104
  Indeed, the 
Constitution did not explicitly mention slavery, but it did give the newly formed 
government‘s stamp of approval to stripping some humans of personhood and relegating 
them to property.  Although the first words of the Constitution are ―We the People‖ 
slaves were not considered to be legal ―persons‖ protected under the Constitution, nor 
were they part of the political ―people‖ who comprised the American nation.   
Although slavery was officially sanctioned in the Constitution, the Framers 
deliberately left the details of slave law unclear.  Judges trying to decipher the 
Constitution‘s vague references to the slave‘s place within the law faced a difficult 
challenge.  There was no formal federal law of slavery; indeed, the Constitution even 
refused to use the words ―slave‖ or ―slavery.‖  Instead, slavery was seen as a state-
controlled issue.  Therefore, judges in each state were largely on their own to create a 
series of precedents that would serve as a codified slave law.  The result was that each 
state had its own system of slave law with literally thousands of cases concerning slavery 
throughout the Nation.
105
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ANALYSIS OF CASES 
This section provides an analysis of some of the influential cases concerning 
slavery and personhood.  There are thousands of state, district, and federal cases that 
pertain to slavery and the implications for personhood.  An attempt to analyze all of these 
cases in detail would be too cumbersome a task for this study.  Instead, after reviewing 
hundreds of these cases, I have selected a sampling of cases from colonial time to the 
start of the Civil War to analyze.  The cases I chose are influential cases that set 
precedents for other courts and specifically speak to the issue of personhood for slaves.  
These carefully selected cases reveal the ways in which slaves were both denied and 
granted personhood under the law depending upon the circumstances of the particular 
case.  This sampling of statutes and cases reveals patterns in the ways that slaves were 
either denied personhood or conceptualized as persons.   
In order to reconcile the slave as both human and property, the states needed a 
unique legal system capable of adjudicating this dual status.  As will be seen, in many 
cases slaves were governed by the same policies as cattle and horses.  However, in some 
cases the slave‘s humanity was taken into account as the slave‘s ability to reason and 
learn were seen as value adding qualities.  In most cases, the slave was treated as property 
and the slave‘s legal voice was that of his master.  The notable exception was within 
criminal law.  When a slave was accused of a criminal offense, his legal personhood was 
restored in order for the slave to be held accountable for his crimes.  Beginning with 






The process of creating a unique legal system to reconcile the status of the slave 
began before the construction of the Constitution as colonial lawmakers struggled to 
design a judicial code for slavery.  Colonists had very few precedents from English 
Common Law upon which to rely.  The legal system that developed to encompass slaves 
became extremely complicated as justices tried to reconcile natural law with positive law 
and economic concerns with social concerns.  Therefore, in the very early courts of the 
colonies, justices began the task of creating a unique system of law that could incorporate 
both the person and property aspects of slaves.  The colonial era saw the emergence of a 
slave society in America and as social patterns hardened, behavior and laws that were at 
first tentative and experimental became routine.   
 In comparison with Spain and Portugal, the English colonies entered the slave 
trade at a relatively late date.  Consequently, laws and cases pertaining to slavery were 
very few and scattered.  From 1619 to 1662, the colonies did not have a clearly 
articulated rational for black inferiority, but evidence of racial bias existed.  Virginia‘s 
early cases provide evidence that race was a qualifying factor in admitting evidence.  
According to Higginbotham, the first case involving a black person in a judicial 
proceeding was Re Tuchinge in 1624.  This case concerned Symon Tuchinge who was 
accused of seizing a Spanish ship.  The case considered whether a black man christened 
in England named Phillip could testify against Tuchinge.  The opinion specifically 
mentioned Phillip‘s race and religion because his race and religion were material in 
determining if his testimony would be accepted.  Higginbotham argues that referencing 





  Higginbotham references another case, Re Davis (1630), which provides 
more concrete evidence that colonial Virginia was institutionalizing black inferiority.  In 
this case, Hugh Davis, a white man, was to be ―soundly whipt before an assembly of 
negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of Christianity 
by defiling his body in lying with a negro.‖
107
  His public offense was interacting with 
someone who was inferior and even less than human.  His act went beyond fornication to 
bestiality because the Negro was not considered a human equal.  Davis‘s punishment was 
public humiliation for the moral and social sin of debasing himself.
108
   
 In comparison with Virginia, the largely Quaker and German Mennonite 
population in Pennsylvania experienced a relatively mild system of slavery.  In 1688, the 
Mennonites issued an official protest against slavery revealing a racially inclusive 
ideology that was unique for that time. The protest stated, ―now though they are black, 
we cannot conceive there is more liberty to have them slaves, as it is to have other white 
ones.  There is a saying that we should do to all men like we will be done ourselves; 
making no difference of what generation, descent, or color they are.‖
109
  Within the 
courts, race was not a significant factor in determining judicial procedures such as 
allowing testimony and trial by jury, nor was race significant in determining punishment 
for crime.  However, research by historian Edward Raymond Turner shows that after 
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1700, Pennsylvania court documents contain racial disparities in sentencing and level of 
crime.  For instance, in 1700, Pennsylvania passed a law which required blacks to be tried 
in a special court without juries.  A 1726 law forbade the intermarriage of whites and 
blacks and imposed stiff fines and penalties.  Pennsylvania law also tended to impose 
more severe punishments on blacks who were subject to hanging and branding as 
opposed to whites who were generally punished with fines or imprisonment for similar 
crimes.
110
  Despite these disparities, Pennsylvania did not have a large slave system and 
where slavery did exist, masters were prevented from physically attacking their slaves.   
 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, more and more colonists from various 
European countries were pouring into the new land.  At the same time, slavery was 
becoming firmly established within the colonies.  As second generation masters and 
slaves were born, slavery became routine instead of tentative, and laws of slavery were 
beginning to form as precedents.  As whites began to form their identity within the new 
land, second generation slaves were already losing their ties to Africa.  Their language 
and religion were conforming to white society.  These slaves were no longer ―Africans‖ 
but were not part of colonial political society.
111
  The process of social alienation, which 
was instrumental in denying their personhood, was beginning.   
 After the British won the Anglo-Dutch war in 1667, the British colonies began to 
enter the slave trade with vigor.  Between 1680 and 1770, the estimated proportion of 
blacks increased from seven percent to forty-four percent in of the total population of 
Virginia and from seventeen percent to sixty-one percent of the population in South 
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Carolina.  In the South in total, blacks increased from six percent of the population to 
forty percent.
112
  Higginbotham argues that from 1662 to 1830 the legal process became 
defined and ruthlessly enforced racial oppression as the rationale for slavery.  This is 
evidenced in a 1669 Virginia statute that provided that a slave was entirely the master‘s 
property, and the master had complete power to handle his own estate to the point that he 
could kill his own slaves.  ―An Act about the casuall killings of slaves: ‗If a slave resist 
his master … and by the extremity of the correction should chance to die, that his death 
shall not be accepted Felony, but the master be acquit from molestation, since it cannot 
be presumed that the propensed malice should induce any man to destroy his own 
estate.‘‖
113
 Virginians could beat, mutilate, and kill their slaves without criminal offense 
because slaves were not persons and thus their killing was not murder.   
Virginia‘s Act of 1680 further cemented the complete submission to the economic 
system of chattel slavery.  This statute granted the master complete domination over the 
slave.  The Virginia Act of 1680 prohibited slaves from gathering for feasts or burials, 
carrying arms, or leaving the plantation without a certificate of permission from the 
master.  The Act states, ―If he absent himself or lie out of his master‘s service and resist 
lawful apprehension, he may be killed.‖
114
  In Patterson‘s terms, the process of 
transforming the slave into a completely alienated and excluded being, a non-person, was 
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complete.  In Virginia, the slave was simply a tool such as a plow horse.  The slave was a 
Kantian means rather than an end.   
 In New York, the transformation of the African to mere chattel did not occur as 
quickly.  When the Dutch controlled the colony of New Netherlands, blacks could own 
property, bear arms, and even testify in courts.  However, when the land was surrendered 
to England and the government entrusted to the Duke of York whose finances were 
closely tied to the Royal African Company, the slave trade was encouraged.  By 1702, the 
slave had been reduced to chattel and the master could treat the slave in any manner 
without judicial or legislative scrutiny.  Slaves were purely property in commercial 
transactions for bills of sale, mortgages, and credit.  After the Revolutionary War, New 
York officially freed all slaves, but blacks could not vote or hold public office.   
 In Massachusetts, even though the plantation system did not exist, slaves were 
identified as chattel in the colony‘s tax assessments.  Until the Revolutionary War, slaves 
were considered to be property of the same sort as horses, cows, and swine.  The 
Massachusetts Constitution ratified in 1780 allowed slavery and required that slaves be 
taxed despite strong opposition from the town of Westminster where white citizens 
protested that the constitution was objectionable because it deprived a part of the human 
race of their natural rights.  This early abolitionist protest found its way into the courts.  
In Commonwealth v. Jennison (Massachusetts, 1781, unreported) the court found that 
slave Quack Walker was a free man.  Chief Justice Cushing declared that the new 
Massachusetts Constitution granted rights incompatible with the institution of slavery.  
Cushing wrote, ―I think the idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and 
Constitution; and there can be no such thing as perpetual servitude of a rational creature, 
95 
 




 South Carolina began with a large population of migrants from the West Indian 
colonies where slavery was prevalent.  Consequently, society in South Carolina was 
unhesitatingly accepting of slavery without moral or legal argument.  Higginbotham 
reports that there was not a single surviving judicial case challenging the validity of 
slavery.  Furthermore, the plantation economy producing rice encouraged large numbers 
of slaves to the point that by 1708 a black majority existed in South Carolina.  In 1712, an 
official slave code provided an official statement of the necessity of slavery.  Slavery was 
justified by asserting that Negroes are barbarous, wild, savage and prone to inhumanity.  
Further, they were unqualified to be governed by laws and customs.  Thus, the Negro 
must know his place as chattel.  He must wear certain clothes and abide by curfews.  
Punishment for runaway slaves included branding and death.  South Carolina‘s judicial 
system accordingly protected the economic interests of the master allowing the master 
wide discretion to regulate and punish his slaves.  Maiming a slave was the same level of 
crime as stealing chickens, and was a lesser crime than burning houses.
116
  In 1740, South 
Carolina code stated, ―If any slave who shall be out of the house or plantation …shall 
refuse to submit to undergo the examination of any white person, it shall be lawful for 
any such white person to pursue, apprehend, and moderately correct such slave; and if 
such slave shall assault and strike such white person, such slave may be lawfully 
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  The slave‘s status as property was affirmed in that taxes on slaves were 
categorized with liquor and other merchandise.   
 The colony of Georgia began with a ban against slavery.  James Oglethorpe, 
Georgia‘s best-known trustee, said that slavery was against the Gospel and the 
fundamental law of England.  However, Oglethorpe‘s reasoning was not purely 
humanitarian as Oglethorpe himself owned slaves on his land in South Carolina and was 
an officer of the Royal African Company.  Oglethorpe feared conflict with the English 
poor for whom the colony of Georgia was originally created.  If poor whites were forced 
to perform the same menial tasks as black slaves, social division would arise.  Again, 
whites knew who they were not – they were not black slaves.  By disallowing slavery, 
Oglethorpe hoped to prevent conflict between whites and blacks.  This was initially 
economically feasible because the first Georgian crops were silk and grapes that did not 
require slaves.  However, by 1750, plantation crops were established and slavery was 
allowed.  Within a few years, slaves were almost half the of the colony‘s population.
118
  
Georgia‘s slave code developed to be as harsh as anywhere else in the South.   
 Colonial laws set the groundwork for the body of cases and precedents that 
formed the slave laws of the South.  These laws firmly established the slave‘s status as an 
outsider who did not belong to the community of persons.  By upholding the slave‘s 
status as chattel property, these laws created the basis for a system of laws that denied the 
personhood of the slave in order to promote the financial profits of the slave economy.  
The colonial period set the stage for increasingly harsh court rulings denying the 
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personhood of slaves during the antebellum era.  From 1800 to the 1860s, the monetary 
value of slaves rose sharply.  Correspondingly, masters became increasingly protective of 
their property.  The master class maintained their political dominance in southern politics 
and protected their property rights.   The southern judicial system followed suit by 
protecting the master class and abandoning the personhood of slaves.   
 
Antebellum Law 
 After the Revolutionary War, slavery was gradually abolished in the North and 
became a way of life in the South.  During this antebellum period, slave law in the South 
was firmly established.  Southern justices struggled to create a system of slave law based 
on the economics of slaves as property combined with the irrefutable humanity of slaves 
that did not easily fit within a purely economic system.  The solution in the South was to 
create a completely separate slave law.  A settled slave law enabled Southern judges to 
simplify their decisions and gave them precedents upon which to rely.   
 Judges who created this body of slave law sought to create a law of slavery that 
was compatible with both natural and positive law.
119
  Mansfield‘s opinion in Somerset 
relied heavily on natural law when he decreed that slavery was too odious to be allowed 
within England.  However, Mansfield did acknowledge that positive law could allow 
slavery even when the practice of slavery violated values of freedom and equality.  
Southern justices, who often personally disagreed with slavery, justified their decisions 
by claiming that positivism prevented the interjection of their beliefs.  Many state laws in 
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the South explicitly sanctioned slavery.  Furthermore, the newly ratified Constitution 
itself referred to the institution.   
By clinging to this justification, Southern justices were able to uphold the 
abhorrent practices of slavery under a Constitution that claimed liberty and freedom.  In 
the face of antislavery demand, the justice was able to respond, ―I cannot‖ thereby 
attempting to placate antislavery protestors while still ruling in favor of Southern 
plantation owners.  The Constitution itself provided a remarkably powerful symbol of 
judicial fidelity to positive law.  Justices were able to cite the Constitution as requiring 
the separation of powers and support of the Constitutional compromise allowing slavery.  
The separation of powers argument allowed justices to contend that slavery was an issue 
for the people and the legislatures.  If legislative policies, as supported by the electorate, 
maintained slavery then the judicial branch was powerless to change the law.  Further, as 
was illustrated in the discussion of the Constitution, slavery was specifically 
acknowledged in the Three-Fifths Clause, the Migration or Importation Clause, and the 
Fugitive Slave Clause.  The Constitution allowed slavery in order to preserve the stability 
of the union with the southern states.  Justices claimed that they were bound to uphold 
this Constitutional allowance and cited their oath to support the Constitution.  Thus, 
justices did not choose between liberty and slavery.  Instead, they chose between liberty 
and federalism; liberty and the limits on judicial function; liberty and fidelity to public 
trust; and liberty and support of the social compact in the Constitution.
120
   
Because states had the power to regulate their own slave systems, each state‘s 
judicial system codified their own slave law.  Subsequently, there were thousands of state 
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level cases that concerned the dual status of slave as both property and person.  A survey 
of some of the more interesting cases across a number of different topics within slave law 
reveals the diversity of the cases across the states and the consistency in which justices 
affirmed the slave‘s status as primarily property.  Rather than present the cases in a 
strictly chronological order or by court hierarchy, it is more useful to present the cases 
organized by topic.  This allows a clearer portrayal the patterns and precedents used to 
adjudicate the personhood of slaves versus their status as property.  Each of the topics 
within the survey of important cases portrays a different aspect of the personhood issue.  
Within each topic, the cases are presented chronologically to demonstrate the flow of 
decision making within the Southern states.   
To begin this survey, it is helpful to review a few cases that illustrate the 
conceptual difficulties of reconciling natural law with positive law and the law of the 
market with slave society.  Then the question of the personhood of a slave is addressed 
directly in various opinions.  This leads to a review of cases concerning the murder and 
injury of a slave.  The judicial system‘s handling of such cases reveals the court‘s 
proclivity to view the death of a slave as loss of property to the master.  Finally, criminal 
cases will be discussed.  In criminal cases, the slave was often considered to be a person 
so that the court could hold the slave liable for his own criminal actions.  These cases 
confirm the importance of the slave‘s dual status as both person and property.   
 
Natural versus Positive Law 
 The struggle justices faced in reconciling natural law, which forbids human 
chattel, and positive law, which allows systems of chattel slavery, is clearly seen in a 
series of cases involving foreign ships carrying slaves.  In 1822, a French ship 
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transporting slaves was seized.  The United States brought suit against France claiming 
libel for violating the slave trade laws of the United States and the general laws of 
nations.  The case reached Justice Joseph Story on the federal circuit court of 
Massachusetts.  Because France did not permit the slave trade, Justice Story determined 
that the ship was a pirate.  Therefore, the seizure was legitimate and the slaves on board 
were returned to the consular of France to be dealt with ―according to his own sense of 
duty and right‖ United States v. La Jeune Eugenie 26 Fed. Case 832, 851 (1832). In his 
opinion, Justice Story wrote his personal thoughts on the practice of slavery.  ―It stirs up 
the worst passions of the human soul, darkening the spirit of revenge, sharpening the 
greediness of avarice, brutalizing the selfish, envenoming the cruel, famishing the weak, 
and crushing to death the broken-hearted‖ United States v. La Jeune Eugenie 26 Fed. 
Case 832, 845 (1832).   
However, three years later, when another ship carrying slaves was captured 
hovering off the U.S. coast, a different decision was reached.  This case reached Chief 
Justice Marshal at the Supreme Court who ordered that the Africans be returned to their 
owners.  In The Antelope 23 U.S. 66 (1825), the slaves were claimed by Spanish and 
Portuguese owners.  Both Spain and Portugal permitted the slave trade and therefore 
international law dictated that the slaves be returned.  Chief Justice Marshall publicly 
agonized over his aversion to slavery, but felt compelled to uphold the property rights of 
nations who approved slavery.  He despaired that although slavery was contrary to the 
laws of nature, it was accepted by the laws of nations.  He wrote,  
In examining claims of this momentous importance; claims in which the 
sacred rights of liberty and property come in conflict with each other; 
which have drawn from the bar a degree of talent and of eloquence, 
worthy of the questions that have been discussed; this Court must not yield 
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to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty, and must obey the 
mandate of the law (23 U.S. 66, 114). 
 
Marshall‘s opinion was reminiscent of Lord Mansfield‘s reasoning in Somerset.  
However, unlike the Somerset decision, Marshall did not free the slaves on board the 
Antelope.   
Both La Jeune Eugenie and The Antelope illustrate the personal conflicts the 
justices felt when trying to follow their own convictions against slavery in the face of 
positive law that permitted slavery.  Because France did not allow the slave trade, Justice 
Story was able to make a decision that freed the slaves and was able to pen dicta that 
clearly stated his opinion on the subject.  Chief Justice Marshall was not as fortunate.  In 
this case, the positive law of both Spain and Portugal allowed slavery, and Marshall felt 
compelled to uphold their laws.  He claimed that he had a duty to obey the law despite 
feelings to the contrary.  What emerged from The Antelope and La Jeune Eugenie was the 
conclusion that natural law is a source for international law but was subordinate to the 
constitutions, statutes, and practices of nations.   
 Sixteen years later, another case involving a slave ship reached the Supreme 
Court.  The Amistad 40 U.S. 518 (1841) presented a unique situation in which the African 
slaves aboard the ship mutinied against their captain.  In many philosophical discussions, 
the ship was considered a microcosm of society and a mutiny on a ship isolated the 
abstract right of revolution.  In The Amistad, the Court was faced with the actual 
situation.  During the ship‘s journey from Africa to Cuba, the Africans managed to 
overtake the captain and take control of the ship with the intention of returning to Africa.  
Two Spanish slave holders claimed possession of the slaves.  The Africans claimed that 
they were born free as natives of Africa and unlawfully kidnapped and pirated as slaves.  
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It was not disputed that slaves could be held as property both within Spain and the United 
States and therefore were subject to restoration as property.  The laws of slaves as 
property were carefully and irrefutably stated.  However, this case involved something 
different.  Various treaties with Spain formally abolished the African slave trade.  
Therefore, as kidnapped Africans, the slaves on board the ship claimed that they were 
entitled to freedom.   
This time Justice Story was writing the opinion of the Supreme Court and was 
able to express his anti-slavery sentiments.  He wrote, ―It is also a most important 
consideration in the present case, which ought not to be lost sight of, that, supposing 
these African Negroes not to be slaves, but kidnapped, and free Negroes, the treaty with 
Spain cannot be obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to respect their 
rights as much as those of Spanish subjects.‖   The Court allowed the slaves to be 
returned to their homeland in Africa.  In the absence of a positive law against mutiny, 
natural law controlled and the Africans were not accused of any crime.  Further, as 
victims of kidnapping, they were not subject to a positive Spanish or international law 
that allowed slavery.  Therefore, Justice Story was able to rule in favor of the African 
slaves.  The supremacy of positive law was affirmed, but the appeal to natural law as the 
residual was also upheld.   
 
The Market Economy versus a Paternalistic Society 
Just as slave law posed a seemingly irreconcilable dichotomy between natural and 
positive law, the issue of slavery also created a conflict between the status of the slave as 
fungible property and his status as a human.  Southern judges wrestled to create a code of 
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slave law that accommodated the competing pressures posed by the economic 
designation of the slave as property and the moral concerns inherent to the slave who was 
a human being.  Legal historian Mark Tushnet‘s argues that Southern judges wrestled to 
accommodate the prevailing bourgeois economic system with the paternalistic social 
system of slavery.  His compelling argument is worth reviewing because it provides 
insight into how Southern judges treated human property.  
Tushnet contends that the bourgeois economic system, which was the accepted 
doctrine of the North, was based on employer/employee relations in a capitalistic system.  
In this system, the employer is unconcerned with the personal life of the employee except 
to the extent that the personal life affects the employee‘s productivity.  The value of the 
employee is quantifiable in terms of labor units and all other aspects of the employee‘s 
life are inconsequential to the employer.  On the other hand, the involvement of a master 
in the lives of his slaves is total because he is responsible not only for the productivity of 
slaves but for their wellbeing because problems in the personal lives of slaves could lead 
to rebellion.
121
  Further, as Patterson describes, the slave was stripped of all identity and 
was natally alienated.  Although the slave could be conceived as a person, he was not part 
of the ―people‖ within the community.  Thus, a slave came to be integrated through the 
master.  His only claim to personhood and status came from his master.
122
  Although the 
master used the slave to produce wealth, the relations within the society were social as 
well as economic.  Transactions between the master and slave took into account all belief, 
feeling, and sentiment between the two parties.  This included production, but also 
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included the entire spectrum of the slave‘s being including family life and religious 
activity.  The master‘s domination of the slave could not be reduced to simple market 
terms.  
Thus there is a dichotomy.  The capitalistic economic system was individualistic, 
impersonal, and based strictly on the value of labor.  The social system of slavery was 
paternalistic, intimately personal, and encompassed every aspect of life for the master and 
slave.  Southern justices participated in both of these worlds and accordingly had to 
reconcile the differences.  Cotton produced by the South was traded in the market of the 
capitalistic system which meant that many issues that arose would involve the market 
economy.  Further judges had to abide by the politics of the federal government which in 
large part were based on the market economy.  At the same time, the reality of the 
Southern slave system was that it was inextricably bound up with the complete social 
system of slave society.  Interpreting slave law in purely economic terms was impossible.  
Therefore, Tushnet argues that Southern judges referred to both the property and the 
humanity of the slave within opinions even though it would seem as though these two 
designations were not compatible.
 123
   
As Southern courts were forced to assimilate the social system of slavery with the 
economic system of law, they also faced a societal dilemma of incorporating a non-
person into a body of law designed for persons.  Because slaves were primarily seen as 
the property of the master, the courts used commercial law to decide most cases.  While a 
monetary award for damages generally satisfied concerned parties in most cases, slaves 
posed a significant issue because they were not completely fungible commodities in this 
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sense.  Masters developed sentiments toward their human slaves which made them more 
valuable in the master‘s estimation.  Further, human qualities such as rational ability and 
intelligence, which were difficult to measure, altered the economic value of the slave.  
The economic value of the slave as property was not easily reconciled with the rational 
ability and sentimentality of the slave as a human.  While court opinions rarely stated this 
dichotomy openly, the conflict can be found in many opinions.   
The reality is that the law tended to reflect the will of the most politically coherent 
and determined faction of the ruling class.  Because the master class was politically 
powerful, their economic interests prevailed and the property of the slave was upheld.  
Even though many masters recognized the humanity of their slaves, the law‘s 
sponsorship of the property value allowed masters to treat their slaves as purely property 
and completely dehumanize their slaves in practice.
124
  Human qualities such as 
intelligence and rational ability were factored into the property value of the slave rather 
than being acknowledged as criteria for personhood.  
 The struggle to reconcile the property aspect of the slave within the law and the 
humanity of the slave within a slave society is clearly illustrated in Jourdan v. Patton, 5 
Mart. O.S. 615 (1818) heard by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.  In this case, a slave 
who was owned for many years by the plaintiff was injured and blinded by a slave owned 
by the defendant.  The plaintiff sued for damages: $1,200 for the value of the slave, plus 
the amount of the medical bill for care already given to the slave, plus $25 a month for 
maintenance of the slave.  The slave was to remain forever in the possession of the 
plaintiff.  The Louisiana Supreme Court held that once the full value of the slave had 
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been paid, title should pass to the defendant because he had paid for the slave property, 
and the plaintiff was not entitled to funds for maintaining the slave.  This decision 
emphasized the absolute nature of the property involved.  The court opinion stated, ―The 
principles of humanity, which would lead us to suppose that the mistress, whom he had 
long served, would treat her miserable, blind slave with more kindness than the 
defendant, to whom the judgment ought to transfer him, cannot be taken into 
consideration, in deciding this case.‖
125
  Deconstructing this sentence, the Court first 
acknowledges the issues of sentiment.  The mistress would most likely provide the best 
care for the slave since familiar relations connected them.  However, the rules of law 
(based on economics and not sentiment) precluded familiar relations from having any 
bearing on the case.  As a piece of property, the defendant was entitled to the slave once 
he had paid the market value.  The court thus found that there was no room for sentiment 
within the law. 
 In Virginia, Judge Brook also acknowledged the effect that a slave‘s humanity 
had on the law and on property values.  In Allen v. Freeland 24 Va. 170 (1825), Brook 
wrote, ―Slaves are not only property, but they are rational beings, and entitled to the 
humanity of the Court, when it can be exercised without invading the right of property; 
and as regards the owner, their value is much enhanced by the mutual attachment of 
master and slave; a value which cannot enter the calculation of damages by a jury.‖  (24 
Va. 170, 178-9)  Instead of seeing a conflict between property and sentiment, Judge 
Brook finds an extra economic value in slaves who possess familiar relations with their 
master.  Traits such as loyalty, good behavior, and proper training enhanced the property 
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value of the slave.  Brooks recognized that as rational beings, slaves should be treated 
with humanity.  However, this humanity can only be exercised without invading the 
owner‘s property right; clearly, for Brooks, the property value is much more important 
than the slave‘s humanity.  
Another Virginia case, Randolph v. Randolph 27 Va. 194 (1828), echoes the 
importance of human qualities in calculating property value.  Judge Cabell wrote, ―Slaves 
are rational beings, and, as such, have moral qualities, which are calculated to render 
them of peculiar value in the estimation of their masters. … Moreover, slaves are human 
beings; and therefore, I do not think that even their attachments and feelings are to be 
disregarded‖ (27 Va. 194, 202).  Judge Green concurred arguing that although a jury 
cannot adequately quantify the personal attachments between the master and a slave, 
when a slave is sold, the market value measures the value of the slave. 
 The human qualities of chattel slaves became an important issue in many cases.  
As is seen in Randolph, placing a monetary value on a slave‘s character meant that even 
when a slave was viewed as a person, the property aspect intruded.  Judge Nott in South 
Carolina warned that allowing slave buyers to have a warranty on the slave‘s moral 
qualities would be ―worse than opening Pandora‘s Box upon the community‖  Smith v. 
McCall 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 220, 224 (1821).  Judge Nott wrote this because if the 
courts considered the character of a slave, they were in effect admitting that the slave was 
a person and not simple chattel.  Thus, this was the opening of Pandora‘s Box to allow 
the slave to be a person in other circumstances.  In various cases, witnesses told stories 
about slaves running away from a cruel master or seeking to join their family members.  
When testimony explicitly recognized human motivations and intentions, the stories were 
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often weeded out of court transcripts in fear of giving legal recognition to slaves as moral 
agents with volition.
126
   
 The antebellum legal system throughout the states was very careful to ensure that 
the commodity aspect of the slave was upheld and personhood suppressed.  For example, 
the slave had no ―right‖ to representation through an attorney because the slave had no 
legal identity or legal personhood.
127
  Furthermore, slave abduction was a property crime 
instead of kidnapping.  Kidnapping was legally defined as the unlawful abduction of 
another person.  Because the slave was not legally a person, he could not be kidnapped.
128
  
The case Neal v. Farmer 9 Ga. 555 (1851) heard by the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed 
that by definition, a slave could have no legal protection for rights and liberties because 
the slave did not have the status of person.  ―If it [Common Law] protects the life of the 
slave, why not his liberty? And if it protects his liberty, then it breaks down, at once the 
status of the slave. …It is absurd to talk about the Common Law being applicable to an 
institution which it would destroy‖ (9 Ga. 555, 579).  The Georgia Supreme Court 
essentially ruled that if a slave was granted liberties, this would destroy his status as a 
non-person, and if a slave were acknowledged as a person, then the institution of slavery 
would de facto be destroyed.  Thus, in an effort to uphold the institution of slavery which 
was part of Georgia‘s Common Law, the Georgia Supreme Court denied legal 
protections, rights, and liberties to slaves.   
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Even William Goodell agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court.  He argued that a 
slave, by definition, could not have political rights and liberties.  ―Not being accounted a 
person, but a thing, he can have no personal rights to be protected–no rights of reputation 
or character–no right to education–no rights of conscience–no political capabilities or 
rights–not even the right of petition, as the Federal Congress (very consistently with its 
recognition of legal human chattelhood) have affirmed.‖
129
  Of course, Goodell was 
vehemently against slavery, and therefore he sought an end to slavery so that these 
human beings could enjoy the rights and liberties that Goodell felt should be guaranteed 
to all humans.  Unfortunately, Goodell‘s views were not commonly shared among judges 
in the South.  Turning to North Carolina, a case decided five years after Neal v. Farmer 
affirms that slaves had no rights in that state.   
 In 1856, Judge Nash, presiding on North Carolina‘s Supreme Court, found that a 
slave did not have the capacity to sign a promissory note.  He opined, ―Under our system 
of laws a slave can make no contract. In the nature of things, he cannot.  He is, in 
contemplation of law, not a person for that purpose.  He has no legal capacity to make a 
contract.  He has no legal mind.  He is the property of his master‖ (Batten v. Faulk, 49 
N.C. 233, 233).  This judgment unequivocally stated that a slave was not a person under 
the law who was able to enjoy rights such entering legal agreements.  Instead, Nash 
unambiguously ruled that a slave was property.   
 Decided the same year that Judge Nash issued his opinion in North Carolina‘s 
Supreme Court the most infamous case denying the personhood of the slave was Justice 
Taney‘s U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. 393 (1856) in 
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which Taney left no doubt that the slave was property and not a person nor a citizen.  
This case concerned the slave Dred Scott who sued to win recognition as a free man, a 
citizen of Missouri, and a citizen of the United States.  Scott argued that he gained his 
freedom when his master took him to the free states of Illinois and Wisconsin for two and 
four years respectively.  The Missouri Court and the US Circuit Court for Missouri both 
heard the case which in itself was significant because as a slave, Scott did not have the 
right to sue.  In fact, this grant of jurisdiction comprises half of Taney‘s opinion.  Taney 
wrote, ―The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this 
country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and 
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become 
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to 
the citizen?‖ (60 U.S. 393, 403) Taney answered no.  
 In a stunning example of using Dennett‘s third condition of personhood, which 
states that ―Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude 
taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it,‖ Taney argued that the community 
did not recognize or acknowledge slaves in the community of persons and citizens.
130
  
Because his words explicitly deny the status of personhood and citizen to slaves, Taney‘s 
statement, although lengthy, deserves to be quoted.  
The words ―people of the United States‖ and ―citizens‖ are synonymous 
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body 
who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and 
who hold the power and conduct the Government through their 
representatives.  They are what we familiarly call the ―sovereign people,‖ 
and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this 
sovereignty.  The question before us is, whether the class of persons 
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described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and 
are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and 
that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the 
word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the 
rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to 
citizens of the United States.  On the contrary, they were at that time 
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been 
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet 
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but 
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to 
grant them (60 U.S. 393, 404-405). 
 
Although Taney conceded that the states had the power to confer citizenship on 
whomever it thought proper, the states could not bestow national citizenship under the 
Constitution on a group of persons who were not embraced in the political family when 
the Constitution was written.  Taney repeatedly uses the word ―family‖ to convey his 
theme of those included and excluded as citizens.  His historical exegesis of the 
Declaration of Independence revealed that slaves were ―beings of an inferior 
order…justly and lawfully reduced to slavery for his benefit‖ (60 U.S. 393, 407).  Thus, 
enslaved Africans were not included in the Declaration‘s preamble ―all men are created 
equal.‖  Taney concludes that the esteemed men who drafted the Declaration chose their 
words carefully and only considered slaves as property rather than persons or citizens.  
Taney‘s further analysis of the Constitution confirmed his argument that slaves were 
simply property and not part of the people of the United States.  Slaves were a means to 
an end rather than persons.  Thus, Taney ruled that blacks could not be citizens in any 
sense, and the Dred Scott was not free.  
 Justice Daniel concurred with Taney arguing that it was a fundamental truth that 
the African race did not belong to the ―family of nations‖ and that all of Europe regarded 
the African race as ―subjects of capture or purchase; as subjects of commerce or traffic; 
… as property in the strictest sense of the term‖ (60 U.S. 393, 475). Further, Daniel states 
112 
 
that the African was not deemed a political person in the states or the Federal 
Government.  
In his dissent, Justice Curtis argued that free Africans are citizens and persons, but 
in doing so, he acknowledged that as long as the binds of slavery apply, the slave is not a 
person.  Justice McLean‘s dissent argued that slaves are explicitly referred to as 
―persons‖ in the Constitution and thus must be considered persons.  However, he did not 
elaborate on his argument in favor of full personhood for slaves, and the much louder 
arguments of Justice Taney and the majority court against African personhood and 
citizenship won the day.  
 
The Unfettered Right of a Master to his Property 
 
Dred Scott set forth in no uncertain terms that the law considered the slave to be 
property rather a person.  Considerations pertaining to the slave‘s humanness were not 
valid concerns when adjudicating a master‘s right to his property.  In fact, the entire 
system of slavery rested on the assumption that property rights had primacy in the 
American legal system and therefore, the master had an unfettered right to treat his 
property in any manner that he or she desired.  This assumption was important in the 
sometimes thorny cases involved when a slave was abused or murdered by the master.   
The murder of slaves was directly related to the personhood of slaves because if 
considered purely property, a slave was not a person who could be murdered.  In a very 
few cases, a master or other citizen who wantonly killed a slave was convicted of murder.  
However, in many other cases where masters killed their slaves, the law found that either 
a lesser crime such as homicide was committed or even that no crime at all was 
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committed.  The master had the power to control and dispose of his property as he saw fit 
– even to the point of killing his slave.  Violence against a slave was not a crime against 
the person of the slave but was a crime against the property of the slave owner.   
One unusual case concerning the killing of a slave in Mississippi gave the 
impression that the personhood of a slave was sometimes considered.  In State v. Jones 1 
Miss. 83, (1820), the master claimed that he was innocent of murdering his slave because 
slaves were not persons who could be murdered.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi 
disagreed and reasoned that because a slave was rational and could be convicted of 
crimes based on his rational ability, then the slave was also a person who could be 
murdered.  The court stated, ―By the provisions of our law, a slave may commit murder, 
and be punished with death; why then is it not murder to kill a slave?...Is not a slave a 
reasonable creature, is he not a human being, and the meaning of this phrase reasonable 
creature is a human being, for the killing of a lunatic, an idiot, or even a child unborn, is 
murder, as much as the killing a philosopher, and has not the slave as much reason as a 
lunatic, an idiot or an unborn child?‖ (1 Miss. 83, 85)   
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court does not phase its argument in terms of 
personhood, the court is essentially repeating some of the arguments for personhood 
presented in Chapter One‘s literature review.  The court is saying that rational creatures 
should have protection under the law because rational creatures are, in essence, persons.  
Furthermore, the law protects lunatics, idiots, and unborn children even though they are 
not rational persons.  A slave is at least as reasonable as a lunatic, idiot, or unborn child, 
and therefore deserves protection even if society does not acknowledge the fact that 
slaves are rational persons.  Furthermore, the court recognized that if the slave was 
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capable of committing murder as a rational person, then the court must also recognize the 
murder of a slave as a murder of a person.  
 This opinion by the Mississippi Supreme Court was progressive among southern 
courts.  However, State v. Mann 13 N.C. 263 (1829) decided by North Carolina‘s 
Supreme Court gives a more accurate picture of the prevailing reasoning of the time.  In 
most states, the master had virtually complete control over the discipline of his slave 
property to the point of ―disposing‖ of this property.  The most infamous and well-
studied case declaring the absolute right of the master over the slave was State [North 
Carolina] v. Mann.
131
  In this case, Elizabeth Jones hired out her slave Lydia to John 
Mann.  When Lydia tried to escape from Mann, he shot and wounded Lydia.  Mann was 
charged with assault and battery, and Jones demanded 1200 dollars in damage for the 
value of the slave and sought to retain possession of the slave from Mann. 
When Judge Ruffin wrote the North Carolina‘s Supreme Court opinion, he first 
expressed deep remorse over the horrors of slavery claiming that a slave was ―doomed in 
his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to 
make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits‖ (13 N.C. 263, 266).  
Although Ruffin expressed his remorse, he found that the law declared that the slave had 
―no will of his own [and surrendered] his will in implicit obedience to that of another.  
Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body.  There 
is nothing else that can operate to produce the effect.  The power of the master must be 
absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect‖  (13 N.C. 263, 266).  Further, 
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Ruffin admonished, ―The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no 
appeal from his master‖ (13 N.C. 263, 267).  Although Ruffin used the word ―person‖ in 
his opinion, he by no means meant that the slave was a legal person in the sense of a 
being with rights and duties.  Ruffin‘s definition of the slave is straight from that 
Immanuel Kant.  While Kant opposed slavery because it subjects a human to the total 
control of another human and therefore denies personhood, Ruffin accepts the condition 
of slavery as a sad, but undeniable fact.   
Ruffin‘s opinion demonstrates the dichotomy between the requirements of a 
market economy and the social system of slavery.  Jones sought monetary damages and 
to retain possession of the slave.  If Jones considered slave Lydia to be simply property, 
she would not want to incur the continued expense to maintaining the article of property. 
For instance, when damaged equipment constitutes a financial drain on the owner, the 
owner generally is allowed to abandon the equipment to a junk yard.  This would not due 
for human property.  Further, Jones would rather incur expenses herself than allow Mann 
to retain possession of Lydia which signals that Jones feared that Mann would continue to 
abuse Lydia.  Jones believed that Lydia was more than just an article of property and 
recognized that Lydia was a human who suffered in unique ways.  This reveals the 
sentimental attachments that formed with this unique human property that cannot be 
captured in purely market terms.  Despite the tensions between the economic and social 
spheres, Judge Ruffin ultimately ruled that Lydia was simply property and that Mann was 
not liable for injury to a person. Thus the issue of Lydia‘s retention was moot because she 
returned to her owner without any compensation. 
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Over thirty years later, the fact that slavery absolutely denied personhood was still 
the predominant view.  The case Oliver v. State 39 Miss. 526 decided by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court in 1860 echoed the State v. Mann decision.  ―If the Master, in the exercise 
of lawful authority, in a lawful manner, be resisted by his slave, then the master may use 
just such force as may be requisite to reduce his slave to obedience, even to the death of 
the slave, if that become necessary to preserve the master‘s life, or to maintain his lawful 
authority‖ (39 Miss. 526, 540).  Interestingly, the circuit court who originally heard the 
case compared the death of a slave from lawful correction to that of a parent correcting a 
child.  This comparison speaks to the paternalistic treatment of the slave and highlights 
that children were subject to the control of their ―master‖ without full autonomy granted 
to persons.   
The Oliver v. State opinion emphasized the consistent and enduring view across 
Southern states that the slave was simply property to be disposed of at the master‘s will.  
The slave was not a person in any legal or moral sense.  The view of most southern state 
courts was that the relationship between a master and slave was primarily a private 
relationship based on property that was beyond the scope of the judicial system.  The 
slave could not appeal to the courts in cases of abuse by a master because the slave had 
no legal right to the judicial system.   
 
A Slight Exception to Unrestricted Use of Slave Property – Third Party Cases 
 A notable exception to unrestricted use of slaves occurred when abuse by a third 
party harmed the master‘s property or when a medical injury to a slave devalued the 
master‘s property.  In these cases, the slave had some protections under the law, but as 
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will be seen from the following cases, the true intent of the law was to protect the 
master‘s property rather than the person of the slave.  Jumping backwards 
chronologically, there are several cases that illustrate these exceptions.  In all of these 
cases, the slave remained simple property and a non-person within the judicial system 
with no recourse to the law.    
 The issue of third party harm was an interesting subcategory of slave property law 
because, unlike when the master harmed a slave and the slave had to recourse to the law, 
in third party cases, the laws served to protect the slave but only in order to protect the 
property element of the slave.  Because the slave was property, a third-party hirer of this 
property was allowed to use this property as needed.  However, just as a renter of a house 
is subject to penalty for destroying the owner‘s property, a hirer of slave property was 
subject to penalty when the slave was destroyed.  Slaves were extremely valuable 
property for the master, and masters used their political power to create tougher laws 
against the physical harm of their slaves by third parties.   
 In State v. Hale (1823) 2 Hawk. N.C. Rep. 582, North Carolina Supreme Court 
Chief Judge Taylor began his opinion concerning the injury of a slave by equating slaves 
to animals.  Although the master had an absolute right to punish his slave without court 
interference, just as he could any animal on his land, the master‘s property must be 
protected from abuse by a third party.  He wrote,  
For all purposes necessary to enforce the obedience of the slave, and to 
render him useful as property, the law secures to the master a complete 
authority over him, and it will not lightly interfere with the relation just 
established.  It is a more effectual guarantee of this right to property when 
the slave is protected from wanton abuse from those who have no power 
over him; for it cannot be disputed that a slave is rendered less capable of 
performing his master‘s service when he finds himself exposed by the law 
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to the capricious violence of every turbulent man in the community State 
v. Hale, (2 Hawk. N.C. Rep. 582, 585). 
 
As Judge Taylor carefully explained, third party protection of the slave was simply to 
protect the master‘s right to property.  The slave himself still had no real recourse for 
protection from abuse.  Thus, although third party protection did protect the slave from 
harm to a certain extent, the foundation of these laws in protecting the master‘s property 
rights truly did not differ from other laws that upheld the master‘s absolute control over 
his slave property.  Similarly, Judge O‘Neall wrote on the South Carolina Court of 
Appeals in Tennent v. Dendy (1837), ―slaves are our most valuable property.  For its 
preservation, too many guards cannot be interposed between it and violent, unprincipled 
men‖ (23 S.C.L. 35, 36).  As O‘Neall clearly states, slaves had to be protected from 
violence due to their property value rather than their human or moral value.   
 Just as third parties were liable for any damages they inflicted on a master‘s slave 
property, third parties were also responsible for taking care of slave property in instances 
of medical problems.  In general, masters took extremely good care of the medical needs 
of their slave property to ensure that the slaves were productive.  In fact, historian Peter 
Kolchin claims that most slaves received medical care that exceeded most Southern 
whites, and slaves saw physicians much more frequently than whites.
132
   However, a 
third party hirer, as a temporary user of the slave‘s services, did not have the long term 
health of a slave in mind.  Therefore, it was not assured that a hirer would provide 
necessary medical treatment.  In order to protect the master‘s slave property while under 
the control of a third party, the law held that when a slave became ill while under the care 
of a third party, the hirer was responsible for all medical costs.   
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The case Hogan v. Carr & Anderson, 6 Ala. 471, (1844) decided by Alabama‘s 
Supreme Court, aptly illustrates this situation.  In this case, a slave injured his leg while 
under the third party hire of Mr. Carr.  Carr did not provide medical care to the slave, and 
the untreated wound became so infected that the slave‘s life was endangered.  The 
master, Hogan, retrieved the slave and provided treatment.  Carr sued for breach of 
contract.  When the case reached the Alabama Supreme Court, Judge John Ormond found 
that a hirer had an obligation to treat a slave humanely and provide medical care when 
needed just as a hirer had an obligation to treat a horse humanely.  Ormond‘s ruling was 
consistent with other rulings that protected the value of a master‘s property.  Comparing a 
slave to a horse was an analogy typically used in the antebellum South to describe the 
property aspect of slavery.   
A similar case was heard by Georgia‘s Supreme Court a few years later.  The case 
Lennard v. Boynton, 11 Ga. 109, (1852) involved a third party, Frances Lennard, who 
was renting the labor of a slave from Thomas Boynton.  During the rental period of one 
year, the slave died from illness.  The master, Boynton, claimed that he could still collect 
the $100 due for entire one-year contract.  When the case reached the Georgia Supreme 
Court, Judge Lumpkin agreed arguing that the death of the slave was not the fault of 
Boynton and Lennard had entered into the agreement knowing the risk that the slave 
could succumb to illness.  Furthermore, if a third party did not have to assume any risks 
in a contract, then there would be great temptation for a hirer to abuse a slave and exploit 
a master‘s property by allowing a slave to be devalued by poor health.  Accordingly, 
Judge Lumpkin addressed both the obligations of the master and the hirer in his opinion.   
Humanity to this dependent and subordinate class of our population 
requires, that we should remove from the hirer or temporary owner, all 
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temptation to neglect them in sickness, or to expose them to situations of 
unusual peril and jeopardy.  We say to them, go, and they must go; stay, 
and they must stay; whether it be on the railroads, the mines, the infected 
districts or any where else.  Let us not increase their danger, by making it 
the interest of the hirer to get rid of his contract, when it proves to be 
unprofitable.  Every safeguard, consistent with the stability of the 
institution of slavery, should be thrown around the lives of these people.  
For myself, I verily believe, that the best security for the permanence of 
slavery, is adequate and ample protection to the slave, at our own hands.  
Lennard v. Boynton, 11 Ga. 109, 113 (1852) 
 
Thus, if hirers were allowed to neglect the slave and allow the slave to die from disease 
or starvation in order to evade a contract, the system of slavery faced instability.  
Although he mentions the importance of humanity, Lumpkin‘s concern was to maintain 
the southern slave system rather than to acknowledge the human needs of the slave.   
 Both Hogan v. Carr & Anderson and Lennard v. Boynton reveal the underlying 
motives for protecting the slave‘s welfare.  Not only was private property at stake, but 
devaluing property by allowing slaves to starve and be mistreated threatened the entire 
institution of slavery.  As will be seen in Chapter Five, the motive of most animal welfare 
laws is to protect the human owners of animals and society at large.  In the same way, 
welfare laws for slaves were predominantly designed to protect the institution of slavery 
and the welfare of the state rather than the welfare of the slave.   
 
Recognition of Rational Ability 
 
Third party issues were also relevant in wrongful death cases when a slave 
accidentally died on the job.  A number of cases arose when slaves were killed while 
being hired out to the railroads.  When a dispute of negligent homicide occurred, the 
master‘s claim of a property loss was countered by the railroad‘s claim that the slave as a 
rational person could have avoided injury.  In these cases, the courts considered that 
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although the slave was a valuable piece of property to the master, the slave also possessed 
volition and mobility as a rational being.  Free workers on the railroads generally had 
difficulty winning wrongful death and personal injury suits because they did not have the 
means to pursue a lawsuit against powerful corporations such as the railroads.  However, 
plantation owners had both the means and the will to litigate, and slave law in this area 
was more settled and generally more carefully reasoned than in other areas of law.   
The courts often swerved in their favorable treatment of transportation interests in 
favor of the politically powerful master class.
133
  Again, the private property interests of 
the masters were dominant.  Many states required railroads to fence their land in order to 
avoid injury to livestock, another valuable form of property for plantation owners.
134
  In 
the same way, railroads had to safeguard slave property.  Judges borrowed from the laws 
of livestock and free people to create this new category of legal precedent.  Because 
slaves were property, laws must be upheld to protect the viability of the slave market.  
Hiring a slave generated the same rights and responsibilities as hiring a work animal such 
as a horse or mule.  However, because slaves were human, they could avoid accidents 
more easily than animals.  Because slaves were expected to behave rationally, owners 
sometimes failed to win damages for injuries.  For instance, a railroad was liable for any 
cow that was hit on the track.  Nevertheless, railroads did not always compensate slave 
owners for the negligent death of a slave who was hit by a train because the slave was 
able to sufficiently reason and protect himself from danger.  Thus, in these cases, the 
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rational ability of the slave was considered in order to rule that the slave was not 
protected.   
A Maryland circuit court ruled that an 1846 statute that compensated owners of 
stock animals that was injured or killed by trains did not include slaves.  ―Negroes were 
intentionally omitted because of their greater capacity to avoid such dangers than stock‖ 
(Scaggs v. R.R., 10 Md 268, 278 (1856).  North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Battle 
reasoned that slaves differed from other property such as a cow or even a wooden log in 
their ability to reason.  ―In the care which is to be taken of a slave, he is to be considered 
an intelligent being, with a strong sense of self-preservation, and capable of using the 
property means for keeping out of, or escaping from, scenes of danger‖ (Couch v. Jones 4 
Jones 402, 408 N.C. 1857). 
Although the courts found that the rational capacities of the slave set him apart 
from other animals, this did not affect his status as a non-person.  As a human, he was 
simply a piece of property with special abilities.  Thus, although the courts did 
acknowledge the slave as a rational agent, the courts were very careful to avoid drawing 
the conclusion that, as rational agents, slaves must be persons.  Literary studies expert 
Arthur Riss argues, ‗[r]ather than inevitably foregrounding the logical contraction at the 
heart of slavery, the recognition that the slave is ‗not in the condition of a horse or an ox‘ 
marks the extent to which the logic slavery does not inevitably shatter when it hits the 
bedrock of the slave‘s resemblance to ‗persons.‘‖
135
  Although the master did not always 
win his case, when the master was successful, the victim who was compensated in the 
lawsuit was always the master, not the slave.  The slave‘s family never received any type 
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of compensation.  Thus, although the slave‘s ability to reason set him apart from other 
types of chattel, his status was confirmed as property.   
 An interesting subset of employment cases includes a set of ―lemon laws.‖  The 
domestic slave market was an important aspect of slave society and maintaining its 
integrity was essential for economic viability.  Slave sellers had the responsibility to 
guarantee the quality of their merchandise.  This responsibility was greater within the 
slave market than the cattle market because slaves could talk and therefore sellers knew 
more about the slaves‘ health and well-being than did owners of cattle.  If the slave was 
not as skilled or productive as the seller guaranteed, the buyer did not have the option of 
lowering wages or firing the slave.  A slave buyer with no legal recourse may have tried 
to unload the slave on another unsuspecting buyer.  This would ultimately undermine the 
legitimacy of the slave market.   Thus the courts did not uphold the ―buyer beware‖ rule 
in slave cases.  Instead, rules shielded buyers and protected them from purchasing 
―lemon‖ slaves.   
 An example of the lemon law is Kirk v. James 29 Miss. 206 (1855).  A Louisiana 
law from 1834 allowed a purchaser to recover damages if a slave ran away within two 
months of sale and there was no evidence of unusual punishment.  When Kirk‘s slave ran 
away after three days, he effectively sued stating that the slave was defective and had a 
vice that made him escape.  The slave‘s rational decision to escape was a ―defect,‖ and 
the motivation to run away was not attributed to the master and the horrific conditions of 
slavery, but was seen as a deficiency in the property.  This case illustrated that the law 
shielded the rights of the masters rather than the slave as a human person.  Unlike a horse 
that could not plot to runaway, the slave‘s rational ability, when a detriment to the master, 
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was viewed as a particular problem in his property value rather than a sign of the slave‘s 
personhood.   
 
The Criminal Law of Slaves 
 
 The law rarely acknowledged the ―character‖ of the slave in fear that Pandora‘s 
Box would be opened to acknowledge the personhood of the slave.  However, a major 
exception was within criminal law.  For criminal matters, a slave was held culpable for 
his crimes and deficiencies in character were acknowledged.  If a slave was not a person 
with rational abilities and volition, then logically, society could not hold the slave 
responsible for his or her crimes.  When a slave injured a third party, someone had to be 
held criminally responsible – either the master or the slave.  This problem forced the 
courts to recognize that slaves as humans could commit crimes and must be considered 
legal persons who were culpable.  Whereas in other types of cases, the real party at 
interest was the master and not the slave, in criminal cases the master‘s responsibility 
could not extend to the mens rea or guilty mind of the slave.  Thus, the slave had to be 
held liable.  Goodell stated, ―The slave, who is but ‗a chattel‟ on all other occasions, with 
not one solitary attribute of personality accorded to him, become ‗a person‟ whenever he 
is to be punished!‖
136
  Orlando Patterson‘s survey of slave societies throughout the world 
found that although the slave had no will beyond that of the master, in no slave society 
was the master held responsible for his slave‘s criminal actions.
137
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The Federal Case of United States v. Amy 24 F. Case 792 (1859) became one of 
the most famous cases directly concerning the personhood of the slave.  Slave Amy was 
accused of stealing mail.  However, the law stated that if any person shall steal or take 
any letter from the mail, or any post-office, the offender shall, upon conviction thereof, 
be imprisoned for not less than two but no more than ten years.  Thus, the counsel for 
Amy argued that a slave was not a person but was the property of the master.  Because 
the law only spoke of persons without reference to the property of the master, Amy as a 
slave could not be punished.  Justice Taney, sitting on Virginia‘s circuit court, found that 
while a slave was not a citizen entitled to rights and duties, in criminal matters, slaves 
were persons under the law.  After analyzing the Constitutional references to slavery, 
Taney concluded that in this realm of the law slaves were always referred to as persons.  
―It is true that a slave is the property of the master, and his right of property is recognized 
and secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and it is equally true 
that he is not a citizen, and would not be embraced in a law operating upon that class of 
persons.  Yet, he is a person, and is always spoken of and described as such in the state 
papers and public acts of the United States.‖ (24 F. Case 792, 809)  Taney continued 
arguing,  
In expounding this law, we must not lose sight of the two-fold character 
which belongs to the slave.  He is a person, and also property.  As 
property, the rights of the owner are entitled to the protection of the law.  
As a person, he is bound to obey the law, and may, like any other person, 
be punished if he offends against it; and he may be embraced in the 
provisions of the law, either by the description of property or as a person, 
according to the subject matter upon which congress or a state is 
legislating (24 F. Case 792, 810). 
 
 Taney‘s opinion epitomizes the law‘s tendency to uphold the character of the 
slave as a person only when advantageous to white, plantation society and upholding the 
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value of the slave as property the rest of the time.  However, because punishment, and 
especially capital punishment, deprived the master of his property, owners began to 
demand greater safeguards for their property.  Due process rights such as trial by jury and 
the right of appeal began to appear in capital cases involving slaves.  These due process 
rights, although invoked for the slave, ultimately were designed to protect the master.
138
   
In Alabama, an emancipation case highlighted the dual nature of a slave to be 
denied personhood to make legal choices but to be treated as persons when guilty of a 
crime.  Creswell‟s Executer v. Walker 37 Ala. 229 (1861) involved John Creswell, who in 
his will, designated that his slaves could choose freedom or slavery.  In choosing 
freedom, they would be sent to Liberia.  In choosing slavery, they would be sent to his 
daughter Zeuly Walker where they would be treated kindly.  The slaves chose freedom, 
and Zeuly Walker brought the case claiming that slaves did not have the legal capacity to 
make such a choice and therefore must remain as slaves.  Justice Walker for the Alabama 
Supreme Court stated the question at hand as, ―Can a master, by his will, clothe his slaves 
with the irrevocable power of determining and changing, by an uncontrollable act of their 
will, their own civil status?‖ (37 Ala. 229, 233)  Justice Walker answered by saying the 
slaves were unequivocally property and not persons in respect to their civil status.  His 
reasoning is worth extensive quoting.   
So far as their civil status is concerned, slaves are mere property, and their 
condition is that of absolute civil incapacity.  Being, in respect of all civil 
rights and relations, not persons, but things, they are incapable of owning 
property, or of performing any civil legal act, by which the property of 
others can be alienated, or the relations of property, or the legal duties or 
trusts in regard thereto, in any wise affected (37 Ala. 229, 233). 
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According to the legal conception of slavery, as it exists in the southern 
States, a human being endowed with civil rights cannot be a slave.  The 
possession of these rights is incompatible with the condition of slavery, 
and any attempt to confer them upon a slave, durante servitute, is an effort 
to accomplish what is legally impossible (37 Ala. 229, 235). 
 
After ruling that slaves are merely things without the capacity to make civil decisions that 
comes with personhood, Justice Walker quickly qualifies his argument by conceding that 
slaves are legal persons when guilty of a crime and thus must be punished as persons.  He 
wrote, 
Being endowed with intelligence, conscience, and volition, they are 
deemed capable of committing crime; and the same public policy which, 
so far as the performance of civil acts is concerned, refuses to consider 
them as persons, gives them a criminal status, and recognizes them as 
persons in respect of acts involving criminal responsibility.  Because they 
are rational human beings, they are capable of committing crimes; and, in 
reference to acts that are crimes, are regarded as persons.  Because they 
are slaves, they are necessarily, and, so long as they remain slaves, 
incurably, incapable of performing civil acts; and, in reference to all such, 
they are things, not persons. (37 Ala. 229, 236)   
 
Justice Walker cogently summarized the status of slaves.  In respect to their civil status 
and the accompanying rights and duties, slaves were mere property – things not persons. 
However, as rational beings capable of committing crimes, they were granted personhood 
so that they could be found culpable and punished for their actions.  Thus, the slave was 
only allowed the status of person when it benefited the master class rather than the slave.  
 
Dawn of a New Era 
 
 The same year that the Alabama Supreme Court decided Creswell v. Walker, the 
Civil War broke out largely over the issue of slavery.  From the colonial period to the 
middle of the nineteen century, non-slave holders began to change their conceptualization 
128 
 
of slavery.  These Americans stressed that slaves, as human beings, were persons rather 
than property.  This change in mindset from property to person allowed Americans to 
consider the rights of slaves and blacks in general.  Constitutional law professor Earl 
Maltz writes, ―Once blacks were conceptualized as people, then their entitlement to these 
rights followed ineluctably.  Hence, the core of the antebellum Republican position was 
simply that blacks were people rather than property.‖
139
 
 As the Civil War was drawing to a close, Congress passed the Thirteenth 
Amendment abolishing slavery.  Although the specific wording of the Amendment did 
not mention ―persons‖ or ―property,‖ a review of the Congressional debates over its 
passage reveal that its intent was to abolish the concept of property in a human being.  
Ever loyal to the concept of slave property, several Senators, in particular Democratic 
Senators Powell of Kentucky, Saulsbury of Delaware, and Davis of Kentucky, argued 
that before slavery was abolished, slaveholders in loyal union states must be financially 
compensated for the loss of their property.
140
  This measure was not given substantial 
consideration in the Congress, but is important to note that the property aspect of the 
slave was contested right up to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
 The end of the Civil War marked a new era for American politics.  The North had 
won the War to preserve the Union and free the slaves.  Now the victorious party of 
President Lincoln could usher in its plan for emancipation and reconstruction.  While the 
South needed to be rebuilt, a primary focus of Republican Congressional leaders was to 
punish the South for treason.  Furthermore, in the short time since the end of the Civil 
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War, many southern states had enacted the notorious Black Codes that reduced the 
freedmen to virtual slaves and further enraged the North.  After passing the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Congress began to work on a plan to protect the newly freed blacks and 
eliminate the Black Codes.  This process was complicated, however, by the fact that the 
members of Congress widely disagreed on the rights and privileges afforded to blacks.  
Even though most Americans by the time of the Civil War conceded that blacks were 
persons and no longer property, citizenship for African Americans was widely debated.  
While many Radical Republicans advocated full political and civil rights for blacks as 
citizens, many others saw blacks as a separate caste of persons, inferior and degraded 
compared to the white race.  Even though blacks were persons, they were not full persons 
in the sense of status, rights, or liberties.  Thus, although the Fourteenth Amendment 
ostensibly granted all persons ―privileges and immunities‖ and the right of ―life, liberty 
and property,‖ blacks as a degraded class of persons still faced many of the same 
injustices that they faced when their status was mere property.  Additionally policy 
makers faced the issue of Federalism, which complicated plans to allow the Federal 
Government to implement programs in areas that had traditionally been the arena of the 
states.  An examination of the Congressional debates surrounding the Fourteenth 
Amendment reveals many of the problems facing the framers as they dealt with the new 
freed ―persons‖ entering into Union for first time.   
Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment do not often address the topic 
of personhood directly in the debates, the issue underlies much of the meaning of Section 
One of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Scholar Howard Jay Graham finds evidence of this 
through his study of Christian leaders such as James Birney, William Ellsworth, and 
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Theodore Weld who greatly influenced Republican Senator John Bingham, the primary 
author of Section One.  Birney condemned the practice of slavery because it was a denial 
of government protection to which all human beings were entitled by virtue of their 
humanity.  He argued that no matter the type of blood, Negro or Caucasian, the subject of 
debate was a human being.  Because all human beings owed allegiance to the state, 
government could not deny protection of natural rights.
141
  Human beings were 
automatically persons in Birney‘s view.  Weld demanded, ―persons be treated according 
to their intrinsic worth irrespective of color, shape condition or what not.‖
 142
  He found 
that it was degrading to other persons that Negroes were denied human status and refused 
personality.  These leaders were among the first to state their theories in terms of broad 
natural rights, human equality, equal law, reciprocal protection, and the ideal of reason.
143
   
Birney argued that slavery denied a person the fruits of government and the 
attributes of personhood.  In fact, Birney went so far as to construct a coherent counter 
theory to the predominant system of slaves as property rather than persons.  This counter 
theory utilized the wording and the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights to argue that all persons have a right to property and 
liberty in their own selves.  Because the Constitution called slaves ―persons‖ rather than 
―things,‖ slaves had a right to their selves as property, and no owner could take that 
property right away.  This argument was reminiscent of Locke‘s argument for property in 
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one‘s self.  Utilizing the Bill of Rights, he argued that Article Four, Section Four 
guarantees the right of people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable search 
and seizure.  Because he argued that slaves were persons, they could not be deprived of 
their earning by seizure.  Slavery robbed the person of both his property and person.   
This ingenious argument employed the very argument of property rights that 
slaveholders used, but attributed the property right to the slaves themselves.  Birney 
wrote, ―(Congress) should see that every person therein enjoys the right of property.  This 
is the very reason why Congress should abolish slavery.  The right of property is sacred.  
It belongs to every man.  Now, shall Congress continue to deprive one-fifth of the people 
of the District of their property because Virginia and Maryland did so before?‖
144
   
 These powerful arguments by Birney and his colleagues influenced John Bingham 
to such as extent that in an 1859 speech Bingham stated,  
I invite attention to the significant fact that natural or inherent rights, 
which belong to all men, irrespective of all conventional regulations are by 
this Constitution guaranteed by the broad and comprehensive word 
―person,‖ as contradistinguished from the limited term citizen – as in the 
fifth article of amendments, guarding those sacred rights which are 
universal and indestructible as the human race, that ‗no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, but by due process of law, nor shall 
private property be taken without just compensation.
145
   
 
 Other leaders in Congress also addressed the issue of personhood directly.  
Democrat Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland noted, ―Subject to the same complaints, 
cured by the same medicines, sustained by the same food, who could deny for a moment 
that the black man is a man and a human being; and if he be a man and a human being, 
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who can doubt for a moment that he is a ‗person?‘ ‖
146
  However, the status of 
personhood did not automatically entitle the free man to a bevy of political and civil 
rights.  Although moderate Republican Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York was 
fervently opposed to slavery, during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment he 
stated, ―A man, and yet not a man.  In flesh and blood alive; politically dead.‖  Now 
emancipated, ―they are not slaves, but they are not, in a political sense, ‗persons‘‖
147
  
Constitutional law scholar Earl Maltz argues that Bingham‘s and Conkling‘s 
opinions were typical of the antebellum Republican position which was a commitment to 
the idea that all men were equally entitled to a limited set of natural rights, whatever their 
condition or attributes and regardless of race.  However, this limited set of natural rights 
did not include all the legal rights and freedoms granted to white citizens.   Personhood 
for the African American was limited; they were not a part of the political ―We the 
People.‖ As one prominent Republican put it, with respect to natural rights – the rights to 
life, liberty and property – ―it is a question of manhood, not color.‖
148
  However, despite 
the rights entitled to every man, Republicans were careful to distinguish between limited 
and absolute equality.  Bingham fully supported limited equality for all persons, which 
included the minimum of protection for life, liberty, and property.  However, Bingham 
and other Republicans were careful to distinguish between a freedman‘s rights as a 
person and a freedman‘s rights as a citizen.   
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Citizenship was a thorny issue complicated by that fact that states traditionally 
had jurisdiction over granting citizenship.  Many post-Civil War leaders were very 
reluctant to grant citizenship to the freed slaves even though many had fought in the war.  
The distinction between ―person‖ and ―citizen‖ was very important because Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the life, liberty and property of all ―persons‖ but 
―citizens‖ were further guaranteed privileges and immunities.  Hence, attaining the status 
of ―citizen‖ was an important advance in terms of the rights conferred by the Fourteenth.  
As Maltz explains, ―even if no other benefits were conferred, designating a person a 
citizen meant that person was a member in good standing of political society.  Thus 
Democrats could effectively charge that on an important symbolic level, advocacy of 
black citizenship was equivalent to an assertion of racial equality.‖
149
  
Issues involving political rights were especially important because while 
Congress was debating the Fourteenth Amendment, they were also considering the Civil 
Rights Bill.  This bill was designed to ensure the basic rights of the newly freed slaves in 
the face of the Southern Black Codes, which reduced the status of the freemen to a level 
at or even below that of slave.  As Republican Senator Howard of Michigan argued, the 
Thirteenth Amendment made the slave a free man and not merely a non-slave.  Hence, 
the Civil Rights Act must protect his rights of property and person.
150
  However, the 
purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to ensure the same and equal benefits of person and 
property, but again excluded political rights.  As Republican House Representative 
Wilson of Iowa explained,  
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What do these terms mean?  Do they mean that in all things, civil, social, 
political, all citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal?  
By no means can they be so construed.  Nor do they mean that all citizens 
shall sit on juries, or that their children will attend the same schools.  
These are not civil rights and immunities.  Well, what is the meaning?  
What are civil rights?  I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute 
rights of individuals, such as the right of personal security, the right of 
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.
151
   
 
The majority of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were unwilling to 
confer civil and political rights for two reasons.  First, it was argued that the American 
system of federalism authorized the states to confer this type of right and privilege.  For 
the Federal government to intervene would be a violation of this sacred system.  Second, 
although the African American was now free, the reality was that many of the framers 
and the public in general were not ready to accept this level of equality.  As Republican 
Senator James Patterson of New Hampshire maintained, ―I am opposed to any law 
discriminating against (blacks) in the security of life, liberty, person, property and the 
proceeds of their labor.  These civil rights all should enjoy.  Beyond this I am not 
prepared to go, and those pretended friends who urge political and social equality 
…are…the worst enemies of the colored race.‖
152
  Democrat Senator Reverdy Johnson of 
Maryland also doubted that equality of races and instead believed that differences were 
ordained by God.  He advised the Congress to forgo conferring civil and political rights 
until the freemen were ―ready‖ to accept this challenge.  He stated,   
Leave the blacks as they are, protected by the Constitution of the United 
States in every right which belongs to a freeman, entitled to claim the 
benefit of all the guarantees of personal liberty and protection to be found 
in the Constitution of the United States, as much as the white man.  Leave 
him to work for his living, as the white man works for his living.  Leave 
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him free to contract, as he is.  Leave him under the protection of laws that 
will enable him to enforce his contracts, as he is.  Leave him to educate 
himself, as far as nature will permit, until he can raise himself to the 
elevation of the white race, as I think he may; and then, if possible, change 
your organic law; then, if possible, forget that nature has made the 
distinction.
153
   
 
Another telling quote, this time from Republican Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, 
illustrates the fact that many American leaders were not yet ready to embrace full 
personhood for freed slaves and African Americans.  Instead, they clung to perceived 
biological and psychological differences between whites and blacks as an excuse to deny 
full personhood.   
We all know it instinctively, although it is so impalpable that we can 
scarcely define it, and yet it so deeply marked that even the physiological 
differences between the Negro, the Mongol, and the Caucasian are not 
more persistent or more obvious.  When we speak of a race, then, we 
mean the moral and intellectual character which in their association make 
the soul of a race, and which represent the product of all its past, the 
inheritance of all its ancestors, and the motives of all its conduct.  The men 
of each race possess an indestructible stock of ideas, traditions, 
sentiments, modes of thought, an unconscious inheritance from their 
ancestors, upon which argument has no effect.  What makes a race are 
their mental and, above all, their moral characteristics, the slow growth 
and accumulation of centuries of toil and conflict.  These are the qualities 




The debates over the Fourteenth Amendment reveal that although Congressional leaders 
sought basic civil protections for all persons, even some Republican leaders did not seek 
full equality.  In fact, the quotes from Johnson and Lodge foreshadow the ―separate but 
equal‖ policies that the Supreme Court would sanction in Plessy v. Ferguson.  
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Native Indians were another group specified as inferior to the Caucasian race.  
Like the Chinese and the Africans, Native Indians were not accepted as full persons.  
Republican Senator Trumbull of Illinois asked, ―What does that phrase ‗excluding 
Indians not taxed‘ mean?  … It is a constitutional term used by men who made the 
Constitution itself to designate, what? To designate a class of persons who were not a part 
of our population.  That is what it means.  They are not counted in the census.  They are 
not regarded as part of our people.‖
155
  Trumbull‘s comment is very revealing because he 
phrased his argument deliberately to reference personhood.  Being one of ―our people‖ 
had a clearly different meaning than being simply a ―person.‖  Although Trumbull was 
one of the authors of the Thirteenth Amendment, his attitude toward other races was not 
completely inclusive.  Trumbull‘s attitude was typical of many U.S. leaders who 
sincerely wanted to end slavery and grant personhood to all humans, but who did not see 
non-whites as equal to whites.  To these leaders, blacks, Native Indians and the Chinese, 
while indisputably persons, were not included in ―our people.‖  They were a separate and 
degraded caste of persons.  This caste system based on race included limited political 
rights and a solid system of segregation to prevent various races from integrating as the 
American People.  It would be close to one hundred years before the Supreme Court was 
finally able to start dismantling the caste system.   
The Fifteenth Amendment was pushed through Congress by the end of 1869.  
This Amendment states, ―The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race, color of previous 
condition of servitude.‖  Although this Amendment was negative in that it only prevented 
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discrimination and did not confer the right to vote to anybody, the Amendment was 
important in preventing states from blatantly depriving blacks of the vote because of race.  
The Enforcement Act of 1870 was an attempt to stop terror toward black political 
involvement and criminalized official and private interference with voting.   
 The abolition of slavery destroyed the legality of human property and allowed 
freedmen to gain the status of ―person.‖  However, by the end of the Civil War, the battle 
for freedmen involved something more.  Although freedmen were seen as ―persons‖, 
their status as such was lower than whites as ―persons.‖  As a separate caste of persons, 
freedmen did not have access to the full array of civil and political rights enjoyed by 
whites.  Two important Supreme Court cases, the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. 
Ferguson signaled a step backwards in the fight of African Americans to attain full rights 
and freedoms as persons.  
 
A Step Backwards 
 
While Plessy v. Ferguson is considered the monumental case concerning 
segregation, at the time, the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 were a turning point for black 
Americans.  This cluster of suits concerned the very meaning of racial caste and racial 
degradation in ordinary life as blacks and whites lived together in every city and town.  
The cases received intense public debate, and future president Benjamin Harrison, then a 
leading senator, was in the galley.
156
  The case reaching the Supreme Court (109 U.S. 3) 
encompassed five cases involved with discrimination in public accommodations from 
Sections One and Two of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.   
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 Justice Bradley, writing for the Supreme Court, found that Sections One and Two 
were unconstitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment affected state law, and 
Congress had no authority to intervene in private matters.  Furthermore, private 
discrimination was not a badge of servitude and therefore not covered under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Bradley stated, ―It would be running the slavery argument into 
the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or 
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater or deal with in other matters of intercourse or 
business‖  (109 U.S. 3, 24-25).  Bradley further contended, in an argument that would 
again be made one hundred years later against affirmative action, that the freedman 
should cease to be the ―special favorite of the laws.‖  Bradley wrote, ―When a man has 
emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the 
inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his 
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of 
the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or as a man, are to be protected in the ordinary 
modes by which other men‘s rights are protected‖  (109 U.S. 3, 25).  Surely Justice 
Bradley did not think that African Americans had attained full rights as persons 
considering the widespread discrimination and violence blacks faced.  Rather, it seems 
that Bradley felt that African Americans should be satisfied with their place in society as 
a degraded caste and should not ask for more. 
 Justice Harlan sharply disagreed with this conclusion.  In his dissent, Harlan 
wrote, ―I am of the opinion that such discrimination is a badge of servitude, the 
imposition of which congress may prevent under its power, through appropriate 
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legislation, to enforce the thirteenth amendment; and consequently without reference to 
its enlarged power under the fourteenth amendment the act of March 1, 1875, is not, in 
my judgment, repugnant to the constitution‖  (109 U.S. 3, 43).  Additionally, Harlan 
discussed the degradation and limited rights possessed by black Americans.  He stated, 
―It (the Fourteenth Amendment) introduced all of that race, whose ancestors had been 
imported and sold as slaves, at once, into the political community known as the ‗People 
of the United States.‘  They became, instantly, citizens of the United States of their 
respective states‖ (109 U.S. 3, 46).  This statement is important because many of the 
delegates debated whether racial minorities were part of ―our people.‖  (Recall the 
statement by Trumball concerning Native Americans.)   
Harlan‘s dissent was a bold statement in light of the status quo of treating blacks 
as a degraded class of persons.  However, as a dissent it had little power.  News of the 
Supreme Court opinion, which overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875, was met with 
outrage and despair in the black community.  Thousands of blacks and white 
sympathizers marched in the Nation‘s Capitol.  Bishop Henry Turner, an early Civil 
Rights leader, remarked, ―Nothing has hurt so much since the day we were emancipated 
as the decision of the Supreme Court.‖  Frederick Douglass said, ―When a colored man is 
in the same room or carriage with white people, as a servant, there is no thought of social 
equality, but if he is there as a man and a gentlemen, he is an offense.‖
157
  This is a telling 
statement of the reality for blacks in America.  As men and gentlemen, or simply persons, 
they were an offense against society.   
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 Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896) is the landmark decision that made 
separate but equal the official legal and political doctrine for the next fifty-eight years.  
The statute at issue in Plessy was the Louisiana Separate Car Act, which mandated that 
no person should be permitted to occupy seats in coaches other than the ones assigned to 
them by race.  Conductors for passenger trains were required to assign passengers to the 
proper cars and faced fines or jail if they made incorrect assignments.  At the Louisiana 
State Supreme Court hearing, James C. Walker, Plessy‘s lawyer, argued that the separate 
car law: 
[E]stablishes an invidious distinction and discriminates between citizens 
of the United States based on race, which is obnoxious to the principles of 
national citizenship, perpetuates involuntary servitude as regards citizens 
of the colored race under the merest pretense of promoting comfort of the 
passengers on railway trains and in further respects abridges the privileges 
and immunities of the citizens of the United States and rights secured by 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments of the Federal Constitution.
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Walker was arguing that segregation created a caste system in which blacks were not 
fully free persons, but instead suffered from the perpetuation of involuntary servitude.  
Regardless of Walker‘s passionate speech, neither society nor the courts were ready to 
concede this fact.   
 Justice Brown‘s opinion for the Court illustrates a difference between racial 
distinction and racial discrimination.  He stated, ―A statute which implies merely a legal 
distinction between the white and colored races – a distinction which is founded in the 
color of the two races, and must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from 
the other race by color – has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or 
to reestablish a state of involuntary servitude‖ (163 U.S. 537, 541).  The Louisiana statute 
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did not create an inequality simply by reasonably distinguishing between races.  Brown 
fell short of explaining the reasonableness of legal distinctions based on color, but rather 
assumed this as common knowledge.  Brown assumed that racial differences exist like 
physical differences and are rooted in man‘s nature.  They cannot be altered through legal 
schemes.  ―If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United 
States cannot put them upon the same plane‖  (163 U.S. 537, 552).  Justice Brown 
therefore validated segregation and the separate but equal doctrine by ruling that racial 
differences are real and can be acknowledged.  Separating the races did not create an 
inequality if the available public service is provided to both races on an equal basis.   
 Again, Justice Harlan provided a stinging dissent.  He argued that railways were a 
public means of transportation and distinguishing by race was unconstitutional because a 
law that prevented blacks and whites from voluntarily choosing to occupy the same 
conveyance was a violation of liberty.  If Louisiana‘s statute were upheld, the state could 
next mandate separate sides of the street for races and prevent interracial private vehicles.  
If a state could segregate races, it would not be a stretch to isolate Protestants from 
Catholics.  For Justice Harlan, segregation reinforced America‘s caste system and 
excluded blacks from the ―people‖ of the United States.   
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the 
law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man 
as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his 
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is 
therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the 
fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is 
competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil 




However powerful his statement against the Court opinion, his dissent did not overturn 
the official doctrine of separate but equal. That would have to wait fifty-eight years until 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
This review of cases reveals the judicial system‘s consistency in maintaining the 
slave‘s legal status as property for most areas of law and conceding personhood only 
when slaves were involved in criminal activity.  The slave as property was simply a tool 
to be used by the white, master class or a means to an end.  The master class ensured that 
the law sustained the slave‘s inferiority.  Tocqueville wrote, ―What could ever be more 
fictitious than a purely legal inferiority! What more contrary to human instincts than 
permanent differences established between such obviously similar people!  Nevertheless, 
these differences have lasted for centuries, and they will persist in very any places; 
everywhere they have left traces which, though imaginary, time is hardly able to 
obliterate.‖
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We the People 
 
 The United States Constitution was formed for and by ―We the People.‖  The 
third word of the founding document, a variation of the word ―person,‖ testifies to the 
importance of understanding who this word includes and who it does not include.  As the 
review of cases showed, slaves were definitely not included as part of the ―people.‖  Even 
after the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and slaves gained the status of 
―persons,‖ their membership as part of the ―We the People‖ was still very much contested 
by the politicians who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, individuals who refused to 
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acknowledge African Americans as full citizens, and people who harbored racial 
prejudice against persons of a different skin color.   
 Slavery left a nearly indelible mark on American society that caused African 
Americans to be treated as inferior. This inferiority was felt as African Americans were 
excluded from the political realm of ―We the People.‖  Constitutional law scholar Mark 
Brandon writes,  
Who ―we‖ are is sometimes problematic, and therein lies the original 
failure of the Constitution: it failed to constitute slaves.  That is not to say 
that the Constitution failed to account for slaves, nor even that it failed to 
bind them in some (literal) sense of the word.  But it did not bind them in 
a constitutional sense.  Put somewhat differently, although slaves were 
certainly not free in the constitutional world, they were in a theoretical 




Brandon was correct that slaves certainly were accounted for – the thousands of cases 
arbitrating their fate attest to this fact.  Brandon is also correct that slaves were ―free from 
that world‖ but this freedom was not a positive value.  It was a deliberate exclusion based 
on ascriptive and inegalitarian policies based particularly on race.  Rogers Smith‘s 
argument of creating civic myths illustrates the profound ways Africans were deliberately 
excluded from the political sphere.   
 Rogers Smith studies the problems facing political leaders who are trying to 
create a ―people.‖  Creating a ―people‖ requires civic myths of common identity and 
goals.  Leaders then use these myths to create the legal structure that governs this 
―people.‖  The civic myth is used to legitimate government and create unity in following 
the laws and political leadership.  While American political leaders may have strong 
liberal democratic intentions and may offer personal freedom for all citizens, these 
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leaders may resort to ascriptive policies to differentiate a distinct ―American People.‖  
Smith shows that these two contrary ideals emerged and persisted throughout colonial 
and antebellum American history because of the deliberate intentions of the political elite 
who truly believed in liberalism and democracy as well as racial and sexual domination.   
 Furthermore, building a ―people‖ requires unity and cohesion among constituents.  
Political leaders need to make their constituents feel as though they are a distinct and 
special group with common loyalties and bonds.  This group must feel that its leaders and 
laws are legitimate.  In early America, these constituents were white males.  As was 
discussed earlier, these individuals knew who they were not – they were not black.  This 
notion served to unite disparate individuals and therefore political leaders encouraged (or 
at least did not resist) ascriptive policies which would instill a sense of legitimacy for the 
fledgling government.  Although the colonists saw themselves as British subjects, only 
British subjects with certain ethnic, religious, and class traits were entitled to political 
privileges.  This excluded non-whites, women, and Catholics.  Smith states, ―Beginning 
with political and religious views of themselves as bearers the ‗famous English liberty‘ 
they increasingly argued that Americans were a superior new breed, and possibly 
mankind‘s ‗redeemer nation.‘ ‖
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 In Federalist #2, John Jay speaks of the dangers of foreign powers and seeks to 
convince his readers that the ―American People‖ are a cohesively knit group able to resist 
foreign dangers.  He writes,  
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been 
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people – a 
people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, 
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of 
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government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their 
joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long 
and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence. 
 
Jay‘s conception of a united people uses ascriptive tactics as he claims that the ―people‖ 
descended from the same ancestors.  He has no regard for Africans or even Europeans of 
descent other than Anglo-Saxon.   
Paul Finkelman argues that freedom for whites did not exist in a vacuum; it was 
contrasted to slavery.  He comments,  
Developing a racist precept is very much like colonizing a nation or, 
perhaps more to the point, enslaving its people.  One needs to go about 
these tasks with the enthusiastic devotion and single-minded determination 
of a zealot.  One must hear only the call of one‘s crusade and not he cries 
of one‘s victims.  In short, one needs to be totally convinced of the 
righteousness of one‘s task, while not being too troubled by one‘s own 




Early American leaders were quite successful in their goal: they successfully excluded 
slaves and free blacks from being included in ―We the People‖ and they successfully 
promoted the slave‘s status as property over the status of person.  Thus, law followed 
politics as the personhood of the slave was denied and the slave was reduced to chattel in 
absolute terms.   
 Black chattel slavery in America successfully reduced human slaves to property 
rather than persons.  In order to sustain this system of human property, early Americans 
employed various arguments including that slaves did not possess the rational and 
cognitive capabilities to qualify as persons, and as social outcasts, they were not included 
within the community of accepted ―persons.‖  Thus although slaves were acknowledged 
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human beings, they did not qualify for a bestowal of personhood.  They were simply 
Kantian means to an end.   
 Chattel slavery is a dark mark on American‘s history.  Although slavery has been 
abolished in American law, the issues of personhood still exist in other arenas.  Arthur 
Riss argues that the problem of personhood raised with the issue of slavery still exists 
today.  He contends, 
For, as arguments over fetal ―personhood,‖ animal rights, and genetic 
engineering drastically demonstrate, modern liberal culture continues to be 
riven by controversies over this identity category.  And what makes these 
debates continuous with debates over slavery is the logic they share: these 
debates recruit the very notion at the heart of such debates (the ―persons‖) 
as the primary means to solve all debate.  That we regularly turn to the 
―person‖ as if it could serve as the unequivocal orbiter of justice reveals 
the extent to which we depend upon the ―person‖ as an identity category 
external to any specific juridical, social, historical, or cultural framework.  
Indeed, the fact that we still debate the notion of the ―person‖ in multiple 
political spheres suggests that the concept that we summon to once and for 
all explain and establish liberal practice is more contingent and less 




Riss in correct that personhood as an identity category was at the heart of the slavery 
debate and remains central in the debates over the status of corporations, fetuses, and 
animal rights.  A review of what this chapter gleaned from the debate on slavery, allows 
comparisons with the other entities in this study to determine if the slavery debate has 




 From this thorough study of personhood in slavery, I can review the hypotheses 
laid out in the first chapter to determine the degree to which they are supported by the 
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slave cases.  My first hypothesis is that the core theory, with its roots in the liberal 
tradition, would influence the law.  Much of the core theory builds upon the works of 
Locke and Kant.  Kant argued that slavery violates the maxims of a just and moral 
society in which one person cannot be used as an end for another person‘s purposes. 
While glimpses of this liberal theory can be found in opinions where justices described 
their own moral objections to slavery, most judicial opinions involving slavery did not 
follow Kant‘s liberal foundation that opposed slavery.  Instead of reflecting Kant‘s 
theories, the law was more aligned with Locke whose theories spoke against slavery even 
though Locke was involved in the American slave system.  Justices often lamented the 
fact that slavery violated the maxims of a liberal democracy but still upheld the economic 
institution of slavery.   
 While some decisions acknowledged that an entity could not be both person and 
property as is demonstrated in Kant‘s theory, the majority of judicial decisions concluded 
that the slave was decidedly property rather than a person.  By denying the personhood of 
slaves, justices could rule in favor of slaves as property.  In contrast to the teachings of 
the core theory, most justices during the antebellum slavery era ignored the fact that 
slaves were rational agents. Generally, justices included slaves in the same property 
classifications as cattle and horses and disregarded the cognitive abilities of human 
slaves.  The exception was in cases involving crimes committed by the slave. In these 
instances, the rational agency of a slave to knowingly violate the law was acknowledged 
and the slave was punished accordingly. 
Overall, the concept established in the core theory that an entity could not be both 
person and property and the concept that a rational agent is a person were understood by 
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most justices involved in slave cases.  However, these concepts were largely ignored in 
order to uphold the slave system based upon property rights. The American judicial 
system tended to deny the slave personhood stemming from the criteria of rational, 
intelligent agents. Further, the judicial system disregarded Kant‘s admonition that a 
person could never be used as a means to an end as a piece of property. Early American 
law is fairly consistent in denying the personhood of the slave and upholding the slave as 
property. 
How then, does the study of slavery fare against the hypotheses presented at the 
beginning of this study?  In respect to my first hypothesis that the core theory would 
influence the law, it seems as if the liberal theories of Kant had very little influence on 
judicial opinions while the contradictions apparent in Locke‘s theories were more in line 
with judicial reasoning.  Therefore, the core theory is reflected in the law, but it is not the 
liberal tradition that is generally attributed to Locke and Kant.   
My second hypothesis is that justices would tend to define ―person‖ in opposition 
to human being and to property.  This hypothesis is strongly supported by the slave cases.  
In almost all the cases I analyzed, justices carefully considered the human qualities of the 
slave but ultimately decided that a slave was property.  Many decisions provided 
elaborate justifications as to why a slave should be considered property rather than a 
person.  Holding that the slave was property rather than a person was by and large 
consistent among the cases.  Thus, slave cases did define the slave in relation to the 




My third hypothesis holds that the there should be consistencies in how justices 
adjudicate personhood for slaves and other entities such as corporations, fetuses, and 
great apes.  Thus, in order to reveal the consistencies and inconsistencies, it is necessary 
to delve into an analysis of the personhood in respect to corporations, fetuses, and 
animals to see how their struggle for personhood compared to that of slaves.  With the 
lessons learned concerning personhood for slaves, I turn to an analysis of the next entity 







When a human is born, this new person is given a social security number.  When 
a corporation is born, this new person is given a Federal Employer Identification 
Number.  The corporate person is not male or female, is not black or white, does not eat, 
drink or sleep, and cannot be imprisoned or executed if found guilty of a crime.  The 
corporation can have multiple residences, can live forever, and change its identity in a 
matter of minutes.  It cannot be enslaved, but it can sell itself.  The corporation cannot 
give birth, but it can cut off parts of itself and turn them into new ―persons.‖  The 
corporate person is not human but composed of groups of humans united for the purpose 
of commerce.  Further, the corporation, as an entity that is bought and sold, is categorized 
as property.  Despite its non-human, property status, the Supreme Court has granted the 
corporation personhood and thus the corporate person has many of the same rights and 
privileges as the human person.  This chapter explores the history, theory, and law of 
corporate persons to discover how this non-human property was granted personhood.  
 The discussion of corporate personhood has features in common with the chapters 
concerning slaves, fetuses, and great apes.  Like the other chapters, the personhood of a 
corporation straddles the gulf between property and person.  Just like the preceding 
chapter on slaves pointed out that the slave was a human being that was the legal property 
of another person, so too the corporation is owned by human persons while at the same 
time the entity of the corporation can own property on its own accord.  The discussion of 
corporate personality also features a discussion of the cognitive criterion of rationality 
that features prominently in the other chapters.  However, in this discussion, the study of 
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corporate personality takes a unique turn.  The rationality of the persons who combine to 
form a corporation is not in question.  Instead, theorists must determine if a corporation, 
as a separate person, has its own capacity for rational agency apart from its members.  
The analysis of the corporation differs from the other chapters in that the analysis 
revolves around the status of the group rather than an individual.  As the chapter 
illustrates, determining the legal and moral status of a group-person in a political system 
that is built on an individualist foundation poses unique quandaries.  
This chapter argues that the bestowal of legal personhood to the corporation 
resulted in far reaching legal and moral consequences for corporations, individuals, and 
the political process.  Some of the confusion surrounding the status of the corporation is 
in large part due to use of the term ―person‖ to apply to both corporations and human 
beings.  By using the general term ―person,‖ the law has failed to note the important 
distinctions between a corporation as both the subject and object of property rights; the 
distinctions between a corporation as a ―person‖ and a human being as a ―person;‖ and 
the distinctions between humans as individuals and as organized associations.  As famed 
political scientist Westel Woodbury Willoughby argued, ―It is unfortunate that the word 
‗person‘ as a technical term, should have found lodgment in jurisprudence, for the idea 
connoted by it is quite distinct from the meaning attached to it by the moralist or 
psychologist, and, the difference not being steadily kept in mind, much confusion of 
thought has resulted.‖
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  Law professor Bryant Smith concurred saying ―most of the 
confusion of thought with respect to the subject comes from the disposition to read into 
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legal personality the qualities of natural human personality.‖
165
  Willoughby and Bryant 
are correct in stating that the meaning attached to ―person‖ by the moralist or 
psychologist, or even the average citizen who is accustomed to thinking about a natural 
person is quite different from a legal definition, and the difference must be kept in mind.  
John Dewey, one of the most famous legal scholars of the early twentieth century argued, 
―The root difficulty in present controversies about ‗natural‘ and associated bodies may be 
that while we oppose one to the other, or try to find some combining union of the two, 
what we really need to do is overhaul the doctrine of personality which underlies both of 
them.‖
166
  Unfortunately, even though numerous scholars cited in this chapter have 
argued that the concept of corporate personality should be overhauled, corporate 
personality remains a mainstay of legal thought and moral thought.  This chapter will 
examine the ramifications of corporate personality.  
In the simplest terms, the corporate charter was ostensibly granted by the state in 
order to ease the difficulty of doing business for individuals working as a group.  The 
group, as the corporate entity, has the ability to buy, sell, or exchange property because 
the corporation provides a unified source of control over the collective property owned 
by the corporation‘s members.  The corporation can also develop, produce, and promote 
products under the corporate name with the corporation acting as a legitimate and 
autonomous economic actor in the market place. The corporate charter also lends 
expediency to legal matters involving the corporation. While the case of John Doe v. 
AT&T can be docketed and decided in a reasonable time, John Doe v. millions of 
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stockholders each designated by name, is not reasonable in terms of time and resources.  
Furthermore, by treating the corporation as a person, the courts can more easily prosecute 
corporate criminal activity by addressing and punishing the corporation directly through 
fines or dissolution (though not usually imprisonment.)  For the members of the 
corporation, the primary benefits of the corporate charter are limited liability for 
shareholders and the unlimited life of the corporation to conduct business.  Thus, the 
application of corporate personality is largely a matter of convenience and practicality for 
the purpose of conducting business transactions.  However, while granting personality 
may save many legal resources, it is argued by many scholars that granting the status of 
―person‖ to the corporation has actually caused more complications than it has 
resolved.
167
   
Corporations were granted the status of person in the introductory notes to a 
Supreme Court decision in 1886.  This case is discussed in great detail later in the 
chapter, but for now, it is suffice to point out that the decision conferred the legal status 
of personhood but did not imply that corporations had any claim to moral personhood 
akin to individual human beings.  In fact, members of the legal positivist school argue 
that the ascription of legal personhood to the corporation is a simple cut and dry matter of 
assigning a particular legal status without any connections to ethics or morality.  They 
effectively ended legal debate on the matter of corporate personhood.  However, the 
matter is not so simple.  With the bestowal of legal personhood, it became conceivable to 
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many theorists that corporations may have a claim to moral personhood as well.  Thomas 
Donaldson, a business ethicist, argues that most of the general public perceives the 
corporation to be a moral entity because the public recognizes an irrefutable characteristic 
of morality in the corporation – the duty to acknowledge and abide by norms and laws.
168
  
Within general understanding, corporations are the subjects of blame in a moral context.  
For example, the general public blames British Petroleum for the massive oil spill in the 
Gulf and demands recompense from the corporation rather than blaming the individual 
stockholders, the workers on the oil well, or the management.  (Although there was a 
large amount of public outcry against British Petroleum CEO Tony Hayward who was 
perceived to be too cavalier in his statements about the oil spill.)  By the same token, 
other corporations have been praised for their contributions to a healthy environment or 
for their charitable giving programs. As large, influential entities that can make 
significant impact on the course of human events, corporations are perceived as moral 
agents just like individual persons who are moral agents.   
The recognition of a corporation as a moral agent causes anger among people who 
feel corporations are too influential, and some activists who argue that corporations are 
too influential as moral actors blame the enormous power of corporations on their status 
as persons.  They argue that granting legal personhood effectively grants corporations all 
the rights and privileges that should only be granted to individual, human persons under 
the Constitution. In fact, there is a small but vocal grassroots movement to revoke the 
corporation‘s legal status as a person as a first step in controlling the power of large 
companies.  One such organization, ―Reclaim Democracy,‖ claims that by calling 
                                                 





corporations ―persons,‖ the public has been deceived into believing that corporations are 
legitimate contenders for the status of person with rights. They argue, ―Granting 
corporations the status of legal ‗persons‘ effectively rewrites the Constitution to serve 
corporate interests as though they were human interests.‖
169
  William P. Meyers, an 
activist who argues against corporate personhood among other issues, argues that 
corporate personhood allows corporations to escape regulation and government control.  
According to Meyers, the lack of corporate regulation allows corporations to unjustly 




 One of the further complications of granting corporate personhood has been that 
the bestowal of this status has led many corporate actors to demand additional rights and 
protections granted to persons.  Although the corporate charter was originally granted by 
the state to ease the difficulty of doing business for individuals working as a group, 
corporations began to challenge the Supreme Court that as persons, they had a right to 
further privileges granted to persons by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  The legal 
battle began in the late 1800s when railroad corporations began to swamp the Court with 
demands for immunities as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In more recent 
legal battles, corporations have sought protection as persons under the First 
Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech, the Fourth Amendment‘s protection from 
unreasonable search and seizure, and Fifth Amendment‘s right to remain silent in 
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criminal cases.  In Hong Kong, the government has taken the personhood of the 
corporation to what many critics consider an extreme level by effectively granting some 
corporations the right to vote.  Under Hong Kong‘s 1997 revised constitution as part of 
the People‘s Republic of China, sixty seats in the Hong Kong legislature are elected by 
voters, ten are elected by a committee from Beijing, and thirty are elected by ―functional 
constituencies‖ including some of Hong Kong‘s most prominent corporations.
171
  
 The legal status of personhood has caused complicated problems of corporations 
seemingly overreaching in their limited legal status as persons to attain further rights and 
privileges that have been traditionally perceived as limited to individual, human persons.  
Despite this problem, however, legal and moral issues concerning the status of the group 
are not recent issues.  The concept of the group as opposed to the concept of the 
individual person is a natural concept that has been in existence for as long as human 
beings have formed social units.  Freedom of association and the right to form groups are 
generally considered to be basic tenets of personal liberty.  Arguably, the freedom to 
form a corporation is part of this natural right of association.  Further, once a group is 
formed, it is natural to consider the group as a separate entity from its component 
members.  It is common to consider organized groups such as the Catholic Church, 
University of Maryland, the State of Kansas, or the Roman Empire as unique entities.  
Each of these organizations is composed of individual members, but once the 
organization is formed, the group is considered as separate from the individual members.  
The University of Maryland employs professors; the Catholic Church owns the Vatican; 
the State of Kansas issues bonds; and the Roman Empire conquered Europe.  Each of 
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these statements is universally accepted and demonstrates that collectivities are an 
accepted part of everyday life.    
 So too is the business corporation.  Walmart Corporation hired 1000 new 
employees.  Walmart was convicted of unfair labor practices.  Walmart bought stock in 
McDonald‘s Corporation.  Walmart contributed 10 million dollars to the Sam Johnson for 
Senate campaign.  While these statements are common in normal conversation, there are 
tremendous implications in each statement.  Does Walmart have certain rights in the 
respect to the way it hires and fires its employees?  Further, does Walmart have duties to 
its employees such as guaranteeing safe working conditions?  What does it mean to say 
that a corporation owns another corporation?  Finally, can a corporation participate in the 
democratic process?  These are important questions in today‘s society where corporations 
are ubiquitous and control a large part of the global economy.  Each of these questions is 
discussed in the analysis of corporate personhood.  However, before delving into the 
various theories of moral and legal personhood and their applications to corporations, it is 
necessary to briefly review some of the history leading to the rise in power of 
corporations and how that evolution shaped philosophical and legal thought.  
 
Historical Review of the Corporation  
As the corporation grew in scope and power, theories of corporate personhood 
also evolved and changed.  The history of the corporation is intertwined with the 
theoretical basis for corporate personhood and unraveling them is difficult at best.  
However, because understanding the moral and legal justifications for corporate 
personhood is a complicated matter, it is wise to first review a bit of history and then 
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plunge into a more detailed account of a corporation‘s status as a person.  A review the 
evolution of the business corporation will put the theories within their historical context.   
As has already been pointed out, humans have been relating to each other as part 
of groups since the dawn of human social interactions.  Therefore, the concept of the 
collective is not new, and the corporation, as a special type of collective for business 
purposes, was not a revolutionary idea.  The collective spirit for economic transactions 
has a foundation in early Greek philosophy.  According to Plato, collectives arise 
naturally as individuals realize that they cannot survive independently but instead must 
rely on a division of labor to provide all the necessary goods and services in a 
community.
172
  However, Plato was not an advocate of private property and 
entrepreneurism because he believed that private property would corrupt individual virtue 
through selfishness and self-aggrandizement.  In fact, his revered Guardians were not 
allowed private property in order to maintain their virtue.  Although some scholars trace 
Plato‘s theory of the Organic State to modern theories of corporate personhood, because 
Plato did not advocate private property as part of a virtuous state, it is not clear that 




The roots of corporate personality are more readily found in early European 
history.  Pope Innocent IV, who led the Catholic Church from 1243 to 1254, taught that 
―The Church‖ was the body of Christ and was considered as a whole.  Parishes, convents, 
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monasteries, and the like did not exist on their own, but drew their strength and purpose 
from the entire Christian Church.  As a whole, ―The Church‖ could be understood as a 
person, albeit a fictitious person, acting as an individual actor for certain purposes under 
the law such as owning property.
174
  Pope Innocent IV effectively introduced the fiction 
theory of corporate personhood which in its simplest terms holds that corporations are 
legal fictions created by the state and endowed with an artificial personality for the sake 
of convenience.  This theory will be discussed in great detail in the next section of this 
chapter.  
 Although the Church provided an early example of corporate personality, the 
Church‘s activities were tied to titles and parishes, not business in the modern sense.  It 
was the unchartered joint-stock companies of late Seventeenth Century England that 
resembled the form of modern corporations complete with centralized management, 
transferability of shares, limited liability, and legal personality.  Because voyages to the 
New World were tremendously expensive and risky ventures, very few wealthy 
individuals had the resources to finance voyages to the Colonies.  Instead, individuals 
needed to pool their resources and share the risk of these expensive voyages.  When the 
voyages were successful, the shared payoff was worth the investment and risk.  In 1600, 
Queen Elizabeth chartered the East India Company with monopoly trading power in the 
Colonies.  The East India Company, having gained its corporate charter directly from the 
Queen and to serve the pleasure of the Queen, was an example of what corporate theorists 
would consider concession theory because the Queen had conceded to grant a corporate 
title.   
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 Joint-stock companies such as the East India Company grew in number as the 
concept proved to be successful.  Investors grew rich as did the British Government 
which was entitled to a share of the profits.  Through lobbying the Queen for laws that 
directly benefited the company, the East India Company set a precedent in the late 1680s 
that is still followed by modern corporations today.  In return for its efforts, the East India 
Company was rewarded with a law that required a license to import anything into the 
Colonies, thus strengthening their monopoly privileges.  Later, they were also awarded 
the Townsend Acts of 1767 and the Tea Act of 1773.  These laws increased profitability 
to stockholders, which included the Crown, and the Company was able to undercut small, 
local importers and drive them out of business.
175
   
 Although the East India Company was able to gain a monopoly in the Colonies, it 
was continually challenged by independent colonial entrepreneurs who ran small trading 
ships and from independent retailers who bought from Dutch trading companies rather 
than the East India Company.  In fact, the East India Company caused much of the 
colonial anger that led to the Revolutionary War.  In the newsletter The Alarm, the author 
who called himself Rusticus warned, 
Are we in like Manner to be given up to the Disposal of the East India 
Company, who have now the Assurance, to step forth in Aid of the 
Minister, to execute his Plan, of enslaving America?…They have levied 
War, excited Rebellions, dethroned lawful Princes, and sacrificed Millions 
for the Sake of Gain…Fifteen hundred Thousands, it is said, perished by 
famine in on year, not because the Earth denied its Fruits; but (because) 
this Company and their Servants engulfed all the Necessaries of Life, and 
set them at so high a Rate that the poor could not purchase them.‖
176
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In a letter from Jefferson to Adams on October 28, 1813, Jefferson also warned of the 
problems caused by this large corporation.  ―The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous 
ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy.‖
177
 
Some of the strongest anti-corporate sentiment is found in the writings of John 
Adams.  He wrote, ―Increasingly, it would seem, the average American works for a 
corporation, trades with corporations, owns stock in corporations.  Yet for all this he 
traditionally has viewed the corporation with misgivings, often-downright antagonism.  
Emotionally, our attachment still is to small enterprise and individual proprietorship.‖  
Further, Adams wrote, ―We obviously have during a good share of our national history, 
thoroughly mistrusted, feared and at times hated and reviled a partner we have been 
neither able nor willing to live without.‖
178
  At the Constitutional Convention, James 
Madison proposed putting the federal government in control of corporations when a 
corporation was required for the public good, but the authority of a single state was 
incompetent.
179
  Madison‘s proposal failed because many of the delegates feared that 
granting this potentially enormous power to the federal government would open the doors 
for an American version of the East India Company. These delegates believed that the 
best preventative measure against these large and powerful corporations was to keep the 
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corporate charter at the state level.
180
  The final text of the Constitution did not mention 
corporations.  Still fearful of the rise of monopolies such as the British joint-stock 
companies, Jefferson and Madison went so far as to propose an eleventh amendment 
which would ban monopolies in commerce and would prohibit corporations from owning 
other corporations. This proposal also did not gain traction with the other delegates.  
 The colonial fear of joint-stock corporations carried over to an early American 
fear of all types of large corporations as corruptors of civic virtue.  The American ethos 
was largely built upon rugged individualism.  However, corporations represented the 
emergence of collectivist institutions in which an association of wealthy and powerful 
people could unite to subvert the efforts of individuals.  In a constitutional convention to 
revise the state constitution of Michigan, corporations were called, ―soulless, heartless, 
remorseless, and conscienceless…regardless of the dying or the dead.‖  During the 1837 
convention to revise Pennsylvania‘s constitution, the subject of corporations arose.  A 
report from this convention portrayed corporations in an equally unflattering light. ―All 
corporations… are unrepublican and radically wrong…a compromise of the principle of 
equality with that of property.‖  ―These ‗legislative monsters‘ which had ‗no souls to 
damn, and no bodies to whip‘ certain Ohio democrats complained, were permitted the 
‗easy virtue‘ of operating without concern for ‗energy and economy…careful 
circumspection and wise frugality.‖
181
 
 In these early years, while the corporation‘s profit motive was acknowledged, the 
business corporation was thought to serve the needs of the state and not simply the 
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private profit of the stockholders.  The state was empowered to alter or rescind corporate 
charters and privileges when public welfare was in jeopardy.  American historian 
Rowland Berthoff reports that many early Americans required assurance that the 
corporation would not endanger liberty, and in the early 1830s through the 1850s, many 
people still called corporations unrepublican monopolies that unequally favored certain 
individuals.  In Indiana, it was briefly considered to disqualify corporate officers and 
perhaps stockholders from public office.  Although the stockholders and corporate 
officers had individual rights, Indiana lawmakers challenged, ―who could pretend that the 
rights of the individuals incorporated and unincorporated are equal?‖
182
  
The fear that early American citizens exhibited in respect to corporations was 
symptomatic of the individualist economic theory that was the foundation of early 
American thought.  Closely resembling Adam Smith‘s theories, the predominant 
economic unit was the individual who produced goods for sale in the market and the 
individual who bought the goods for consumption.  Other than the few joint-stock 
companies that so riled the Colonists, very few other businesses took the corporate form.  
The individualist perspective undergirded the law and theories of the corporate form.  
Some theorists who disagreed with fiction theory espoused group theory which held that 
human beings are the true bearers of rights and duties. As such, humans have the right to 
do business as a group, but the group is not a legal person in itself.  The law only protects 
individuals. It was in the tradition of individualism that fiction theory and group theory of 
corporate law arose.  The influential English jurist William Blackstone found that 
corporations could be included within the definition of legal persons arguing that legal 
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persons included both natural and artificial persons.  He wrote, ―Natural persons are such 
as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human 
laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies 
politic.‖
183
  Blackstone put into writing what was slowly becoming a reality – although 
the Founding Fathers feared the rise of corporations such as the East India Company, 
corporations were on the rise and were beginning their assent as legal persons as the 
fledging American nation came of age.  
As the Industrial Revolution brought increased production and profitability in the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors, the number of corporations began to steadily 
increase. From 1776 to 1800, about three hundred companies incorporated through state 
governments with the majority forming in the New England states.  These companies 
formed to take advantage the limited liability for investments and the unlimited life of the 
corporation.
184
  One well-known corporation of the early 1800s was the Boston 
Manufacturing Company which incorporated in 1813.  The corporation had a large 
investment pool of $400,000 which it used to consolidate the various elements involved 
in textile manufacturing. The Boston Manufacturing Company owned the Waltham mill 
which produced the waterpower to power looms in the Appleton textile mill which it also 
owned.  It also sold textile machinery.
185
  The corporation was one of the early examples 
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of horizontal integration in which a corporation takes over all the various elements of 
production.   
While the Boston Manufacturing Company was breaking ground in the 
manufacturing industry, railroads were becoming increasingly powerful corporations as 
they forged alliances with one another and dominated the transportation industry.  The 
capital required to build railroad networks was vast and therefore required investments by 
a large number of people.  As more and more individuals invested in the railroad 
corporations, the corporations were transformed from small, closely managed firms to 
large mega-firms requiring an extensive management system.  Railroads began a 
managerial revolution by creating bureaucracies of business professionals to manage the 
myriad railroad operations including management of funds, capital investments, pricing 
and advertising, and finally, the operation of the trains.  The railroad corporations, with 
their large management structures complete with bureaucracies of middle management, 
were the predecessors of the modern day corporations as we understand them.
186
  Indeed, 
it would within the railroad industry that the law would adjudicate the fate of the 
corporation as a legal person.  
When the colonists and early American citizens acquiesced to the state‘s granting 
corporate charters to a select and limited number of companies, these citizens expected 
that the corporation would serve the public interest as well as make a profit.  England‘s 
joint-stock companies, although they made enormous profits, also had the parallel 
directive to increase the strength of England.  Universities, church organizations, and 
civic groups which acquired a corporate charter had a clear public purpose.  However, as 
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the nineteenth century progressed and the number of commercial corporations rose, the 
public service aspect of the corporation dissipated while the profit motive rose.  
Correspondingly, as more and more businesses demanded a corporate charter, state 
legislatures facilitated the process by enacting general state incorporation laws that made 
the incorporation process swift and inexpensive.
187
 
Relaxing the incorporation process was a significant milestone because it altered 
the understanding that incorporation was a privilege granted by the state for both public 
and private purposes.  Free incorporation suggested that incorporation was not a special 
privilege but a right available to any group of people seeking to do business with a purely 
profit motive.  The process of incorporation became administrative as the state was 
simply a rubber stamp on the paperwork rather than a sovereign granting a special status 
to a company.  As incorporation became routine, corporations did not have the same 
obligation to serve the public interest and the needs of the state.
188
    
As states modified their incorporation laws, theorists began to reconsider the 
social reality of the firm.  Corporations were increasing in strength and number, and were 
playing a role in political affairs.  Theorists began to consider the reality of the 
corporation as a separate entity from its members and as a very real legal person in its 
own right. The legal fiction and concession theories were brought into question, and the 
real person theory promulgated by Otto Gierke and Maitland which came to dominate 
theories of the firm, began to take hold.  The real person theory holds that a corporate 
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person, just like a human person, has legal and even moral rights and responsibilities. The 
evolution of these theories in considered in-depth in the next section.  As theories of the 
firm began to change, theorists also began to waver in their commitment to 
individualism.  The management structures of the railroads in which groups of middle 
managers and investors, rather than individual actors, were the main players was in stark 
contrast to the traditional individualistic conception of the firm.  Stockholders refrained 
from taking an active role in the management of the corporation as ownership and the 
means of production began to separate.
189
  The turn of the Twentieth Century ushered in 




 By 1904, corporations accounted for three-quarters of all of America‘s industrial 
production.  As wealth and power began to be concentrated in the hands of fewer large 
businesses, American‘s industrial landscape became increasingly an oligopoly.  For 
example, in 1909, six or fewer companies accounted for half of the production in the 
following industries: food processing, electrical machinery, primary metals, petroleum, 
rubber, and tobacco.
191
  Correspondingly, the government found that they needed a way 
to control the rising power of large corporations.  During the Gilded Age, which lasted 
from approximately the 1870s to the 1920s, government sought a cooperative relationship 
with business and labor in the hopes that cooperation would result in general economic 
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prosperity.  Legal historian Gregory Mark argues that during this time, the scope of the 
corporation shifted from being able to do things specifically allowed by its charter to 
having the latitude to do anything not specifically prohibited in the charter.  Mark 
attributes this shift to the general incorporation laws that made incorporation seem 
unexceptional and the wave of regulatory measures enacted by state legislatures that 
reified the autonomy of the corporation.  Mark states, ―The state had once been the 
source of a corporation's purpose and power.  By the beginning of the Gilded Age the 
state supplied only a corporation's robes and, for some businesses, a subsidy.‖
192
 
It was during this time that many of the initial corporate personhood cases 
reached the Supreme Court.  These cases are discussed in great detail in the second half 
of this chapter.  As a prelude to that portion of the chapter, railroads corporations led the 
demand for corporate personhood.  The Supreme Court acquiesced and in 1886 granted 
legal corporate personhood to protect the life, liberty, and property of a corporation.  
However, although corporate personhood was debated within the Court, this concept did 
not garner much debate within the other branches of government.  Instead, the legislature 
and executive branches accepted corporate personhood and chose to control the power of 
corporations through regulatory measures.  
As part of the managerial revolution, businessmen began to see themselves as 
trustees for society with responsibility for philanthropic pursuits.  Corporations began to 
contribute to various public welfare programs such as hospitals, universities, and private 
charities.  While these donations contributed to public welfare, they also increased the 
corporation‘s public image and contributed to profitability.  Theorists began to consider 
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the purpose of the corporations – was it simply to make a profit or did the corporation 
have a responsibility to society?  What were the moral requirements of the corporate 
person?  Further, could businesses unduly influence American politics and values through 
their participation in the public sphere and were the interests of the shareholders 
adequately represented when philanthropic decisions were made by a group of 
professional managers?
 193
  All of these considerations contributed to the evolving 
understanding of the corporate person.  
By the end of the Gilded Age, the real person theory, which taught that the 
corporate person should be considered in the same light as a natural person for legal 
matters, was firmly accepted by the courts and legal theorists.  The debate over legal 
corporate personhood largely withered away while new scholarship provided by 
economist Gardiner Means and lawyer Adolf Berle turned the study of corporations in a 
new directions.  Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property in 1933 as a textbook explanation of the corporation drawn from the view of 
corporate finance.  Unlike previous scholarship, Berle and Means assumed the power and 
permanence of the corporation and did not bother to explain the political and social 
justification of the corporate autonomy.
194
  Instead, Berle and Means focused on the 
structure of the corporation explaining that the corporation is composed of various groups 
including the board of directors, professional managers, and the stockholders who are the 
owners.  According to Berle and Means, the hallmark of the modern corporation was the 
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fragmentation of accountability and legal liability among these groups.  This led to the 
conclusion that there is no discernable mind or conscience within the corporation.  This 
was a startling conclusion for moral theorists who were beginning to take note of the 
rising power of the corporate person.  Although legal theories of the corporate 
personhood were dormant, the work of Berle and Means ignited scholarship by 
philosophers concerned with the moral justification of the corporate person.
195
  
 In the Twentieth and into the Twenty-first Centuries, the reality was that 
corporations had become major institutions rivaling the U.S. government in wealth and 
power.  It is now common place for large corporations to have public relations teams 
working for them to boost their public image and guide management in social and 
political affairs.  Most large corporations are concerned with more than just profit 
maximization and take an active role in politics through activities such campaign 
contributions, lobbying, and influencing regulatory agencies.  By engaging in such 
activities, the corporation has proven to be a powerful agent beyond the limited realm of 
finances and into the sphere of politics and the community.  The actions taken by 
corporations affect many aspects of everyday life.  Thus, the modern corporation is a 
significant actor whose moral agency must be considered.  On that note, we turn to a 
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comprehensive review of the various moral and legal theories that arose throughout 
history.  
 
Theories of Corporate Personhood 
 The preceding section outlining the rise of the corporation foreshadowed some of 
the important legal theories concerning corporate personhood.  As the corporation grew 
in size and power, theories evolved from viewing the corporation as a simple fiction to 
considering the corporation to be a legal person in much the same way as a natural 
person.  Although some scholars argue that a legal conception of personhood does not 
involve an ethical debate, there are implications for moral philosophy when a collective 
entity is granted personhood with associated rights and duties.  Since ―person‖ is a value 
laden term, bestowing personhood on the corporation ties the corporation into a moral 
and ethical debate as the corporation is seen as an agent whose actions have moral 
consequences.  It seems to be impossible to separate the purely legal use of the term from 
the commonly understood ethical implications of the term.  Corporate personhood 
illustrates a dichotomy between a moral person and a legal person, and theorists must 
determine both the legal and the moral status of the corporation.   
 Because the corporation involves a dichotomy between a moral and a legal 
person, there are two separate but related theoretical paradigms that must be explored.  
The first is the traditional theories of personhood have their basis in Locke and Kant and 
analyze what it means to be a person in the traditional sense.  Within this debate, the 
corporation‘s status as both person and property comes into clear focus.  Kant‘s 
differentiation between means and ends shows that a corporation straddles this divide by 
being both the subject and the object of property rights.  The theories put forth by Locke 
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and Kant of a person as a rational agent also illustrate the problematic matter of 
determining whether a collective, which is composed of rational agents, can be 
considered an agent in and of itself.  These foundational theories produced a host of more 
modern theories of corporate personhood that analyze whether the collective entity can 
qualify as a moral person.  There are theorists who argue both for and against corporate 
moral personhood. 
 Because corporate personhood developed largely through the courts as a legal 
device, there is a substantial body of theory discussing what it means for a corporation to 
be a legal person.  The historical review mentioned the most common models of fiction 
theory, group theory, and real person theory.  These models developed primarily in the 
legal paradigm and isolated from moral theory.  However, there are important 
connections between moral and legal theory which can be seen in a review of the 
important court cases adjudicating corporation personhood. 
 One of the common threads between the moral and the legal theory is their basis 
in individualism.  America‘s ethos of individualism had a great impact on how the 
collectivity of a corporation was conceived.  From the founding of the nation and into 
modern times, individualism has remained a primary tenet of American political thought.  
As the corporation grew in prominence, American theorists, politicians, and legal 
scholars struggled to fit the concept of the collectivity within the individualistic model.  
As theorists forced a square peg into a round hole by forcing the idea that the corporation 
could be considered a person just like an natural human being, many problems arose.    
 America‘s Founding Fathers constructed the Constitution with a strong 
foundation in individualism which emphasizes the rights and privileges of the individual 
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person as opposed to the group.  The Founding Fathers, who were influenced by works of 
individualist philosophers such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and the Barron De 
Montesquieu, wrote the Constitution in the spirit of individualism. Thus, the 
Constitution‘s references to ―person‖ or ―citizen‖ refer to an individual and the rights or 
duties of the group are not fully delineated.  As corporations entered the legal domain as 
actors, the framework of individualism in the Constitution did not change to 
accommodate the collective.  Rather, the concept of the corporation was made to fit 
within the individualism framework.  The corporation was deemed a ―person‖ so that the 
law could manage the collective within the same body of law that it adjudicated cases 
regarding human persons.   
 Legal scholar and moral philosopher Meir Dan-Cohen argues that equating the 
corporation to the individual person suited neoclassical economic scholarship just as it 
did legal scholarship.  The corporation was likened to the individual actor and the firm‘s 
production frontier was equated to the individual‘s utility frontier.  The firm was seen as 
having the singular goal of profit maximization which drives all decision-making.  The 
leader at the top of the corporation‘s hierarchy was equated to the individual economic 
actor.  The firm could easily be replaced by the individual manufacturer with little 
consequence for the economic theory.  This simplistic view, however, glosses over many 
of the important characteristics of the modern corporation.   
Profit maximization is not necessarily the singular goal of modern corporations as 
many firms engage in political and charitable pursuits.  Advocates of corporate social 
responsibility claim that a corporation serves many constituencies including shareholders, 
employees, customers, the state, and even the public.  Each of these constituencies has 
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different demands and the corporation‘s goals vary in an effort to meet these demands.  
Profit maximization for the shareholders is one of many goals.  Another complication to 
the collective-individual analogy is that the size and complexity of a corporation‘s 
decision-making structure differs significantly from that of an individual actor.  The 
traditional economic model preserves at least one individual at the top of the firm‘s 
hierarchy who was the human locus of responsibility.  In modern corporations, control is 
split among senior managers, middle managers, the board of directors, labor union 
officials, and so on.  Bargaining and complex decision-making processes are the norm 
rather than a president who makes important decisions.  Further, collective decision-
making differs from individual decision making.  Collective choice scholars such as 
Kenneth Arrow have proven that processes used to aggregate individual preferences do 
not necessarily result in a decision that accurately reflects the preferences of the 
members.
196
  By manipulating the agenda or order of votes, different outcomes can be 
attained.  Therefore, the corporate decision may not necessarily reflect the true 
preferences of the composite members.  Finally, in modern corporations it is difficult to 
even find the individual persons on whom the corporation is based.  As the discussion of 
the holding company demonstrated, the importance of the individual shareholder is on the 
decline as much of the investment capital of a corporation is supplied by other collectives 
such as banks, insurance companies, or other corporations.   
Despite the problems in comparing a corporation to an individual, the law does 
not clearly recognize these differences.  According to Dan-Cohen, instead of recognizing 
the difference between individuals and organizations, the corporation was made to fit 
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within an individualistic framework that uses the ambiguous term ―person‖ to apply to 
both individuals and organizations. The classical conception of the economy as a system 
of transactions among individuals was transposed on the legal foundation of individual 
property rights.  Corporations as associations of persons were made to fit into the 
individualistic framework by assuming an artificial personhood that allowed them to act 
as individual persons.  Although corporations as a group-person do share some 
characteristics with the individual-person, the relationship is not exact.  While equating 
the corporation to an individual simplified matters for justices working within the 
individualist tradition, the analogy was not perfect and created problems as will be seen 
in the legal section of this chapter.
197
   
As the law contemplates the analogy between an individual person and a 
collective person such as a corporation, many issues are at stake.  The bestowal of 
personhood generally implies the bestowal of certain rights and duties.  Do these rights 
and duties extend beyond narrowly construed legal claims to rights and duties as moral 
agents?  Some legal scholars argue that legal personhood does not imply moral 
personhood and the two concepts must remain distinct.  However, in practice this is next 
to impossible.  It is very common to hear the British Petroleum Corporation deceived the 
public in its efforts to clean up the Gulf oil spill or that Nike Corporation engaged in 
unjust labor practices.  These statements attribute moral agency to corporations by 
showing that a corporation is responsible for actions and is the subject of blame.  
Corporations engage in activities that individuals do such as participating in contracts, 
making public statements, apologizing for actions, etcetera.  Further, it seems that there is 
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something to the notion that the collective is more the sum of its individual members.  
While the individual rational agents within the corporation certainly have rights and 
duties, it is meaningful to say that the corporation itself, as a separate entity, also has 
rights and duties.  There seems to be a strong prima facie case for granting corporation 
moral agency.  However, with acknowledging the possibility of moral agency in a 
corporation comes many thorny subjects such as determining if a corporation can have a 
guilty mind and how to adequately punish a corporation for its misdeeds.  Theorists have 
pondered these issues and a review of some of the most prominent theories of corporate 
personhood reveals just how complex the issue is.   
The chapters concerning slaves, fetuses, and great apes utilize a core theory of 
personhood supplied by John Locke and Immanuel Kant as a foundation for determining 
if these entities qualify as persons.  In the case of corporations, the theories of Locke and 
Kant are more difficult to apply because both of these theorists base their models of 
personhood on the individual rather than the collective.  The individual as a rational and 
autonomous person is declared a person.  Certainly corporations and other associations 
are composed of these rational and autonomous persons, but neither Locke nor Kant 
analyze the group itself as a candidate for personhood.  When Locke and Kant were 
writing their treatises, corporations were not widespread and were not a dominant part of 
the political or social landscape.  Therefore, there was not a pressing need to address 
corporations in their accounts of personhood.  Because neither Locke nor Kant 
specifically address the status of corporations, it is difficult to infer what these scholars 
would have said about the collectivities.  Thus, when studying the works of Locke and 
Kant in respect with corporate personhood, care must be taken not to presume what these 
177 
 
theorists would say on the subject.  However, it is possible to make some general 
inferences using their arguments about individualism as applied to collectives.  
 Locke‘s theories involve the social contract, and in many ways, corporations can 
be seen in light of a social contract agreed to by various individual persons.  As such, 
corporations are the products of human ingenuity just as other human-created 
agreements.  In fact, the corporation can be seen as a series of contracts in which the state 
agrees to grant a corporate charter in exchange for certain public benefits from the 
corporation; investors agree to supply the corporation with capital in exchange for a 
return on their investment; employees agree to work in the factories in exchange for 
wages; and so on.  According to business ethicist Thomas Donaldson, comparing the 
corporation to a social contract is a useful way of assessing the moral performance of a 
corporation – when the corporation has fulfilled its terms of the contract, it has done well.  
If the corporation fails in the contract, then society is justified in condemning the 
corporation.
198
  Donaldson may provide a way of assessing the outcomes of a corporate 
body, but he does not argue that the corporation is itself a moral agent under Locke‘s 
theories.  Using the social contract theory, the corporation is the project that individuals 
pursue but the corporation is not a project pursuer.  
  The term ―project pursuer‖ is used by Lockean scholar Loren Lomasky to 
describe his understanding of a Lockean person.
199
  According to Lomasky, persons are 
those who have the rational ability and autonomy to choose a certain course of action and 
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then follow through to pursue those plans.  For Lomasky, commitment to certain projects 
is a part of a person‘s identity.  Some projects are facilitated by a group effort in which 
cooperation and specialization are critical.  Forming a corporation can facilitate attaining 
the goals of a project, or forming the corporation could even be the project itself.  The 
critical point is that the corporation itself is not the ―project pursuer‖ with the rational 
ability and autonomy of an individual person.  Thus, under Lomasky‘s criteria for 
personhood, it would seem that a corporation, as a separate and unique entity apart from 
its constituting members, would not qualify.  
 A noteworthy contemporary of John Locke was Adam Smith whose Wealth of 
Nations became a foundational treatise in the field of economics.  Like Locke, Smith 
based his work on the individual, and argued that the individual should pursue his own 
self-interest which would result in profit maximization and greater economic results than 
if the state were to guide commerce. Smith also promoted the division of labor as a 
concept that would yield greater economic benefits through specialization.  Although his 
theories on the invisible hand and specialization of labor could be applied to the 
corporation, it is difficult to deduce what Smith would have thought of modern 
corporations.  He addressed joint stock companies, the predominant corporate form in his 
day, with skepticism as being mismanaged, inefficient, and prone to becoming 
monopolies.
200
  Thus, it is unclear if Smith would defend the corporation as a legal and/or 
moral person.  
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 Like Locke and Smith, Immanuel Kant was an individualist and did not speak to 
the personhood of the group or the corporation in his teachings.  For Kant, the whole can 
never be greater than the sum of its parts, so he likely would be willing to assess the 
moral capabilities of the individuals who comprise the corporation, but not the 
corporation itself.  In the Kantian tradition, the corporation as a collective cannot be a 
moral agent.  There has been some interesting scholarship applying Kantian ethics to the 
business ethics of the corporation such employing the Categorical Imperative to argue 
against corporations who use people as a means to an end through deceptive advertising 
and exploitative working conditions.
201
  However, these studies analyze how 
management should treat employees or how leaders should treat stockholders.  They do 
not speak to the moral agency of the corporation as an autonomous and rational actor in 
its own right.  
In terms of the Categorical Imperative, Kant argued that persons must be treated 
as ends in themselves rather than a means to be used for another‘s purposes.  Because a 
person cannot be a means, and property is a means to fulfilling ends, Kant reasons that a 
person cannot be property.
202
  In these terms, a corporation would be a means that human 
individuals use to attain any number of ends such as financial profits, social camaraderie, 
scientific progress, and so on.  The list of possible goals that individuals hope to attain 
through forming a corporation is practically endless.  Corporations exist for a purpose 
designed by those who created the corporation.  It does not make sense for a corporation 
to exist without a purpose.  Corporations are therefore the means to be used for an end. 
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This is how Kant separates a person from property.  Kant would consider the corporation 
to be simply property while the individuals who make up the corporation are the persons.  
This is a good launching point for the discussion of person versus property that is 
reoccurring in each of the chapters.  The corporation is at the same time both the subject 
and object of property rights.  As a subject of property rights, a corporation may own 
goods, equipment, stock, and even other corporations.  At the same time, human beings 
own the corporation; it is a commodity on the stock market as humans buy and sell shares 
of it.  In this respect, the corporation is the object of property rights.  Traditionally, the 
subject of property rights is considered a person while the object of property is 
considered a thing.  Because the corporation is both the subject and the object, the 
corporation is considered both person and thing and is legally endowed as both.
203
   
This is an anomaly according to Kant‘s teaching because an entity cannot be 
classified as both person and thing.  If persons own persons, we have a slave economy, 
and if things own persons were are in a world of science fiction.  The strict divide 
between these two classifications is what determines ownership relations and allows 
market exchanges.  The concept of corporate personality suffers from confusion between 
humans and property in much the same way that the concept of slavery suffers.  A slave 
was undoubtedly human, but his status as property put his personhood in question.  A 
corporation is undoubtedly property, but because this association of humans has the 
capability to act as one united individual, the corporation claimed personhood. Once 
again, we are reminded that being human does not automatically require a grant of 
personhood, and being property does not necessarily require a denial of personhood.  
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In a famous passage, Kant distinguishes between entities that either have a price 
or a dignity.  He writes, ―In the kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or a 
dignity.  If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is 
exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity….Morality, 
and humanity as far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has 
dignity….Autonomy is…the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational 
nature.‖
204
  For Kant, only individual human persons can have dignity or an intrinsic 
worth.  All other entities can only have a price.  Dan-Cohen argues that Kant would 
include a corporation as an entity with a price rather than see a corporation as a moral 
person with dignity because the corporation is a means to be used by humans.  According 
to Dan-Cohen, as a means, a corporation is similar to a machine to be used for human 
purposes.
205
  He uses this foundation to argue that individuals and corporations are 
entitled to different rights. 
Dan-Cohen contends that individuals, who have Kantian dignity or are ends in 
themselves, are entitled to autonomy rights which are bestowed upon moral agents and 
outline the sphere in which an individual can act without interference from the state and 
must be respected by other individuals.  An organization such as a corporation cannot 
have this type of autonomy right.  Instead, organizations have derivative rights that come 
from the individuals within the organization.   Thus, the organization can invoke the 
rights of individuals to claim a harm and can even win lawsuits based on derivative 
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rights.  But the rights remain derivative because the organization is simply a means to an 
end and therefore does not have autonomy rights of its own.
206
  
While these arguments are plausible, the modern corporation stretches this 
conception dividing means versus ends and persons versus property.  The corporation, as 
an object of property rights, is also the subject of property rights.  The corporation can 
own shares in other corporations.  For instance, corporation A owns corporation B as a 
means to an end.  To complicate the scenario, suppose that at the same time that 
corporation A owns all the stock in corporation B, corporation B owns all of the stock in 
corporation A.  Essentially, the two corporations own each other and indirectly each 
owns itself.  This leads to an infinite regress when trying to determine the means and the 
end of the corporate relationship.  It also allows corporations to essentially eliminate 
human beings as the dominant owners.
207
  This scenario is similar to that of a holding 
company which is a corporation whose purpose is to hold stocks in other corporations – a 
corporation that owns other corporations.  When assessing the means and ends, 
ownership tends to regress to those human beings who have shares in the holding 
company.  However, given the complicated tangle of corporate finances, it is often 
difficult to sort through the various holding companies to find the human stockholders.  
In general terms, it is the corporation itself which is considered to be the property holding 
entity.  In this respect, a holding company does serve as an end of sorts while the various 
other corporations which it owns are the means.  However, just because a corporation can 
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hold property does not mean that the corporation is a Kantian person.  Holding property 
is not the essence of personhood according to Kant.  It is the individual as an 
autonomous, rational agent who is an undisputed end.  The ability of a corporation to 
hold property in other corporations complicates the situation but does necessarily bestow 
status of Kantian person to a corporation.  
 According to ethicist Stephen Wilmot, corporations cannot be ends in themselves.  
But the complicated status of corporations as collectives of individuals and as property 
owners does give corporations a claim to personhood that must be defined as separate 
from the personhood as individuals.  Wilmot argues that a critical difference between 
humans as persons and corporations as persons stems from the means versus ends 
dichotomy.  Because corporations exist for a specific purpose, Wilmot contends that 
actions taken by a corporation that are outside of its purposes and requirements should 
not be permitted.  Wilmot states that corporations as collectives have second-order 
autonomy that stems from the individuals who comprise the corporation.  Therefore, it is 
permissible to state that a corporation itself made a decision in some cases.  He uses the 
example of the management of Ford Motor Company using its resources to create a 
military force to subvert the U.S. Government.  If the managers, shareholders, and all 
other relevant parties agreed to create a military force, Ford Motors would be responsible 
for the wrongdoing.  However, the punishment would be difficult to apply.  Individuals, 
who are ends in themselves and have autonomy to choose their actions, can be punished 
by a restriction in pursuing their goals.  Punishment of a corporation by restricting 
second-order autonomy is much more difficult.
208
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This is the dilemma in applying Kantian ethics to a corporation.  Kant designed 
his theory to apply to individuals who, as rational and autonomous beings, could use 
reason to choose their ends and identify their duties towards others.  Therefore, 
individuals can make moral judgments and can be judged by others for their moral 
actions.  The ability of a collectivity such as a corporation to act as a rational and 
autonomous being and therefore a moral agent is very much debated within philosophy.  
Therefore, the discussion must turn to whether a corporation can be considered a moral 
agent.  
The other chapters discuss the dichotomy between person and biological human 
being by means of a detailed account of the abilities of rational agents to qualify for 
personhood.  In these accounts, the important criteria, stemming from the philosophies of 
Locke, Kant, and Daniel Dennett, is the presence of a rational mind and the capability of 
volition.  In the case of the corporation, the discussion is different because the individuals 
who make up the corporation are agreed to be persons with rationality and volition.  The 
question is whether the corporation itself, as a separate entity, also has rational abilities 
that would qualify for personhood.  Is there a collective rational mind and collective will 
that could qualify for personhood? 
Most studies of corporate personhood do not spend much time analyzing the 
conditions of natural personhood as they apply to corporations.  There is a paucity of 
scholarship that utilizes Kant‘s criteria of rationality or Dennett‘s conditions for 
personhood as applied to corporations.  However, when comparing and contrasting 
claims to personhood made by the various entities in this study, such an analysis is 
necessary and yields interesting results.   




 The preceding paragraphs outlined Kant‘s definition of a person as a rational, 
autonomous individual who cannot be used as a means to an end.  Locke‘s account of 
personhood is also based on the individual who is self-aware and has a memory of his or 
her past. Locke defines a person as a ―thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, 
as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without 
perceiving that he does perceive.‖
209
  Locke set the precedent that a person should be 
considered a rational agent who can make decisions and is culpable for those decisions.  
Building on Locke‘s foundation, philosopher Daniel Dennett designed six criteria for 
personhood: 1) persons are rational beings, 2) they are conscious and they are intentional, 
3) they are considered persons by others, 4) they can reciprocate, which refers to the 
ability to formulate second order intentions or to have a belief about a belief, 5) they have 
the capacity for verbal communication, and 6) they are self-consciousness or self-
aware.
210
  The question is whether a corporation, apart from its constituent members, can 
qualify as a person according to these criteria.   
 According to legal scholar Arthur W. Machen, the corporation does not qualify as 
a person according to criteria one, two, four, and six.  While he agrees that the persons 
who compose the corporation qualify according to such criteria, Machen states that a 
corporate entity is not a rational being who can understand the law and decide to follow 
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the law. The law can only speak to the human beings underneath the corporate veil, and 
punishment to a corporation must also reach the human beings within the corporation.  
Thus, he argues that to consider the corporation a person according to rationality criteria 
is a fictitious personification of a non-person entity.  When considering corporate 
personhood a fiction, the law can then treat the corporation as if it were a rational being 
with volition and cognition. The comparison is a metaphor to portray that fact that a 
corporation bears some resemblance in the law to a rational being.  But for Machen, the 
collective is not a person in the moral sense.
211
 
 Dennett‘s social recognition criterion number three offers an avenue for 
corporations to claim personhood.  According to this condition, in order for an entity to 
be a person, the community must recognize it as a fellow person.  While Dennett does not 
claim that criterion three is sufficient for personhood, the idea of social acceptability has 
been important for corporate personhood. The Supreme Court recognized corporate 
personhood in 1886 and has never rescinded this status.  Although there is a small 
contingent of pundits who protest corporate personhood on various websites, for the most 
part, the general public has accepted the legal personhood of corporations or is apathetic 
to the issue.  Very recently, protests on Wall Street have brought some public attention to 
the issue of corporate personhood.  It remains to be seen if a sizeable number of people 
are able to address the issue and convince the social community that corporations should 
not be included. 
                                                 




Recently, when replying to a protester at a political rally, Republican presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney responded ―Corporations are people, my friend.‖
212
  Romney was 
explaining that in his taxation plan, corporations could be included within the ―people‖ 
taxed.  Romney did not further explain his views on corporate personhood and it appears 
that he did not consider the implications of corporate personhood beyond his response to 
a noisy protester.  However, the statement caught the media‘s interest which brought it to 
the attention of the American public.  In response, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, a 
chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee called Romney‘s statement a 
―shocking admission‖ stating ―Mitt Romney‘s comment today that ‗corporations are 
people‘ is one more indication that Romney and the Republicans on the campaign trail 
and in Washington have misplaced priorities.‖
213
  However, Romney‘s statement is not a 
―shocking admission,‖ it is a legal reality.  Neither Romney nor Schultz seems to be well 
versed in the actual implications of corporate personhood.  While the story made national 
news for a couple days, public interest in the story soon faded.  The issue of corporate 
personhood is sometimes mentioned in association with the current ―Occupy Wall Street‖ 
movement protesting the power and wealth of corporations.  Thus far in the protests, the 
argument seems to be fueled by a perception of corporate audacity and arrogance to even 
claim personhood.  However, the movement has not yet spawned an academic debate on 
the legal intricacies of corporate personhood.  Yet, the issue seems be gaining some 
public notice through this movement which will perhaps lead to a more robust academic 
                                                 
212
 Philip Rucker, ―Mitt Romney Says ‗Corporations are People‘ at Iowa State Fair,‖ The Washington Post 
11 August 2011, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-
are-people/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html, accessed 23 November 2011.  
 
213
 Philip Rucker, ―Mitt Romney Says ‗Corporations are People‘ at Iowa State Fair,‖ The Washington Post 
11 August 2011, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-
are-people/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html, accessed 23 November 2011.  
188 
 
debate over corporate personality.  It remains to be seen if the ―Occupy Wall Street‖ and 
associated movements can raise public awareness of the issue of corporate personhood to 
point where it becomes a contested political issue and part of the national public agenda.  
While most of the general public seems to be ambivalent about the issue, even 
many mainstream political theorists seem to have accepted the concept.  One of the most 
important modern political philosophers, John Rawls, seems to have tacitly accepted 
corporate personhood in his treatise A Theory of Justice.  When Rawls lists the nature of 
the parties who participate in the original position, he adds item c which includes 
―associations (states, churches, or other corporate bodies).‖
214
  Unfortunately, Rawls does 
not elaborate on this inclusion anywhere else in the book.  It seems that Rawls considered 
associations in his general understanding of persons, but either did not think that this 
point was worth further explanation or decided not to delve into the complicated task of 
explaining the nature of corporate persons.   
 The other avenue for corporations to claim personhood under Dennett‘s theory is 
the criterion of verbal communication.  Most large corporations have an official 
spokesperson who is authorized to speak for the corporation as a whole.  When the 
spokesperson announces the ―corporation‘s‖ official policy or official viewpoint, she is 
not verbalizing the opinion of laborers, or the marketing team, the view of stockholders 
or the personal view of any one person within the corporation.  Rather, she is verbalizing 
what corporate decision makers, including the board of directors, CEO, stockholders, and 
other interested parties, have concluded is the ―corporate‖ view resulting from the 
corporation‘s decision making process.  There seems to be solid ground to conclude that 
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the corporation itself can speak through its designated spokesperson.   Surprisingly, there 
is little to no theoretical scholarship concerning the corporate voice even though the 
corporate voice is exceptionally loud as most corporations employ intense marketing 
tactics to promote their products.   Although the scholarship on the corporate voice is 
limited, a few contemporary theorists who analyze the strength of corporations argue that 
just as corporations have their own voice, they also have their own rational decision 
making mechanisms that would qualify them as Lockean and/or Kantian persons.   
 Linguistic specialist Sanford Schane examines the intersection of language and 
law and argues that in normal linguistic usage the corporation is considered a person 
because the corporation shares the mental capacities of an individual.  He argues that 
cognitive states such as rationality, intelligence, and volition can be attributed to 
corporations.  Additionally, many action verbs of intentionality, guilt, and malice can be 
used with both individuals and corporations.  He even conjectures that it is possible to 
give corporations the right to vote.  His conclusion is that it is not simply metaphor to 
attribute agency to corporations.
215
 
Ethicist Kenneth Goodpaster argues that corporations have certain capabilities 
that are very similar to the rational individual.  First, the corporation has perception in 
that the corporation gathers information about resources, risks, and the impacts of 
alternative courses of action before making a decision.  Corporations monitor the 
environment, gather marketing data, produce financial data, and follow government 
regulations as they make decisions.  Further, Goodpaster argues that corporations can 
take part in moral reasoning if moral norms are used in decision-making and when moral 
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principles are part of corporate ethical codes and official corporate policies.  Goodpaster 
concludes that there is a corporate mind, but he puts ―mind‖ in parenthesis so it is not 
clear if he truly believes that a corporation has a rational mind just as an individual 
does.
216
   
 The most prominent advocate of the proposition that corporations should be 
treated as rational, decision making agents who are part of both the moral and legal 
community is ethicist Peter French.  French argues ―corporations can be full-fledged 
moral persons and have whatever privileges, rights and duties as are, in the normal course 
of affairs, accorded to moral persons.‖
217
  In order to support this claim, French develops 
a detailed analysis of a corporation‘s internal decision-making structure to conclude that a 
corporation itself, apart from its constituent members, can make moral decisions.  The 
internal decision-making structure utilizes two important components.  First is an 
organizational flow chart of responsibility that designates which persons or offices have 
input on what decisions and the pecking order of these persons when making a decision.  
French likens it to the grammar of corporate decision-making.  The second element is the 
set of corporate policies or rules that guide decision-making.  This delineates the 
overarching corporate mission and beliefs so that when a decision is made that is 
motivated by a corporate desire and is consistent with the corporate policies, it can be 
said that the decision is corporate intentional.  French contends that a corporation can 
have intentions because they have reasons for doing things to realize corporate goals.  
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These corporate goals are not reducible to the self-interested desires of directors or 
managers.   
In order to act on its corporate intentions, French says that the corporation uses its 
decision making process to choose a course of action, and this demonstrates the 
corporation‘s rationality as a moral agent.  When the decision-making process is 
activated, it incorporates all the inputs from the various biological humans within the 
organization and synthesizes a corporate decision that is consistent with corporate 
policies.  He argues that it truly is a corporate decision because not one human actor 
made the decision and the corporate intentions cannot be reducible to the intentions of 
any one individual human member.
218
  French further argues that through this process, a 
corporation itself can be shown to be rational and intentional just like any individual 
human person.  
 This is a significant departure from the traditional individualist teaching that only 
individual rational agents could have moral worth.  In a modern, large corporation, the 
CEO does not have the sole authority to make significant decisions such as joining a 
cartel or violating environmental policy.  Rather, these decisions are the result of the 
internal decision-making process that incorporates the intentions of a host of corporate 
players as well as corporate policy.  Thus when corporations are accused of polluting the 
environment or praised for community service projects, there is truth to these statements 
because the corporation should be treated as a moral agents.  As a moral person, the 
corporation is subject to the laws of criminal liability because the corporation can be 
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shown to have intent and culpability.  French uses the example of Ford Motor Company 
to illustrate his point.  
 In 1978, a Ford Pinto was rear-ended and burst into flames killing the passengers.  
The Elkhart Indiana Superior Court indicted Ford on three counts of reckless homicide.  
Ford filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the homicide statutes cannot be applied to 
corporations because the statutes were intended to keep people from killing each other.  
―People‖ in this case applied to human beings, and because a corporation was not a 
human person, the statute did not apply.  The judge in the case disagreed ruling that 
corporations themselves are members of the class of intentional actors and thus are 
subject to criminal law.
219
 
 The idea that as rational, intentional, moral actors the corporation is subject to 
criminal law raises the debate over a corporation‘s culpability for wrong doing.  Does the 
corporation have a mens rea or a guilty mind?  French would conclude yes.  However, 
traditionally moral and legal theorists have concluded that a corporation is not a moral 
agent and does not have a mens rea.  As early as 1612, famed English jurist Sir Edward 
Coke reasoned ―Corporations cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor 
excommunicated, for they have no souls.‖
220
  Over one hundred years later, another 
famed English legal scholar William Blackstone declared ―a corporation cannot commit 
treason or felony or other crime in its corporate capacity; though its individual members 
may, in their distinct individual capacities.‖
221
  Both Coke and Blackstone based their 
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reasoning on the fact that a collective such as a corporation has no mind or mental state 
that would make it capable of contemplating and committing a crime.  Only the 
individuals who compose the corporation could be found guilty of a crime.   
 Machen points out that another difficulty in enforcing criminal penalties against 
corporations is that to punish a corporation could unjustly impose a penalty against 
innocent corporate members who took no part in the corporate decision.  Finding a guilty 
person within a corporation is sometimes impossible, as has been pointed out.  A factory 
worker may have knowingly participated in a process that created a faulty widget, his 
supervisor was negligent in imposing factory standards, and the board of directors had 
suspicions that the widget was faulty but did not want to bear the financial imposition of 
a recall.  Therefore, blame is shared and no one person is responsible.  But to impose a 
financial penalty on the corporation would unjustly hurt the investors who had no 
knowledge of wrongdoing.  Machen concludes that the problem of imposing corporate 




 To many theorists, the problem of punishing a collective is more than just a 
practical problem.  Corporate acts can cause real harm to others and without a 
satisfactory way to punish the corporation, there is a fear that the corporate person will 
act with impunity.  The notion that a corporation can pay a fine to survivors of a 
homicide victim seems to be an affront to justice by many people who believe that a loss 
of life cannot be compensated financially.  However, there are very few other 
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punishments that are appropriate for a corporation beyond fines, business restrictions, or 
the loss of the corporate charter.  This becomes a significant issue in the legal section of 
this chapter.  
 French‘s theory that a corporation should be treated as a rational, intentional, and 
culpable moral agent, while thought provoking, has many critics.  One of the most 
compelling critiques comes from fellow business ethicist Patricia Werhane who also 
examines the moral personhood of the corporation but comes to much different 
conclusions.  While French argues that a corporation has intentions of its own, Werhane 
points out that the only way to discover the corporation‘s goals is to ask employees and to 
observe the behavior of the employees.  Thus, it is the members of the corporation that 
have common goals rather than the organization itself.  Further, she argues that French is 
wrong in asserting that corporations appear to think about goals.  Rather, it is the 
members within the corporation that contemplate courses of action.  She uses the 
example of Dow Chemical manufacturing napalm.  The Dow Chemical board of directors 
debated manufacturing napalm and the employees did the manufacturing.  Because these 
individuals were acting as agents of the corporation, Dow Chemical was held responsible.  
But that is not to conflate the corporation with the individual agents within the corporate 
umbrella.
223
  Werhane subscribes to a variation of group theory which is discussed in 
detail in the following pages. 
 Werhane does not, however, ascribe to the view that the corporation is simply an 
aggregation of its members.  She admits that when a corporation commits a wrongdoing 
such as polluting a river, there are a variety of individual members within the corporation 
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from the management, to the chemists, to the actual people who dump the pollutant, who 
are involved in the action.  In these cases, it does make sense to speak of the corporation 
as a unit.  She states, ―We cannot because not all actions of corporations are redescribable 
merely as individual actions.  There is such a phenomenon as collective corporate action 
even though the actors are themselves all individuals who contribute to the collective 
activity.‖
224
  In order to account for the moral actions of collectivities, Werhane develops 
an alternative theory to French which involves what she terms secondary moral agents. 
 She argues that although it seems that a collective exhibits intentional behavior, a 
collective does not really think, desire, believe, or intend because there is no 
psychological entity to have such intension.  Rather, she contends, a corporation‘s 
decision-making procedures combines the intents of the boards of directors, stockholders, 
managers, employees, as well as the advice from outside agents such as lawyers, 
accountants, and public relations firms.  Together all of these agents form the collective 
intentions that are exhibited in corporate action and goals.  As opposed to the individual 
agents who are primary moral agents, Werhane concludes that a corporation is a 
secondary moral agent because the agency is a composite of the moral agents within it.  
As secondary moral agents, collectives can act as moral agents and therefore are morally 
responsible for actions and they have moral rights.  She qualifies this statement by stating 
that these moral rights are secondary in that individual moral rights must be given 
primacy but a corporation does have a moral right to freedom and should be treated 
equally among other corporations.
225
  In cases of corporate free speech, the corporation 
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must recognize the free speech rights of its employees to exercise their rights just as a 
corporation does.  Because corporations generally have more financial resources at their 
disposal to amplify their messages, they unjustly overpower individual voices.  Thus she 
concludes that corporations exceed their rights as secondary moral agents.
226
  
 Werhane is critical of French‘s approach, but she does not completely dismiss the 
idea that corporations can function as moral agents albeit in a limited way.  Other 
scholars are not so charitable.  For instance, economist Milton Friedman argues that a 
corporation is not a moral agent and does not have any type of social responsibility.  He 
argues that a corporation is simply a tool to maximize profits for its shareholders.  It is a 
Kantian means to achieve the end of profit maximization.  Friedman maintains that the 
duty of corporate managers is to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the profit seeking 
investors and to do so without fraud or deception.  To not use the stockholders‘ money 
wisely would be tantamount to stealing, and therefore the corporate managers have a 
moral duty to maximize profits.
227
     
 Friedman takes a very limited view of a corporation‘s moral duties.  However, 
other scholars agree with Friedman that a corporation cannot be a moral agent.  Ethicist 
and Kantian scholar Matthew C. Altman argues against French saying that collectives 
cannot be moral agents because only individuals can fulfill this role.  From a perspective 
of Kantian ethics, Altman argues that viewing the corporation as a person or a moral 
agent is not appropriate because Kantian ethics cannot apply to collective intents.  He 
argues that apart from its members, the corporation does not have moral obligations or 
                                                 
226
 Patricia Werhane, Persons, Rights, & Corporations, Prentice Hall Inc. (1985): 63-64. 
 
227
 Milton Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to Increase Its Profits,‖ New York Times 




moral agency.  In order to have moral agency in Kantian ethics, an entity must be able to 
act according to right moral principles.  Only rational individuals are able to engage in 
this type of reasoning to determine right principles and act accordingly.  A corporation 
itself has no rational nature or consciousness in the sense the Kant understands it.  
Corporate policies that guide the ethical behavior of its members are not set by the 
corporation itself – they are established by the shareholders and directors.  Further, 
corporations do not have desires, predispositions, or moral principles.  A company does 
not have a profit motive any more than the state desires tax revenues.  Rather, it is the 
members of Congress who may want money to spend.  The state itself cannot desire 
anything.  Similarly, the shareholders of a corporation may have a profit motive but the 
corporation itself does not have any motives itself because corporations, like other 
collectives, do not have self-interest.  A corporation cannot create its own Kantian ends.  
In other words, there is a difference between the goals for a corporation as intended by 




In common practice, corporations are often said to have made value judgments 
based on moral principles because businesses use their decision-making procedures to act 
in ways that are morally relevant.  This is argued by both Goodpaster and French.  For 
example, Syngenta Corporation, which manufactures herbicides for the farming industry, 
has been blamed for polluting water systems in the Midwest.  When casting blame, there 
is no one individual who can be said to be entirely at fault.  The chemists who made the 
product understood that some of the chemicals were environmentally harmful.  The 
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Syngenta management also realized the harm but continued to manufacture the product; 
the marketing team promoted the product, and sales teams sold it. In casting blame, the 
easy method is to just blame Syngenta Corporation as the person at fault.  Altman claims 
that although responsibility cannot be assigned to any particular agent, it is incorrect from 
a Kantian perspective to assign blame to the corporation itself.  Again, the corporation as 
a collective is not a moral agent.  Similarly, Johnson & Johnson is sometimes praised for 
issuing a full voluntary recall of Tylenol when some capsules were found to be laced with 
cyanide.  Tylenol itself did not have virtuous motives – the executives who issued the 
recall were the agents who had motives which could have been inspired by virtue, long-
term profits, or company reputation.  Altman‘s point is that these corporations, as 
corporations, did not have motives apart from the individuals within the corporations.  
Stemming from its individualist foundation, Kant‘s ethics apply to individuals.  Thus, 
Altman reasons that we can only judge businesspeople not businesses.  Altman contends 
that we cannot attribute moral personhood to a corporation without illegitimately 
anthropomorphizing it.   
 Altman brings the debate over the moral personhood of corporations full circle 
from the initial Lockean and Kantian perspective that only individuals can qualify as 
moral agents, to arguments from French and Werhane that a type of collective moral 
agency is possible, and back to a Kantian perspective that corporate collectives cannot be 
considered moral agents on their own accord.  The theories of moral personhood for 
corporations lead into a review of legal theories of corporate personhood.  Theorists 
generally consider legal corporate personhood to be a separate issue from moral 
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personhood, but as the next section explains there is significant intersection of the 
theories.   
 
Legal Theory Section 
 While moral theory concerning corporate personhood calls into question whether 
or not a corporation can be considered a rational agent, legal theory concerning 
corporation personhood has observed these questions but has largely developed its own 
conceptualizations of corporate personhood that are largely separate from moral theory.  
Legal theorists do not spend much energy studying the conditions of natural personhood 
or theories such as Kantian end and means or Dennett‘s conditions for rational agency.  
Instead, legal theorists spend more time debating the legal requirements for an entity to 
qualify as a person for juridical purposes.  The paradigms of legal personhood and moral 
personhood do intersect in a few scholarly works, but not often.  However, this study 
examines various types of natural and legal persons and thus the intersection of moral and 
legal personhood is important for drawing comparisons among the various entities vying 
for personhood.  Therefore, in the analysis of corporate personhood, it is necessary to 
review the prominent legal theories that influence court decisions.   
Moral theories of personhood as applied to corporations have been in circulation 
since the rise of the corporation in the 1800s and experienced revitalization in the 1980s.  
In contrast, legal theories of corporate personhood have had a relatively short lifecycle in 
the United States.  The prominent legal theories surrounding corporate personality 
developed mostly in Continental Europe, especially France and Germany, in the late 
1800s.  European scholars debated the essence of corporate personhood and whether the 
bestowal of personhood was simply a legal shortcut, a manifestation of the personhood of 
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the individual members of the corporations, or whether the corporation should be 
considered a person just as a human being.  In the United States, some scholars examined 
these questions as well, but not with the fervor of their European counterparts.  American 
debate took place from 1890 to 1930, but largely vanished after John Dewey‘s 1926 
article in the Yale Law Journal.  In his article, Dewey presented a legal positivist 
argument that the law was not dependent upon moral, psychological, or social definitions 
of personhood.  Arguing that theory is indeterminate, Dewey concludes that the law sets 
its own standards for personhood and states, ―for the purposes of the law, the conception 
of ‗person‘ is a legal conception; put roughly, ―person‖ signifies what law makes it 
signify.‖
229
  Dewey dismisses the inherent theoretical problems of using the word 
―person‖ for the corporation and contends that the subject of legal personality is a right-
and-duty-bearing-unit, and this includes man, corporations, and any other units the courts 
determine have rights and duties.  Thus, Dewey concluded that scholars should not 
concern themselves with theories, but should focus their studies on the entities that have 
rights and duties before the law.   
Dewey‘s argument was convincing for many scholars of corporate personhood, 
and American publications concerning the essence of corporate personhood waned after 
1930.
230
  Perhaps the lack of theoretical discussion has increased the confusion 
surrounding legal personality.  At any rate, it has not helped clarify the term.  
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Contemporary legal theorist Margaret Davies remarks, ―Whereas modern legal theorists 
have sought, at length, to elucidate the concept of property, comparatively little time has 
been expended on the companion concept of legal personality.  This is remarkable given 
the importance of the concept to our daily lives as citizens and as legal actors.‖
231
  While 
property law is regarded as fundamental in most law schools, it is very rare to find the 
―Law of Persons‖ on the curriculum.  Because scholarly debates over legal personhood 
were limited in the United States, it is difficult to ascertain whether Supreme Court 
justices were explicitly operating within a particular theory and knowingly applying well-
defined sets of principles in order to reach their decisions.  However, these theories are 
useful as explanatory models for interpreting decisions.  Because the corporate person 
does not neatly fit into the individualistic model upon which the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights was based, legal theories help bridge the gap between the individualist structure of 
the law and the reality of the corporate collective.  They provide a conceptual background 




Three major theories have emerged around the subject of corporate personality 
and are commonly referred to as fiction theory, group theory, and person theory.
233
  The 
earliest theory was fiction theory which Pope Innocent IV proposed to explain the 
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corporate body of the Catholic Church.  This theory maintained that a corporation is a 
distinct social entity and its personality is a mere fiction created by the state.  This theory 
dominated most early American legal thought because it was based on the foundation of 
individualism.  True to a Lockean model, corporations are simply formed by rational 
individuals with individual property rights who join together through a social contract in 
order to pursue their economic self interest in an efficient manner. The law confirms the 
unique status of the individual, and fundamental legal relations take place between one 
human and another human.  If individuals enter into an association, the resulting group 
does not have an independent existence on its own, and has no preexisting rights.  Only in 
contemplation of the law does the entity acquire its legal personality and thus it becomes 
a legal fiction.  The state bestows the status of person to the corporation and the state can 
also revoke this status.   
 This theory helps clarify some the confusion surrounding legal personality 
because it carefully distinguished between ―natural persons‖ who are human beings and 
―artificial persons‖ who are created by the law such as corporations.  Edward Coke, an 
early subscriber to fiction theory, distinguished the two types of person by what God 
made and what the King made.  For Coke, a corporation was ―artificial‖ because a royal 
charter or the state gives it status, rather than the natural event of birth that provides the 
status of person to a human.
234
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 One of the strongest American advocates of fiction theory was Chief Justice 
Marshall.  In his definitive opinion, Marshall utilized fiction theory to explain the status 
of corporations. 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only 
in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only 
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it either 
expressly or as incidental to its very existence.  These are such as are 
supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.  
Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be 
allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of 
many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single 
individual Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward  17 U.S. 518, 636 
(1819). 
 
In Marshall‘s view, the corporation is not a natural person and has no ability to formulate 
and pursue goals.  Its only purpose is to fulfill a need for humans. Thus, Marshall‘s 
argument is functionalist – the corporation is a means to an end.  Returning to Kantian 
theories, if a corporation is simply a means to an end, then it cannot be a person in a 
moralistic sense.  Although Marshall does not directly invoke Kant in his opinion, this 
seems to coincide with Marshall‘s argument because Marshall carefully stipulates that the 
corporation is simply a person in the law and not in any other sense.  Granting corporate 
legal personhood is simply a means to achieve economic ends set by humans.  Marshall‘s 
fiction theory does not stretch beyond the legal into political or moralistic theories of 
personhood.  Marshall‘s argument also stresses the importance of the individualistic 
framework of the law in the fact that corporate personality allows the corporation to 
assume the form of an individual for the purposes of doing business.  
 A variant of fiction theory is entitlement or concession theory.  In this model, the 
right to incorporate is a special privilege granted by the sovereign.  The corporation exists 
204 
 
only as a creation of the state.  Its powers are only those spelled out in its charter, and all 
other acts are ultra vires and therefore void.  Entitlement theory is prominent in 
Marshall‘s conception of the corporation.  He argues, ―The objects for which a 
corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote.  They 
are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in 
most cases the sole consideration of the grant. …The benefit to the public is considered 
as an ample compensation for the faculty it confers, and the corporation is created‖ 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518, 638 (1819).  
 Dewey explains that fiction/entitlement theory was exhibited in decisions by early 
American judges who were influenced by the individualistic age.  When it is difficult to 
identify the single persons who are said to be the ―real‖ persons, it is very convenient to 
do business as a fiction.  Although a fictitious person has a clear title to property and 
contract, its liabilities and burdens outside of property are not so clear.
235
  While 
entitlement theory was prevalent in the early 1800s, during the Jacksonian era, special 
charters were denounced as examples of political favoritism, legislative corruption, and 
monopoly.  Consequently, ―free incorporation‖ laws were constructed which made the 
corporate form universally available and undermined concession theory.  Incorporation 
was no longer a state or sovereign conferred privilege but a regular mode of conducting 
business.
236
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As corporations as collectivist legal institutions grew in power, fiction theory 
clung to its individualist foundations.  The corporation stood in clear contradiction to a 
legal culture dominated by Lockean ideas of pre-social, natural rights.  Rather than the 
individual being the powerful actor, associations of persons were rapidly becoming 
dominant.  As separate economic entities, corporations diluted individual moral and legal 
responsibility among those in the group.  Thus, fiction theory sought to retain 
―methodological individualism‖ or the view that the only real starting point for political 
and legal theory is the individual.  In this view, corporations were simply artificial 
aggregations of individuals.  Legal historian Morton Horwitz argues that in Western 
countries, theories of corporate personality were associated with a crisis of legitimacy in 




While the fiction theory had many advocates, critics argued that a corporation was 
no more fictitious than any other individual or group of individuals.
238
  Thus, to call the 
corporation a ―fiction‖ is misleading because the corporation is real; it certainly exists.  
Arthur Machen argues that if a corporation is created, it is real and therefore cannot be 
purely fictitious having no existence except in legal imagination.
239
  Bryant Smith states, 
―The legal personality of a corporation is just as real as and no more real than the legal 
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personality of a normal human being.  In either case it is abstraction, one of the major 
abstractions of legal science, like title, possession, right and duty.‖
240
 
 Another criticism of fiction theory arises when trying to adjudicate the culpability 
of a corporation.  A fictitious entity cannot be capable of motives or malice, and therefore 
cannot commit injury.  If a malicious tort is committed, a flesh and blood being who is 
capable of malice must be the person who committed it.  This person may be a director, 
an agent or a shareholder in the corporation, but the important point is that an actual 
person, not a fictitious entity, commits the tort.  Thus, if an individual is wronged by a 
malicious tort committed by a corporation, is there no path for recompense?  There are 
many instances of wrongs committed by a corporation, and even if the motivation behind 
the injury was from a flesh and blood human being within the corporation, it is the 
corporation as a whole that must make restitution.  As famed legal historian Paul 
Vinogradoff argued, ―Character and motive can be attributed to corporate entities and it 
has come to be recently a more or less established doctrine that corporations are 
responsible, similarly as are individuals, for crime or tort.  Law, as it were, goes behind 
the pure abstraction of the artificial entity.‖
241
 
 As corporations began to dominate the economy, fiction theory receded as a 
popular legal theory.  Fiction theory‘s attempt to force corporations into an individualist 
mold created more confusion among legal scholars than it resolved.  Thus, scholars 
looked for alternative theories that better fit reality.  A second theory of corporate 
personality that seemed to better fit the collective nature of the corporation is group 
theory.  Within this theory, human beings are the original bearers of rights, and among 
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these rights is the ability to join together to do business under a separate name.  The 
group does not become a separate entity to be treated as a legal person.  Rather, it is the 
humans under the corporate name who are entitled to the same rights and protection of 
the law as guaranteed to them as single individuals.  Although it is convenient to think of 
the rights of a corporation as a legal unit, corporate rights are nothing other than those of 
the component members.  Persons conducting business under a corporate name are 
entitled to the same rights and protections guaranteed to them as individuals.  A corporate 
name is simply a useful name for identifying the members of a group but the corporation 
is not considered a person itself.   
 This theory is very much related to fiction theory because although a corporation 
is frequently spoken of as a person, the existence of a corporation independently of its 
shareholders is a fiction.  The rights and duties of a corporation are really the rights and 
duties of the persons who compose the corporation, and not of an imaginary or fictitious 
being.  Group theory‘s preservation of the rational human beings who form the 
corporation is the most pronounced of the three theories. 
 One of the benefits of retaining importance of the rational individuals within the 
corporation is that when a corporation is found guilty of a crime, group theorists look to 
the flesh and blood human beings for responsibility and punishment.  Humans are not 
allowed to hide behind the corporate veil and shirk blame.  However, in the modern 
complex corporation where decisions are the result of numerous actors, group theory 
does not provide a solution for pinpointing who among the many agents should be held 
accountable.   
208 
 
 Group theory starts to break down when considered in light of Michel‘s Iron Law 
of Oligarchy.  Michel‘s work is in respect to political parties, and he argues that the party 
as an entity is not necessarily identifiable with all of its members.  The party is created as 
a means to an end.  However, having been formed, the party becomes an end in itself 
with its own aims and interests that are detached from the individuals which it represents.  
―By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into 
existence through the need for the division of labor, creates for itself, as soon as it 
becomes consolidates, interests peculiar to itself.‖
242  The corporation acts in much the 
same way.   
Although individuals create it as a means to conduct business, the corporation 
often takes on a ―life of its own‖ as its own person.  The bureaucracy that runs a 
corporation may have interests that do not necessarily reflect all the interests of the 
individual members.  Thus, although the rights and duties stem from the individual 
members within the corporation, the corporation acts as its own entity.  British legal 
scholar A.V. Dicey reiterated Michel‘s Law when he pointed out that individuals 
belonging to corporations, trade unions, or political parties tend to act differently when 
part of the group.  He wrote, ―when a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred 
thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common 
purpose, they create a body which by no fiction of but by the very nature of things, 
differs from the individuals of whom it is composed.‖
243
  Thus, rather than being a mere 
association of individuals, the corporation itself becomes a unique entity apart from its 
                                                 
242
 Robert Michel, Political Parties, [New York: Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 1962] 353. 
 
243
 A.V. Dicey, ―The Combination Laws as Illustrating the Relation between Law and Opinion in England 




members.  It no longer derives all of its characteristics from the members of the group.  
Goodpaster argues that this phenomenon is particularly true for modern corporations that 
are large and heavily bureaucratic.  He argues that corporations are not unstructured 
groups of people like passengers on a train nor are corporations completely hierarchical 
in their decision making structure with the CEO making the important decisions.  Rather, 
the corporation reflects the decision making process involving many individuals with 
varying levels of authority.  Taken as a whole, Goodpaster argues that the corporation 
takes on traits such as competence, intelligence, innovativeness, and aggressiveness that 
are generally afforded to human persons.  Thus, Goodpaster presents a case that the 
essence of a corporation is similar to that of a natural person.
244
  
Legal theorists who agree that corporations should be considered in the same way 
as natural human individuals subscribe to person theory.  The primary proponent of this 
theory was German historian Otto Gierke who argued that groups were as ―real‖ as the 
persons who formed them.  In contrast to group theory, Gierke argued that the 
corporation is more than just an expression of the sum its members.  It acquires a 
common will and pursues its own goals, makes decisions based upon those goals, and its 
life may continue indefinitely, regardless of changes in membership.  Frederic Maitland, 
a student of Gierke, summarizes Gierke‘s position in his introduction to Gierke‘s treatise.  
Maitland writes, ―A universitas (or corporate body)…is a living organism and a real 
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person, with a body and members and a will of its own.  Itself can will, itself can act…it 
is a group-person, and its will is a group will.‖
245
   
In short, the corporation has many of the criteria of rational agents that are needed 
to qualify for personhood.  Within this framework, a corporation can still be referred to as 
an artificial person when one needs to distinguish them from natural persons.  However, 
in fiction theory, the legal person is created by the law while in person theory, the 
corporation is a legal person naturally just as any human being.  Legal realists generally 
do not consider the moral agency connected to corporate personhood because most legal 
scholars limit their theoretical inquiries to the legal world and conceive of a juristic 
person as the subject of rights.  However, it is readily apparent that there is a connection 
because to talk of rights and duties implies agency and consciousness.  Peter French 
recognizes this and he is critical of legal scholars for this limitation.  He challenges the 
legal realist tradition to consider the corporation as a moral as well as juristic person.
246
 
As corporations grew in number and size, and theorists realized that the individual 
members of the group no longer had direct control over corporate actions, theorists began 
to move from group to theory to person theory.  Person theory better reflected the fact 
that corporate decisions were made by numerous managers using decision-making 
processes rather than a single individual or by the shareholders.  The corporation was 
taking on a life of its own.  In order to fit this collective entity within the individualistic 
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framework of the legal system, theorists recognized the corporation as a real juristic 
person with profit maximizing motives and agency.  
Person theory acknowledges the importance of the group, but unlike group theory, 
it allows the corporation itself to be the bearer of rights and duties.  The legitimacy of the 
corporate person does not reflect the rights of the individual members.  Rather the 
corporate person has legitimacy in its own right.  The legal personality of the corporation 
is just as real as the legal personality of a human being.  As Maitland summarizes, a 
corporations ―is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the state‘s machinery, no collective 
name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person with a body and members 
and a will of its own.‖
247
   
Person theory is the most contentious conception of corporate personality in that 
the corporate personality does not depend upon the human beings who formed the 
corporation, nor does it apologize for elevating the property of a corporation to that of a 
legal person.  Person theory disregards the importance of the rational, property-owning 
individual and thus challenges Locke‘s emphasis on individualism.  Person theory even 
more flagrantly violates Kantian notions of means and ends because the corporation, 
which is a property to be used for the convenience of human beings, suddenly becomes a 
person in its own right without reflection of the humans who formed it. The corporation 
as a tool or a ―means‖ for furthering economic progress, suddenly becomes the ―end‖ and 
is a person in and of itself.  
 We will find that each of the three theories can be found in the legal reasoning of 
the Supreme Court, but ultimately, person theory emerged to meet the changing needs of 
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American legal jurisprudence.  Schane argues, ―The fiction theory emphasized the power 
of the sovereign, the group theory emphasized the contractual rights of individual 
persons, and the person theory emphasized the economic freedom of formal 
organizations.‖
248
  As the corporation grew in strength and number during the turn of 
twentieth century, many legal scholars and justices realized that the person theory best fit 
the real power held by corporations.  Because person theory treated the corporation as an 
entity independent of its members, it could have its own property and debts, it could 
delegate power to agents, and could be the bearer of rights and duties.  The person theory 
freed corporations from the restrictions of both fiction and group theory.  Many legal 
scholars agree that after 1930, person theory was the dominant paradigm.
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 Despite its popularity, person theory has its flaws because it tends to elevate the 
corporation to the status of or even above the humans it was designed to serve.  As noted 
legal scholar Max Radin argues, ―The law exists for, by and through actual human 
beings.  Any statement that cannot be resolved into one about living human beings is not 
a legal statement.  The ‗personality,‘ then, which is the ultimate object of our 
consideration, … is after all and in spite of all, a man.‖
 250
  Although the corporation is 
composed of human beings, the association in and of itself is not human, and although 
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the corporation resembles a human in some ways, it is not exhaustive in its attempt to 
include all the movements and relations of the flesh and blood beings who are involved. 
 Person theory also presents a problem with corporate liability.  Unlike in fiction 
theory, person theory has an advantage in that the corporation as a person can be found 
guilty of a crime.  However, when the corporation is to be punished for the crime, there is 
a problem in who really suffers.  When a corporation‘s property is taken, it is the 
shareholders who ultimately suffer the punishment.  Thus, it is the living and breathing 
human beings who pay the price for the crimes of their corporation.  If a corporation is 
dissolved as a punishment, the stockholders can reorganize their business under a 
different name to gain the same benefits as before.  Dissolution is therefore futile.  
Consequently, in sentencing and punishing a corporation, the attempt is always to reach 
the actual, living human beings.  If they cannot be reached, there is no punishment even if 
punishment has been mandated.   
As demonstrated, each of the three theories is useful as a guideline for analyzing 
corporate personality, but each also has significant flaws.  Person theory dominated legal 
theory until approximately 1928 when legal realist John Dewey asserted that the law 
could signify person to mean whatever the law wanted.  Dewey‘s proclamation signaled 
to fellow scholars that the debate over personhood was futile and they should move on to 
other topics.  Many legal scholars took Dewey‘s advice and focused on the reduction of 
legal personality to simply right-and-duty bearing units. However, despite the seemingly 
attractive simplicity of this legal reduction, this paradigm entails its own set of problems.  
Right and duty relations are not necessarily the ultimate units of the law.  Excessive 
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reliance on the claim-duty relation obscures the fact that other relations such as privileges 
and capacities, are every bit as important.
251
  
 Machen, the noted proponent of person theory, also disagrees with Dewey‘s 
argument for reducing personality to legal relationships.  For Dewey, ―person‖ is a 
technical term in law, and does not mean a human being but a group of legal 
relationships.  For Machen, the term ―person‖ in reference to the corporation is not 
arbitrary.  The corporation is called a person because one treats it as a person.  Machen 
ascribes the human capacity to reason to the corporation and argues that the corporation 
can be guilty of particular crimes involving mental states such as malice and fraud.  For 
Machen, it is not a purely legal matter in which human beings are removed.  Instead, the 
human qualities that can be attributed to the corporation are the important factors in 
conferring legal personality.
252
   
 By the 1930s, Dewey‘s call to end the debate over corporate personality coincided 
with the publication of the Berle and Means textbook on the corporation with a focus on 
management structures.  For the next fifty years, corporate theorists focused their 
attention to management theories and corporate personality ceased to be a subject of 
debate.
253
   
In the early 1980s as corporate scandals involving huge, international companies 
erupted, corporate personality again entered debate circles as scholars tried to determine 
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the proper legal and moral status of the corporation.  One legal theorist who reinvigorated 
the debate over corporate personhood was Phillip Blumberg who posited that fiction, 
group, and person theories were all outdated and a new approach was needed.   
 Blumberg argues that the reality of large multinational corporations with 
complex, multi-tiered structures and thousands of public shareholders across the globe 
present new legal problems that cannot be accommodated with current theory.  
Traditional theory was based on the corporation as a simple and primarily singular unit 
designed to conduct business.  However, modern corporate economics is dominated by 
large parent companies and holding companies that are involved with many, diverse 
subsidiary corporations.  Further, the CEO of Corporation A likely serves on the board of 
directors for Corporations B, C, and D and is the primary supplier for Corporation E of 
which it also owns stock. Corporate economics are no longer simple – rather corporate 
economics characterized by complex webs of intersecting ownership relations.  The law 
no longer looks behind the corporate veil. Instead, the law must look behind layers of 




Blumberg argues that a new concept of corporate personality is needed to reflect 
the reality of a complex corporate world.  He contends that the law must recognize 
corporate groups or conglomerates as legal units.  Blumberg argues that the parent 
company and all its affiliated subsidiaries and linked companies must be considered as 
one legal unit in order to hold complex corporations liable.  Otherwise, complex 
corporations are able to shirk blame by hiding behind the complex webs of fragmented 
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corporate ownership.  Thus, Blumberg concludes that a new corporate person is needed 
that encompasses the entire corporate conglomerate and reflects modern corporate 
economics.
255
  Despite convincing arguments that this new concept is needed, Blumberg 
does not fully deliver on providing the details of how this new corporate person would fit 
into the legal and moral framework of personality.  Blumberg leaves this task for future 
scholars of corporate personality.  
Blumberg‘s unfinished attempt to create a new concept of corporate personality is 
one of many attempts by legal scholars to fit the corporation into the pre-existing 
individualistic framework of the American legal tradition.  The problem is that the 
corporation does not fit neatly into this framework because the corporation is not a 
―person‖ in the ordinary sense of the word.  The corporation is a group rather than an 
individual, and the corporation is property to be used as a means by humans.  Therefore, 
although the various legal theories are useful in providing some understanding of what it 
means to say that the corporation is a person, none of the theories fully justify 
personhood in either a legal or a moral sense.  The Supreme Court, which has had to 
adjudicate the essence of corporate personhood, has utilized these theories to help reach 
decisions.  In fact, in some cases the Court invokes two or even three legal theories in the 
same case in an attempt to explicate corporate personhood.  Although, the theoretical 
underpinnings of legal personality seem to raise as many questions as they try to answer, 
this foundation is necessary as we turn to an examination of the Supreme Court‘s 
decisions involving corporate personality. 
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ANALYSIS OF CASES 
 
 Turning now to the concept of corporate personality as developed by the Supreme 
Court, we find that the Court struggled to find proper theories to suit the collective within 
an individualistic legal framework.  A review of some of the most important cases 
concerning the corporate person reveals that the Court employed all of the various legal 
theories at various times, but did not necessarily employ them consistently to create a 
firm legal conception of corporate personhood.  The Court also struggled to justify the 
moral ramifications associated with the term ―person‖ when applied to the corporation.  
Most moral theories of personhood apply to natural persons.  It was difficult for the Court 
to decipher how to adjudicate the moral requirements of personhood in respect to an 
artificial person.  Further, the dual status of person and property raised unique problems 
for determining the rights and obligations of a corporation. 
 Unlike the previous chapter on slavery where some of the most telling opinions 
on the personhood of slaves came from lower courts and state court opinions, the case 
law on corporate personhood was primarily developed by the Supreme Court.  Although 
there are some relevant lower court opinions, there are thousands of Supreme Court cases 
concerning corporations, so I have primarily contained my pool of cases to the Supreme 
Court with the exception of a few cases where personhood arguments were influential for 
later Supreme Court decisions.  I have further selected those cases that are most relevant 
to the issue of corporate personhood and best exemplify how the Court developed the 
concept in the last 200 years.  
 The review of cases begins in the early nineteenth century, when 
fiction/concession theory dominated thinking on corporate personality by legal theorists 
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and influenced the Supreme Court.  However, as the number of applications for corporate 
charters rose in the late nineteenth century, there was increasing mistrust of the special 
charter granted by the state.  State charters were argued to foster political corruption, 
political favoritism and monopolies.  Thus free incorporation, which allowed associations 
to incorporate automatically, fostered the rise of group theory.  Consequently, in the 
Court opinions of the 1800s, there is a mixture of both fiction/concession theory and 
group theory. 
 The first major Supreme Court Case concerning the corporation was Bank of the 
United States v. Deveaux 9 U.S. 61 (1809).  In this case, the Bank which was chartered in 
Pennsylvania, was suing Deveaux, a tax collector from Georgia, for taking taxes that the 
Bank claimed it did not owe.  The Bank preferred that a federal court rather than a State 
of Georgia court hear the case.  However, the defendant claimed that there was no federal 
jurisdiction because the corporation was not a citizen of Pennsylvania, and moreover was 
not a citizen at all.  Because Article 3 of the Constitution refers to ―controversies between 
citizens of different states,‖ the Court was forced to consider the nature of corporations.  
The Court‘s decision in this case fits within fiction theory because the Court, borrowing 
from Blackstone and Coke, stated, ―That invisible, intangible, and artificial being that 
mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and consequently 
cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States‖ (9 U.S. 61, 8).   
Furthermore, the Court argued, ―a corporation aggregate is an artificial, invisible 
body, existing only in contemplation of law. It has no analogy to a natural person. It has 
no organ but its seal.  It cannot sue, or be sued, for a personal injury.  It cannot be 
outlawed. It never dies. … For all these reasons it cannot come within the description of 
219 
 
those who are entitled to sue in the circuit courts of the United States‖ (9 U.S. 61, 86).  In 
this argument, the Court was implicitly referring to the moral qualities of a human 
person.  The Court reasons that since the corporation is not mortal and does not have a 
human body, the analogy to a human person is weak and cannot have bearing on the case.  
However, the Supreme Court did not to completely deprive corporations of access 
to the federal courts.  The opinion continues to discuss the legal rights of the individuals 
within the corporation, and switches to a group perspective. ―What is a corporation 
aggregate?  It is a collection of many individuals united into one body, under a special 
name, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested, by the policy of 
the law, with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual‖ (9 U.S. 61, 65).  
This statement utilizes group theory to argue that although the corporation is artificial, the 
members who compose it, ―a mere collection of men having collectively certain 
faculties,‖ (9 U.S. 61, 66) are persons within the law and do have the legal right to sue as 
citizens.  ―A (corporate) name, indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons 
whom it represents may be the one or the other; and the controversy is, in fact and in law, 
between those persons suing in their corporate character…and the individual against 
whom the suit may be instituted‖ (9 U.S. 61, 87).  Thus, if one lifts the corporate veil, one 
sees the true members of the corporation who are entitled to the Court‘s protection.  The 
interests of the corporation become the interests of the members, and consequently, both 
cannot be deprived of access to the law simply because the individual members chose to 
join together to conduct business under a corporate name.  As a result, the Court did not 
grant the corporation any rights as its own entity.  ―For the term citizen ought to be 
understood as it is used in the constitution, and as it is used in other laws.  That is, to 
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describe the real persons who come into court, in this case, under their corporate name‖  
(9 U.S. 61, 91).   
 Ten years later, the Court was again faced with the subject of corporate 
personality in the case Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518 (1819).  
This case concerned the charter of Dartmouth College, which granted corporate 
privileges and powers to a twelve-person board of trustees.  The New Hampshire 
legislature amended the original charter in 1816 to enlarge the board of trustees and to 
create a board of overseers who included several members of the New Hampshire state 
government.  The original board of trustees brought suit alleging that the 1816 changes to 
the charter were invalid.  This case is noteworthy because it contains Chief Justice 
Marshall‘s definitive opinion using fiction theory in which he states, ―A corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law‖ (17 U.S. 
518, 636).  Agreeing with Marshall in his concurring opinion, Justice Story reminds his 
readers that a corporation, because it is composed of fallible human beings, is subject to 
deviate from its original charter.  Although Story does not delve into the moral 
implications of a corporation committing crimes as a person, he hints that the behavior of 
a corporation must be monitored just as laws monitor the behavior of natural persons (17 
U.S. 518, 674). 
In addition to employing fiction theory, Marshall uses entitlement theory to state, 
―The objects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the government 
wishes to promote.  They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit 
constitutes the consideration, and in most cases the sole consideration of the grant.  …  
The benefit to the public is considered as an ample compensation for the faculty it 
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confers, and the corporation is created‖ (17 U.S. 518, 638).  Marshall holds true to 
traditional doctrine that a corporation should benefit the public and the government.  
However, Marshall decided that even though the state created the corporation, it could 
not dispose of the corporation without sufficient reasons.  Thus, Marshall limited the 
state‘s authority of a corporation and opened the doors for an expansion in corporate 
autonomy.
256
  In James Willard Hurst‘s analysis of this case, he concludes that the Court 
was very concerned to respect state control of corporate activity and thus took pains to 
deny that a corporation was a citizen of the chartering state so that the corporation would 
not have access to the Constitution‘s privileges and immunities clause.‖
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 Thirty-five years later, in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. 
Letson 43 U.S. 497 (1844), the Supreme Court delivered an opinion which was radical in 
terms of corporate personhood.  In the opinion, Justice Wayne stated that the corporate 
person was for all legal intents and purposes the equivalent of a natural person and should 
even be considered a citizen.  At issue was a breach of contract by Letson, a citizen of 
New York against the Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad in the federal circuit court for 
South Carolina.  The railroad, wishing to avoid federal jurisdiction, argued that because 
two of the shareholders were citizens of New York, the overlap of citizenship warranted 
jurisdiction in New York.   
In the notes of the case, Legare, an attorney for the defendant, argued, ―They 
(corporations) stand in this respect precisely in the same category with minors, lunatics 
and idiots‖ (43 U.S. 491, 522).  Legare is essentially arguing that just as minors and 
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lunatics do not have rational and autonomous capabilities but are still respected as 
persons, so too should corporations be extended personhood even though they may fail to 
qualify by certain criteria.  This argument is profound because in the 1840s, there is very 
little evidence that other scholars were using moral philosophy to draw comparison 
between different categories of persons and there is also very little evidence that moral 
philosophers in the 1800s were studying corporate personhood.  Legare then cited Bank 
of the United States v. The Planters‟ Bank of Georgia 9 Wheat. 962 in which Chief 
Justice Marshall declared that when a state was a stockholder in a private company, that 
state was a citizen.  Using this reasoning, Legare argued that if a state, the greatest 
corporation of all, can be sued as a citizen in legal contemplation, why should not other 
corporations be considered citizens for judicial purposes?  (43 U.S. 497, 525)   
 Legare‘s arguments must have been convincing, because the Supreme Court ruled 
in his favor.  In the Court opinion, Justice Wayne argued, ―a corporation, created by a 
state, though it may have members out of the state, seems to us to be a person, (emphasis 
mine) though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and therefore for the 
purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state‖ (43 U.S. 497, 555).  
Wayne criticized the precedent in Deveaux arguing that Deveaux went too far in denying 
the citizenship of the corporation for jurisdictional purposes.  He argued, ―it is, that 
corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all 
intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the same 
state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that 
state, as much as a natural person‖ (43 U.S. 497, 559).  Thus, Wayne overturned Deveaux 
and included the corporation as both a legal person and a citizen. 
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 While in Deveaux, the corporation was an ―artificial being‖ and a ―creature of the 
law,‖ in Letson, the corporation was explicitly a person deserving the same treatment as a 
natural person.  This opinion marks an abrupt foray into person theory, and in fact, in his 
influential arguments Legare quotes Savigny, one of the founders of person theory.  In 
Letson, the Court granted the corporation personhood due to its residency within a 
particular state.  The Court said that a corporation that has been created in a particular 
state and is conducting business there resembles a person born in that state and living 
there because both belong to and inhabit the state.   
Schane argues that the Supreme Court, in declaring that a corporation was a 
citizen in fact created a new legal status and bestowed upon corporations both 
personhood and citizenship.  In this analysis, both personhood and citizenship are 
essential.  Article 3 of the Constitution explicitly refers to ―controversies of different 
states‖ and thus refers to citizens and not persons.  However, for a corporation to be 
considered a citizen, it must first be granted both personhood and residency.
258
  Although 
the term ―person‖ may blur differences between corporations and human beings, granting 
corporations citizenship was a radical decision.  This case did not change the course of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to employ person theory and declare the corporation a 
moral and legal person.  Rather, it seems to be an aberration and the Court soon returned 
to more conservative theory.  However, the case is noteworthy because it marked the start 
of litigation which would dominate the latter half of the 1800s on behalf of railroad 
corporations seeking personhood. Cases soon followed on the heels of Letson that 
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demonstrated that the Court was not willing to abide by a broad bestowal of corporate 
personhood just yet.   
In 1852, the Court heard Rundle v. Delaware Raritan Canal Co. 5 U.S. 80.  At 
issue was a canal constructed by the Delaware Raritan Canal Corporation which was 
commissioned by the state of New Jersey to improve navigation along the Delaware 
River.  George Rundle sued claiming that the canal harmed his business along the river 
because it diverted the water he needed to power his mill.  Justice Grier gave the opinion 
of the Court and ruled in favor of the Delaware Raritan Canal Corporation.  Grier‘s 
opinion does not delve into corporate personhood.  However, Justice Daniel‘s dissent 
provides a lengthy argument against the corporate personhood that was affirmed in 
Letson.   
Justice Daniel was a member of the Court in 1844 when Letson was decided, but 
for an unrecorded reason, he did not participate in the Letson decision.  Therefore, he had 
to wait until Rundle to state his opposition to broad grants of personhood and citizenship. 
In his dissent, Justice Daniel took issue with the Letson ruling that a corporation can be 
considered a citizen.  He wrote, ―A corporation, therefore, being not a natural person, but 
a mere creature of the mind, invisible and intangible, cannot be a citizen of a State, or of 
the United States...‖ (5 U.S. 80, 44).  Daniel provides a lengthy judicial history referring 
to Blackstone and the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel to defend his argument that only 
natural, human persons can be citizens.  Daniel explains that citizens have certain rights 
and duties such as the right to vote, run for office, and the like that are essential 
properties of citizenship.  If an entity is to be considered a citizen, it must be able to 
perform these functions.  Thus, Daniel contends that if a corporation is a citizen, then ―it 
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must be treated to all and intents and purposes‖ and should be able ―to aspire to the 
Office of President of the United States‖ (5 U.S. 80, 51).  Actions such as aspiring to be 
President are functions of a rational and autonomous agent or a person in the traditional 
sense of the word.  Daniel is inferring that true citizens are rational and autonomous 
persons who have duties and rights within the government.  As an artificial-group person, 
a corporation is not able to perform such functions, and neither was Daniel seriously 
implying that a corporation should.  Rather, this statement was an exaggeration and 
sarcasm meant to bring attention to Daniel‘s point that, in his opinion, only human beings 
were the sort of moral agent who could be citizens and could hold the rights and 
privileges of citizens.   
 One year later, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. 57 U.S. 314 (1853), 
the decision in Letson was found too radical and its application of personhood and 
citizenship was repudiated.  This case involved state court jurisdiction for the railroad 
which was incorporated in Maryland.  The Court noted, ―A corporation, it is said, is an 
artificial person, a mere legal entity, invisible and intangible.  This is no doubt 
metaphysically true in a certain sense.  The inference, also, that such an artificial entity 
‗cannot be a citizen‘ is a logical conclusion from the premise which cannot be denied‖ 
(57 U.S. 314, 327).  The Court returned to group theory and argued that a person who has 
a controversy with a corporation did not deal with a metaphysical abstraction, but the 
natural persons comprising the corporation.  However, the Court did make clear that 
corporations were covered under Article 3 of the Constitution, and declared that the place 
of incorporation decided the citizenship of the shareholders.  Strangely, the corporation 
was no longer a citizen on the merits of its state of incorporation, but the individuals 
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within the corporation had citizenship based upon the state where the corporation filed 
for its charter.  ―The persons who act and use (the) corporate name may be justly 
presumed to be resident in the State which is the necessary habitat of the 
corporation…and should be estopped from averring a different domicil‖ (57 U.S. 314, 
328).  Schane characterizes this decision as a hybrid of the person and group theories 
because the Court embraced the legal fiction of the corporation in order to give 
corporations the rights of citizens, but at the same time was reluctant to attribute 
citizenship directly to them.  In both Letson and Marshall, the place of incorporation had 
become decisive in the determination of citizenship.
259
 
 The case Dodge v. Woolsey 59 U.S. 331 (1855) involved a tax levied by the State 
of Ohio against a bank incorporated in Ohio.  The Court restated the claim that a 
corporation exists by the permission of the government to serve the good of the citizens.  
If the corporation does not fulfill its duties for the good of the commonwealth, or 
oversteps its boundaries, the state has the right to revoke its charter.  The Court then 
looked at the issue of legal jurisdiction and found that the bank, as a corporation, was an 
artificial person but had a real existence within the State of Ohio.  However, since the 
bank stockholder bringing suit was a citizen of Connecticut, the stockholder could appeal 
to a federal court.  In the matter of the tax discrepancy, the Court found that the newly 
enacted Constitution of Ohio that imposed greater taxes on the bank was unconstitutional 
because it violated the charter agreement between the State and the bank.  Finally, the 
Court found that John Woolsey, a stockholder in the bank, did have the right to sue for 
breaches of duty that hurt the stockholder‘s interests.   
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 The Supreme Court opinion in Dodge v. Woolsey is notable for affirming that the 
state does maintain some control of a corporation‘s conduct through charter revocation 
and for determining that a stockholder can bring suit to rectify violations by a 
corporation.  However, for the subject of corporate personhood, the dissent provided by 
Justice Campbell is of greater importance.  Campbell disagreed that a stockholder could 
challenge the actions of a corporation.  He argued that only the state could monitor 
corporations, and the United States in particular must take action to curb corporate 
abuses.  Campbell also disagrees that the new Ohio Constitution that violates the original 
corporate charter is unconstitutional because he argues that citizens have the right to 
amend their laws.  Campbell then launches into a stinging warning of the danger posed 
by granting corporations legal privileges which corporations are prone to abuse.   
In his dissent, Campbell argues that corporations will come to dominate the legal 
and political system with government and especially the court system having no control 
(59 U.S. 331, 374).  His opinion is reminiscent of the arguments against the East India 
Company by the colonists who feared the growing power of corporations.  He argues that 
corporations ―display a love of power, a preference for corporate interests to moral or 
political principles or public duties, and an antagonism to individual freedom, which have 
marked them as objects of jealousy in every epoch of their history‖ (59 U.S. 331, 376).  
This argument is notable because Campbell is implying that the corporate person has the 
moral capacity for good or evil, and Campbell contends that the corporation is more 
likely to do evil.  Although Campbell would argue vehemently against granting corporate 
personhood for the practical reason that harm will come, his argument implies that he 
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agrees that at least according to the criteria of rationality and autonomy, the corporation 
would seem to qualify as a person. 
 In the 1870s, a new point of contention arose in regards to the status of the 
corporation.  In 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment passed, and many litigators for 
corporate rights argued that the Fourteenth applied to corporations as persons. The 
Fourteenth Amendment stated,  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.  
 
The ratification of the Fourteenth was revolutionary for those involved in the struggle to 
gain corporate personhood because if proponents could successfully argue that 
corporations were persons, albeit artificial persons, then they could optimistically argue 
that as a person, the corporation was entitled to protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  This protection would guarantee Due Process and Equal Protection.  
Furthermore, The Fourteenth Amendment extended the other Amendments to the states, 
and thus corporate litigators could argue that 1) corporations must be protected from state 
laws and 2) the other amendments, such as the First Amendment‘s guarantee of free 
speech and the Fourth Amendment‘s protection against search and seizure, must also 
protect corporations.  Thus, the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment opened a new 
battleground for corporate litigators.   
 It is important to note that the Fourteenth Amendment speaks of both persons and 
citizens.  In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. the Court decided that 
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corporations were not citizens.  Lower courts followed this precedent and set the standard 
that because corporations could not be born or naturalized they could not be citizens.  
Circuit Judge Woods stated the argument against corporate citizenship eloquently in his 
opinion for Insurance Co. v. New Orleans 13 F. Cas. 67 (1870). He argued, ―No words 
could make it clearer that citizens of the United States, within the meaning of this article, 
must be natural, and not artificial persons; for a corporation cannot be said to be born, nor 
can it be naturalized. I am clear, therefore, that a corporate body is not a citizen of the 
United States as that term is used in the 14th Amendment‖ (13 F. Cas. 67, 68).  Thus, as 
corporate litigators considered the ramifications of the newly passed Fourteenth 
Amendment, the claim for privileges and immunities as citizens was shaky.   
However, persons were guaranteed life, liberty and property.  Because the 
Amendment‘s wording distinguished between citizens and persons, corporate litigators 
argued that this was purposefully done in order to include corporations.  However, 
persons are guaranteed life and liberty, and it is not clear that corporations can possess 
either of these traits.  Judge Woods explains,  
The complainants claim that this last clause applies to corporations –  
artificial persons. Only natural persons can be born or naturalized; only 
natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so that it is clear that 
artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first two clauses 
just quoted. If we adopt the construction claimed by complainants, we 
must hold that the word "person," where it occurs the third time in this 
section, has a wider and more comprehensive meaning than in the other 
clauses of the section where it occurs. This would be a construction for 
which we find no warrant in the rules of interpretation. The plain and 
evident meaning of the section is, that the persons to whom the equal 
protection of the law is secured are persons born or naturalized or 
endowed with life and liberty, and consequently natural and not artificial 




Despite Judge Wood‘s opinion on the Circuit Court that the word ―person‖ in the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to natural persons, the subject would continue to 
come before the Court.  It is noteworthy that although Judge Woods denied corporations 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, when he became Justice Woods on the 
Supreme Court, he concurred in Santa Clara which granted corporations personhood.  It 
was not extensively argued that corporations possessed life, but the qualities of liberty 
and property were very much open to debate.   
 
The Railroad Industry 
 It was the advent of the railroad industry that brought the most sweeping changes 
to the Court‘s doctrine on corporate personality.  Railroads broke down some of the 
individualist economic doctrine that had prevailed in the 1800s.  Groups of managers and 
investors rather than individual actors become the key economic players as ownership 
and the means of production began to separate.
260
  Collectivist institutions rather than the 
individual entrepreneur were successful in managing large businesses with many 
shareholders.  Although large corporations were very successful, many corporate 
strategies of this period were completely at odds with the popular sentiment of the period.  
While most people were in favor of natural rights arguments as applied to humans, they 
were not in favor of granting immunities and privileges to corporations.  Protests against 
the growing influence and legal privileges of the railroad culminated in nation-wide 
strikes and riots in the late 1870s.  Furthermore, even though laissez faire was popular, 
                                                 
260
 William W. Bratton, Jr. ―The New Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical Perspectives from History‖ 




citizens were still highly in favor of strong state rights to control commerce.
261
  While 
large corporations were still feared by many, the awe and the promises of successful 
railroad companies who were able to unite a vast region and promote commerce at a level 
never seen before overwhelmed most public fear and won favor with politicians and the 
courts.  Even during the Jacksonian period, when there was growing popular hostility 
towards corporations, the number and importance of corporations increased and judges 
indicated their willingness to stretch meanings of key words and ignore phraseological 
limits.
262
   
 Even the young Abraham Lincoln could be found in 1854 defending the Illinois 
Central Railroad against state regulation.  The before the Illinois Supreme Court was 
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. the County of McLean and George Parke, Sheriff 
and Collector 17 Ill. 291 (1856).  Lincoln noted that the Illinois Constitution required 
uniform taxation of all ―persons using and exercising franchises and privileges.‖  He 
argued that the railroad was a person and thus non-uniform taxation of different railroad 
projects was unconstitutional.
263
   
Lincoln won the case and secured uniform taxation for the railroad, but the 
Illinois Supreme Court rejected his personhood argument.  Nonetheless, the personhood 
argument resonated with other attorneys for the railroads across the country who 
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repeatedly filed suit against local and state governments arguing that corporations had 
historically been referred to as artificial persons and thus should be considered persons 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoy the protections of the Constitution.  They 
sued claiming that railroads should not have to pay local taxes because different railroad 




 At the same time that railroads were beginning their legal battle, a sweeping 
personnel change occurred on the Supreme Court bench.  Between November of 1877 
and March of 1882, Justices Harlan, Woods, Gray, Matthews and Blatchford succeeded 
Justices Davis, Strong, Swayne, Clifford, and Hunt.  Legal historian Howard Jay Graham 




 While the railroad cases were gaining momentum in the lower courts, insurance 
companies became the first industry to seek corporate personhood rights from the 
Supreme Court.  Insurance companies were subject to strict state control and were treated 
as foreign corporations in other states in terms of licenses and taxes.  However, insurance 
companies sought relief through the Comity Clause rather than Due Process.
266
  From 
1865 to 1871, the efforts of insurance companies largely failed.  Although Congress was 
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petitioned to enact just and equal laws for interstate insurance companies, Congress 
showed little interest in their plight.
267
   
 In Paul v. Virginia 75 U.S. 168 (1869), several insurance companies incorporated 
in New York brought suit against the state of Virginia over Virginia‘s license and bond 
requirements for foreign insurance companies.  In their arguments for the State of 
Virginia, attorneys Robinson and Bowden argued, ―Now, no one, we presume, ever 
supposed that the artificial being created by an act of incorporation could be a citizen of a 
State in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, and 
the averment was rejected because the matter averred was simply impossible.‖  Justice 
Field agreed that corporations were not citizens under Article Four, Section Two of the 
Constitution which declares, ―the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.‖  Field argued that ―the term 
citizen as there used applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing 
allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature and possessing 
only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed‖ (75 U.S. 168, 178).  Thus, the 
Supreme Court held that corporations were not citizens and insurance was not commerce 
therefore effectually denying the insurance company‘s claim under the Comity Clause.   
The insurance companies did not make much headway, and thus it was the 
railroads that created the real stir in the Supreme Court.  In 1876, four major cases came 
before the Court where railroads claimed the benefits of personhood and were 
subsequently denied:  Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. V. State of Iowa 94 US 155 (1876), 
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Chicago M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Ackley 94 US 179 (1876), Winona & ST. P.R. Co. v. Blake 
94 US 180, (1876) and Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 94 US 164, (1876).  In Peik v. 
Chicago, the Court used a concession theory argument to deny railroads protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court declared,  
The creation of corporations is a prerogative of sovereignty, to be 
exercised or not, as the legislature shall see fit; and at such times, in such 
manner, and subject to such conditions and reservations as it shall 
determine, regard being had only to the restrictions which the Constitution 
imposes upon the lawmaking power.  The latter, therefore, by statue, or 
the people, by fundamental law, may reserve the absolute control over 
these artificial persons; and there is no authority lodges elsewhere to 
interfere with or prevent the exercise of this sovereign right.  The 
government which creates may reserve the power to destroy them, or to 
prescribe the constitution upon which their future or continued existence 
shall depend (94 U.S. 164, 174). 
 
 Although the Court took a conservative approach in these four cases, the stage 
was set for the largest corporate personality case to reach the Supreme Court.  In 1882, 
the California Supreme Court upheld assessment and mortgage deduction provisions that 
applied to railroads.  The California Court based its opinion on the Due Process 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the ruling in Insurance Company v. New 
Orleans (1 Woods 85).  The railroads appealed their case to the Supreme Court and hired 
Roscoe Conkling as their lead counsel – the San Mateo case was born.
268
  San Mateo 
County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1882) 
 Fascinatingly, although this case was perhaps the singularly most influential case 
in establishing corporate personality, the Supreme Court did not ever decide the case.  
Before a decision was made, a settlement was reached and the Southern Pacific Railroad 
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paid its taxes.  However, the arguments for personhood before the Court set the stage for 
subsequent cases.
269
   
 The lead counsel for the Southern Pacific Railroad, Roscoe Conkling, was also a 
former Senator and member of the Joint Congressional Committee of 1866 who drafted 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  In his argument, he contended that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had intended the word ―person‖ to include corporations.  He 
produced a journal from the Committee, which he quoted to prove his point.  His 
argument was successful in that it convinced many legal scholars of the day as well as 
Supreme Court justices and it affected the Santa Clara case four years later.  Historians 
who were convinced of Conkling‘s argument deduced that the word ―citizen‖ had been 
used in clauses that applied to political rights, and the word ―person‖ had been used in 
clauses that applied to property rights.  Perhaps shrewd Republican Congressmen had 
manipulated the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to give business more judicial 
protection against state legislatures.  The fact that successful railroad lawyer and Ohio 
Congressman John Bingham had been a member of the committee that drafted the 
Fourteenth Amendment added fuel to the fire. Bingham was notorious for his success in 
defending the railroads, and the fact that he had been instrumental in drafting the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave plausibility to this argument.  
 Conkling‘s argument and his alleged journal ignited a colossal controversy that 
was most famously put forth in Charles and Mary Beard‘s ―Conspiracy Theory.‖ 
Although a brief account of the Beard Thesis is a bit off track from the study of legal 
                                                 
269
 Howard Jay Graham, Everyman‟s Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, the 





corporate personhood, it is important in that it shows how controversial and heated the 
debate was over the rights of corporations and their standing under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Even if formal theories of corporate personality were not debated within 
Washington, there certainly was a heightened debate over the constitutionality of 
corporate personality.  The Beards argued that Republican Congressional leaders and 
especially John Bingham, had deliberately constructed the Fourteenth Amendment to 
give legal power and protection to the corporations that were aligned with his own 
interests.  While the Beards did not expressly state that Bingham was guilty of 
conspiracy, this conclusion was implied.  Their theory suggested that a conspiracy existed 
from the powerful railroad corporations, to lawmakers in Washington, and all the way to 
the Supreme Court.
270
   
 The Beards alleged that former Senator and railroad lawyer Roscoe Conkling, 
when helping write the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, had deliberately written 
―person‖ instead of ―natural person.‖  Former representative and railroad lawyer John A. 
Bingham did the same in the House.  Then both leaders left Congress to litigate on behalf 
the railroads to argue for corporate persons.  Conkling and Bingham, as paid witnesses of 
the railroads, both testified that they had purposefully used the word person to someday 
ensure that corporations would receive civil rights.  The Beards write, 
In this spirit, the Republican lawmakers restored to the Constitution the 
protection for property which Jacksonian judges had whittled away and 
made it more sweeping in its scope by forbidding states, in blanket terms, 
to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law.  By a few words skillfully chosen, every act of every state and local 
government which touched adversely the rights of persons and property 
was made subject to review and liable to annulment by the Supreme Court 
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at Washington, appointed by the President and Senate for life and far 
removed from local feelings and prejudices.
271
   
 
The Beard‘s argument was coined the ―Conspiracy Theory‖ even though they had not 
named it such or even precisely formulated or documented the theory.  Howard Jay 
Graham, a noted Constitutional scholar who has spent many years studying the 
―Conspiracy Theory‖ has concluded that there is no real proof in the theory.   
 Graham argues that the word ―person‖ instead of ―citizen‖ was chosen for the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it was modeled after the Fifth Amendment, which uses 
the word ―person.‖  At the time, ―person‖ was a generic term that was inclusive of 
African Americans whereas ―citizen‖ implies a different set of rights and duties that were 
troublesome if inclusive of African Americans.
272
  Furthermore, Graham argues that there 
is no record of the word ―citizen‖ being used in the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses; the word is always ―person.‖
273
  Thus, Graham concludes that Conkling 
deliberately misused the facts when arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
written purposively to include corporations as persons.   
 However, Graham does admit that at the time of the drafting of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, corporate personhood cases were being tried in state courts within the 
insurance industry, and the concept was not new to lawyers.  In fact, during the drafting 
of the Fourteenth, various insurance companies submitted over two hundred petitions to 
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Congress asking for just and uniform laws pertaining to interstate insurance 
companies.
274
  This certainly caught the attention of those drafting the Amendment.  It is 
likely that the insurance corporations (among other corporations) were paying attention to 
the drafting of the Fourteenth in the event that its protections and rights could be applied 
to them as well.  Additionally, while the Fourteenth Amendment was being drafted, many 
conflicts were being waged within Congress over various railroad issues such as right of 
ways, freight taxes, and state monopolies.  Members of the drafting committee such as 
Thaddeus Stevens, Reverdy Johnson, Bingham, and Conkling were all aware of and 
involved to various degrees in these matters.
275
  
 Furthermore, it is quite possible that Bingham could have regarded corporations 
as persons although there seems to be no evidence that this was explicitly on his mind 
during the drafting.  Reverdy Johnson, who also served on the joint drafting committee, 
had worked as a lawyer for the Cleveland and Mahoning Railroad in federal courts, and 
had himself used a denial of Due Process as his argument for his clients.  Hence, he must 
have understood that a federal guarantee of due process rights would be valuable in 
protecting corporate interests.
276
   
 Thus, it can be concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment was not drafted in a 
vacuum; the members of the committee were very aware of issues surrounding corporate 
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personality; and some of the members were personally involved in the railroad cases.  
Despite this, Graham argued that the corporate problem may have come up incidentally, 
but the Fourteenth was not ―designed (emphasis his) to aid corporations nor was the 
distinction between ‗citizens‘ and ‗persons‘ conceived for their benefit.‖
277
   
 Returning now to the San Mateo case, Justice Field accepted the argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment could include more than recently freed slaves in its interpretation 
of the word ―person.‖  Justice Field wrote the San Mateo opinion for the circuit court of 
California.  Field would later become a justice for the Supreme Court, and would be very 
influential in subsequent cases concerning corporate personality.  In his circuit opinion, 
Justice Field wrote,  
It is sufficient to add that in all text writers, in all codes, and in all revised 
statutes, it is laid down that the term ―person‖ includes, or may include, 
corporations; which amounts to what we have already said, that whenever 
it is necessary for the protection of contract or property rights, the courts 
will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation to the 
persons who compose it, and protect them, though the process be in its 
name. All the guaranties and safeguards of the constitution for the 
protection of property possessed by individuals may, therefore, be invoked 




Field admitted that corporations were artificial persons, ―they consist of aggregations of 
individuals united for some legitimate business.‖  He further relied upon group theory to 
argue that aggregations of individuals should be protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  ―It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision, intended 
for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the 
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States, should cease to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member 
of a corporation.‖
279
   
This interpretation using group theory is much safer than taking a person theory 
stance that would fully grant corporate personality.  Field further states, ―On the contrary, 
we think it is well established by numerous adjudications of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and of the several states, that whenever a provision of the Constitution, or 
of a law, guarantees to persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to them means for 
its protection, or prohibits legislation injuriously affecting them, the benefits of the 
provision extend to corporations, and the Courts will always look beyond the name of the 
artificial being to the individuals whom it represents.‖
280
  Thus, Field‘s ruling does not 
categorically state that corporations are full persons under the Fourteenth Amendment as 
is held in person theory, but he does give a very strong argument in favor of corporate 
personhood.   
While Justice Field‘s argument using group theory is somewhat cautious in 
advocating full corporate personality, his colleague on the circuit court bench, Justice 
Sawyer wrote a concurrence that forcefully argues for full corporate rights as a person.  
His introductory argument is one of the strongest arguments ever made for the corporate 
person, and was influential when the case came before the Supreme Court.  Sawyer 
wrote,  
In my judgment, the word ―person,‖ in the clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the national constitution, ―No state shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to 
any person the equal protection of the law,‖ includes a private corporation. 
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It must, at least, through the corporation include the natural persons who 
compose the corporation, and who are the beneficial owners of all the 
property, the technical and legal title to which is in the corporation in trust 
for the corporators. The fact that the corporators are united into an ideal 
legal entity, called a corporation, does not prevent them from having a 
right of property in the assets of the corporation which is entitled to the 
protection of this clause of the constitution. Nor does the intervention of 
this artificial being between the real beneficial owners and the state, for 
the simple purpose of convenient management of the business, enable the 
state, by acting directly upon the legal entity, to deprive the real parties 




Both Field and Sawyer were strongly influenced by Mr. John Norton Pomeroy, council 
for the railroads, who was one of the strongest and most eloquent advocates for corporate 
railroads.  Pomeroy was a highly esteemed professor of law at Hasting University turned 
railroad lawyer.  In fact, Pomeroy was an influential player when the Santa Clara case 
was decided.   
 When the San Mateo case reached the Supreme Court, the arguments from the 
council again stressed the personality of the corporation.  Pomeroy argued that ―‗the 
grand object‘ of the Fourteenth Amendment had been to protect life, limb and liberty of 
all natural persons, and the property of all persons, whether natural or legal.‖
282
  Conkling 
contended ―…but equally with the States, they (the United States) are prohibited from 
depriving persons or corporations of property without due process of law.‖  Sanderson, 
yet another lawyer for the railroad argued that because the second and third clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment do not say born or naturalized, persons can include corporations.  
All three in the counsel argued that corporations were included with persons but they 
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were careful to refrain from delving into person theory in which corporations are fully 
legal persons. Nor did they insinuate that corporations could have any qualities of moral 
persons.
283
   
 The opinion from the circuit court and the arguments before the Supreme Court 
were influential enough to be noted by the popular media.  The New York Tribune 
commented, ―If these positions shall be permanently established…the results may be to 
give corporations a resort to Federal Courts wherever they think that State laws operate 
unequally against them, and give a like privilege to taxpayers complaining that a State 
system of taxation is not equal and uniform.‖
284
  Interestingly, as has been noted, the 
Supreme Court did not reach a decision in the San Mateo case because a settlement was 
reached, and the case was moot.  However, the arguments from this controversial case 
were fresh in the minds of the justices when the next case concerning this topic reached 
the Court. 
 In 1886, the Supreme Court heard Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. 
118 U.S. 394.  This case is remarkable in that the issue of corporate personality is not 
discussed as part of the court opinion.  In the beginning of the clerk‘s notes for the case, 
Chief Justice Waite is quoted as saying, ―The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.‖  There is no 
elaboration of the point, and in fact, the declaration is not an official part of the Court‘s 
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opinion.  However, this simple statement at the beginning of the case effectually granted 
corporations the status of persons and has been the precedent since that time.   
 The authoritative judicial justification for corporate personality is found in Justice 
Field‘s and Sawyer‘s opinions in the San Mateo circuit court as discussed above.  These 
opinions as well as the arguments of the counsel in San Mateo and Santa Clara provide 
the reasoning behind this declaration.   
 In Santa Clara, the Southern Pacific Railroad refused to pay taxes of $30,000 on a 
property with a $30 million dollar mortgage.  When the state of California assessed the 
property, they inadvertently included the value of certain fences that were county domain.  
As a result, the Southern Pacific Railroad refused to pay all the taxes on its property, and 
the case when to court.  The Supreme Court decided in favor of the railroad on the issue 
of the fences and ordered the railroad to pay the remaining tax.  The essential aspect of 
this case is the argument of personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
argued by the railroad‘s defense.  Although the Court didn‘t rule on the personhood 
argument, this defense crept into the written record and became part of the history-
altering decision that granted corporate personhood. 
At the heart of the railroad‘s defense was the simple argument that the state 
unfairly prohibited the railroads from deducting the value of their mortgage from their 
property value as individuals are allowed to do.  They argued that this was a violation of 
the equal protection of persons.  Sanderson, a lawyer in the San Mateo case, again argued 
for the railroads.  He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment leveled the field between 
artificial and natural persons. This argument hinged on person theory.  John Norton 
Pomeroy also reappeared representing the railroad.  In his brief, he claimed that the 
244 
 
Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights of the individual shareholders and thus 
protected the corporation as well.  Using a line of reasoning that centered on group 
theory, he argued that provisions of state and federal constitutions ―apply . . .  to private 
corporation, not alone because such corporations are ‗persons‘ within the meaning of the 
word, but because statutes violating their prohibitions in dealing with corporations must 
necessarily infringe upon the rights of natural persons.  In applying and enforcing these 
constitutional guaranties, corporations cannot be separated from the natural persons who 
compose them.”
285
  (Emphasis in original.)   Pomeroy continued his claim using group 
theory, but concluded his argument by straying slightly into person theory in order to 
make his claim stronger.  He stated,  
The truth cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of protecting rights, the 
property of all business and trading corporations IS the property of the 
individual corporators.  A State act depriving a business corporation of its 
property without due process of law does in fact deprive the individual 
corporators of their property.  In this sense, and within the scope of these 
grand safeguards of private rights, there is no real distinction between 
artificial persons or corporations, and natural persons.‖
286
 (Emphasis in 
original) 
 
Despite the strong arguments from Sanderson and Pomeroy, Attorney Delphin M. 
Delmas, attorney for Santa Clara County, countered with strong arguments against 
corporate personhood.  His argument is long, but is worth stating in full due to the 
eloquent refutation of Pomeroy‘s argument and the strong claims against corporate 
personality.  Delmas stated,  
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To my mind the fallacy, if I may be permitted so to term it, of the 
argument lies in the assumption that corporations are entitled to be 
governed by the laws that are applicable to natural persons.  That it is said, 
results from the fact that corporations are (artificial) persons, and that the 
last clause of the Fourteenth Amendment refers to all persons without 
distinction.  The defendant has been at pains to show that corporations are 
persons, and that being such they are entitled to the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment…the questions is, does that amendment place 
corporations on a footing of equality with individuals.  Blackstone says, 
‗persons are divided by law into either natural persons or artificial.  
Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such 
as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and 
government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.‘  This 
definition suggests at once that it would seem unnecessary to dwell upon, 
that though a corporation is a person, it is not the same kind of person as a 
human being, and need not of necessity – nay, in the very nature of things 
cannot – enjoy all the rights of such or be governed by the same law.  The 
equality between persons spoken of in the Fourteenth Amendment 
obviously means equality between persons of the same nature of class, and 
not equality between persons whose very natures are absolutely dissimilar 
– equality between human beings, if the rights of natural persons are 
involved; equality between corporations of the same class, if the rights of 




Delmas is appealing to a common understanding of the word ―person‖ that is a human 
being and based criteria such as rationality and autonomy.  As rational and autonomous 
human being, ―persons‖ are able to enjoy the benefits of governance.  Delmas argues to 
equate these natural persons with artificial persons is a mistake and confuses the very 
nature of personhood.   
 Despite the eloquent arguments for and against corporate personality, the 
Supreme Court did not rule on this subject at all, and instead dealt only with the simple 
tax matter at hand.  However, as stated earlier, the significance of the decision comes 
from the notes at the beginning of the case in which Justice Waite remarked that the word 
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―person‖ in Fourteenth Amendment included corporations. Because this introductory 
statement effectually changed the course of corporate law, the Santa Clara case has been 
the subject of controversy ever since the opinion was published.  At the time, the court 
reporter was J.C. Bancroft Davis, a well-studied lawyer in his own right.  Graham argues 
that Davis may have been part of a conspiracy to insert that statement in the introductory 




 Regardless of the controversy over the opinion, the Santa Clara case effectively 
granted corporate personhood and has been cited ever since in cases referring to 
Fourteenth Amendment rights for corporations.  Legal historian J. Morton Horwitz 
argues that the real significance of Santa Clara is that it went beyond the narrow 
Slaughterhouse ruling in confining the Fourteenth Amendment to the African American 
race.
289
  Slaughterhouse 83 U.S. 36 (1873) was one of the first Supreme Court cases 
involving the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court ruled that the Fourteenth applied to 
the newly freed slaves.  In his opinion, Justice Miller stated, ―By any person was meant 
all persons within the jurisdiction of the State.  No distinction is intimated on account of 
race or color‖ (83 U.S. 36, 129).  Because corporations have neither race nor color, it was 
presumed to apply only to humans and therefore exclude corporations.  Together, San 
Mateo and Santa Clara implied that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to newly freed 
slaves as well as corporations.  Graham concludes, ―Viewed in perspective, the argument 
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is one of the landmarks in American constitutional history, an important turning point in 
our social and economic development.‖
290
  Horwitz concurs with assessment and 
maintains, ―After Santa Clara and more importantly, after New Jersey passed their open 
incorporation act of 1889 which allowed one corporation to own stock in another, thus 
legalizing the holding company and ending any serious law to regulate corporate 
consolidation, many legal thinkers realized that in fact as well as theory, corporations 




 Two years after the Justice Waite‘s unorthodox proclamation that corporations 
were persons, the Court heard Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania 125 U.S. 181 (1888).  
In this case, a mining company incorporated and doing business in Colorado maintained 
an office in Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania assessed the corporation a tax for an office 
license.  The mining company subsequently sued claiming a violation of the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and because domestic corporations 
were exempt from the tax, they also claimed a violation of the equal protection clause.   
Again the Court affirmed that corporations were not citizens under the 
Constitution.  Justice Field wrote the opinion, and referred to his previous judgment in 
Paul v. Virginia in which he held that a corporation was not a citizen.  Again he 
reiterated, ―The term citizen applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic 
owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and 
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possessing only such attributes as the legislature had prescribed‖ (125 U.S. 181, 187-88).  
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically qualifies citizens as those who are ―born or 
naturalized,‖ so it would have been difficult to include corporations in the privileges and 
immunities.  However, the equal protection and due process clause, which refers to 
persons, could include corporations.  On this account, the Court concluded, ―Under the 
designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included‖ (125 U.S. 
181, 189).  The Supreme Court did not unequivocally rule that corporations are persons.  
Rather, they used the more subtle language of ―included under‖ the designation of 
person, which is not synonymous with ―is.‖  The Supreme Court used group theory to 
argue that corporations are ―merely associations of individuals united for a special 
purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular name‖ (125 U.S. 181, 188-89). 
Although a state has a right to regulate corporate entry, once it has recognized a 
corporation and that corporation has complied with requirements for admission such as 
obtaining necessary licenses, then the state must give equal treatment to that of domestic 
corporations because to treat a foreign corporation differently would discriminately single 
out a class of persons – those who were corporate members.  Interestingly, the opinion 
was written by Justice Field – the same person who boldly argued for corporate 
personhood in the San Mateo case for the circuit court of California.  Now on the 
Supreme Court, his enthusiasm for corporate personality seems to be somewhat tempered 
as he reminds his readers that corporations are not citizens and can only claim personality 
based on the rights of the shareholders.   
 This cautious statement of corporate personality was the official statement on the 
subject for the next twelve years.  (The legitimacy of the Santa Clara‟s statement is 
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debatable since it did not occur in the actual opinion.)  In 1910, another case concerning a 
railroad reached the Supreme Court.  In Southern Railroad Co. v. Greene 216 U.S. 400 
(1910), a railroad company, which was chartered in Virginia but had a network of lines in 
Alabama, was charged a franchise tax by the state of Alabama.  Alabama imposed the 
franchise tax based on the amount of capital stock on all foreign corporations authorized 
to operate within the state.  Alabama did not levy a similar tax on domestic corporations.  
The railroad sued claiming discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal 
Protection Clause.  The Supreme Court said, ―That a corporation is a person, within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer open to discussion‖ (216 U.S. 400, 
412).  In his opinion, Justice Day quotes Pembina saying ―The inhibition of the 
Amendment that no state shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the equal 
protection of the laws was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being 
singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation.  Under the 
designation of ‗person‘ there is no doubt that a private corporation in included‖ (216 U.S. 
400, 413). 
 Justice Day, who delivered the Court opinion, omitted the section of Pembina 
which clarifies that a corporations were ―merely associations of individuals.‖  
Furthermore, the Court refers to the railroad as the ―corporation plaintiff‖ rather than the 
members of the corporation.  Calling the corporation the plaintiff implied that a 
corporation had the will and rationality to bring suit in a court of law – just as a rational 
and autonomous person theory.  The corporation is treated as a person in its own right 
with assets, rights and duties.  The Court had at last unequivocally proclaimed that the 
corporation was a person, and had used the person theory to make this claim.  Group 
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theory was pushed to the wayside as corporations were increasingly seen as equivalent to 
human persons.  From the early decision in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux 9 U.S. 
61 (1809) in which ―a corporation aggregate is an artificial, invisible body, existing only 
in contemplation of law.  It has no analogy to a natural person‖ (9 U.S. 61, 86), the Court 
had come full circle to granting the corporation full protection to the property rights of a 
corporation as a person.   
 In Santa Clara and its progeny, the Supreme Court ruled that a corporation as a 
person under the Fourteenth Amendment but did completely address why the corporation 
is a person.  The Court relied on metaphors to illustrate that a corporation was similar to a 
human person but does not provide either strong legal reasoning or robust moral theory to 
support this claim.  This lack of solid theory behind corporate personhood compelled 
legal scholar and lawyer Jess Krannich to conclude, ―This lack of reasoning and analysis 
is troubling given that Santa Clara has proven to be a fountainhead for all other corporate 
constitutional rights.  This suggests a foundational issue for later adjudications of 
corporate personhood.‖
292
  The Court seems to accept corporation personhood as a matter 
of stare decisis without every challenging the concept. Indeed, cases following Santa 
Clara, Pembina, and Southern Railroad Co. v. Greene all presume that a corporation is a 
constitutional person but do not have a solid foundation in constitutional analysis.  This 
leads to incoherence and instability in corporate jurisprudence as the Supreme Court 
adjudicated future cases concerning personhood.  
 
 
                                                 
292
 Jess M. Krannich, ―The Corporate ‗Person‘: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of 




Legal Repercussions of Corporate Personhood 
 Santa Clara and the cases in its wake set the standard that a corporation should be 
treated as a legal person in future cases.  Graham argues that the decisions in Santa 
Clara, Pembina, and Greene were tantamount to two constitutional amendments.  First, it 
granted corporations the freedom to challenge any governmental action opposed to their 
interests.  Second, it empowered the Supreme Court to review all state and federal action 
pertaining to corporations and to veto any action the Court deemed arbitrary or 
unreasonable.  It presumed that all laws were hostile to corporations unless the Court 
ruled otherwise.
293
  If Graham is correct, this a broad grant of power to corporations and 
gives corporations immense opportunity to increase their influence through the legal 
process.  Many scholars, politicians, and legal actors have agreed with Graham‘s 
assessment of these decisions and have sought to reduce the power of corporations within 
government.  Most of the criticism of these two decisions from the Supreme Court bench 
has come from dissenting opinions.  Although these dissents do not have the precedent-
setting influence of a Court opinion, they do keep the debate alive and the subject of 
corporate personality open to question.   
 The first influential dissent was from Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. 
Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).  In this case where J.C. Penney was a party, Florida had 
created various licensing fees depending upon the number of stores within and outside 
each county.  The effect of the law was to charge chain stores more for having multiple 
stores in the county and in the state.  Justice Roberts‘s Court opinion stated that while this 
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particular law was within the state‘s powers, ―corporations are as much entitled to the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as are natural 
persons‖  (288 U.S. 517, 537). 
 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in part, returned to fiction/concession theory to argue 
that a state has the power to create corporations for ends that the state deems desirable as 
well as the power to deny incorporation where the state deems the corporation will harm 
public welfare.  Since the state has the power to regulate and tax intrastate commerce, the 
corporation is free to accept or reject the terms of the state.  The state grants the privilege 
of intrastate commerce to corporations and may set and change the terms of this privilege 
at any time.  He further argues that most Americans have been to led to believe that the 
privilege of forming corporations was inherent and thus they must accept ―the evils 
attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism as if these evils 
were the inescapable price of civilized life, and hence, to be born with resignation‖  (288 
U.S. 517, 549). 
Brandeis reminds his readers that for a greater part of American history, 
corporations were feared as encroachments upon individual liberty and opportunity, and 
corporate privileges were granted sparingly and only for the community benefit.  General 
incorporation was not a sign that people no longer feared corporate domination.  Rather, 
it was to promote equality of opportunity to create a corporation and limit scandals 
associated with government grants.  (288 U.S. 517, 550-1) 
 Brandeis does grant that a corporation is entitled to protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but warns that corporations have become so powerful that they are 
dominating society.  ―Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool employed 
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by individuals in the conduct of private business have become an institution – an 
institution which has brought such concentration of economic power that so-called 
private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the state‖ (288 U.S. 517, 566).  
―Such is the Frankenstein monster which states have created by their corporation laws‖ 
(288 U.S. 517, 568). 
 Hugo Black‘s dissent in Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson 
303 U.S. 77 (1938) is one of the most well-known refutations of corporate personhood.  
The case involved California‘s right to tax an out-of-state corporation.  The Court ruled 
that a corporation may enter another state to do business and can claim the protection of 
the Fourteenth Amendment against subsequent application of state law just as an 
individual may claim this protection.  Justice Black disagreed that a corporation can 
claim the same protections as an individual.  Justice Black directly confronted the issue 
of personality and categorically denied that corporations could qualify as persons.    
I do not believe the word ―person‖ in the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
corporations.  The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and even 
necessary at times, has only a limited application in the field of 
constitutional law.  This Court has many times changed its interpretations 
of the Constitution when the conclusion was reached that an improper 
construction had been adopted. … I believe that this Court should now 
overrule previous decisions which interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment 
to include corporations.  Neither the history nor the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment justifies the belief that corporations are included 
within its protection (303 U.S. 77, 86). 
 
Black then addresses some of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and challenges 
that at the time of ratification, the general public did not realize that the Fourteenth would 
protect more than humans (303 U.S. 77, 88).   
Black‘s second argument is one of the most powerful and logical arguments 
against corporate personality, and has been used since by those who want to rein in the 
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power of corporations.  Corporate personality relies on the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  However, there are two more sections that address representation.  In the 
second section, representatives would be apportioned ―according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed.‖  Black argues that it is inconceivable that persons in this instance would include 
corporations because this section is clearly referring to human persons.  Section three 
states ―no person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress or elector of President 
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States…‖  
Again, it is quite unlikely that ―person‖ in this case meant a corporation because 
corporations cannot serve in Congress.  Black concludes that again, ―person‖ refers to 
human persons with autonomy and rationality (303 U.S. 77, 90).  Thus, a very logical 
argument can be made that if ―person‖ did not include corporations in the second and 
third section, why would corporations be included in the first?  It would be inconsistent to 
change the meaning of the word from one section to the next.   
 In Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949), Justice Douglas 
(with Justice Black concurring) uses the same line of reasoning for his dissent.  This case 
again involved taxation of an out-of-state corporation, and the Court ruled that the tax 
violated the Equal Protection Clause as it applied to the corporate person.  Douglas 
protested that the corporation was not a person to whom the Equal Protection Clause 
applied.  He states, ―It requires distortion to read ‗person‘ as meaning one thing, then 
another within the same clause and from clause to clause.  It means, in my opinion, a 
substantial revision of the Fourteenth Amendment‖ (337 U.S. 562, 581).  Douglas goes 
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on to criticize the Santa Clara decision and urges the judiciary to restrain itself in this 
area.  He wrote,  
But now that the question is squarely presented, I can only conclude that 
the Santa Clara case was wrong and should be overruled. One hesitates to 
overrule cases even in the constitutional field that are of an old vintage.  
But that has never been a deterrent heretofore and should not be now.  We 
are dealing with a question of vital concern to the people of the nation.  It 
may be most desirable to give corporations this protection from the 
operation of the legislative process.  But that question is not for us.  It is 
for the people.  If they want corporations to be treated as humans are 
treated, if they want to grant corporations this large degree of 
emancipation from state regulation, they should say so.  The Constitution 
provides a method by which they may do so.  We should not do it for them 
through the guise of interpretation (337 U.S. 562, 581-2). 
 
Brandeis, Douglas, and Black all urged the Supreme Court to overturn Santa Clara‟s 
precedent that corporations are persons.  Brandeis worried about corporate corruption of 
the political arena; Black cited the history and the wording of the various sections of the 
Fourteenth; and Douglas argued that the citizens, not the courts, should make this type of 
decision.   
Even though the Court declared in Santa Clara that corporations were persons, 
the debate over this issue is far from over.  Since Santa Clara, other types of issues have 
arisen concerning the corporation as a person.  For instance, as a person, does the 
corporation have rights of free speech or immunity from illegal search and seizure?  What 
is the extent of a corporation‘s criminal liability and who should be punished when the 
corporation is found guilty of crime?  These are some of the questions that arose in the 
aftermath of the Santa Clara decision and continue to face the Supreme Court.  The next 
sections analyze corporate personhood in cases pertaining to issues of corporate 







One of the arenas in which corporate personality becomes problematic and incites 
further debate is the area of criminal law.  Because corporate personhood creates 
difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrator of a corporate crime, problems easily arise.  For 
example, the National Crime Index lists crimes by human persons, but excludes corporate 
persons even if the corporations have been convicted of felonies.  As was addressed in 
the theoretical discussion, there is much debate concerning the criminal liability of 
corporations.  The primary issue remains finding culpability and tracing it back to a flesh 
and blood human being.  For instance, if a chemical manufacturing corporation illegally 
dumps toxins into a river, who is to blame?  The person who physically dumped the 
chemicals into the river?  The shift supervisor who approved the dumping? The board of 
directors who turned a blind eye to the issue?  The chemists who knew the chemicals 
were toxic?  
Generally when assigning blame for a wrongdoing, an agent must have malicious 
intent, and because corporations cannot have intent apart from their human members, 
culpability is difficult.   The autonomy and rationality to commit a crime are moral 
attributes of personhood, and corporations are not fully recognized as moral persons.  
Yet, the courts have found that corporations are criminally liable in certain cases thus 
corporations are guilty.  In criminal cases, corporate persons cross the divide from legal 





  A corporation has no hands to commit a murder, yet corporations 
have been found guilty of negligence which resulted in death.
295
   
For some scholars who adhere to person theory, this is not an anomaly because 
they argue that the corporation has a mind and thus may have malicious intent.  As 
British political theorist Harold Laski claims, ―Just as we have been compelled…to 
recognize that the corporation is distinct from its members, so too we have to recognize 
that its mind is distinct from their mind.  By admitting the existence of the corporate 
mind, that mind can be a guilty mind.‖
296
  However, if the corporation can be guilty of a 
crime, then there must be a means to punish the corporation.  Yet, the corporation cannot 
be imprisoned or sentenced to death.  The primary means of punishing a corporation is 
through fines.  The problem here is that pecuniary punishment harms the stockholders, 
not the corporation as a person.   
 The problem of punishment came up in New York Central R.R. v. United States 
212 U.S. 481 (1909).  The case involved illegal rebates provided by the railroad to 
several sugar refineries.  The Supreme Court had to determine how to find blame for the 
corporation‘s actions which amounted to lifting the corporate veil and finding the human 
persons who authorized or took part in the criminal behavior.  The Court wrestled with 
the argument that punishing a corporation was to deprive the stockholders of their 
property without due process of the law when, in fact, the stockholders did not take part 
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in the decision to issue the illegal rebates.  In this case, the Supreme Court determined 
that neither the stockholders nor the board of directors authorized the illegal behavior, 
and thus they could not be charged.   
The defense argued that since the Court could not assign blame to any particular 
person, the corporation could not commit the crime.  ―As no action of the board of 
directors could legally authorize a crime, and as, indeed, the stockholders could not do so, 
the arguments come to this: that, owing to the nature and character of its organization and 
the extent of its power and authority, a corporation cannot commit a crime of the nature 
charged in this case‖ (212 U.S. 481, 493).  However, the Supreme Court could not ignore 
the fact that although corporate criminal offenses seem to be an anomaly, corporations do 
in fact commit crimes.   
Thus, the Court concluded that corporations must be responsible for their actions 
despite the difficulty of finding the human beings at the heart of the offense.  Quoting 
Bishop‘s New Criminal Law § 417 in his opinion, Justice Day writes, ―Since a 
corporation acts by its officers and agents, their purposes, motives, and intent are just as 
much those of the corporation as are the things done. If, for example, the invisible, 
intangible essence or air which we term a corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys, 
lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to do it, and can act 
therein as well viciously as virtuously‖ (212 U.S. 481, 493).  Justice Day found that a 
corporation, just as a moral human person, has the capacity for intentions and for virtuous 
action.  Relying on person theory, he rules that a corporation can be guilty of a crime. 
The Court‘s opinion states, ―to give them immunity from all punishment because of the 
old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take 
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away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the 
abuses aimed at‖ (212 U.S. 481, 497).   
 The problem is further complicated by that fact that while the corporation cannot 
be imprisoned, an individual may be both fined and imprisoned.  Thus, any law that has 
penalties for both the corporation and individuals can be claimed a violation of Equal 
Protection.  If the corporation is fined, the shareholders suffer while the officers and/or 
employees of the corporation who were the actual offenders may not suffer any real 
punishment.  Further, an employee of a large corporation may commit an offense as a 
part of the corporation without the directing officers being cognizant of the employee‘s 
actions.  Are these officers, who may be very far removed from day to day operations, 
responsible for these actions?  Again, issues of Equal Protection and Due Process arise.   
 There are countless cases of corporate criminal acts, and the various courts have 
assigned blame to shareholders, officers, and employees throughout history.  One recent 
case that illustrates the continuing problem of culpability is Meyer v. Holley 537 U.S. 280 
(2003).  In this case, a suit was filed against a real estate agent for racial discrimination.  
The plaintiff filed suit against the president of the real estate company claiming that he 
was responsible for his representative‘s action.  Thus, the Supreme Court was left to 
decide if the Fair Housing Act imposed liability upon the owner of a real estate 
corporation for the fault of one the independent agents.  The Court ruled that in this case, 
the FHA does not impose vicarious liability on the owners or officers of this type of 
corporation.   
 Another issue that emerges under corporate criminal law is attorney-client 
privilege.  Corporations can sue and be sued; they are punishable for their crimes; and 
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they need legal advice. Thus it is logically contended that corporations should be granted 
attorney-client privilege.  Corporations benefit from legal assistance as much as any 
individual and should not be denied simply because of their power or wealth – they are 
―persons‖ after all.  However, once again, the same problems associated with punishment 
surface.  Who is the client?  In some cases it may be the board of directors; in other cases 
it may be the stockholders or even the employees.  Another issue arises when the counsel 
is the in-house-attorney and serves as both an employee and privileged counselor.
297
  
Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (1947) established that employees cannot be considered 
the client under the attorney-client privilege.  They are witnesses and third parties.  
However, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 89 F. Supp. 357 (1953) decided 
that information furnished to an attorney by an officer or employee of the corporation in 
confidence was privileged.  More issues arise when working with shareholders who are 
not truly corporate insiders or outsiders.  Once again, there seems to be no definitive 
precedent to handle these types of problems, and the issue is managed on a case-by-case 
basis.   
 One issue that seems to be resolved to some extent is the corporation‘s Seventh 
Amendment right to a trial by jury.  In the case Ross v. Bernhard 396 U.S. 531 (1970), 
stockholders in an investment company brought suit on behalf of a corporation against 
the directors and brokers for what they alleged were excessive brokerage commissions.  
The stockholders demanded a trial by jury.  Traditionally, the stockholders, who had a 
derivative claim through the corporation, would not be entitled to a trial by jury.  
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However, the Court found that a claim did exist for the corporation itself and based on 
the corporation‘s claim, the stockholders also had a claim for a trial by jury.   
 As I am finalizing this study, another case concerning the criminal liabilities of a 
corporation is on the Supreme Court docket for 2012.  The case involves an accusation of 
crimes against humanity leveled against Royal Dutch Petroleum and its subsidiaries.  
Plaintiffs from Nigeria claim that Royal Dutch Petroleum authorized and promoted the 
torture of Nigerians who were protesting against the environmental damage caused by the 
company‘s oil exploration.  The plaintiffs brought suit under a little known law called the 
Alien Tort Statute which allows the federal courts to hear cases by an alien filing a civil 
suit for crimes in violation of the law of nation. When the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals heard Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (621 F.3d 111, 2010), one of the primary 
issues was whether the Royal Dutch Petroleum Corporation could be found guilty of a 
criminal act against humanity just as an individual, natural person could be found guilty.  
The case revolved around the dichotomy between person and human being and 
questioned whether the corporation, as a collective of rational persons, could possess a 
mens rea in the same way that an individual person.  In his circuit opinion, Judge Jose 
Cabranes ruled that within international law, the corporation is not considered a person 
capable of committing grave criminal acts even though the individuals who comprise the 
corporation can commit crimes that violate human rights. Cabranes therefore he 
dismissed the case.  However, his opinion was hotly contested by Judge Leval who 
argued that a corporation should be responsible for crimes in which it participated just as 
any other rational person. The US Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to 
settle this unchartered territory of corporate personhood in the international sphere.  This 
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case promises to be momentous for this study of personhood because the Court will need 
to decide just how far to extend corporate personhood in terms of the corporation‘s ability 
to act rationally and be responsible for its crimes. The following sections detail the many 
privileges the Supreme Court has extended to corporations based on the claim of 
personhood.  It will be interesting to see if the Court is consistent in saying that while 
corporations have the privileges of persons, they also have the responsibility and 
culpability that goes along with personhood.  
 
Search and Seizure 
 
 Related to problems of criminal law are issues regarding the protection of 
corporations under the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment states, ―The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖  Because the corporation has been 
declared a person, it has been successfully argued that the corporation should be 
protected from unnecessary search and seizure.  This is an interesting argument because it 
essentially asserts that the corporate person, just as a human person, has an autonomy and 
privacy that should not be violated by the state.   
 Protection from search and seizure raises a host of related issues.  Using the 
reasoning of entitlement theory, the corporation is a creature of the state, and thus the 
state has the power to regulate it.  Limiting search and seizure rights hinders the 
government‘s control over its creation.  Further, many government agencies are 
263 
 
authorized to regulate the working conditions and environmental standards of 
corporations.  Without the ability to search the company‘s premises, their capability to 
monitor the corporation is compromised.  Despite these problems, the Supreme Court‘s 
history shows a willingness to grant the corporate person protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.   
 The first case broaching this subject is Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  
The case involved a law that authorized the courts to require a defendant in revenue cases 
to produce his books, invoices and papers.  The plaintiff sued claiming that this 
requirement violated the Fourth Amendment‘s protection against search and seizure even 
though his home or business was not physically searched.  The Supreme Court agreed 
and Justice Bradley wrote, ―Any compulsory discovery by extorting the party‘s oath, or 
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to 
forfeit his property is contrary to the principles of a free government.  It is abhorrent to 
the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American.  It may suit 
the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the true atmosphere of political liberty 
and personal freedom‖ (116 U.S. 616, 632).   
In this case the Court looked at the man who is the owner of the business and 
considered his right to protect his private papers from government inspection.  The notes 
to the case indicate that this was a sole proprietorship and therefore the Court did not 
consider the issues surrounding the search of a corporation.  However, this case is 
important because the Court set the standard of associating an individual‘s business with 
his right to privacy.  This became a central issue when corporate officers and employees 
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refused to offer evidence or allow searches of the company‘s premises claiming that this 
violated their personal protection against search and seizure.   
 Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43 (1906) is the first and most important case concerning 
the corporation‘s Fourth Amendment rights.  In this case, the Court directly examined the 
corporation‘s right of protection and held that the corporation is included under the 
Fourth Amendment.  The case concerned Mr. Hale, the secretary/treasurer of 
MacAndrews & Forbes Company, who refused to answer questions about the company 
before a grand jury claiming that there was no specific charge against any particular 
―person‖ because the issue was with a corporation, not a human being.  Further, he stated 
that the answers would incriminate him.  Hale sought protection under both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.  The Court ruled, ―The question of whether a corporation is a 
‗person‘ under the meaning of this amendment (Fifth) really does not arise.‖  The Court 
stated that the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being a witness against himself, 
but does not protect a third party from protection.  Thus, Hale could not claim Fifth 
Amendment protection because he would be incriminating the third party corporation 
even though he was a spokesperson for the corporation.  Furthermore, Hale could not 
claim protection under the Fourth Amendment for the same reasons.  Although Hale 
could refuse to submit his personal papers, he must acquiesce to providing the 
corporation‘s papers.    
The Court‘s opinion simplifies this very complicated issue.  By declaring the 
corporation a third party, the Court ignores the fact that arises in criminal law – namely 
that there is no flesh and blood person to represent the corporation.  If Hale was claiming 
to be the human behind the corporate veil, he had a valid claim that testifying against the 
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corporation is testimony against himself.  In addition, by Boyd‟s standard, he had a 
legitimate claim to refuse to surrender the corporation‘s papers since they are part of his 
business.  The Court however, does not address this deeper issue and thus leaves the door 
open for further debate and confusion.   
Justice Brown‘s opinion then addressed the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of 
the corporation.  Brown began by harkening back to entitlement theory to argue that 
because the corporation is a creation of the state and incorporated for the benefit of the 
public, its powers are limited by the law.  The legislature has a right to investigate 
corporate contracts in order to determine if the corporation has exceeded its powers.  ―It 
would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make 
use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these 
franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the 
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose‖  (201 U.S. 43, 76). 
Brown‘s opinion then makes an abrupt about face when he states, ―we do not 
wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 
Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. … In organizing itself as 
a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body‖ (201 
U.S. 43, 77).  Brown explains that while a government search is merely a ―quest,‖ a 
seizure is a ―forcible dispossession‖ of the owner.  Brown references the Boyd case as the 
precedent protecting private papers.  However, he expands Boyd‟s ruling to state that a 
person‘s papers are protected whether that person is a human person or corporate person 
(201 U.S. 43, 77).  This bold statement effectively grants corporations protection under 
the Fourth Amendment, and corporations seeking to avoid government regulations have 
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continued to employ this precedent.  Brown concludes his opinion by weakly stating that 
an authorized act of Congress might not constitute unreasonable search and seizure.  
Despite Brown‘s seemingly waffling opinion, the central idea to emerge from Hale v. 
Henkel is that the corporate person is protected under the Fourth Amendment.   
Concurring and dissenting opinions by several justices illustrate that this Fourth 
Amendment protection was a matter of hot contention.  Justice Harlan, although he 
concurs with Brown‘s result, disagrees vehemently the bestowal of Fourth Amendment 
protection to the corporation. In his concurring opinion, Harlan argues that giving the 
corporation this protection greatly curtails the government‘s ability to monitor a 
corporation‘s activities.  Harlan then makes a very interesting statement regarding the 
meaning of the word ―person.‖  He writes, ―In my opinion, a corporation – ‗an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of the law‘ – cannot claim 
the immunity given by the Fourth Amendment; for it is not part of the ‗people,‘ within 
the meaning of that Amendment.  Nor is it embraced by the word ‗persons‘ in that 
Amendment‖ (201 U.S. 43, 79).  Harlan is echoing the reasoning of moral philosopher 
Daniel Dennett whose criterion three states that a person is an entity that other persons 
consider as a fellow person.  Harlan argues that a corporation is not part of the 
Constitutional understanding of ―people‖ and ―persons‖ and failing this criterion, should 
not be included in the Fourth Amendment.  Although Harlan contends that the Fourth 
Amendment‘s definition of ―person‖ does not include the corporation, others who 
disagree could present an equally compelling case that the Fourth Amendment does 
include the corporation.   
267 
 
Justice Brewer makes exactly that argument.  He wrote, ―If the word ‗person‘ in 
that amendment (Fourteenth) includes corporations, it also includes corporations when 
used in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments‖ (201 U.S. 43, 86).  It seems that Brewer 
recognizes the importance of Harlan‘s statement and wants to assert that the meaning 
―person‖ must have some consistency throughout the Constitution, or at least throughout 
the Amendments.  He then makes a person theory argument to say that a corporate person 
must be treated in the same manner as a natural person under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. ―The corporation of which the petitioner was an officer was chartered by a 
state, and over it the general government has no more control than over an individual 
citizen of that state.  Its power to regulate commerce does not carry with it a right to 
dispense with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments…‖ (201 U.S. 43, 87).  The opposing 
arguments of Harlan and Brewer concerning the meaning of ―person‖ under the 
Amendments illustrate that the meaning of ―person‖ is far from settled.  
Between 1906 and 1967 numerous cases came before the Supreme Court 
concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of commercial businesses.  (See Go-Bart Co. v. 
United States 282 U.S. 344, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 254 U.S. 385, 
United States v. Cardiff  344 U.S. 174)  Jumping ahead through history, See v. City of 
Seattle 387 U.S. 541 (1967) presented a case in which a government agency seeking to 
inspect and correct safety issues is barred from surprise, routine inspections without a 
warrant.  Cases involving safety and public health present a pressing political issue 
because the corporation‘s Fourth Amendment rights must be weighed against the right of 
the employee and general public to work and conduct business in a safe environment.  
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The next set of cases demonstrates that even when public safety is an issue, the Supreme 
Court has steadily ruled in favor of protecting the corporation from search and seizure.   
In See v. City of Seattle 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Seattle Fire Code authorized the 
fire chief to enter any building except private dwellings whenever necessary to inspect 
the premises for violations of safety.  When the fire department sought to conduct a 
routine inspection of a commercial warehouse without a warrant, the appellant refused 
access and was then arrested.  The Court cited Camara v. Municipal Court 385 U.S. 808 
(1967) which held that routine code inspections of a personal residence require a warrant.  
The Supreme Court therefore reasoned in See v. City of Seattle that the Fourth 
Amendment safeguards should be extended to commercial premises.  ―The businessman, 
like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free 
from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property‖ (387 U.S. 541, 
544).  Accordingly, a government agency must have a warrant to conduct searches of a 
commercial business.   
Justice Clark‘s dissent criticizes the Court‘s decision because it may jeopardize 
public health and safety.  ―It prostitutes the command of the Fourth Amendment that ‗no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause‘ and sets up in the health and safety codes 
area inspection a newfangled ‗warrant‘ system that is entirely foreign to Fourth 
Amendment standards‖ (387 U.S. 541, 547).  Clark argues that agencies do not violate 
the probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment, and routine inspections are not 
unreasonable.  Thus, there is no reason for the Court to create an entirely new warrant 
process for government agencies.   
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 One of the most influential decisions concerning government regulation of 
corporate activity was Marshall, Secretary of Labor et.al. v. Barlow‟s, Inc. 436 U.S. 307 
(1978).  Mr. Barlow, a businessman, refused to allow an inspector from the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to conduct a search of his business without a 
warrant.  OSHA claimed that surprise visits were necessary in order to thoroughly check 
the working conditions of factories and ensure employee safety.  Barlow countered that 
the Fourth Amendment protected his corporation from warrant-less search, and thus the 
OSHA laws violated the Constitution.  Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court and 
ruled in favor of Barlow.  He concluded that a government inspector without a warrant is 
in the same position as a member of the public, and may not violate the privacy of the 
business.  Employees are free to report any health and safety violations to OSHA, but a 
federal agent must still obtain a warrant in order to conduct a search (436 U.S. 307, 315).  
The Court does allow that the ―probable cause‖ requirement of the Warrant Clause may 
be relaxed when the category of searches outweighs the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  However, for most OSHA searches, the Court ruled that the agent must 
first obtain a warrant even if the element of surprise or timeliness is lost.  This decision 
continues the reasoning of See v. City of Seattle, and holds that the Fourth Amendment 
protections of corporations outweigh a government agency‘s need to conduct surprise 
inspections to monitor public safety concerns.   
 Interestingly, in 1985, the Supreme Court allowed a government agency to 
conduct a controversial search of a corporation from the air.  The case is Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States by and through Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency 
476 U.S. 227 (1985).  Dow Chemical operated a 2,000-acre chemical manufacturing 
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plant that was heavily secured but exposed to visual observation from the air.  The EPA 
contracted a commercial airline photographer to take photos using an aerial mapping 
camera in order to check the company‘s emissions.  Dow sued claiming a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Court held that aerial photographs were not a search prohibited 
by the Fourth Amendment, and the EPA did not exceed its authority under the Clean Air 
Act.  Although the aerial mapping camera enhanced human vision, the Court decided that 
this did not raise Constitutional issues.  This decision is surprising given the past 
precedent in favor of corporations.  Because the EPA agents did not forcibly enter the 
premises, the Court could rule that there was no violation.  However, Justices Powell, 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented from this holding citing a violation of past 
precedent.   
 These decisions represent a clash of interests between two sets of ―persons‖ – the 
corporate person and the human persons who are employees and customers of the 
corporation.  While business operations are private to some extent, when safety and 
environmental issues arise, the government agencies have a legitimate claim to inspect 
the corporate operations.  The Court‘s trend has been to protect the corporate person to 
the greatest, reasonable extent by requiring government agencies to acquire a warrant to 
conduct search and seizures even if the element of surprise and timeliness is lost.  Except 
for Hale v. Henkel, the Court has tended to view these issues from the vantage of the 
infringement of a human person‘s liberty to conduct business rather than the 
corporation‘s protection as a person under the Fourth Amendment.  This pattern is also 
evident in cases concerning a corporation‘s protection of free speech under the First 
Amendment.   
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In March 2011, the Supreme Court decided Federal Communications 
Commission, et al., Petitioners v. AT&T 562 U. S. ____, (2011).  The case involves the 
question whether AT&T, as a corporate person, can prevent the government from 
releasing its information to law enforcement agencies based on a claim of personal 
privacy.  The conflict involved the Freedom of Information Act which required agencies 
to make records and documents publicly available upon request.  An exception to this 
rule was for law enforcement records if the disclosure could ―could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy‖ (5 U.S.C. 
§552(b)(7)(C).  AT&T construed the word ―personal‖ to include all persons of which 
corporations should be included.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, disagreed.  
Roberts wrote, ―‗Personal‘ ordinarily refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of 
personal characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or 
personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say 
that corporations do not have correspondence, influence, or tragedies of their own, only 
that we do not use the word ‗personal‘ to describe them‖ (562 U. S. ____ ).  Therefore, 
Roberts ruled that AT&T did not have ―personal privacy‖ and the Fourth Amendment 
were not at issue in this particular instance.  Roberts did not further expound the concept 




One of the effects of treating corporations as legal persons for purposes of Due 
Process and Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is that when the 
Fourteenth Amendment is extended to include the rights of other Constitutional 
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Amendments to the states, corporations can make a claim for these rights as well.  The 
most noted example of this is the extension of free speech rights of the First Amendment 
to corporations.  A corporation is not a human being and physically has no mouth, vocal 
cords, and etcetera; thus a corporation technically cannot speak.  However, corporations 
do speak through spokespersons as well as a host of mediums to include advertising 
through the mail, telephone, newspaper, radio, television, signs, circulating fliers or 
pamphlets, door-to-door solicitation, political campaign contributions, allowing the use of 
facilities and equipment for political events, sponsoring political advertising and articles, 
publishing political articles in employee newspapers or company fliers, as well as many 
other venues.  This list of corporate speech, although long, is not even conclusive. As was 
discussed in the theoretical section this ability has given some theorists grounds to argue 
that a corporation possesses the ability to communicate which is a criterion of moral and 
legal personhood. Corporations, through their leadership and financial resources, do have 
the de facto ability to speak, and this ability causes numerous problems when 
adjudicating their protection under the law.   
 There are basically two types of corporate speech:  commercial and political.  
While most of corporate speech is commercial – the advertisement of products or 
services – it is political speech that is most interesting in a study of corporate personality.  
When a corporation is allowed into the political arena, two crucial problems arise.  First, 
there is a dangerous threat of political corruption as corporations are able to use their vast 
economic resources to influence the democratic process.  (For instance, Microsoft gave 
over 2.5 million in soft money during the 2002 election cycle.
298
)  In order to combat 
                                                 
298
 Available from http://www.opensecrets.org/softmoney/softcomp1.asp?txtName=microsoft  Last 
accessed on 7/30/2004 
273 
 
corporate influence in the political arena, numerous state and federal laws have been 
enacted.  These laws include the Tillman Act of 1907 (34 Stat. 864), the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1925 (43 Stat. 1070), the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002 (2 U.S.C. § 441b 
)and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (86 Stat. 3, 2 U.S.C. § 431), which has 
been updated several times, among others. 
The second problem with corporate political speech is that when a corporation 
speaks, it is in effect speaking for the stockholders it represents.  However, corporate 
management and not the individual stockholders make most decisions concerning 
political contribution and expenditures, and therefore many stockholders are likely to 
disagree with management‘s political decisions.  While the stockholders likely bought 
stock in the corporation for economic reasons, they are now becoming a party to political 
decisions that may not reflect their personal views.  Thus, the stockholders are being 
forced to participate in political decisions in which they had no influence and with which 
they may not agree.  Permitting corporate funds to be used to influence government 
forces a stockholder seeking profits from market transactions, for which he must delegate 
decision making power, to relinquish political power as well.  His assets may now be 
used to support views that he does not endorse.
299
  Thus, the stockholder has given up 
more than control of his assets in a volatile market; he has relinquished a portion of his 
own political power.  While government has an interest in protecting the speech of 
corporations, it also has a First Amendment concern to ensure that citizens are not 
coerced by management‘s political views.   
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A study of the Court cases affecting corporate speech shows the Court 
increasingly providing First Amendment protection to corporate speech despite the 
serious dangers associated.  Through their status as persons, the corporation has managed 
to claim rights and protections originally meant for human beings.  ―The courts,‖ wrote 
corporate lawyer and scholar William W. Cook in his 1894 treatise on corporate law, ―are 
becoming more liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago would have been held to be 
ultra vires would now be held to be intra vires.  The courts have gradually enlarged the 
implied powers of ordinary corporations until now such corporations may do almost 
anything that an individual may do, provided the stockholders and creditors do not 
object.‖
300
  Cook‘s observation was a premonition of the leeway corporations would gain 
through the Courts.  However, even Cook did not predict that a corporation would 
eventually be allowed to speak even if the stockholders and creditors did object.   
Supreme Court doctrine concerning First Amendment rights for the corporation 
was largely shaped by early cases concerning commercial speech, and therefore a brief 
review of this case law is necessary.  Historically, commercial speech was not protected.  
In Valentine v. Chrestensen 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court held that purely 
commercial advertising is not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.  
However, in 1964, the Court began to back away from this precedent.  In New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the New York Times ran a full-page editorial 
advertisement describing local police action in Alabama.  Sullivan, Commissioner of 
Public Affairs in Montgomery, Alabama, sued for libel.  Sullivan contended that the First 
Amendment did not protect this speech because it was a commercial advertisement.  
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However, the Court held that because the advertisement ―communicated information, 
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses and sought financial 
support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the 
highest public interest and concern,‖ the advertisement was not purely commercial and 
could therefore be protected.   
 This opinion was based on the notion that the First Amendment protects a 
―system of freedom of expression‖ and protects the right of the listener to hear and 
receive information regardless of the source of the information.  This argument is largely 
derived from Alexander Meiklejohn‘s influential book, Free Speech and Its Relation to 
Self-Government.
301
  According to Meiklejohn,  
The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated 
talkativeness.  It does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen 
take part in public debate…What is essential is not that everyone speak, 
but that everything worth saying shall be said…No speaker may be 
declared ―out of order‖ because we disagree with what he intends to say.  
And the reason for this equality of status in the field of ideas lies deep in 
the very foundations of the self-governing process.
302
   
 
This doctrine became the basis for subsequent decisions concerning corporate speech.  
Rather than contending with the rights of a corporation as a person protected under the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court focused on the rights of citizens as listeners to receive 
every possible opinion from any possible source.  In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. V. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court stated, ―It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount‖ (395 U.S. 67, 390).  Thus, the Meiklejohn 
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doctrine became the precedent for adjudicating corporate speech whether commercial or 
political.   
 One of the most famous corporate speech cases is Bigelow v. Virginia 421 U.S. 
809 (1975).  In this case, a controversial advertisement for abortion services was printed 
in a Virginia newspaper, and the state of Virginia claimed that this violated the law that 
prohibited such advertisements.  The Court protected the advertisement saying it 
provided public information to readers that the state had no right to withhold.  This case 
was important because the speech in question was undoubtedly an advertisement, but the 
topic was very controversial and the Court had just legalized abortion three years earlier.  
By protecting the advertisement, the Court was either solidly cementing the Meiklejohn 
doctrine and providing blanket protection for corporate commercial speech, or the Court 
was waffling in its decision based on content.  In fact, Justice Rehnquist‘s dissent 
addresses this dilemma.  He criticizes Court for the failure to firmly clarify if commercial 
speech is protected, and accuses the Court of providing protection based on content. He 
argues that the subject matter of the commercial advertisement should make no difference 
in its protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.   He charges the Court with 
carving out a special results-oriented case rule.  However, one year later in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 749 (1976), the 
Court cemented its decision when it held that a Virginia Statute banning advertisement of 
prescription drugs violated the First Amendment.  The Court set the precedent that the 
public had a right to receive information, and commercial speech is protected based on 
the listener‘s right to hear product information.   
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A fairly recent case involving commercial speech was Nike v. Kasky, 593 U.S. 
654 (2003).  Nike Corporation conducted a large public relations campaign to publicize 
the fact that it was improving the sweatshop labor practices of its subcontractors 
throughout the world.  Consumer advocate Marc Kasky researched Nike‘s claims and 
found that some of the statements were not true.  Kasky sued under a California law that 
prevents corporations from intentionally deceiving customers in their commercial 
statements as false advertising.  Rather than deny the charges, Nike argued that its 
statements were not advertisements but civil speech adding to an ongoing public political 
debate.  As such, Nike claimed that it had the same free speech rights as a natural person 
to say whatever they wish in their campaign slogans.  Nike‘s lead lawyer, Laurence 
Tribe, cited Bellotti as evidence that a corporate person has free speech rights.  The case 
stimulated a considerable amount of interest, and both the AFL-CIA and The New York 
Times filed briefs in favor of Nike.
303
  
The California Supreme Court heard the case in 2002. Kasky v. Nike 02 C.D.O.S. 
3790. In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of Kasky stating that 
if Nike could issue false statements in a press release calling it political speech, then 
consumers would lose their protection against false advertisement. The California Court 
declared because Nike‘s statements were directed to a commercial audience and 
concerned promotion of its products, the speech was commercial in nature and therefore 
not fully protected. Corporate moral philosopher Mary Lyn Stoll argues that if the court 
had ruled in favor of Nike it would have set a precedent that corporations could say 
patently false statements about their products under the First Amendment.  For example, 
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Proctor Gamble could issue a press release claiming that it does not test on animals even 
if they did. Phillip Morris could state that tobacco is not addictive even though this is 
scientifically untrue.
304
   
While some scholars like Stoll saw the merit in limiting Nike‘s speech rights, 
other scholars such as Thomas C. Goldstein who is a lawyer and noted Supreme Court 
commentator, disagreed with the decision.  Goldstein argues that Nike‘s speech was not 
commercial because it targeted consumers who boycotted certain goods for noneconomic 
reasons.  Further, Nike was not promoting a specific product but was engaging in an 
ongoing debate over third-world working conditions.  Goldstein employs a Meiklejohn 
argument to say that Nike had a right to engage in the political and social debate on 
public issues so that the debate is uninhibited and all views are heard.
305
  Even the 
California Supreme Court was divided on the issue.  Justice Chin wrote a lengthy dissent 
and argued, ―Handicapping one side in this important worldwide debate is both ill 
considered and unconstitutional.  Full free speech protection for one side and strict 
liability for the other will hardly promote vigorous and meaningful debate‖ (02 C.D.O.S. 
3790).  Several newspapers wrote amicus curiae briefs on behalf of Nike defending free 
speech rights.  New York Times columnist published an article shortly after the 
California Supreme Court decision criticizing the decision saying, ―In a real democracy, 
even the people you disagree with get to have their say.‖
306
 This column was met with ire 
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with advocates against corporate personhood because, they argued, Nike was not 
―people.‖   
In 2003, the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Unfortunately for this 
study, although the Court originally planned to hear the case, they later dismissed it on 
procedural issues and sent the case back to the California courts.  However, Justice 
Kennedy disagreed with the Court‘s decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari.  Kennedy 
believed the case presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the freedom 
of speech rights of corporations.  Kennedy characterized Nike‘s speech as a mix of 
commercial and public about matters that were of public interest.  Kennedy concludes 
that if the Court were to hear the case on its merits, it would likely rule in favor of Nike‘s 
right to free speech.  The Supreme Court was not given the opportunity to hear the case 
again.  After dismissing it, the two parties settled out of court and the Supreme Court did 
not have another opportunity to adjudicate Nike‘s free speech protections as a corporate 
person (539 U.S. 654,596). 
 In summary, the cases concerning commercial speech lay down the rule that the 
First Amendment‘s primary purpose is to protect the listeners – those who hear the 
speech and receive the information.  The Supreme Court managed to avoid the question 
of the corporate personhood and its relation to First Amendment Protection.  However, 
this subject would come up again in relation to political speech.  Political speech 
encompasses the same concerns of the rights of the listener and the corporate speaker, but 
also includes the problems of potential corruption of the democratic processes and the 
compulsion of the stockholder.  Legal scholar and federal judge Loren Smith comments, 
―This all raises the question that if commercial speech of corporations, speech about the 
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sale of drugs, or property, or widgets, is to be protected against the states by the due 
process guarantee of liberty in the Fourteenth, how much better claim do corporations 
have to this liberty when their topic is political?  After all, political speech is that type of 
speech most clearly recognized by the Court as the target of First Amendment 
protections.‖
307
    
 Theodore Roosevelt once said, ―All contributions by corporations to any political 
committee for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be 
permitted to use money for such purposes; moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, 
as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices 
acts.‖
308
  Roosevelt was addressing the corruption resulting from corporate influence in 
politics.  Congress and state legislatures responded to this corruption by passing a series 
of political campaign financing laws.  When various corporations began to violate the 
restrictions in these laws, the issue came before the Supreme Court.  Two of the most 
famous of these cases are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  We will rely on these two cases to analyze the 
Court‘s position.  However, a short review of some earlier cases is necessary as 
background.   
 Corporations have been granted rights and protections primarily through 
applications of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, when corporations sought free speech 
protection, they again relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process guarantees 
to apply the First Amendment.  However, an important case in 1925 created a setback for 
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corporations.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters Hill Military Academy 268 U.S. 510 (1925), 
the Court held that while the property of corporations is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, corporations cannot claim liberty.  Furthermore, in Hague v. CIO 307 U.S. 
496 (1939) the Court held that right to distribute printed matter under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause applies only to natural persons.   However, despite their judicial 
rhetoric seemingly against free speech protections for corporations in both Pierce and 
Hague, the Court ruled in favor of the corporation and granted their respective free 
speech request.  Loren Smith argues, ―At least since Santa Clara, when the property or 
liberty interests of corporations have been challenged or threatened by state action, the 
Supreme Court has given such rights or interests the full protection of the due process 
and equal protection clauses.‖
309
 
 These cases concerning corporate political speech set the stage for later cases 
heard by the Supreme Court.  The Court was grappling with the dilemma that on one 
hand, speech, no matter its source, must be protected so that all citizens have a chance to 
hear a variety of messages.  On the other hand, the liberty to speak freely is granted to 
natural persons.  Corporations, as artificial persons, do not necessarily have this liberty.  
Furthermore, the size and financial strength of a corporation allow the corporation‘s 
voice to be louder than the typical natural person.  These issues came to a head in the 
issue of corporate campaign contributions.  On the one hand, the corporation should be 
allowed to ―speak‖ through endorsements of money or advertisements in favor of a 
particular candidate.  However, the corporate voice is so powerful that they overwhelm 
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the other players in the political arena.  The Court faced this dilemma in Buckley v. 
Valeo.  
 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which was one of the major political cases of 
the twentieth century, was made even more pivotal because it was decided during an 
election year and all the 1976 federal political campaigns were affected by its outcome.  
The litigants came from a wide political spectrum and included conservative Senator 
Buckley as well as liberal ex-Senator and presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy.  All 
were challenging the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.  They disputed the 
contribution limits and the expenditure limits (including a ban on corporate and union 
contributions and expenditures), levels of required contributor disclosure, the 
constitutional status of the independent agency the Federal Election Commission, and the 
use of federal funds for some presidential and presidential primary campaigns.  The 
central issue at hand was the limitations on individual and group contributions and 
expenditures in federal elections as well as the ban on corporate and union contributions 
and expenditures.   
 Underlying the Court‘s opinion is the question of when speech is protected 
expression and when it is unprotected conduct.  The Court said: ―Some forms of 
communication made possible by giving and spending money involve speech alone, some 
involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two.  Yet this Court 
has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of 
money operates itself to introduce a non-speech element or to reduce the exacting 
scrutiny required by the First Amendment‖  (424 U.S. 1, 17).  Thus, the fact that money 
is being spent does not change nature of its being speech which is protected.   
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The Court distinguished between money expenditures on political expression such 
as articles, newspapers, and fliers and money spent for campaign contributions.  A 
restriction on the amount of money that can be spent for political expression necessarily 
reduces the quantity of expression.  Such limitations ―represent substantial rather than 
merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.‖  ―A 
restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size of 
the audience reached‖ (424 U.S. 1, 19).  Thus, the Court ruled against restrictions on 
expenditures for political expression.   
However, the Court held that limitations on campaign contributions are only a 
marginal restriction on free communication, and the quantity of money spent on 
contributions does not necessarily equate with the quantity of communication.  Hence, 
campaign contributions could be limited.  Furthermore, contribution limits were justified 
in light of the need to control corruption from large campaign donations.   
 In this decision, the Court does not directly address the constitutionality of the 
federal prohibition on corporate expenditures for political purposes.  However, the Court 
affirmed basic First Amendment principles in the area of corrupt practices.  If a $1000 
expenditure limitation is unconstitutional, an outright prohibition on corporate 
expenditures would be very difficult to justify.  The Court was opening the way for 
corporate political speech.  The Court used the Meiklejohn argument once again to rule 
that the rights of the listener are paramount.  Therefore, although it can be argued that 
corporations are creatures of the state and do not enjoy rights such as free speech, this 
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argument becomes irrelevant because the protection of the First Amendment is rooted in 
the right of citizens to hear information instead of the speaker.  The Buckley Court failed 
to address the important issue of stockholder political coercion.  This issue rears its head 
again three years later in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a group of banks and corporations 
wished to expend corporate funds to oppose a Massachusetts referendum to enact a 
graduated personal income tax.  A Massachusetts criminal statute prohibited business 
corporations from making expenditures to influence the vote on any question that did not 
affect the property, business, or assets of the corporations.  Specifically, the law stated 
that ―no question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, 
property, or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, 
business or assets of the corporation.‖
310
   
In the Massachusetts Supreme Court the question was framed in terms of the right 
of corporations to be protected under the First Amendment in the same manner as natural 
persons.  Because the Fourteenth Amendment applies the First Amendment to the states, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment speaks of persons, the Massachusetts Court looked to the 
Due Process Clause for the application of the First Amendment.
311
  The Massachusetts 
Court cites Hague 307 U.S. 496 and Pierce 268 U.S. 510 to show that the liberty referred 
to under the Fourteenth is of natural persons not artificial.  The Massachusetts Court 
noted,  
It seems clear to us that a corporation does not have the same First 
Amendment rights to free speech as those of a natural person, but whether 
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its rights are designated ―liberty‖ rights or ―property‖ rights, a 
corporation‘s property and business interests are entitled to Fourteenth 
Amendment protection.  It is also clear that, as an incident of such 
protection, corporations possess certain rights of speech and expression 
under the First Amendment.  Thus, we hold today that only when a 
general political issue materially affects a corporation‘s business, property 
or assets may that corporation claim First Amendment protection for its 
speech and other activities entitling it to communicate its position on that 
issue to the general public (359 N.E. 2d, 1270). 
 
Because both Hague and Pierce specify that only property (not liberty) is protected by 
Due Process, the Massachusetts Court found that a corporation‘s speech is only protected 
when its property interests are at stake.  Thus, they held that the Massachusetts‘s statute 
was constitutional  
 When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court again focused on 
the rights of the listener under the Meiklejohn doctrine and ignored the question of 
corporate rights.   Justice Powell‘s opinion stated,  
We believe that the (Massachusetts) court posed the wrong question.  The 
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party 
seeking their vindication.  The First Amendment, in particular, serves 
significant societal interests.  The proper question is not whether 
corporations ―have‖ First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are 
co-extensive with those of natural persons.  Instead, the question must be 
whether Section 8 abridges expression that the First Amendment was 
meant to protect.  We hold that it does (435 U.S. 765, 776). 
 
Corporate attorneys Edwin Rome and William Roberts argue, ―Bellotti represents the 
final and complete triumph of the modified Meiklejohnian conception of the First 
Amendment.  The Court rejected in resounding terms the argument that corporations, as 
creatures of state law, have only those rights granted them by the states, and rejected as 
well, the entire analysis presumed by the argument.‖
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  Indeed, Justice Powell wrote,  
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If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the 
State could silence their proposed speech.  It is the type of speech 
indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true 
because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.  
The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the 
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual‖  (435 U.S. 765, 778). 
 
In his argument, Powell acknowledges that natural and artificial persons may have 
different sets of rights under the law.  However, because Powell‘s motive is protecting 
the rights of the listener, he upholds the corporate person‘s right to speak even if that 
person is artificial.  
The Court then turns to the problem of potential corruption of the democratic 
process if corporations are allowed full entry.  However, the Court seems to dismiss this 
argument as not terribly significant.  The Court writes, ―According to appellee, 
corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other points of 
view.  If appellee‘s arguments were supported by record of legislative findings that 
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby 
denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit 
our consideration‖  (435 U.S. 765, 790).  At this point, it seems that the Court is 
backpedaling by saying these concerns are not important, but if they were to become 
critical, then the Court might have a reason to limit corporate speech.  The Court does not 
define a firm precedent for corporate speech: either it is corruptive or it is not.  By 
waffling, the Court fails to articulate a clear policy for future cases.   
 The Court also fails to safeguard shareholder rights.  Although the Court 
recognizes that there may be many instances in which shareholders may not agree with 
the political decisions of the corporate management, the Court argues that shareholders 
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can voice their dissatisfaction through the election of the board of directors.  
Furthermore, minority shareholders have judicial remedy for improper corporate actions 
(435 U.S. 765, 795).  Victor Brudney, a scholar of corporate law, argues that despite the 
need to protect the audience‘s interest in receiving communication and the free 
interchange of information, the state‘s effort to protect the investors from management‘s 
political spending does not thwart ―societal interest.‖
313
  He further argues that even if the 
corporation is a person and its speech fully protected, it does not solve the dilemma for 
the stockholders.  Rather, it leaves the crucial problem of deciding who within the 
corporation may authorize it to utter that speech, and in light of the answer to that 
question, what types of political speech may or may not be protected.
314
 
 The dissent in Bellotti by Justice White, (with Justices Brennan and Marshall 
joining) recognizes the problems of the corporation as a speaker in terms of a huge, 
wealthy entity corrupting politics and a select few in management coercing the speech of 
the shareholders.  Justice White writes,  
There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within the 
scope of the First Amendment.  This, however, is merely the starting point 
of analysis, because an examination of the First Amendment values that 
the corporation expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a 
free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with 
communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions 
which individual expression is not.  Indeed, what some have considered to 
be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of 
communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-
fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech  435 U.S. 765, 805. 
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White‘s opinion calls attention to the fact that a corporation‘s primary motive is 
economic, and the state grants a corporation a charter in order to confer special 
advantages to the corporation for furthering its economic goals.  With the liberal granting 
of corporate speech rights, the corporation is able to use its amassed wealth to acquire 
unfair political advantages in the political process.  This unfair advantage actually 
weakens the speech rights of individual citizens competing to be heard in the political 
arena.  The Court‘s decision, while purporting to further free speech, in some respects has 
reduced expression in the political arena.   
White also addresses the problem of shareholders who become compulsory 
supporters of the corporation‘s political speech and therefore lose some of their own 
speech-related efficacy.  The Court‘s proposed remedy through the election of the 
corporate board of directors does not address the concern that these elections are based 
upon share, not by person.  Hence, the political power of the individuals with a large 
number of shares is magnified to the extent that they can control the use of the assets of 
minority stockholders.  Thus, this proposed solution is not viable under democratic 
auspices.  As Brudney argues, ―a government concerned with protecting First 
Amendment values could reasonably believe it important to free those citizens from 
bondage to management‘s political views, even if the bonds are seen as no more than 
restrictions on their investment opportunities.‖
315
   
Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent for Bellotti in which he directly 
addressed the issue of the corporate person and the related rights and protections.  
Rehnquist begins his challenge of corporate rights by tracing the origin of corporate 
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personality all the way back to Dartmouth College v. Woodword where it was decided 
that corporations are artificial entities.  He then admonishes the Court for not directly 
addressing the issue of corporate liberty even though the issue has been raised numerous 
times.  He argues that although the Supreme Court refuses to address the issue of 
corporate political speech, The General Court of the Massachusetts, the Congress of the 
United States, and the legislatures of thirty of other states have considered the issue and 
have concluded that restrictions on the political activity of corporations is both desirable 
and constitutional.  Given this broad consensus, he reproves the Court for its lack of 
deference for the myriad laws limiting political contributions and expenditures (435 U.S. 
765, 823-824).   
A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of potentially 
perpetual life to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity.  It might 
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the 
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.  
Furthermore, it might be argued that the liberties of political expression 
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States permit 
commercial corporations to exist.  So long as the Judicial Branches of the 
State and Federal Governments remain open to protect the corporation‘s 
interest in its property, it has no need, though it may have desire, to 
petition the political branches for similar protection.  Indeed, the States 
might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power 
to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed.  I think that any 
particular form of organization upon which the State confers special 
privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be 
subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a 
partnership, a trade association, or a corporation (435 U.S. 765, 826-827). 
 
However, Rehnquist‘s opinion was a dissent from the primary opinion and hence did not 
set a precedent that allowed limitations on corporate political speech.   
Two years later, the Court affirmed Bellotti with its decision in Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission 447 U.S. 530 (1980).  The Consolidated Edison 
Company, a electrical utility company serving New York, placed inserts in its billing 
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envelopes promoting the benefits of nuclear energy.  The National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. (NRDC) requested that Consolidated Edison also enclose a rebuttal in its 
next billing envelope.  When Consolidated Edison refused, the NRDC asked the Public 
Service Commission of New York to intervene and open the billing envelopes to include 
literature on controversial issues.  The Public Service Commission refused to open the 
billing envelopes but did enact a rule to prevent utility companies from using bill inserts 
to discuss political issues.  Consolidated Edison then brought suit again the Public 
Service Commission for a violation of First Amendment free speech rights.   
In the Supreme Court opinion, Justice Powell affirms Bellotti stating that as a 
corporation, Consolidated Edison cannot be denied freedom of speech.  Powell then 
discusses the authority of the Public Service Commission to regulate the utility company.  
Consolidated Edison was an authorized monopoly commissioned by the State of New 
York to provide utility services.  As such, it was subject to New York State regulations.  
Thus, the Public Service Commission argued that as part of the State‘s plenary control, it 
could regulate what was placed in its billing envelopes.  Powell disagreed saying that 
New York State could not violate free expression because there was not a compelling 
reason to do so.  Free speech in this instance trumped state authority.  Powell‘s decision 
was in direct contrast to concession theory which would allow state regulation of a 
corporation based on the fact that the state granted the charter for the corporation‘s 
existence.  Rome and Roberts argue, ―Read together, Buckley v. Valeo, First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, and Consolidated Edison raise a serious doubt whether a flat 
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prohibition on corporate political expenditures will be held consistent with the First 
Amendment.‖
316
   
In 1986, the Supreme Court heard a case very similar to Consolidated Edison. In 
Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), the public 
utility Pacific Gas and Electric Company refused to insert a rebuttal message supplied by 
a public interest group in its billing envelopes.  Justice Powell, again writing for the 
Court, confirmed that forcing the utility to comply was a violation of the company‘s 
freedom of speech protections.  The interesting part of the case for the issue of corporate 
personhood came in Justice Rehnquist‘s dissent.  He states that natural persons enjoy 
negative free speech rights or the right to remain silent on an issue as a component of a 
natural person‘s freedom of conscience.  Corporations, on the other hand, do not have a 
freedom of conscience because corporations are not rational, autonomous agents as are 
human persons.  Rehnquist writes, ―Extension of the individual freedom of conscience 
decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking 
point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‗intellect‘ or ‗mind‘ for freedom of 
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality‖ (475 U.S. 1, 34).  Rehnquist 
refutes the idea that a corporation has the rational mind that is necessary for personhood.  
Therefore, Rehnquist argues that a corporation fails on this criterion and should not be 
considered persons in the same way as natural, moral persons.  He argues that Bellotti 
and Consolidated Edison are based on the Meiklejohn theory of broadening the forum of 
information available to listeners.  Therefore, Rehnquist dissents in Pacific Gas urging 
the Court to return to a more constrained view of corporations as artificial persons.  
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Four years later, the Supreme Court did return to a more restrained view of 
corporate speech rights in the case Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S 
652 (1990).  This case is important for two reasons.  First, the Court upheld a Michigan 
law that curtailed a corporation‘s ability to fund political candidates.  Second, the Court 
focused on the corporation as a speaker rather than focus on the listener‘s right to receive 
information.  The case involved Michigan‘s Campaign Finance Act which prohibited 
corporations from using treasury money to support candidates.  Michigan applied this law 
to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce because the Chamber of Commerce, which 
accepted payments into its general treasury, could be a conduit for corporations to 
influence elections and bypass regulations.  The Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
brought suit arguing that the restrictions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.   
 The Court opinion, written by Justice Marshall, upheld the Michigan law and 
limitations on corporate political speech.  Marshall relied on FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).  Although this decision involved an 
organization, not a corporation, Marshall argued that many of the principles remained.  In 
FEC v. MCFL, the Court stated, ―[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation 
. . . are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They 
reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The 
availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, 
even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas‖ 
(479 U.S. 238, 258).  Based on this, Marshall argued that corporations, because of their 
size and resources, could have an unfair advantage in the political arena.  Marshall wrote, 
―…the State's decision to regulate only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the 
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compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of 
political ‗war chests‘ amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations‖ 
(494 U.S. 652, 666).  Based on this potentially corrosive effect that corporations could 
have, Marshall upheld the Michigan law.  Marshall‘s opinion points out the potential 
dangers of corporate personhood when the corporation is allowed to use its resources to 
over shout the other natural persons in the political arena.  Justice Brennan concurred 
pointing out that an individual stockholder might oppose the use of corporate funds, 
which are drawn from stockholder contributions, to support a particular candidate.  
Brennan‘s opinion is based on a group perspective in which the corporation is simply a 
conglomeration of the stockholders, and the political opinions of management may not 
reflect those of everyone else in the corporation.   Justice Scalia provided a stinging 
dissent which he began with the following declaration: ―Attention all citizens. To assure 
the fairness of elections by preventing disproportionate expression of the views of any 
single powerful group, your Government has decided that the following associations of 
persons shall be prohibited from speaking or writing in support of any candidate: ___.‖ 
Scalia continued, ―In permitting Michigan to make private corporations the first object of 
this Orwellian announcement, the Court today endorses the principle that too much 
speech is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe‖ (494 U.S. 652, 679).  
Scalia‘s point with this perhaps overly dramatic introduction is that the government 
should not censure certain speakers who are involved in political debates.  Scalia 
maintains that just because corporations may have a vast number of resources, their 
speech rights should not be suppressed.  Similarly, the state cannot limit wealthy 
individuals from speaking politically.  Further, Scalia disagrees with Justice Brennan‘s 
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group theory argument.  Scalia argues that a stockholder becomes a part of a corporation 
with the objective to make money.  If corporate management decides that certain political 
speech is part of the corporation‘s strategy to make money, then the stockholder has de 
facto authorized it.  If the stockholder disagrees with a political decision, he can either try 
to convince the majority to reverse the decision or sell his stock.   
 Justices Kennedy and O‘Connor also disagreed with majority opinion.  Kennedy, 
with O‘Connor and Scalia joining, argued that the decision was a form of censorship 
based on the speaker‘s identity.  He states that the decision creates ―second-class 
speakers‖ who are corporations (494 U.S. 652, 697).  Kennedy‘s use of the phrase 
―second-class speakers‖ was likely carefully crafted to avoid the phrase ―second-class 
citizens‖ because corporations are not citizens and to call them citizens would incite a 
new legal battle.  At the same time, ―second-class speakers‖ invokes the discriminatory 
connotations of the phrase ―second-class citizens‖ among those who are accustomed to 
thinking of the corporation as a fellow legal person.  FEC v. MCFL proved that the battle 
over corporate personhood was still very much a hot button issue. 
 Twenty years later Justices Scalia and Kennedy (O‘Connor was off the bench by 
this time) got their opportunity to overturn Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce in 
the landmark case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876, 
(2010).  This case was considered a landmark because of its far-reaching consequences 
for both free speech rights and corporate personhood.  Explaining that the decision would 
impact elections at all levels if the Court gave corporations increased First Amendment 
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rights, Erwin Chemerinsky, the dean of the University of California, Irvine law school 
called the decision, ―one of the most important First Amendment cases in years.‖
317
 
The case involved the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, 
also known as the McCain-Feingold Act, which prohibited corporations and unions from 
using funds from their general treasuries to pay for election related speech.  The Act did 
not prevent corporations and unions from forming political action committees (PACs) to 
fund campaign speech.  During the 2008 presidential campaign, a nonprofit corporation 
called Citizen United paid for television commercials to promote a film called ―Hillary: 
the Movie‖ which was a critical documentary of candidate Hillary Clinton.  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia found that the commercials violated the Act‘s 
restriction on electioneering communications thirty days before the primaries.  When the 
case reached the Supreme Court, the justices heard the case and then decided to rehear 
the case again in order to determine if they needed to overrule Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Upon reargument, the majority found that Act‘s prohibition of independent 
expenditures by corporations and unions was an invalid violation of the First 
Amendment.  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce was overruled and much 
broader free speech rights were granted to the corporate person.  Justice Kennedy‘s 
opinion merits close analysis because he has much to say about the corporate person.  
Kennedy‘s addresses the harm of limiting certain ―speakers‖ which includes 
corporations.  By again using the term ―speaker,‖ Kennedy avoids the discussion of 
corporate personhood, but because a person is generally considered a moral, rational, and 
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communicative agent, personhood can be implied by the term ―speaker.‖  Kennedy 
reaffirms his analogy of the corporation to a moral person saying, ―Corporations, like 
individuals, do not have monolithic views. On certain topics corporations may possess 
valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in 
speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials‖ (130 S.Ct. 
876, 91).  Kennedy is subtly arguing that a corporation has the ability for rational 
thoughts and the volition to use that rational ability to influence other persons.  Kennedy 
also argues, ―By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to 
strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice‖  (130 S.Ct. 876, 
53).  This is a very important argument in terms of moral personhood for corporations 
because Kennedy is implying that a corporation has worth, standing, and respect, all of 
which are considered moral qualities that are generally accorded to natural persons.  
Referring to the Belotti decision, Kennedy argues that ―political speech does not lose 
First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation‖ (130 S.Ct. 876, 
53).   
 Kennedy then addresses the argument made in Austin that corporate campaign 
spending compels stockholders to fund political speech with which they might not agree.  
Kennedy contends that if was a truly valid argument, then Congress would have to ban 
political speech at any time rather than the 30 or 60 day timeframe that is specified in the 
Campaign Reform Act.  Kennedy asserts that the remedy to this problem is not in 
contravening the First Amendment.  Rather Congress should explore other regulatory 
measures (130 S.Ct. 876, 88).   
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 Justice Stevens filed an opinion which concurred in part and dissented in part.  
The focus of Stevens‘ dissent was corporate personhood.  He wrote, ―The conceit that 
corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not 
only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this case‖ (130 
S.Ct. 876, 143).  Stevens goes to the heart of the corporate personhood issue arguing that 
although corporations make contributions to society, they are not members of society.  
He points out that unlike natural persons (who are rational and moral agents), 
corporations cannot vote or run for office.  Further, because corporations can amass huge 
financial resources and can be controlled by nonresidents, their role in the electoral 
process is subject to suspicion which lawmakers have a constitutional and democratic 
duty to monitor (130 S.Ct. 876, 143).   
 Stevens then takes a historical look at view the Constitutional Framers took of 
corporations.  Stevens asserts that the Framers had human, individual Americans in mind 
when they designed the First Amendment.  He claims that the idea that a corporation 
could invoke First Amendment rights would probably have been a ―quite a novelty, given 
that at the time, the legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to rest entirely in a 
concession of the sovereign‖ (130 S.Ct. 876, 206).
318
  Stevens concludes that this 
historical examination attests to the fact that Constitutional history does not dictate that 
corporations be given First Amendment rights.   
 Stevens then considers the question of ―who‖ is even speaking when a business 
corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate (130 
S.Ct. 876, 275).  He argues that is it not customers or employees speaking because these 
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individuals usually have no say in such decisions.  Nor is it the shareholders who are 
removed from day-to-day decisions.  He concludes that ―who‖ must be among the 
mangers or officers who decide to place the advertisements, but they cannot be said to be 
speaking for the whole of the corporation.  He argues that part of the decision in Austin 
was based on the need to protect shareholders from this type of coerced speech.  The 
Citizens United decision undermines the political convictions of such shareholders.  
 Justice Scalia joined Kennedy‘s opinion but wrote his own concurrence primarily 
to refute Justice Steven‘s dissent.  He begins by refuting Stevens‘ discussion of the 
Framers intent in respect to corporations.  Scalia argues that Stevens does not present 
sufficient evidence to prove that the Constitutional Framers did not intend associations 
such as corporations to have speech rights.  In opposition, Scalia demonstrates that 
colleges, religious institutions, guilds, and other recognized corporations actively 
petitioned the government and expressed opinions in newspapers and pamphlets (130 
S.Ct. 876, 133).  Scalia then criticizes Stevens‘ personhood argument saying, ―The 
dissent says that ‗speech‘ refers to oral communications of human beings, and since 
corporations are not human beings they cannot speak.  This is sophistry.‖  Scalia‘s 
scathing refutation of Stevens‘ dissent matched the public debate that erupted with the 
Supreme Court announced its decision.   
 Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe criticized the decision saying, ―Talking 
about a business corporation as merely another way that individuals might choose to 
organize their association with one another to pursue their common expressive aims is 
worse than unrealistic; it obscures the very real injustice and distortion entailed in the 
phenomenon of some people using other people‘s money to support candidates they have 
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made no decision to support, or to oppose candidates they have made no decision to 
oppose.‖
319
  Legal scholar Ronald Dworkin also criticized the decision by pointing out 
that a corporation that has vast resources will overpower other, individual speakers, and 
will create a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas.  Dworkin argued that the decision 
was ultimately a threat to democracy as corporations now had the authority to greatly 
influence the political process.
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With the most recent case of Citizen‟s United, confirming that the corporate 
person has the right to speak, it seems that in the realm of the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has accorded corporate persons rights that are on a par with those 
accorded to human persons.  Although the First Amendment lacks any reference to 
persons, corporations have been given this right and are presumed to ―speak‖ as rational 
and autonomous agents.  Perhaps the continuing confusion of the word ―person‖ has 
encouraged the Court to equate these two types of persons even though allowing 
corporations to speak on political matters could subvert the democratic process.  Or 
perhaps, the corporation, as a composite of citizens whose financial concerns carry over 
into political concerns, should have the right to influence political matters to promote the 
goals of the corporation.  Either way, Citizen‟s United was a large step forward in 
recognizing the legal, and to some extent, the moral personhood of a corporation because 
the Court decided that a corporation has the right to express its thoughts and opinions in 
the political arena.  It will be interesting to see if the Court continues this expansive view 
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of the corporate person when deciding Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Trading in 2012 which 
concerns a corporation‘s responsibility for criminal actions. 
 
The Corporation as a Unique Type of Person 
 This analysis of corporate personhood has demonstrated that the corporation is a 
unique type of person because it displays some of the criteria for personhood but lacks 
other criteria.  Therefore, the debate over whether the corporation is truly a person is still 
very much alive in both moral and legal paradigms.  In Citizens United, Justice Stevens 
argued ―It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
feelings, no thoughts, no desires.  Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities 
of human beings, to be sure, and their ‗personhood‘ often serves as a useful legal fiction.  
But they are not themselves members of ‗We the People‘ by whom and for whom our 
Constitution was established‖ (130 S.Ct. 876, 274).  In referring to conscience, beliefs, 
feelings, and desires, Stevens was referring to the moral sense of personhood.  He argues 
because the corporation does not function as a rational, autonomous being, the 
corporation should not be considered a person.  Further, he argues that corporations are 
not part of the community of recognized persons – ―We the People‖ – and therefore do 
not qualify as person with this criterion either.  Despite Stevens‘ insistence that 
corporations should not be considered moral persons, there are some grounds for 
considering corporations as moral persons. 
 Some moral and legal scholars do believe that corporations are part of ―We the 
People‖ and are part of the community of persons.  Recall Peter French‘s argument in the 
theoretical analysis or the words of Justice Field in Paul v. Virginia ―Under the 
designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included‖ (125 U.S. 
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181, 189).  As a collective person, a corporation is able to use its decision making 
processes and networks of managers to reach decisions that are separate from the 
decisions of the individual members.  Further, corporations generally have spokespeople 
who speak on behalf of the corporation.  Thus, it seems that there are some valid 
justifications for considering a corporation to be a person. 
 Legally, the Supreme Court has maintained that the corporation is a person since 
1886 and although this declaration has been debated by the Court since that time, the 
precedent remains that corporations are persons.  Some of the justification for legal 
personhood draws upon the arguments for moral personhood.  A corporation is the 
subject of legal rights and duties stemming from the rights and duties of the individuals 
underneath the corporate veil.  Therefore, it is fitting that the legal system would 
recognize the corporation as a right and duty bearing entity.  Further, once incorporated, 
the corporation takes on a life of its own which the Court has recognized in the form of a 
legal person.  However, the corporation as a legal person is not without controversy as 
Citizens United proves.  The bestowal of legal personhood to the corporation has resulted 
in far reaching legal and moral consequences for corporations, individuals, and the 
political process.  The corporation as an entity becomes more than the sum of its parts 
and has the potential to become extremely politically powerful. 
 Since the beginning of incorporation laws in the United States reaching back to 
colonial times, the law has struggled with how to adjudicate culpability for corporate 
crimes.  Punishment of corporate malfeasance is extremely difficult because the corporate 
veil must be lifted to find the individual humans responsible for the crime.  However, it is 
often a chain of actions by multiple individuals that leads to the wrongdoing and finding 
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someone upon whom to fix the blame can be nearly impossible.  Thus, the corporation is 
able to commit legal crimes but is not culpable as an individual human person is 
considered culpable.  Thus, scholars who criticize corporate personhood argue that 
corporations are able to commit crimes with impunity.   
Scholars also argue that corporate personhood has gone beyond its original 
charter to facilitate business transactions as corporations are increasingly seeking 
increased political rights such as the right of privacy, the right to remain silent, and 
freedom of speech.  Corporations have been fairly successful in their bids for protection 
as persons under the Bill of Rights.  The idea that a corporation can claim personal 
privacy or speech rights might come as a shock to the average citizen who is not 
accustomed to thinking about the term ―person‖ being extended to a corporation.  
However, Citizens United and the recent case involving AT&T demonstrate that 
corporate personhood has many implications as corporations can claim privileges such as 
the right to political speech through campaign funding as well as immunities such as 
privacy protections.  According to the citizens group Reclaim Democracy, which was 
formed to advocate against corporate personhood, ―Granting corporations the status of 
legal persons effectively rewrites the Constitution to serve corporate interests as though 
they were human interests.‖
321
  Activist Ted Nace is even more critical of corporate 
personhood.  In his widely read book, Gangs of America: The Rise of Corporate Power 
and the Disabling of Democracy, Nace writes, ―Like a myopic Dr. Frankenstein, the 
Court had worked piecemeal and haphazardly, grafting a finger here, an eyebrow there, 
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until the result was a full-fledged legal superperson.‖
322
  He goes on to criticize the 
Supreme Court for failing to compose an explicit explanation of corporate personhood in 
the numerous Court opinions that address the issue.  
 Critics such as Nace argue that slaves and corporations were both granted their 
personhood at approximately the same time but the struggle for rights and freedoms for 
corporations was won much more easily.  Indeed, it seems that the Court was more 
willing to grant personhood to the fictional group-person than it was willing to accede to 
personhood for freed slaves who were rational, autonomous human beings.  Comparing 
the struggle of slaves for personhood to that of corporations, it is possible to compare and 
contrast the means by which the law adjudicated the two different types of personhood. It 
is also possible to see if my hypotheses hold up for corporations.   
 
Verification of Hypotheses 
Cases concerning corporate personhood followed on the heels of slavery cases, 
and therefore, the precedents established concerning personhood for slaves should 
influence those of corporations.  The corporation, like the slave, faces the dual status as 
both property and person as it is an entity that is owned by other persons and yet at the 
same time, is considered a person in and of itself.  A corporation‘s status also involves 
the concept of being a person in the sense of a rational agent who can make decisions and 
is culpable for his actions.  This is not to say that an African American had the same 
moral weight as a corporation or to equate these struggles for personhood as morally 
equal.  Rather, a comparison is useful to elucidate the meaning of personhood.  
                                                 




With these similarities between the personhood of the slave and the corporation, 
we can analyze whether justices relied upon the core theory in corporate personality cases 
to a greater extent than they did in the slave cases. We can also examine whether justices 
have defined the corporate person as it relates to the status of property and human being.  
Finally, we can determine what influences the slave cases had on the corporate cases and 
what consistencies or inconsistencies arise in the determination of personhood with these 
two types of entity.    
 The chapter on slavery illustrates that the core theory is reflected in some 
opinions concerning the status of human property, but by and large, judges and justices 
adjudicating the issue of slavery tended to ignore the liberal teachings of Locke and Kant 
who denounced slavery.  Instead, justices found that the slave was property rather than a 
person. The foundational theories provided by Locke and Kant are utilized in a different 
way in the corporation cases.  In these cases, the personhood and rational agency of the 
individuals who form corporations is not in question.  Rather, the courts must decide if a 
group that is acting as an individual can claim personhood.  Thus, the analysis revolves 
around determining the legal and moral status of a group-person in a legal system built 
upon an individualist foundation.  Neither Locke nor Kant analyzes the group as a 
candidate for personhood.  However, building upon their theories of a person as a rational 
agent, theorists have tried to determine if a group can act as a single rational agent with 
volition and accountability.  
 Neither Kant nor Locke directly speaks to the personhood of the corporation or 
the group because their theories were based on the rational individual.  Locke speaks of 
the social contract, and in some ways, a social contract is similar to a corporation in that 
305 
 
it is a covenant agreed upon by the individual members, but it is the members who are the 
true persons.  Similarly, it is likely that Kant would consider the personhood of the 
individuals who comprise the corporation but would not consider the personhood of the 
corporation itself.  The corporation can be considered a means to achieve human ends, 
such as wealth, scientific progress, status, and other goals. 
 My analysis of cases reveals that justices did not spend much time evaluating 
whether the corporation could be both person and property, but they did spend a great 
deal of effort analyzing whether a corporation could be considered a person based on 
rational capacity.  Although the corporate person is a group, it is common understanding 
to think of corporate negligence, deception, or even good will.  It is also understood that a 
corporation can speak through its spokesperson.  The corporation has many of the 
qualities of Locke‘s and Kant‘s rational agent.  The cases analyzed in this chapter 
illustrate how justices wrestled over whether a person could also include a collective, or a 
person should be limited to the rational agents within the corporation.  
 The intense discussion of the rational abilities of corporations in respect to 
personhood prove that the core theory does play a role in these cases, thus supporting my 
first hypothesis that the core theory would influence the law in these cases.  In fact, in his 
dissent in Citizens v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, (2010), Justice Stevens cites Locke when 
arguing that the ability to utter speech is an ability afforded only to individual human 
persons and corporations do not technically have the ability to speak in the sense 
protected by the Constitution (130 S.Ct. 876, 207).  This very recent case illustrates that 
justices are still looking to the works of great scholars to find answers to an issue that has 
been problematic for years. 
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 My second hypothesis is that justices will define corporate personhood in 
opposition to human beings and to property.  This certainly seems to be true in respect to 
human beings, as the previous analysis demonstrates the many debates that occurred and 
continue to take place regarding whether a collective entity can qualify as a person under 
the same criteria of an individual human being who has rational capacity and volition.  
However, the corporation cases show little concern about the fact that the corporation is 
property and yet is still vying for personhood.  The dichotomy between person and 
property did not prevent the law from granting personhood to the corporation.  This 
echoes the slave cases.  Although many of the slave cases consider and even agonize over 
the fact that a human being could be considered property, ultimately most justices agreed 
that the slave was foremost property, even if the slave‘s personhood was recognized in 
some instances such as when guilty of a crime.  In the corporation cases, the law easily 
grants that corporations are both persons and property; in the slave cases the law 
struggles with this dual status, but emphasizes the property status while acknowledging in 
some part that the slave may also be a person.  
 My final hypothesis is that there should be consistencies in how justices 
adjudicate various entities vying for personhood.  The first corporation cases concerning 
personhood occurred at about the same time that the justice system was parceling out the 
rights and responsibilities of slaves and freed Blacks as persons and citizens.  However, 
the corporation cases rarely mention the personhood of slaves.  In fact, only one of the 
cases I analyzed mentioned slavery, and that case did not occur until 1938.  In his dissent 
for Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson 303 U.S. 77, Justice Black 
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argues that the Fourteenth Amendment concerned the rights of newly freed slaves and 
was not meant to grant personhood to corporations.   
Given the parallels between the quests for personhood by both former slaves and 
corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is surprising that the opinions do not 
overlap to a much greater extent.  It seems that justices were not concerned that the 
precedents and legal theories they developed in respect to the personhood of slaves and 
freed Blacks were consistent with those they developed for corporations.  The legal 
debate over personhood for slaves primarily centered on confirming the slave‘s status as 
human property.  The legal debate over corporations centered on whether a collective had 
the same status as a thinking individual.  It seems as though the parallels between the two 
types of cases were not recognized or were ignored.  Given the political influence and 
considerable resources corporations are able to expend to advocate for their interests, it is 
not surprising that corporations were able persuade justices to grant corporate personhood 
while slaves were denied this status.  Corporations were able to gain personhood much 
more quickly and with fewer struggles than slaves.  Despite the theoretical similarities 
between the two petitions for personhood, there are few consistencies between the two 
types of cases as the law recognized the business interests of corporations but ignored the 
moral interests of slaves.  My third hypothesis is not correct because the law did not 
create a coherent system of precedent and theory to construct a better overall 
understanding of what it means to be a person in the law.   
The next chapter addresses the personhood of the fetus.  The fetus has the 
potential to be a moral and legal person, but inside the womb, it has not actualized any of 
the criteria for personhood.  Further, in some respects the fetus is considered to be the 
308 
 
property of the mother.  The fetus represents the issues of person versus human being and 
person versus property albeit in a different manner than the issues in the slave and 
corporations cases.  Thus, the fetus presents the Supreme Court, as well as legal and 
moral theorists, with another questionable situation of personhood, and a careful 
examination of this entity will reveal any parallels or dissimilarities with slaves and 




Personhood for the Fetus 
 
To some scholars within the religious and philosophical community, fetal 
personhood begins at conception.  To other religious leaders and philosophers, fetal 
personhood is a much more nebulous concept with no real defining moment.  Within the 
medical community, the beginning of human life is acknowledged from conception, but 
other considerations such as physical and mental capacities are also part of the equation 
when determining personhood.  Within the medical community as in the religious 
community, the exact moment when a fetus should be granted personhood is very much 
open for debate.  Within the law, legal personality is also the subject of intense debate.  
The law takes cues from both the moral and biological paradigms but also fashions its 
own conceptions of the legal meaning of personhood for the unborn.   
In Levy v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 68 (1968) the Supreme Court defined ―person‖ with 
respect to illegitimate children.  The Court stated, ―They are humans, live, and have their 
being.  They are clearly ‗persons‘ within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment‖ (391 U.S. 68, 71).  According to the criteria ―live and have 
their being,‖ fetuses would seem to qualify for personhood.  Five years later, the Supreme 
Court considered fetal personhood directly in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and 
concluded that fetuses were not persons.  ―In short, the unborn have never been 
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense‖ (410 U.S. 113, 162).  Beyond Roe, 
many lower courts have found that fetuses do qualify as persons when the issue is an 
injury or wrongful death sustained in utero.  Although the Supreme Court denied 
personhood for the fetus in the context of abortion, in other realms of jurisprudence, fetal 
personhood is very much open for debate.  
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The personhood of the fetus is perhaps the most controversial section in this study 
given its implications for abortion.  As a human being, the fetus has a potential claim to 
personhood.  However, this claim is in contention with the woman whose right to control 
her body is a component of her rights as a person.  In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
found that the fetus is not a person protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Court stated that if the fetus is a person with a corresponding right to life, abortion would 
necessarily be first degree murder and illegal.  However, the Court‘s ruling that abortion 
is permissible and that the fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
completely resolve the issue.  The Court also found that the state has a legitimate interest 
in protecting the ―potential‖ life of the unborn and that this interest grows as the woman 
approaches full term.  Once the compelling point of viability is reached, the state‘s 
interest in protecting potential life can override the woman‘s right of bodily integrity.  It 
seems as if the Court was willing to accept a notion of the fetus as a (limited) person after 
it had reached viability.  After all, a third trimester fetus is extremely similar to a born 
baby in terms of its development.  However, designating a specific point in development 
as compelling raises continuum problems.  The fetus is growing and developing from the 
moment of conception until birth and then through childhood.  Can the fetus be a 
nonperson at the beginning of its time in the womb and a person at the end?  On the other 
hand, once the fetus reaches viability and merits state protection, the pregnant woman 
somehow loses her right of bodily integrity.  Can an acknowledged person lose a 
constitutionally guaranteed right such as the right to privacy?  In Roe v. Wade, the Court 
declared that the fetus was not a person in the whole sense, but it did recognize that the 
fetus can be treated as a person in some contexts after it reaches viability. 
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 This decision outraged those who supported the concept that life begins at 
conception and who felt that personhood should be granted to the fetus immediately upon 
conception.  The decision was equally offensive to those who took issue with the viability 
standard arguing that the fetus should not be recognized as a person in any sense and 
therefore, the woman‘s rights over her body should not be violated in favor of a fetus 
who has no legitimate claim to any rights.  As can be seen, much of the controversy over 
abortion really concerns a debate over personhood.  While the fetus is an entity that, as a 
biological human being, may deserve a certain amount of respect and protection, the 
mother is also a person whose rights must be upheld.  The Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Roe did not resolve the issue because it did not completely decide the status of the fetus. 
By holding that the fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, but a 
―potential life‖ and a legitimate interest for the state once viability is reached, the Court‘s 
decision raises as many questions as it answers.  
 This chapter will examine the meaning of personhood in respect to unborn 
humans – the fetus.  The initial scholarship addressing the meaning of persons in Chapter 
One comes into clear focus in this chapter.  The question of personhood for the fetus 
presents the dichotomy of person versus human being in stark contrast.  The fetus is 
certainly a biological human being, but it lacks many of the criteria needed for 
personhood such as rationality, language, and second order volitions.  In reality, a human 
does not develop the cognitive capacity for language and rational decision making until 
well into infancy and childhood.  Therefore, even the personhood of young children can 
be called into question.  However, the fetus has the potential to develop these rational 
capacities, and indeed has brain activity in as few as eight weeks.  Further, while the fetus 
312 
 
is not a rational agent, neither are Alzheimer‘s patients nor the comatose, and society is 
extremely reluctant to strip these humans of personhood.  Another criterion often used to 
designate a moral agent is sentience.  Scientists continue to research the point at which 
the fetus is able to feel pain or is sentient.  Current estimates range from as early as six 
weeks to twenty-six weeks.
323
  Using the conservative estimate of six weeks, the fetus 
could have moral standing at about the time a woman is discovering her pregnancy.  This 
chapter will demonstrate that using criteria such as rationality and sentience to distinguish 
humans from persons is problematic at best. 
Fetal personhood also demonstrates the dichotomy of the person versus property.  
Some scholars argue that a person has a property right to his or her own body.  Is the 
fetus living within the woman‘s body a part of her body?  If so, the idea that a woman 
―owns‖ her fetus and then her subsequent child is fraught with potential moral issues 
involved with one person owning another.  The concept echoes the discussion of slavery.  
On the other hand, if a woman has a property right over her body, she has the right to 
make decisions concerning her body.  As part of her body, this property right would seem 
to include the right to evict the fetus living within her body.  Conversely, if the fetus is 
seen as a separate entity, then the fetus too has a property right to his or her body which 
the woman cannot violate.  While the woman may be able to evict the fetus, she does not 
necessarily have the right to terminate the fetus‘s life.  The state may have the obligation 
to step in and try to save the life of the fetus born prematurely.  Right now, technology 
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has not advanced to the point at which the fetus is able to live outside the womb at a 
young age.  However, there may soon become a time when artificial wombs can sustain a 
fetus at young ages of gestation.  As can be seen, the moral issues involved with 
personhood and property are brought to the fore with the discussion of the fetus.   
 These moral issues set the stage for examining important court decisions 
concerning the fetus in which these personhood issues must be adjudicated.  The 
discussion of abortion related cases encompasses a large portion of the chapter because 
the abortion debate has come to monopolize much of the modern discussion of fetal 
personhood, and the relevant literature is vast.  While abortion is the most obvious issue 
caught up in fetal personhood, other legal issues are involved as well.  For instance, the 
law has long recognized that the fetus has rights to inherit given that it is subsequently 
born alive.  A more pressing issue is involved when a crime is committed against the 
mother and subsequently harms the fetus resulting in death or injury.  At least thirty-six 
states currently have fetal homicide laws and fifteen of these laws apply during early 
stages of development.  Some of these laws imply and others explicitly state that for the 
purpose of the statute, the fetus is a person.
324
  These criminal statutes raise the 
possibility that a mother who knowingly harms her fetus can be held liable for her 
actions.  Several cases have affirmed the fact that a fetus who is harmed in utero and is 
subsequently born alive can file a tort claim against the mother or other third party.  In 
other cases, the state has forced a mother to undergo medical procedures such as blood 
transfusions and caesarians in order to save the fetus.  This chapter will address these 
types of cases in light of the literature concerning personhood.  To begin such a complex 
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discussion, it is best to start with the foundation grounding Chapter One, and study what 
foundational scholars such as Aristotle, Locke, and Kant have to say on the subject before 
moving into more modern theorists whose scholarship examines the subject of the fetus 
directly.   
 
Theoretical Foundation 
 Abortion and the status of the fetus were not critical moral topics for early 
philosophers although there is evidence that the topic was discussed.  Evidence in ancient 
Greek society points to relatively liberal abortion policies as well as infanticide policies 
in an effort to control the population.  Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle 
believed that the fetus was formed and had life at approximately forty days for a male and 
ninety days for a female.  Plato acknowledged that the fetus was a living being, but did 
not believe the fetus had moral standing.
325
  Similarly, Aristotle advocated abortion for 
population control and to ensure that the fittest humans occupied Greece.  In The Politics, 
Aristotle wrote ―As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no 
deformed child shall live, … but when couples have children in excess, let abortion be 
procured before sense and life have begun.‖
326
  By cautioning that abortion should take 
place ―before sense and life have begun,‖ Aristotle presumably meant that abortion 
should take place before the forty day mark for males or the ninety day mark for females.  
While Aristotle had no moral qualms with abortion, he did believe that the fetus was 
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affected by the mother‘s actions ―just as growing plants are by the earth.‖
327
  Therefore, 
Aristotle thought that the state should take charge of the wellbeing of pregnant women to 
monitor their exercise, diet, and mental activities to ensure the wellbeing of the 
developing fetus so that the subsequent child was healthy.  It is reasonable to conclude 
that Aristotle would find that a crime is committed when third party causes injury to a 
fetus that affects a child or adult later in life.  
 Although Plato and Aristotle did not see abortion as morally wrong, not all Greek 
philosophers agreed.  Contrary evidence exists in the Hippocratic Oath which is believed 
to have been formulated in the Fourth Century B.C.E.  The Hippocratic Oath explicitly 
prohibits abortion: ―I will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise 
such a plan; and similarly I will not give a woman a pessary to cause an abortion.‖  As a 
foundational document of medical ethics, the explicit condemnation of abortion puts into 
question the widespread moral acceptability of abortion in ancient Greek societies.  
 The Roman Empire condoned abortion and infanticide in one of the earliest 
Roman codes of law, the Twelve Tablets, which allowed a father to order his wife to 
undergo an abortion if he had sufficient reason and allowed the father to kill a female or 
deformed infant through exposure.  Religious scholar Michael Gorman writes, ―That the 
fetus is not a person was fundamental to Roman law.  Even when born, the child was 
valued primarily not for itself, but for its usefulness to the father, the family, and 
especially the state, as a citizen ‗born for the state.‘‖
328
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 Other ancient societies provide an alternative to the predominantly liberal 
abortion regulations in ancient Greek and Roman societies.  In ancient Assyria, the most 
serious crime committed by women was abortion which was seen as an offense against 
the state because it was feared that innocent blood shed within a family would pollute the 
entire state and cause calamity.  The punishment for a woman convicted of abortion was 
death without burial.
329
  In contrast, the ancient Jewish tradition did not condemn 
abortion, but neither did it universally condone the practice.  In most early Jewish 
societies, deliberate abortion was relatively rare while accidental or therapeutic abortions 
were allowed in certain cases.  Although Jewish texts called the fetus ―human,‖ the fetus 
was not legally regarded as a person.  Instead, the fetus was regarded as part of the 
mother.
330
  The Jewish scholar Philo of Alexandria compared the unborn to a statue that 
an artist had not yet revealed, and he considered abortion to be murder.
331
  While early 
Jewish societies did not universally condone abortion, when the mother‘s life was at 
stake, the Jewish tradition clearly viewed the woman‘s life as primary.  The Mishnah, a 
code of ancient Jewish law, required abortion when the woman‘s life was in danger.
332
 
 Early Christian, and in particular, early Catholic doctrine has a complex history of 
abortion-related philosophy, but in general, abortion was not acceptable.  The Didache, 
an early Christian catechism, condemned abortion as did the ―Epistle of Pseudo 
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Barnabas,‖ and Athenagoras‘s ―Plea for Christians.‖
333
  Early saints Saint Basil the Great 
and Saint John Chrysostom both condemned abortion calling it murder.  The philosophy 
of Saint Augustine relied on the concept of ensoulment which is the point at which some 
Catholic theologians believed a soul animated the human body. Augustine held that this 
point was generally at forty days for males and ninety days for females. Therefore, he 
held that aborting an embryo prior to ensoulment should be punished by a fine, while 
abortion after ensoulment should be punished by death.
334
  Catholic theologian and 
philosopher Thomas Aquinas agreed with Augustine that abortion before ensoulment was 
morally wrong while abortion after ensoulment was homicide.   
 Thomas Aquinas‘s account provides an informative account of thoughts during 
the Middle Ages concerning the status of the fetus.  Writing from approximately 1244 to 
1274, Aquinas‘s treatises informed much of Catholic doctrine as well as influencing John 
Locke who studied classics at Christ Church College.  Aquinas maintained Aristotle‘s 
theory that a soul develops through various successions until the rational soul is infused 
at forty days for men and ninety days for women at which point Aquinas believed that the 
fetus had moral import.
335
  Before the time of ensoulment, destroying the fetus would be 
wrong in that it is contrary to nature but not homicidal.  Destroying a fetus after 
ensoulment would be killing a human being and would be murder.  Referring to Exodus 
21:22 which concerns causing a pregnant woman to miscarry, Aquinas wrote, ―He that 
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strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death 
either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, 
especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.‖
336
  Aquinas concludes 
that a fetus that has reached the point of ensoulment has moral worth and therefore killing 
the fetus, either with abortion or third-party injury, is a sin.
337
   
 It is difficult to discern what John Locke would have said about abortion because 
he did not address the subject.  After examining his treatises, there is evidence to support 
a theory that Locke would have supported abortion as well as evidence to suppose that 
Locke would have been against abortion.  Therefore, it is challenging to draw even 
tentative conclusions.  On the one hand, Locke believed that a person was a ―thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection.‖
338
  With this definition, a fetus would 
not qualify as a person, and so it is questionable if Locke would believe that the fetus had 
moral worth.  On the other hand, an infant would not qualify as a person either, and 
Locke does not indicate the humans who are not persons are beings that can be disposed.  
On the contrary, Locke devoted a considerable portion of his writing, in particular An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Some Thoughts on Education, to the 
education of children indicating that he did believe that children had moral value.  Thus, 
the evidence is inconclusive concerning Locke‘s moral considerations of the fetus.   
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 Locke‘s views on the body as private property seem to indicate that Locke would 
allow a woman to have control of her body which is rightfully her property.  With 
embryology at such a primitive state during the 1600s, it is likely that Locke would have 
viewed the fetus as part of a woman‘s body, at least before quickening.  If the fetus is 
considered a part of the woman‘s body, it seems that Locke would agree that a woman 
has the right to end a pregnancy and terminate a fetus.  On the other hand, Locke argues 
that persons cannot cause harm to themselves.  Although a person owns herself, Locke 
believes that a person is still ultimately God‘s property, and thus a person cannot cause 
harm or kill herself.  Locke cautions that a person is ―bound to preserve himself,‖ and if a 
fetus is part of the self, a woman would be bound to preserve the fetus as well.
339
  
Therefore, it is unclear if the woman‘s right to control her own body would take 
precedence or if Locke would consider abortion an unlawful harm to the self.  
 Locke does not believe that all of morality is tied up in rights.  He claims that 
there are some moral duties that obligate persons such as the duty Locke says parents 
have to care for their children.  The duty to sustain a fetus may fall within this type of 
moral duty.  Locke was a physician as well as a philosopher, and as such, would have 
taken the Hippocratic Oath which forbade performing abortion.
340
  Locke may have 
concluded that even though persons have rights to their own bodies, abortion was 
immoral and thus should not be performed.  All this is speculation because we do not 
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have Locke‘s own views on the fetus and thus must conjecture.  It seems Locke‘s theories 
could support both the prohibition and authorization of abortion. 
 Deciphering Kant‘s views on the fetus is much easier because he asserts in several 
of his writings that a fetus is a person with moral worth.  In The Metaphysical Principles 
of Virtue, Kant asserts that if a pregnant woman commits suicide, she takes the life of 
another person as well as her own.
341
  Further, in his discussion of the duties parents have 
towards their children, Kant specifically states that a child is a person from the moment 
of procreation.  His opinion is worth quoting at length.   
[C]hildren, as persons, have from procreation an original innate (not 
acquired) right to the care of their parents until they are able to look after 
themselves, and they have this right directly by law (lege), that is, without 
any special act being required to establish this right. For the offspring is a 
person, and it is impossible to form a concept of the production of a being 
endowed with freedom through a physical operation. So from a practical 
point of view it is a quite correct and even necessary idea to regard the act 
of procreation as one by which we have brought a person over into the 
world without his consent and on our own initiative, for which deed the 
parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his condition so 
far as they can.  They cannot destroy their child as if he were something 
they had made (since a being endowed with freedom cannot be such a 
thing) or as if he were their property, nor can they even just abandon him 
to chance, since they have brought not merely a worldly being but a 
citizen of the world into a condition which cannot now be indifferent to 




Thus, if the time of procreation is meant conception, Kant argues that the fetus is a 
person.  Even though Kant argues that persons are rational beings, he seems to make an 
exception for fetuses and children who are not yet in possession of the rational faculties 
but will develop them in the course of human growth.  He also directly states that a child 
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is not the property of the parents even though they created a child – this would seem to 
apply to the fetus as well since a fetus is created by the parents.   
 Even though Kant asserts that fetus is a person, there are still conflicts within 
Kant‘s theories of autonomy and self governance on one hand and the dignity and inner 
worth of human beings, including the fetus, on the other.
343
  If a human has autonomy 
over herself, then it seems that the law cannot force a woman to continue an unwanted 
pregnancy.  Kant argues that man must not be used as a means to an end.  Denying 
abortion reduces the woman to a fetal container and thus reduces her to a means for 
reproducing.  This devalues her worth as a person.  According to Kant‘s categorical 
imperative, people should act as though their actions could become a universal law.  It is 
unlikely that Kant would allow a universal law that would force all women into enduring 
pregnancies that interfere with their goals and well-being.   
 On the other hand, it is equally unlikely that Kant would allow completely open 
abortions as a universal law.  In asking whether or not society would like all women to 
have an abortion in the face of a difficult pregnancy, it is unlikely that most people would 
agree that abortion should be the rule.  Further, Kant believes in the dignity of all persons 
including the fetus which he argues must be preserved.  The evidence in Kant‘s writing 
indicates that Kant thought that the fetus had moral worth and therefore would not 
approve of abortion.    
 Locke‘s and Kant‘s groundwork on the subject of personhood inspired numerous 
scholars who study individual autonomy and the mental criteria of consciousness and 
rationality for personhood.  They also set the groundwork for scholars analyzing 
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personhood as the antithesis of property and what it means to say that a person can or 
cannot have a property right in his or her own body.  Locke‘s and Kant‘s foundational 
work in this field took on a new importance in modern scholarship as theorists began to 
contemplate the moral and legal ramifications of abortion.  Scholars revisited what 
distinguishes a person from a human being according to the mental capacities of 
autonomy, rationality, and culpability for one‘s actions.  A fetus does not have the 
capacity for rationality, autonomy, or culpability and therefore fails to qualify by these 
criteria.  However, the fetus, just as an infant, will develop these capabilities with time 
and thus is a potential person.  In contrast to mental criteria, some scholars argued that 
social recognition as a member of the community of persons is the key component for 
bestowing the status of personhood.  If a mother welcomes her pregnancy, she 
acknowledges that her fetus is a person, but if the pregnancy is not desired, the woman 
does not include the fetus in the category of persons.  Finally, abortion and modern issues 
of surrogacy and fetal tissue research caused scholars to revisit the distinction between 
person and property.  A woman is not property and thus should not be considered a 
means to an end for carrying a fetus.  However, can a woman claim a property right in 
her body and subsequently her fetus?  All of these issues are involved in the modern 
scholarship of fetal personhood and will be discussed thoroughly in turn.   
One of the lasting legacies of Locke and Kant was their emphasis on rational 
capacities as a defining characteristic of persons.  Locke‘s ―thinking, intelligent being‖ 
and Kant‘s emphasis on autonomy have led many modern philosophers to emphasize 
psychological criteria as the defining characteristics of persons.  Rational beings or 
entities who are capable of reason, reflection, and autonomy are generally considered to 
323 
 
be persons.  This is in contrast to a biological definition that relies on criteria such as 
human parentage or DNA evidence.  Undoubtedly, the fetus is biologically and 
genetically a human being from the point of conception with a unique genotype.
344
  
Further, the zygote or the fertilized egg is the first step in the biological process in which 
the zygote becomes a fetus, and then an infant, child, teenager, adult, and finally an elder.  
Just as certainly as the fetus is biologically human, the fetus is certainly alive.  Thus, 
there should be no question that the fetus is a live, human being.  However, as previous 
chapters illustrated, classifying an entity as a human being does not automatically 
guarantee personhood.   
According to Locke, Kant, and many modern philosophers whose theories will be 
examined in following section, personhood is not a biological category; rather it is a 
bestowed status given to entities that possess certain mental capacities.  While granting 
that the fetus is biologically a human being is a significant status above that of an 
individual organism, it does not automatically imply personhood.  Amidst the passion of 
abortion debates, this important distinction is often obscured when the terminology used 
is ―human life‖ as it is in the Roe opinion.  Biologically, the fetus is a ―human life.‖  
However, if ―human life‖ is employed to connote a being who has the intellectual ability 
to reason and reflect, then the fetus as a ―human life‖ is in question.
345
  Thus, although 
the fetus is a member of the human species and a human being, the significant question is 
whether the fetus deserves membership in the community of persons.  In contrast, most 
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adult women do have rational abilities allowing them to evaluate their actions, make 
reasoned decisions, and act with autonomy.  It can be argued that the sine qua non of 
personhood is autonomy and the freedom to choose one‘s own destiny.  Thus, some 
theorists argue that abortion prohibitions strip a woman of her freedom and autonomy 
and therefore devalue her as a person.  When reflecting on psychological criteria for 
personhood, both the capacities of the fetus and the woman must be examined.  Because 
the personhood of the woman is more firmly established than that of a fetus, it is a logical 
place to begin. 
 
A Woman’s Autonomy as a Person 
As a recognized moral and legal person, a woman has rights of privacy, 
autonomy, and bodily integrity.  For many women, reproductive rights are absolutely 
essential for their own moral personhood.  As a self-possessive individual, the woman 
must have the autonomy to make decisions concerning her own body.  Kantian ethicist 
Jeffrey Reiman argues that privacy is a precondition of personhood.  ―Privacy is a social 
ritual by means of which an individual‘s moral title to his existence is formed….To be a 
person, an individual must recognize not just his actual capacity to shape his destiny by 
his choices.  He must also recognize that he has an exclusive moral right to shape his 
destiny.‖
346
  Thus, under Reiman‘s conception of personhood, a woman must have the 
ability to shape her destiny which includes the right to terminate a pregnancy.   
Much of the passion on the pro-abortion side of the debate stems from this 
determination to defend the bodily integrity and self determination of women.  The body 
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is the fabric of personhood and to take away a woman‘s right to make decisions about her 
body is a violation of her personhood.  Using Kant‘s moral philosophy, a woman cannot 
be used as a means for an entity that is not clearly deserving of protection.  The use of the 
term ―fetal container‖ has become a popular way to protest using women as a means for 
reproduction.  In fact, a compelling argument can be made that forcing a woman to carry 
a fetus to term is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery and 
involuntary service.  It the woman does not want the pregnancy, forcing her to do so 
could be seen as a type of coerced labor.  A pregnancy entails hardship on the woman‘s 
body and a great deal of pain.  For those who fervently believe in abortion rights, a forced 
pregnancy is a form of servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
347
  
Those who support abortion rights argue that a woman is not required to be a 
Good Samaritan by allowing the fetus unfettered use of her body for nine months.  While 
it may be morally commendable for a woman to carry a fetus to term, the fetus does not 
have a right to a woman‘s body.  In order to understand this argument more clearly, it is 
helpful to compare the conditions of pregnancy to those of organ donations.  Since the 
courts do not require people (male or female) to provide organs or even blood to those 
who may need them to live, women cannot be asked to donate their bodies as the organ to 
carry fetuses to term.  A Pennsylvania case, McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 
(1978), illustrates the issue.  Robert McFall was suffering from bone cancer and his 
cousin, David Shimp, was a match for a bone marrow transplant that could save his life.  
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However, Shimp refused to donate his marrow.  When McFall sought a court order to 
compel the donation, the judge ruled that although he found Shimp‘s action ―morally 
indefensible,‖ he could not compel Shimp to comply.  The court found that, except for 
very limited circumstances, a person should not be forced to undergo medical procedures 
for the benefit of another.  Similarly, although some may think it morally indefensible for 
a woman to deny her body to her fetus, the law is limited in its power to compel a woman 
to serve as a life support.  For instance, a developing fetus depends upon the woman‘s 
blood and circulatory system.  Yet, the law does not require a parent to give a blood 
transfusion to a born child.  The law cannot force a woman to donate her body to the 
fetus.  In short, the law cannot mandate that women be Good Samaritans.   
However, some scholars mount significant challenges to this line of reasoning.  
Biomedical ethicist Baruch Brody admits that a person does not have an obligation to be 
a Good Samaritan, but he disagrees that a prohibition of abortion forces a woman to be a 
Good Samaritan or that it reduces a woman to a means to an end.  He concedes that 
person X does not have a duty to save person Y‘s life through use of X‘s body, financial 
assets, home, and so forth.  A right to life does not guarantee the use of another person‘s 
body.  However, person X is not relieved of his duty not to take person Y‘s life or in 
other words, X does not have the right kill Y.  Similarly, a fetus conceived in a laboratory 
will die unless implanted in a woman‘s body, but that fetus has no right to any woman‘s 
body.  However, the woman who is pregnant does not have the right to take away the 
fetus‘s life because to regain her body, she must kill the fetus.  The duty not to save a life 
327 
 
is not the same as the duty not to take a life.  If the only way a woman can take back the 
use of her body is to kill the fetus, then she does not prima facie possess this right. 
348
 
At the heart of the matter is the problem of conflicting rights between the 
pregnant woman and the fetus.  A proposed resolution to this dilemma is that the woman, 
as a rational agent and a fully recognized person, has rights that supersede those of the 
fetus whose rights are questionable.  In other words, a potential person‘s rights may not 
supersede those of an acknowledged person.  Even if the fetus were granted personhood, 
there would still be a conflict between the person of the fetus and the person of the 
woman.  Both have strong claims and it is by no means a given that the fetus‘s right to 
life would supersede the woman‘s right of bodily integrity.   
This resolution is not satisfactory for theorists who argue that a fetus is a person.  
If the fetus is a person, then abortion effectively kills a person.  A pregnant woman does 
not have to raise a child after she gives birth – she can give the child up for adoption and 
continue to pursue her goals.  Thus, abortion opponents argue that the nine months of 
inconvenience a woman faces during a pregnancy before she can deliver and give the 
baby up for adoption do not outweigh the harm that is caused by an abortion that 
effectively kills a person.  Life and death outweigh the suffering of pregnancy.  This line 
of reasoning hinges on the assertion that a fetus is a person.  This is an assertion that must 
be carefully examined.  Using psychological criteria of rationality and autonomy, we can 
consider whether or not a fetus qualifies as a person.   
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Psychological Criteria for Personhood 
In order to systematically analyze whether a fetus should qualify for personhood 
using psychological criteria, it is useful to return to Daniel Dennett‘s six conditions of 
personhood as discussed in Chapter One.  Dennett bases his conditions on his 
understanding of Locke‘s ―thinking, intelligent being with reason and reflection.‖  
Although the details of Dennett‘s criteria are debatable, they provide a solid starting point 
for analyzing personhood and have been employed by many scholars who study issues of 
personhood.
349
  If a fetus can qualify as a person under all six conditions, there is a very 
strong case to be made that a fetus is indeed a person.  Recall Dennett‘s six conditions of 
personhood:  
1) Persons are rational beings.  
2) Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or 
to which psychological or mental or intentional predicates are ascribed. 
3) Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an 
attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it.   
4) The object of this personal stance is capable of reciprocating and 
having second order volitions. 
5) Capable of verbal communication. 
6) They are self-conscious.350 
 
Excluding criterion three, the fetus does not meet the criteria for personhood.  (I will 
discuss the significance of criterion three a bit later.)  A fetus is not rational in that it has 
the capacity to process complex thoughts and desires.  Nor is a fetus intentional in that it 
has beliefs and desires and is able to act to reach those goals.  A fetus cannot meet the 
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criteria for condition four which is the ability to reciprocate when other persons act 
intentionally towards you, nor can a fetus reflect upon goals and evaluate the morality of 
certain actions before choosing to act.  According to condition six, a fetus must be self-
conscious of his goals and actions; a fetus is able to react to stimuli and eats and sleeps to 
fulfill bodily requirements but is not able to set life plans and intentions.  Finally, a fetus 
is not capable of verbal communication and therefore fails condition five.  Dennett argues 
that infants as well as fetuses do not meet these criteria.  He also excludes the insane and 
mentally handicapped.
351
  Dennett‘s conditions of rationality and consciousness along 
with the mental capabilities to reciprocate and communicate verbally have been lauded 
by many scholars as the necessary bundle of capabilities needed for a being to be 
considered a person.  Legal scholar Ronald Dworkin provides one of the best known 
arguments for personhood based on mental capabilities.   
Dworkin, who subscribes to his own version of natural law theory, argues that a 
fetus cannot have interests of its own from the moment of conception because without 
mental capacities, there are simply no thoughts or interests to be had.  Therefore, the fetus 
cannot have an interest to stay alive.  Dworkin finds that most people agree with him that 
an immature fetus without any brain functioning cannot have an interest in survival.  
Instead, he finds that most people object to abortion because they believe that life in and 
of itself has an intrinsic or sacred value.  Thus, just like a priceless work of art should not 
be destroyed whimsically, abortion should not be used with caprice.  Similarly, most 
people agree that endangered species, whose lives are valuable based upon their rarity, 
should not be slaughtered with caprice.  A work of art or an endangered non-human 
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animal has no interests of its own and thus it is not a harm to it to be destroyed.  
Similarly, a fetus lacking a developed brain has no interests of its own and thus abortion 
is not a harm to the fetus itself.  Dworkin contends that people who believe in the 
intrinsic value of human life at all stages must not impose their views on all of society, 
and thus Dworkin argues that abortion, at least until the age of development where the 
fetus gains the mental capacity to feel pain, must remain legal.
352
  Dworkin finds that 
twenty-six weeks is a compelling threshold because this is the biological point at which 
the fetus is able to feel pain.  Since twenty-six weeks roughly coincides with the age of 
viability, Dworkin agrees with Roe‟s judgment.
353
  Dworkin‘s threshold is the ability of 
the brain to register pain, and therefore he does not adhere to Dennett‘s more rigid criteria 
that would seemingly exclude fetuses as well as young children.  However, some scholars 
such as Michael Tooley would agree that both fetuses and infants can be excluded from 
personhood based on psychological criteria.  
 Epistemologist Michael Tooley argues that newborns are not persons because 
they lack higher mental capacities for rational thought, deliberation, and self-
consciousness.  After examining neurophysiological and bioelectrical evidence, he 
concludes that the earliest age an infant could be considered a person is approximately 
three months.  Thus, Tooley concludes that infanticide of newborns under the age of three 
months, just like abortion, is not morally wrong.
354
  He states that as an infant develops, 
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―their destruction becomes more and more seriously wrong, until eventually, it is 
comparable in seriousness to the destruction of a normal adult human being.‖
355
 
 Tooley‘s argument is very controversial and ignited outrage within the general 
public and the academic community.  However, if the criteria for personhood were based 
solely on Dennett‘s conditions, Tooley is not wrong.  Tooley‘s argument sparked 
controversy because modern society accepts birth as the event that marks the beginning 
of acceptance in the community of persons.  Other societies, such as early Inuit 




 If mental capacities are the standard for bestowing personhood, then perhaps 
humans up to age three months are ―potential persons‖ and adults with Alzheimer‘s or the 
comatose who have lost their mental abilities are ―former persons.‖  Robert Larmer, who 
studies ethics and the philosophy of the mind, invites scholars to participate in a thought 
experiment in order to analyze the personhood of the comatose in comparison to the 
fetus.  Imagine that a person is in a serious accident and goes into a coma as a result of 
her injuries.  Her doctors determine that she will heal, but she will be in a coma for nine 
months after which time she will become conscious.  Unfortunately, when she awakes, 
she will have complete amnesia with no knowledge of her past plans.  In fact, the 
amnesia will be so complete that she will need to develop motor skills and learn how to 
use a language.  In essence, she will be like a newborn.  Her next of kin, who is also her 
power of attorney, requests that she be taken off all life support and not be allowed to 
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regain consciousness.  Does her next of kin have this right or does society have an 
obligation to protect the life of this patient?  Larmer argues that her life must be protected 
not because she previously had consciousness and rationality but simply because she has 
the potential to become conscious.  He further argues that a fetus, no less than the 
comatose patient, has the potential for consciousness and rationality and thus is deserving 
of protection.
357
   
 Although the fetus does not meet the requirements as formulated by Dennett, the 
fetus (as well as infants and children) will develop these capacities with time.  Thus, the 
fetus is a ―potential person‖ or as the Roe Court said, a ―potential life.‖  The issue of 
potentiality raises the subject of psychological continuity.  If I am a person now, and at 
one point I was a fetus, and the person I am now is psychologically identical to the fetus, 
then it appears that there is an inconsistency in saying that the fetus is not a person.
358
 
However, this apparent inconsistency is resolved to some extent by recalling that 
personhood is a bestowed status and that this status can be granted and taken away.  A 
human being may not be granted personhood until he or she reaches a certain mental 
maturity and similarly, if mental capacities are lost, personhood may be taken away.  
Although the fetus is psychologically identical to the adult person, the fetus has not yet 
received the designation of person.  Although this reconciles problems of psychological 
continuity, this line of reasoning does not explain the significance of viability as the 
compelling point signifying that the fetus now is a ―potential life.‖  
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Viability signifies that the fetus has the capacity to survive outside of the womb.  
However, the fetus acquires other potentialities much earlier.  At conception, the zygote 
has the potential for life in that it will develop into a human being through the normal 
course of growth.  A six-week-old fetus has all its major organs.  At eight weeks, the 
fetus has brain activity.  For some scholars who rely heavily on cognitive abilities as the 
criterion for personhood, this eight week point is a significant milestone because the 
brain, although not able to process rational thoughts, is beginning to function and has the 
capacity to develop until all rational faculties are present.  Another critical milestone is 
sentience which, as mentioned earlier, is between six and twenty-six weeks.  Historically, 
quickening, or the age at which the mother first feels the fetus move, has been an 
important milestone.  Although the fetus is able to move long before the mother feels it, 
at quickening the mother receives a dramatic signal that her fetus can move on its own 
and therefore is a being in its own right.  Quickening generally occurs around eighteen 
weeks.  Finally, for scholars who argue that a person is a rational, communicative, self-
conscious agent, the fetus does not reach any compelling points while in the womb, and 
in fact, does not reach rational agency until several years into childhood.   
This discussion demonstrates that there are several significant developmental 
points that can be taken into consideration.  If bodily continuity is part of the criteria, then 
logically, one cannot go back further than conception as the starting point of a person. 
Neither the sperm nor the egg on its own can be a human being, but once fertilization 
occurs the new organism immediately begins to grow and develop – it has potentiality.  
Thus, the conservative argument that life begins at conception makes logical sense.  Does 
this also mean that personhood begins at conception?  After all, the Declaration of 
334 
 
Independence begins with the phrase, ―all men are created equal‖ implying that 
personhood begins with creation.  On the other hand, there is a danger of over inferring 
backwards and employing a slippery slope argument.  As it is often said, an acorn is not 





Community Based Criteria for Personhood 
Thus far, the personhood of the fetus has been considered from the point of view 
of developmental capacities and has been based primarily on the entity‘s capacity for 
rational thought.  However, rational capacity is not the only way to evaluate personhood.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, an alternative to personhood based on rational 
capacity is to bestow personhood according to those individuals who are socially 
recognized as part of the community of persons.  
A fundamental critique of personhood based on mental capacity is that it is guilty 
of discrimination based on mental characteristics.  Epistemologist Jay Rosenberg is one 
such philosopher who argues that personhood based simply on rationality is too 
exclusive.  He argues that newborns, the comatose, and the brain-damaged should still be 
considered persons even though they do not have rational capacities because they have a 
―special relationship‖ to rational beings.  Infants are potentially rational beings while the 
brain-damaged and comatose are formerly rational beings.  More importantly, in his 
view, these individuals are the offspring of rational persons.  Thus, Rosenberg returns to 
a biological basis for personhood.  He further argues that functional capacities are a 
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matter of degree – humans possess varying levels of intelligence, various competencies, 
and abilities to communicate – thus choosing a qualifying point on this continuum and 
withholding rights based on this qualifying point is morally arbitrary.  From this line of 
reasoning, it can easily be concluded that the fetus of at least eight weeks who has a 
heartbeat and brain functioning qualifies as a person.  Otherwise, those who bestow the 
status of personhood are discriminating based upon mental capacity.   
Quickening is a sign of social recognition on the part of the mother, and if the 
woman allows it, others who can feel the baby moving within her.  By placing her hand 
on her stomach, a woman often marvels at the movement within her.  Advancing medical 
technology allows the woman, doctors, and others in the examination room to view the 
fetus at even earlier stages.  Using internal ultrasounds and three-dimensional technology, 
a fetus can be viewed throughout all of the pregnancy.  Even the first cells of the embryo 
are visible within two to three weeks after conception.  By twenty weeks, an 
amniocentesis can reveal the gender of a fetus, and the fetus takes on the identity of ―he‖ 
or ―she‖ rather than an ―it.‖  Some parents even name the fetus when they discover the 
gender.  The rite of naming is a powerful sign of personhood.
360
   
Sociologist Nicole Isaacson did a quantitative analysis of the text of Williams 
Obstetrics which is a leading obstetrics text for gynecologists and obstetricians.  Her 
analysis of the changes in text from 1960 into the 1990s revealed that as technology 
advanced to better examine the fetus in utero, the fetus was increasingly differentiated as 
a separate patient from the woman who carried it.  Further, the fetus in utero and the baby 
ex utero were blurred into the single category of ―infant‖ or –―fetus-infant.‖  She argues 
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that the medical community is increasingly personifying the fetus as technology allows 
earlier viewing and medical treatment of the fetus.
361
   
According to political scientist Robert Blank, advanced technology has increased 
a fetus‘s social recognition as an individual entity and as a person before birth.
362
  This 
appears to be very true in the case of baby Olivia Maize who was born in 1994.  When 
Olivia‘s mother, Sherrie Maize, was five months pregnant, she discovered that her fetus 
had a profound heart defect requiring a transplant immediately upon birth.  The chances 
of finding a donor were remote, and the fetus had a slim chance of survival.  Sherrie and 
her husband Lonnie decided to start searching for a donor immediately and to enjoy every 
moment they had with their baby – even while she was in utero.  They named their fetus 
Olivia, talked to her, and bought her clothing.  Even the community of Murphy, North 
Carolina welcomed Olivia by speaking to Sherrie‘s stomach, sending music to be played 
in utero, and sending gifts.  According to social recognition standards, Olivia was a 
person long before she was born.  Sadly, Olivia rejected her transplant and died a few 
months after birth, but according to her parents, she had been a person much longer.
363
   
Although advanced technology allows social recognition of a fetus in some cases, 
birth remains the most significant and celebrated event in terms of social standing.  
Libertarian theorist Loren Lomasky argues before birth, the fetus primarily exists in 
anonymity rather than as a unique individual within the community of persons.  He 
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argues, ―Birth is the transition of anonymity to public standing.‖
364
  He contends that the 
only person with whom the fetus can form social relationships is the mother whose body 
responds to the pregnancy and who can feel the movements of the fetus.  He concludes 
that permissive abortion policies are based on the unique relationship between mother 
and fetus with the final discretion regarding abortion residing in the mother who has a 
relationship with the fetus. 
Marjorie Reiley Maguire, who is a scholar of religion as well as holding a J.D., 
agrees with Lomasky‘s conclusions concerning permissive abortion policies.  She argues, 
―What makes a being a person is membership in the human community. The touchstone 
of personhood is sociality.  It is not our brain capacity, or the proper number of 
chromosomes, but our personal relatedness to others that makes us a person.‖
365
  Children 
as well as the mentally impaired have a certain publicity and are part of a network of 
social relations.  However, Maguire argues that the fetus is socially recognized and hence 
part of the community of persons only if the mother recognizes it as such.  She contends 
that a woman who willingly and happily consents to continuing a pregnancy marks the 
beginnings of her fetus‘s personhood.  A woman who does not consent to a pregnancy 
and desires an abortion has not recognized her fetus as a socially constructed person.  
Thus, this fetus is not ascribed personhood.  Maguire asserts that if society grants 
personhood to a fetus when the woman does not recognize it, society then denies the 
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Lynn Morgan, an anthropologist specializing in feminist studies, contends that 
personhood is not a natural category, but instead is socially constructed by the society 
that recognizes certain individuals as persons.  Morgan‘s international ethnographical 
study revealed that there were no universal criteria nor a universal consensus on what 
constitutes a person.  For example, she found that in the 1950s a death of a newborn in 
Korea would not receive much more attention than the death of an animal because that 
culture did not recognize newborns as people.  Similarly, until the turn of the Twentieth 
Century, Inuit communities practiced female infanticide when food resources were scarce 
and therefore, newborns were not fully recognized into the community of persons.  
American society tends to recognize persons at biological birth, yet this is not a guarantee 
of personhood as scholars such as Tooley points out.
367
  
Personhood based on social recognition helps explain criminal statutes for third 
party homicide.  When an acknowledged and wanted fetus is killed by a third party, the 
mother (and father) feels a tremendous loss for her fetus and this loss must be 
compensated by punishing the perpetrator.  The law compensates parents for their loss.  
This differs from a mother who voluntarily ends the life of her own fetus because the 
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mother who undergoes an abortion has not bestowed personhood on her fetus and thus 
the fetus‘s death via abortion is not the death of a person.   
A dilemma associated with the argument that personhood is a socially bestowed 
status involves the mother as the sole moral judge able to bestow or withhold the status of 
person for the fetus.  Should the mother, even though it is her body in which the fetus 
resides, have sole determination in this important matter?  The Roe decision appears to 
say that until the point of viability, the woman is the sole arbitrator.  However, history 
has shown that many injustices have been committed by exclusionary measures that 
exiled certain human beings from the status of person.  Recalling the earlier discussion of 
slavery, we find that many masters and supporters of slavery argued that slavery was not 
unjust because slaves had no rights – they were not members of the ―We the People‖ of 
the Constitution.  Slaves were considered human animals on a par with livestock and 
other property.  At that time, slavery was socially acceptable because slaves were simply 
not members of the community of persons.  Slaves received their personhood from their 
masters.  Similarly, the Nazi regime believed that Aryans were the only true persons and 
thus atrocities against Jews, Slavs, and other individuals were not crimes against 
humanity.  Clearly, women who cannot cope with a pregnancy and seek an abortion are 
not on a par with Nazis or slaveholders.  However, allowing one sector of the population 
the sole responsibility for determining the community of persons is a tenuous proposition.  
Such exclusion could lead to euthanizing infants born with disabilities or even 
euthanizing certain genders, a practice that is not discouraged in China.  History teaches 
that caution must always be employed when deciding who is included and excluded in 
the community of persons.  As meta-ethicist Roger Wertheimer cautions, ―Men of good 
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will have often failed to recognize that a certain class of fellow creatures were really 
human beings just like themselves.‖
368
  
Thought experiments conducted by Wertheimer reveal that people often think 
differently about the fetus when asked to imagine unusual social circumstances.  
Wertheimer asked his subjects to imagine that the womb of the mother was transparent so 
that if the mother wore mid-drift bearing clothing, the development of the fetus would be 
in full view.  He also asked them to imagine that science had advanced so that a fetus 
could be taken out of the uterus, observed, fondled, and then put back in the mother.  
These thought experiments alter the social dimensions of the fetus and, through public 
exposure, bring the fetus much closer to the relationships within the human community.  
While Wertheimer does not argue that these thought experiments justify a person‘s 
opinions concerning the status of the fetus, they do often move his subjects to see the 
object from a different angle.
369
   
In fact, some medical doctors who specialize in prenatal care and are intimately 
familiar with the development of the fetus view the fetus as their patient and as part of the 
community of persons.  For instance, Sir Albert Liley, a pediatric neurophysiologist who 
perfected the technique to transfuse blood from the mother to the fetus, was dedicated to 
viewing the fetus as both a person and a patient.  In a 1972 article on fetal personality 
Liley wrote,  
We may not all live to grow old but we were each once a fetus ourselves.  
As such we had some engaging qualities which unfortunately we lost as 
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we grew older.  We were physically and physiologically robust.  We were 
supple and not obese.  Our most depraved vice was thumb sucking, and 
the worst consequence of drinking liquor was hiccups not alcoholism. … 
Is it too much to ask therefore that perhaps we should accord also to fetal 
personality and behavior, rudimentary as they may appear by adult 




Liley‘s work offers an alternative to the argument that only the mother can grant 
personhood to the fetus.  As a physician who was intimately familiar with the fetus, Liley 
felt strongly that this entity should be granted access to the community of persons.  
 Medical technological advances in internal ultrasound are allowing a woman (and 
whomever else accompanies the woman into the exam room) to view the fetus at all 
stages of pregnancy.  An internal ultrasound can be performed throughout pregnancy and 
allows a woman and her doctors to monitor the development of the fetus.  These 
technologies strengthen the emotional bonds between the woman and fetus and also 
further the social recognition of the fetus as a person.  The woman also receives 
photographs of the developing fetus that she can show to others further strengthening the 
communal acceptance of the fetus.  
Using community based criteria for personhood makes sense when considering 
the practical implications for the fetus.  It allows us to speak of a fetus as a person and a 
patient when the mother wants the fetus and is undergoing medical treatment to save the 
fetus‘s life.  It also explains why society is horrified for a fetus as well as the woman 
when a pregnant woman is battered and miscarries, and why society demands criminal 
punishment for many instances of ―fetuscide.‖  On the other hand, it explains why most 
people do not feel that criminal punishment is appropriate for a woman who aborts her 
fetus.  A woman who does not desire her pregnancy has not accepted her fetus into the 
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community of persons and therefore, society does not have protective measures for the 
unwanted fetus.   
 
The Fetus and Property Concerns  
 Thus far, the analysis has considered the rational and social acceptability criteria 
that distinguish a human being from a person.  As has been demonstrated, there is a sharp 
divide between those who believe that a fetus is simply a biological human being but not 
person and those who argue that the fetus meets certain criteria that allow a fetus to be 
considered a moral and legal person.  Just as the issue of the fetus invokes the human 
being versus person debate, it also requires an examination of property issues.  Locke 
argues that persons have a property right to their own bodies.  Thus, a woman can 
exercise her rights in respect to her body and expel an unwanted fetus.  This argument 
can be taken even further to argue that as a part of her body, a fetus is a woman‘s 
property.  Conversely, considering a human body to be simply property raises the issue 
discussed earlier of whether a human body can be simply used as a means to an end.  Is 
the human body sacred and beyond commodification?  If the body is property, perhaps 
someone could rent a woman‘s body such as in the case of surrogacy.  A surrogate 
mother is in many ways a ―fetal container,‖ albeit a willing container.  These concerns 
require an examination of the property aspects involved in a discussion of fetal 
personhood.   
 The concept of the body as property illustrates the conflict between a woman and 
a fetus in respect to abortion.  It seems that both a woman and a fetus cannot both be 
possessive individuals.  If the woman is a possessive individual, the fetus becomes her 
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property.  If the fetus is the possessive individual, the woman is the housing for the fetus.  
Although Locke argues that a person has a property right in his or her own body, a 
property right in one‘s own body does not give a woman the right to kill someone found 
on her property; in fact the law generally holds that a person is liable for injury to others 
while on his or her property.  However, if the woman cannot control her body, her 
autonomy as a person is diminished.   
The idea that the body could be commodified is fraught with moral peril 
according to property law scholar Margaret Radin.  Radin studies the inextricable links 
between property and personhood and worries that over commodifying certain things, 
such as body parts, causes harm to human dignity and allows for economic exploitation.  
She argues that some goods, such as the body, are market-inalienable – i.e. are not to be 
bought and sold on the market.  She fears that people who are destitute will be forced to 
sell their bodies or body parts in order to survive when they otherwise would not choose 
to do so.  This leads Radin to question the wisdom of surrogacy.  She contends that 
parent-child relationships are closely connected with the personal identity of 
personhood.
371
  She does not condone the concept of baby selling because she argues that 
―conceiving of any child in market rhetoric wrongs personhood‖ because it commodifies 
a personal attribute and fosters an inferior conception of human flourishing.
372
  She finds 
the issue of surrogacy more difficult to adjudicate.   
 If a surrogate mother is paid for selling her gestational services, her womb can be 
considered her property and therefore alienable.  This does not assume that the fetus/baby 
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is also her property – the baby cannot be objectified as property and sold to the 
prospective parents who are paying for the gestational services.  However, Radin cautions 
that surrogacy could lead down a slippery slope to thinking of a child as property.  It 
could also lead to further commodification of women who would be valued for their 
genetic traits such as height, race, and intelligence by prospective parents who seek a 
specific genetic history for their child.  Radin sees additional potential problems with 
surrogacy in that it may be destitute women who unwillingly resort to surrogacy and 
further, commodifying the womb could lead reinforcing oppressive gender roles that 
portray women as breeders.  She concludes that surrogacy cannot be prohibited but 
appeals to her Aristotelian conception of human flourishing to encourage society to limit 
the scope of commodification.
373
  
Political philosopher Richard Arneson finds Radin‘s scholarship compelling but 
finds some fault with her theories of personhood which ultimately compel Arneson to 
argue that surrogacy should be permitted.  Arneson argues that the counterposition to 
Radin‘s view that commodification reduces personhood is to acknowledge that the 
market is a mechanism for humans to form their values and preferences and thus the 
market enhances individuality and personhood.
374
  Further, he argues that there are 
distinct benefits of surrogacy that outweighs the costs.  Infertile and homosexual couples 
who are not able to have children have an opportunity with surrogacy.  Although there 
are objections that surrogacy implies a property in personhood, Arneson finds that 
surrogacy does not assume an ownership in the born child.  Against objections that 
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surrogacy degrades women by turning the womb into a piece of property, Arneson argues 
that surrogacy cannot be seen as degrading when a woman altruistically agrees to be a 
surrogate for a couple who cannot conceive.  Finally, although it is unfortunate that 
indigent women may reluctantly become surrogates in order to make money, Arneson 
argues that the remedy for this problem is not to further restrict the options of poor 
women.  He contends that no matter how restricted a person‘s options are, to narrow the 
range of option even further is unacceptable.  After evaluating these objections and many 
other benefits and costs of surrogacy, Arneson concludes that from a Utilitarian 
perspective, the benefits outweigh the costs and thus surrogacy should be permitted.
375
   
 On the other side of the spectrum from Radin is judicial behaviorist and judge for 
the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Richard Posner whose radical pragmatism has 
led him to advocate a free market for buying and selling babies should replace regulated 
adoptions.  He concedes that allowing a market for babies would lead to baby breeding as 
the market created incentives for a good ―product‖ with desirable genes.  However, he 
argues that the benefits would outweigh these problems.  Posner and his colleague 
Landes contend that adoption agencies have created a shortage of Caucasian children for 
adoption and adults who want a child have resorted to a black market to buy children.  
Further, there is an oversupply of African American children in welfare facilities due to 
the state removing children from homes where the parents cannot adequately care for 
them.  The reason for this problem, according to Posner, is that the market is not 
operating efficiently because adoption agencies are not charging a market clearing price 
for their services.  He argues that if adoption regulations were relaxed and prospective 
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parents were allowed to bid on children for adoption and pay a market price, the market 
would return to equilibrium and both the shortage and oversupply of adoptive children 
would decline.  Posner rebuffs what he calls ―symbolic‖ objections to his proposal that 
persons should not be commodified.  He argues that there should be a property right in 
children because it would encourage foster parents to take good care of their 
investment.
376
  To be sure, Posner and Landes present a radically capitalistic view of 
personhood and property.  However, their claims are not as outlandish as may initially 
seem when considering that there are active legitimate markets and black markets for 
human body parts including fetal tissue.   
 The question of whether or not the fetus is the woman‘s property and can be sold 
is highly relevant for medical research where fetal tissue is in high demand for its 
research and therapeutic value.  Fetal tissue has extraordinary potential for growth, can 
differentiate, and is less likely to be rejected by a transplant recipient than adult tissue.  
Currently, scientists are focusing on the potential of fetal tissue to assist Parkinson‘s and 
diabetes patients, but the list of diseases that could benefit from fetal research is 
extensive.  If the woman has an alienable property interest in her fetal tissue, she may be 
persuaded to abort her fetus for financial compensation from medical research 
companies.  The Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990) 
decision, mentioned in Chapter One which concerned property rights in body parts used 
for commercial research, is broad enough to cover fetal tissue.
377
  The California 
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Supreme Court ruled in Moore that a person does not have a property right in his own 
tissue.  However, in other cases, a person does have a property right to bodily parts such 
as plasma, sperm, or hair which can be sold for profit.  Therefore, the issue is not 
completely settled, and there is room for future cases to litigate whether a woman can sell 
the tissue from an aborted fetus.  Allowing a woman to profit from research on her fetus 
introduces a whole bevy of problems in that commodification can undermine the human 
dignity of both the woman and the fetus.
378
 
 However, if the woman decides carry her fetus to term, does she then have the 
responsibility to treat her fetus as a socially recognized person rather than a piece of her 
bodily property?  From the previous discussion, it is implied that once the decision to 
carry to term is made, the woman has recognized her fetus and thus there is a state 
interest in ensuring the health of that fetus.  A growing recognition that the fetus is not 
the property of the woman has led to the recent legal phenomenon of successful tort cases 
brought by individuals who were harmed by their mother in utero.  A New Jersey statute 
allows the Bureau of Children‘s Services to intervene on behalf of an unborn child who is 
not receiving proper care.  The problem is that in order for Children‘s Services to take the 
fetus into custody, the mother must be taken into custody as well.  Several courts have 
allowed the state to mandate a caesarian surgery in order to preserve the life of the fetus 
even though this violates the mother‘s rights of autonomy.
379
  Medical professionals who 
view the fetus as a patient rather than simply a body part of the mother endorse the 
                                                 
378
 For a full explanation of this argument, please see Margaret Jane Radin, ―Property and Personhood‖ 
Stanford Law Review, 34 no. 5, (1982).  
 




personhood of the fetus.
380
  Cases concerning the selling of fetal tissue and tort cases 
against the mother are further judicial quandaries in the making.    
 Considering a fetus as simply another body part of the woman oversimplifies the 
issue.  As feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon writes,  
In my opinion and in the experience of many pregnant women, the fetus is 
a human form of life.  It is alive…More than a body part but less than a 
person where it is, is largely what it is.  From the standpoint of the 
pregnant woman, it is both me and not me. It ―is‖ the pregnant woman in 
the sense that it is in her and of her and is hers more than anyone‘s.  It ―is 




As MacKinnon correctly points out, the issue is more complex than comparing the fetus 
to a pint of plasma that can be donated or sold.  While the fetus is part of the woman‘s 
body, it is also a unique entity.  Thus, although the woman considering an abortion is 
certainly a person with rights and immunities, the status of her fetus cannot be 
determined simply and easily.  This is why the personhood of the fetus in cases such as 
abortion is an agonizing issue for some citizens.  
The concept that there is a property right in the womb and in the fetus raises all 
types of moral dilemmas and new courses for the law to chart.  Among both scholars and 
the public there is an intuition that some entities such as the body or fetal tissue are 
simply too personal to be fungible property.  However, there are legitimate reasons why 
the body and bodily tissue should be considered property in some situations.  The ability 
to rent the womb, sell fetal tissue, and have control over one‘s body all raise issues over 
the distinction between personhood and property.  Just as with the distinction between 
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human and person, it is not likely that the law will come to clear distinctions between 
property and person in respect to issues involving the fetus.   
 
Alternative Ways to View the Abortion Debate  
Of course there are alternative ways to view issues concerning the fetus beyond 
the dichotomy between human and person and the dichotomy between property and 
person.  In fact, many well-known scholars cogently argue that personhood is not 
necessary to the debate.  This study is primarily concerned with the legal formation and 
consequences of fetal personhood, but a quick review of two of the most well-known 
abortion related arguments is beneficial for understanding alternative theories.  
Ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse makes a persuasive argument based on virtue theory 
that biological or psychological milestones are not critical factors in adjudicating the 
morality of abortion.  She argues that abortion is a serious matter because it involves 
ending life and therefore cannot be compared to other surgeries such as an 
appendectomy.  She writes,  
to think of abortion as  nothing but the killing of something that does not 
matter, or as nothing but the exercise of some right or rights one has, or as 
the incidental means to some desirable state of affairs, is to do something 
callous and light-minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous and wise 
person would do.  It is to have the wrong attitude not only to fetuses, but 





However, Hursthouse does not argue that abortion is necessarily wrong.  Rather, she 
argues that the gradual development of the fetus is relevant for moral decisions.  Just as a 
miscarriage at a late stage of pregnancy when the fetus is well developed is considered 
much more tragic than a miscarriage at an early stage of pregnancy, an abortion at a late 
                                                 
382
 Rosalind Hursthouse, ―Virtue Theory and Abortion,‖ Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991): 237-238. 
350 
 
stage is considered a greater moral difficulty than that one at an early stage.  Hursthouse 
does not look to a milestone such as viability as the determining point in the moral 
decision.  Rather she looks at the mother‘s health, life plans, and other aspects of her life 
as well as the fact that the fetus is a developing human life.  This seems to correspond 
with much public opinion and comments such as, ―I believe it would be morally wrong 
for me to have an abortion, but I can understand that the decision to abort might be 
correct for a woman in more difficult circumstances.‖  
Libertarian theorist Lomasky‘s theory of the importance of ―project pursuers‖ is 
similar.  A woman has projects she intends to pursue and these are interrupted with an 
unplanned pregnancy.  Lomasky‘s definition of project pursuer also includes infants.  He 
believes that a harm to an infant is an injury committed to the child itself even though an 
infant is not in full possession of her rational capacities because the child has moral 
standing as a future project pursuer.  ―To damage an infant is to damage the project 
pursuer that it will be.  Indeed what counts as damage or benefit for an infant is 
determined by what will likely further or diminish its eventual success in living as a 
project pursuer.‖
383
  Lomasky‘s theory breaks down when it comes to the fetus.  He 
admits that he cannot come to a solid conclusion concerning the fetus and inconclusively 
decides that ―fetuses are neither clearly in nor clearly out of the moral community.‖
384
  If 
the fetus, as a ―potential life‖ is also a potential project pursuer, then damage to the fetus 
could be an injury to the fetus itself rather than an injury to the parents.   
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 This is essentially the argument of ethicist Don Marquis who contends that even if 
the fetus is not granted personhood, it is prima facie wrong to kill a fetus because a fetus, 
just like any other human being, has a ―valuable future like ours.‖
385
  He argues that the 
loss of life deprives a human of all future experiences, projects, and activities.  This loss 
is what makes killing prima facie morally wrong.  Fetuses, just like children and adults, 
have future projects and thus it is morally wrong to kill a fetus just as it is wrong to kill 
any child or adult.  For Marquis, the fact that the fetus is a human being and a potential 
person is enough to justify the prohibition of abortion.  The difficult conflict in abortion 
is that the woman also has future experiences, projects, and activities that an unwanted 
child will disrupt.  Hence, the mother‘s rights as a person must also be taken into 
consideration. 
The preceding discussion of personhood as it pertains to women and fetuses 
creates a context in which to examine the history behind the status of the fetus.  This brief 
review is necessary to set the context for analyzing court cases adjudicating the 




 A brief look at the evolution of American abortion statutes and judicial rulings 
provides some insight on the status of the fetus and how a woman‘s right to abort was 
viewed.  Justice Blackmun felt that this history was so important for his ruling in Roe that 
he devoted a considerable amount of his opinion to a historical overview.  Unfortunately, 
Blackmun relied in large part on the work of Cyril Means, a law professor and legal 
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counsel for the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL).  Although much of 
Means‘s scholarship is accurate, it is nevertheless prone to biases based upon his 
affiliation with NARAL.  Blackmun‘s opinion has come under harsh criticism from both 
anti and pro-abortion scholars who question the validity of his sources.
386
  Fortunately, 
the history of abortion rights is a well researched topic, and many unbiased sources exist.  
 Early English and American legal documents make very little reference to 
abortion statutes.  However, there is evidence of literature pertaining to infanticide by 
parents which seemed to be much more widespread than abortion.
387
  In 1648, Sir 
Edward Coke stated that abortion was a ―great misprision and no murder.‖
388
  Although it 
was not a murder punishable by death, a misprision was still a grave offense similar to 
that of a modern felony.  According to legal scholar William Blackstone, by the thirteenth 
century, abortion of a quickened fetus was prohibited in common law. He wrote, 
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent in every individual, and 
it begins in contemplation of the law as soon as an infant is able to stir in 
the mother‘s womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or 
otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if anyone beats her, whereby the child 
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not 
murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But the modern 
law doth not look upon this offence in quite so atrocious a light, but 
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Notably, Blackstone‘s summary of common law made a third party assault against a fetus 
which resulted in death a common law misdemeanor of the same caliber as an abortion.  
However, it is difficult to find record of anyone being punished for abortion before the 
1800s.  
 In one particular set of circumstances, the fetus did seem to have a claim to life.  
When a pregnant woman was sentenced to execution, the punishment was generally 
delayed until she gave birth.
390
  In Botsford v. Union Pacific Railroad, 141 U.S. 250 
(1891), which was one of the cases cited in Roe v. Wade as a example of personal privacy 
law, the Supreme Court stated that a woman‘s right to privacy was superseded when she 
was quick with child to prevent ―taking of the life of an unborn child for the crime of the 
mother‖ (141 U.S. 250, 253).  Many times, pregnant women were released from prison so 




In approximately 1750, new abortion techniques that involved inserting 
instruments into the uterus to induce abortion replaced herbal and poison methods.  
Although these techniques were still dangerous to the woman‘s health, they were less 
dangerous than herbs and had the same approximate mortality rate as other surgeries of 
the time.  These innovations increased the popularity of abortion over that of infanticide.  
In the early decades of the 1800s, abortion grew in visibility.
392
  As incidents of abortion 
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rose, laws regulating the practice also rose.
393
  In 1803, Lord Ellenborough‘s Act 
provided a comprehensive list of crimes against the person in English and American law.  
It included prohibitions of abortion punishable by death if the fetus was quick.  Joseph 
Dellapenna argues that this act was followed by other statutes prohibiting abortion until 
approximately 1861 when most abortions were criminal.
394
  
Beginning in the mid 1800s, the American medical profession began to reconsider 
the morality and legality of abortion. Although the sperm was discovered in 1677, the 
mammalian egg was not discovered until 1827, and the fact that the egg and sperm were 
the structural beginnings of organisms was not recognized until 1839.  These new 
discoveries called into question the scientific importance of quickening.
395
  As the 
science of embryology grew, many physicians began to consider the welfare of the 
unborn fetus as a patient in its own right.  
 Doctor Hugh Hodge from Pennsylvania advocated the criminalization of abortion 
in an 1869 lecture explaining that the fetuses as well as the mother were his patients.  He 
stated, ―He must regard the infant, as well as the mother, from the period of conception to 
delivery.‖
396
  Other anti-abortion physicians such as Doctor Horatio Storer of Boston 
published tragic accounts of injury to women after botched abortions.  He and likeminded 
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physicians called upon the American Medical Association to demand stricter laws against 
abortion.
397
  Despite political action by physicians calling for increased restrictions on 
abortion, physicians during the mid 1800s were not united in this movement.  Some 
doctors remained sympathetic to women seeking abortion; others were concerned to 
protect the health and life of the mother facing unprofessional or unregulated abortions, 
and others were interested in protecting the life and health of the fetus.
398
  Still other 
doctors resented the fact that midwives and other paraprofessionals were profiting from 
the abortion business and felt that by regulating abortion, the trade could be limited to 
physicians within the American Medical Association.
399
 
In his Roe opinion, although Justice Blackmun acknowledges that some 
opposition to abortion arose from advocates of the fetus, Blackmun cited the dangers to 
the health and life of the mother as the primary reason for restrictive abortion laws.  
However, careful research shows that both the welfare of the mother and concerns over 
the fetus along with other societal and financial concerns compelled stricter abortion 
regulations.  
 Much of the furor over abortion stemmed from declining birth rates among 
middle and upper class white Protestants.  Many politicians felt that abortion was the 
culprit for the declining birth rates among the elite race.  African American and Native 
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American were the most worrisome racial competitors although high fertility rates among 
Irish Catholics were also a problem.  Anti-abortion advocates hoped to force white, 




 In 1821, Connecticut passed the first comprehensive antiabortion law which 
punished abortion after quickening.  Missouri followed in 1825, Illinois in 1827, and 
New York in 1828.  By 1860, all but thirteen states had some kind of antiabortion 
legislation.  In 1873, the Comstock law forbade the importation, mailing, and interstate 
transport of literature concerning abortion and contraceptives.  
 The discussion over abortion legislation in the states took place within the same 
time period that the Fourteenth Amendment was being discussed and ratified.  While the 
subject of abortion was not brought up within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
members of Congress were undoubtedly familiar with the issue.  Just as the intentions of 
the framers can be surmised concerning the personhood of corporations, scholars have 
attempted to infer whether persons also included the unborn.  It is not at all clear that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to include the fetus within its scope.  On 
the other hand, it is not clearly evident that the framers meant to exclude fetuses.  Given 
the wide latitude of the word ―person‖ in respect to corporations, and its eventual 
extension to women and children, it is conceivable that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could also include the unborn in their definition of ―person.‖  The Roe Court 
did not consider the fact that state abortion laws were becoming decidedly stricter during 
the same time period that the Fourteenth Amendment was debated and ratified, nor did 
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the Roe Court venture into the possible ramifications of these simultaneous events.  We 
are left to wonder if the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had chosen the word 
―human‖ rather than ―person,‖ would the abortion debate have evolved in a completely 
different direction.  On that note, we turn to an examination of judicial decisions 
concerning the status of the fetus.  
 
ANALYSIS OF CASES 
 It is tempting to begin the review of cases concerning fetal personhood with Roe 
v. Wade since this case definitively declared that fetuses were not persons.  The decision 
in Roe v. Wade engendered the modern, very heated debates over personhood.  However, 
beginning the discussion with Roe v. Wade glosses over some the very important earlier 
cases that discuss fetal personhood and set the stage for the Roe v. Wade decision.  There 
are many cases dealing with injuries to fetuses, wrongful death of fetuses, and the ability 
of a fetus to inherit property.  However, most cases do not address the issue of 
personhood directly.  In choosing which cases to analyze, I picked Supreme Court and 
lower court cases that directly spoke to the issue of fetal personhood and set precedents 
regarding personhood that were then followed by other courts.  Leading up to Roe v. 
Wade, I chose influential cases that confirmed the personhood of a fetus up until the 
1950s when the courts recede from this trend and begin to rule that the fetus is not a 
separate agent.  This leads to Roe v. Wade which was the landmark case in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that the fetus was not a person.  Following Roe v. Wade, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts continued to debate the status of the fetus, and I 
reviewed cases where the courts reflected on the personhood of the fetus for both 
abortion cases and other emerging issues involving a fetus. 
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 Most of the state and federal cases concerning the status of the fetus from the late 
1800s to the 1960s did not concern abortion.  Instead, they dealt with issues such a third- 
party injury and wrongful death of the fetus, medical malpractice suits where the fetus 
was injured or died, the mother‘s negligence, and the right to claim monetary benefits as 
a dependent.  These early cases initiated discussions of legal fetal personhood.  
 In the late 1800s when the study of embryology was just beginning, courts had a 
difficult time proving that injury to a fetus in utero caused subsequent injury or death.  
The fetus was generally considered a part of the mother and not able to claim wrongful 
injury on its own account.  Further, the courts were wary of fraudulent claims of injury to 
the fetus.  Thus, most claims, especially those before quickening or viability, were 
denied.  As science progressed and scientists and doctors gained greater understanding of 
the development of the fetus, the effects of in utero injury were proven.  Thus, the courts 
gradually changed their stance and began to award damages for injury and wrongful 
death of the fetus.  As doctors began to prove that significant damage to the fetus and 
subsequent born child can occur during the first trimester, many courts even granted 
relief before the fetus was viable.  These courts explicitly stated that, in these cases, the 
fetus was a person from the time of conception.  By the 1900s, most jurisdictions began 
to grant relief for personal injury to a child born alive with fetal injuries.  Wrongful death 
claims were often granted to fetuses who died in utero due to injury or died upon birth 
from injuries sustained in utero.  Many courts, but not all, required that the fetus be viable 
at the time of injury.
401
  Courts usually granted recovery for medical and burial expenses 
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as well as recovery to the parents for their potential child‘s future earnings or for mental 
anguish for the loss of their unborn child.
402
  
 Awarding damages to the pregnant woman and expectant father when third-party 
injury causes the death of their fetus reflects the need to protect the rights of prospective 
parents and compensates them for their loss while deterring and punishing tortuous 
behavior against pregnant women.  Holding a third party responsible for negligent or 
criminal behavior is consistent with the protection of the pregnant woman.
403
  In these 
cases, unlike abortion cases, the fetus and the mother are not in conflict and protecting 
the rights of one is beneficial to both.  This is important to note because in the vast 
majority of pregnancies, the woman desires her unborn child and thus injury to the fetus 
is an injury to her.  
 However, a debate remains as to whether the third party destruction of a fetus 
against the will of the pregnant woman is simply a tort against a woman or is also 
committed against the fetus.  If the fetus is not a person with rights and protections, then 
the tort cannot be committed against the fetus qua fetus.  Rather, the tort is against the 
mother and recovery is only to compensate the parents for the loss of their desired child.  
However, if the court recognizes the personhood of the fetus in criminal cases and rules 
that the tort is also against the fetus, the court is thereby recognizing the rights and claims 
of the fetus.  Opponents of abortion fear that this type of recognition for fetal personhood 
could bleed into abortion cases.  With this overview, a review of some court decisions in 
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early cases will illuminate issues of fetal personhood before abortion took over the 
discussion.  
 
Early Cases Concerning Fetal Personhood 
 In the chapter on slavery, the case State v. Jones was analyzed (1 Miss. 83, 1818).  
Although this case did not concern the personhood of the fetus, the court famously said,  
By the provisions of our law, a slave may commit murder, and be 
punished with death; why then is it not murder to kill a slave?...Is not a 
slave a reasonable creature, is he not a human being, and the meaning of 
this phrase reasonable creature is a human being, for the killing of a 
lunatic, an idiot, or even a child unborn, is murder, as much as the killing a 
philosopher, and has not the slave as much reason as a lunatic, an idiot or 
an unborn child? (1 Miss. 83, 85)  
 
The Mississippi court grouped the fetus with humans whose rational capabilities were 
questionable but were nevertheless protected from deliberate homicide.  This early case 
helps set the stage for later cases concerning fetal injury and wrongful death.  
The most famous case from the 1800s concerning prenatal injury was Dietrich v. 
Inhabitants of Northampton which was tried in Massachusetts in 1884 (138 Mass. 14).  In 
this case, a pregnant woman slipped and fell on a defect in a highway.  She suffered a 
miscarriage, and although her fetus was born alive, it died within ten to fifteen minutes 
due to immaturity.  Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts and decided that the fetus was not a separate entity apart 
from the mother and thus had no claim as a separate person.  Holmes stated that there was 
a lack of precedent upon which to rely for this case, but Lord Coke‘s rule that the woman 
must be ―quick with child‖ required that the fetus had reached some degree of 
independent life at the time of the injury.  In this case, Holmes decided that the fetus was 
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still part of the mother and thus any injury to the fetus was too remote to be recovered 
other than by the mother.  Holmes‘s opinion set the precedent for the next sixty years.  
An injury to an unborn child was simply an injury to the mother just as an injury to the 
mother‘s head, heart, or leg.   
 In 1900, the Supreme Court of Illinois adjudicated a case concerning an injury to 
a fetus just ten days from birth.  In Thomas Edwin Allaire v. The St. Luke‟s Hospital et al. 
(184 Ill. 359; 56 N.E. 638), a pregnant woman admitted to the hospital before giving birth 
was injured in an elevator accident.  The fetus‘s left arms and legs were withered as a 
result of the accident leaving him permanently crippled upon birth.  Even though the 
fetus was near term, the Illinois court rejected the claim in fear that awarding damages 
might set a precedent for a child to sue the mother for injuries.  The Court relied upon the 
Dietrich precedent that the fetus was part of the mother and could not claim a separate 
injury.  
 The influential opinion in this case however, was Judge Boggs‘s dissenting 
opinion.  He argued that a new principle should be established that after viability, the 
fetus had an independent life from the mother and could make legal claims.  Boggs 
wrote,  
The law should, it seems to me, be, that whenever a child in utero is so far 
advanced in pre-natal age as that…such child could and would live 
separable from the mother and grow into the ordinary activities of life, and 
is afterwards born and becomes a living human being, such child has a 
right of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his 
or her person at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the 
mother. (184 Ill. 359; 56 N.E. 638, 374) 
 
Other courts picked up on this dissent and began to view the fetus as a separate existence.  
Some jurisdictions began to find an inconsistency in that a fetus‘s property and contract 
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rights were legally protected while personal rights were not.  The growing medical 
literature concerning the development of the fetus as separate from the mother also 
helped bring a change in legal thinking.  The medical findings of the causes of congenital 
damage helped courts find a proof of causation in prenatal injury cases.
404
  Although 
Boggs probably did not use the word ―person‖ to convey a special significance of 
personhood, his argument that the fetus was a separate entity apart from the mother was 
compelling.  This was one of the first legal arguments for fetal personality.   
 
The Fetus Gains Some Recognition as a Person 
 In 1872, California adopted a law which stated, ―A child conceived, but not yet 
born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the 
event of its subsequent birth.‖
405
  Thus, California was the first state to explicitly legislate 
that the fetus, regardless of stage of development, was a person.  This law engendered the 
following three cases in the Supreme Court of California that dealt with the subject of 
fetal personhood.  
 Daubert v. Western Meat Co. 139 Cal. 480; 73 P. 244 (1903) involved a man who 
was killed on the job due to the company‘s negligence.  At the time, his wife was 
pregnant.  She successfully brought a suit for damages, and when the child was born, the 
child also brought suit for the wrongful death of her father.  The court ruled against the 
minor child finding that at the time, the wife was the only heir in actual existence who 
could bring suit because the child, as a fetus at the time of the father‘s death, was a part 
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of the mother.  However, in his dissent, Judge Beatty invoked the Civil Code stating that 
the unborn child was a person.  Beatty argued that a posthumous child was an heir to the 
father just as a born child. Thus, and according to the Civil Code, Beatty argued that the 
now born child had a claim.  
 Thirty years later, in 1931, The People v. Don Yates (114 Cal. App. Supp. 782; 
298 P. 961) was argued before the California Supreme Court.  This was an especially 
interesting case because it essentially was a child support claim against the father for the 
welfare of the fetus.  Again relying on the California Civil Code that the unborn child 
was a person, the appellant pregnant woman charged that the father of the fetus omitted 
to furnish food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance to the unborn child of five 
months gestation.  The California court agreed with her claim arguing that an unborn 
child, just as a born child, needed sustenance.  Although the fetus could not receive food, 
clothing, and shelter directly, it did require these necessities indirectly through the 
mother.  Impairment to the life of the mother would affect the growth and development of 
the fetus.  The court ruled, ―In the somewhat analogous case of a nursing infant, it has 
been held that it is dependent on its father for food, clothing and shelter, and he is subject 
to criminal prosecution for failing to furnish them‖  (114 Cal. App. Supp. 782; 298 P. 
961, 787).  Thus the father was responsible for furnishing basic necessities to his unborn 
child through the mother.  
 Finally, the most well-known case resulting from California‘s grant of fetal 
personhood was Scott v. McPheeters. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629; 92 P.2d 678 (1939) In this 
case, a mother brought suit on behalf of her eleven-year-old child who claimed medical 
malpractice by the physician who delivered her.  The negligent use of metal clamps and 
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forceps damaged the child‘s brain and spine causing permanent paralysis.  The court 
ruled that even though the child was still a fetus in the process of being born at the time 
of the injury, the child was a person under California law.  Thus, the child had the right to 
sue for injuries sustained.  Judge Thompson wrote, ―The respondent asserts that the 
provisions of section 29 of the Civil Code are based on a fiction of law to the effect that 
an unborn child is a human being separate and distinct from its mother.  We think that 
assumption of our statute is not a fiction, but upon the contrary that it is an established 
and recognized fact by science and by everyone of understanding‖ (33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 
633).  The California Court‘s insistence that the fetus was a legal person influenced other 
American courts.  
 Seven years later, the US District Court for the District of Columbia heard a 
similar case in Bonbrest et al. v. Kotz et al. 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946).  Bette Bonbrest 
sustained critical injuries during the birthing process, and her father, as her guardian, 
brought suit against her physician, Dr. Kotz.  Because Bonbrest was clearly viable at the 
time of injury, the court found that she had an independent existence apart from the 
mother.  ―True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of extra-uterine life - and while 
dependent for its continued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar 
relationship to its mother, it is not a 'part' of the mother in the sense of a constituent 
element - as that term is generally understood‖ (65 F. Supp. 138. 140).  The court further 
reasoned that if recovery for prenatal injuries is denied, then the child must endure life 
with a wrong for which there is no remedy.  Thus the court essentially overruled Dietrich 
and found that an injury to a viable fetus that is subsequently born alive is recoverable in 
a court of law.   
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Other courts picked up on this opinion.  For example, in a 1949 negligence case in 
Ohio state court, the judge ruled that a child could recover for injuries sustained when a 
fetus.  Judge Matthias wrote, ―If the common law protects the rights of the unborn child 
and if every intendment in the law is favorable to him, the inference is inevitable that 
such unborn child is a person and possesses the rights that inhere in a person even though 
he is incapable himself to assert them‖ (Williams, An Infant, v. The Marion Rapid 
Transit, Inc. (152 Ohio St. 114; 87 N.E.2d 334; 1949).  
 While the Bonbrest precedent was becoming the standard for many courts seeking 
to provide protection for in utero injury to the fetus, another type of case was about to 
find its way through the judicial system.  This time, the mother, Josephine Chavez, was 
accused of homicide.  The defendant woman gave birth to a child in 1945 in her 
bathroom.  She cut the umbilical cord and left the newborn under the bathtub to conceal 
it.  The next day, her mother found the dead body of the newborn, and an autopsy 
revealed that the baby bled to death because the umbilical cord was not tied off.  In the 
case The People v. Josephine Chavez (77 Cal. App. 2d 621; 176 P.2d 92; 1947), the court 
found Chavez guilty of homicide.  The court ruled that a child in the process of being 
born, whether or not that process is complete, is a person and thus could be the victim of 
homicide.  Although it may not have caused a stir at the time of the decision, the case set 
an important standard for modern cases dealing with partial birth abortion where the live 
fetus is partly delivered in the birth canal before being destroyed.  It also set a standard 
that mothers could be guilty of negligence to their own fetuses which would become 
important in later cases concerning drug abuse by pregnant women.   
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 Cases following Dietrich began to stretch the boundaries of wrongful injury, 
viability, and born alive policy for fetal cases.  In 1949, the case Verkennes v. Corniea 
(229 Minn. 365; 38 N.W.2d 838), was unique because in this wrongful death case, the 
fetus was stillborn.  In previous cases of injury the fetus, the courts allowed compensation 
when the child was subsequently born alive.  Most wrongful death laws required a 
―person‖ who had died, and since the status of the fetus as a ―person‖ was questionable, it 
was hard to recover for the death of the fetus.  Further, with limited knowledge of 
embryology and fetal growth, it was sometimes difficult to pin down causality for an 
injury.  The Minnesota court relied upon the capacities of the fetus and ruled that because 
the fetus was viable at the time of injury, the fetus had the potential to live and grow.  
The court found it appropriate to treat the fetus as a newborn infant and ruled that the 
injury was to the child itself and not just to the mother.  Verkennes v. Corniea was the 
first court to allow recovery for prenatal death under a wrongful death statute.  Other 
courts followed this development and held that a live birth requirement was logically 
indefensible.  To deny a right of action for a stillborn child leads to the inconsistent 
outcome that a tortfeasor could be held liable for injuries for a fetus born alive but not for 
more severe injuries to a fetus who is stillborn.  In effect, the tortfeasor is rewarded for 
killing rather than injuring a fetus.   
In a 1953 New York case of prenatal injury, the court ruled that from the moment 
of conception, the fetus was a separate being able to recover for injury.  In Kelly v. 
Gregory, Judge Bergan stated, ―We ought to be safe in this respect in saying that legal 
separability should begin where there is biological separability.  We know something 
more of the actual process of conception and fetal development now than when some of 
367 
 
the common-law cases were decided; and what we know makes it possible to 
demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception‖  (282 A.D. 542; 125 N.Y.S.2d 
696).  This case helped set the precedent that although important, viability was not 
necessary for a fetal claim.  Legal scholar Carol A. Simon argues that the trend toward 
eliminating the viability criteria is correct because a fetus can sustain an injury before or 
after viability.  She writes, ―Once the child is born alive, it is a separate human being 
deserving of compensation, regardless of whether it was a separate legal entity at the time 
the injury was originally inflicted.  At birth, and throughout its life, the child exhibits the 
injury which was caused by the prior negligent act.‖
406
  In fact, injuries inflicted during 




The Fetus Begins to Lose Recognition 
 Although the New York court in Kelly v. Gregory ruled that a fetus was a separate 
agent and a child could claim injury for harms committed while still a fetus, this decision 
did not mean that New York set a precedent for granting fetal personhood in all legal 
instances.  New York also set precedents that for personal property matters, the fetal 
person was simply a legal fiction with no claim to inheritance.  In the case In re Peabody, 
5 N.Y.2d 541; 158 N.E.2d 841 (1959), the court found that the fetus could not become 
beneficiary of a trust until birth when the then born child became a person in fact.   
 Again in New York, the court ruled against parents seeking recompense for a 
wrongful death claim when their twins were stillborn following an automobile accident.  
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In the case Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969), the court ruled 
―before there may be a ‗decedent,‘ there must, perforce be birth, a person born alive‖ and 
thus ruled that since the fetuses were stillborn, there was no case beyond the damages to 
the parents in their own right.  Relying on In re Peabody, the court held that a ―child en 
ventre sa mere is not a person ‗beneficially interested‘ in an irrevocable trust‖ and 
further, even though the law has recognized a theological or biological separate existence 
apart from the mother, ―the law has never considered the unborn foetus as having a 
separate ‗juridical existence‘‖ (24 N.Y.2d 478, 485). 
 In 1970, a case involving a pre-viable fetus was again denied a wrongful death 
decision.  This case was heard in the Supreme Court of California, the same court that in 
the first half of the century broke new ground by allowing compensation for harm done to 
fetuses.  In this case, a husband met his estranged wife, who was in an advanced state of 
pregnancy from another man, on a mountain road and beat her until she miscarried.  The 
woman filed charges for assault on her and for the murder of her fetus.  In the decision 
Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619 the court ruled against the 
charge of murder deciding that an unborn fetus did not meet the definition of ―human 
being‖ within California‘s homicide statutes.  This ruling was a setback for fetal 
recognition, but also was a major setback in the crusade to end battery against women.  
Unhappy with the California Supreme Court‘s decision, the California legislature 
responded by creating a new category of murder that included fetuses.  The California 
Penal Code Section 187(a) which concerned homicide added the fetus to the list of 
possible murder victims.  Despite the amendment to the California law, the trend of the 
courts was toward denying any claims of personhood to the fetus.  As this trend was 
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developing, the issue of abortion was gaining steam and would inevitably end up in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
Roe v. Wade: The Landmark Case  
 The previous review of cases leads up to an examination of Roe v. Wade and 
subsequent abortion related cases which defined modern debate concerning fetal 
personhood.  Roe v. Wade is the seminal case where personhood is directly addressed; 
however before delving into the details of that case, a brief look at Byrn v. New York City 
Health & Hospitals Corp. helps set the stage because this case essentially outlines many 
of the arguments concerning personhood that would surface in Roe and in its wake.   
 In Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. 31 N.Y.2d 194; 286 N.E.2d 
887 (1972), the plaintiff, as a guardian of unborn children, sought to declare New York‘s 
1970 abortion liberalization statute unconstitutional.  This is immediately striking 
because the plaintiff claimed to represent fetuses.  Advocates against abortion have often 
protested that Supreme Court cases fail to adequately represent the interests of fetus 
through a third-party or guardian representative.  
 In his opinion, Judge Breitel went straight to the heart of the matter and said that 
the real debate turns on whether a ―human entity , conceived but not yet born, is and must 
be recognized as a person in the law‖  (31 N.Y.2d 194, 200).  Breitel stated that although 
religion and philosophy could regard the fetus as a person at any stage, the law does not 
necessarily correspond to this.  As an example, Breitel referred to the slave who was 
denied personhood and the monk who is sometimes regarded as civilly dead when he 
enters the monastery.  He then finds that a fetus in the womb is not a legal person with 
rights; instead, granting personhood to the fetus when it benefits a born child is a legal 
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fiction.  He concludes by finding that the Constitution does not confer legal personality 
for the unborn, and the legislature may confer protection short of conferring legal 
personality.   
 Dissents by Judge Burke and Judge Scileppi provide the opposing arguments 
employed by those in favor of fetal personhood.  Burke found that the majority opinion 
was irrational and conflicted with natural justice.  Burke stated that the most basic right is 
the right to live, and this should be guaranteed to the fetus which is a live human being 
and furthermore is defenseless (31 N.Y.2d 194, 206).  Judge Scileppi argued that 
classifying living, human beings as nonpersons is a constitutionally suspect classification.  
He continued that it was his moral and legal belief that life begins at conception because 
at that moment the fetus gains existence both in fact and in legal contemplation.  ―To 
conclude otherwise is to countenance genocide‖  (31 N.Y.2d 194, 213).  The arguments 
of the judges in Byrn would again be echoed as advocates on either side of the abortion 
debate readied themselves for Roe v. Wade.   
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, decided in 1973, involved an unmarried, Texas 
woman who was prevented from seeking an abortion by Texas‘s criminal abortion laws.  
The case immediately attracted worldwide attention, and amicus curiae briefs poured in 
to the Supreme Court supporting both sides of the debate.  Anti abortion briefs generally 
argued that an unborn child was a human being and a person deserving of state 
protection.  Pro-abortion briefs generally argued that the fetus was not a person in the 
law, and that the constitutional rights of the woman to bodily integrity, personal liberty, 
and freedom of choice must be protected.   
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 Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court which established a 
Constitutional right to an abortion.  The opinion is long and wide-ranging, but this 
analysis will focus on the portions of the opinion concerning fetal personhood.  
Blackmun began with a historical review of abortion policies similar to the review in the 
previous section.  He concluded this section by finding that throughout much of history 
the fetus was not regarded as a person, and women had a far broader right to terminate a 
pregnancy than they do in modern times.  However, as the previous historical section 
demonstrated, Blackmun‘s historical conclusions have been criticized by many 
historians, and Blackmun was probably incorrect in assuming that abortion rights were as 
liberal as he assumed.   
 Blackmun then turns to the issue of personhood and states that if the fetus had 
personhood, the appellant‘s case collapses because the fetus‘s right to life would be 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, as explained earlier, this is not 
necessarily true.  Even if the fetus were a person, the rights of the fetus would be in 
conflict of another person – the woman carrying it.  The rights of the fetus would not 
automatically outweigh those of the woman.  If Blackmun had not made this argument, 
perhaps the Court would have more leeway to rule that the fetus is a person, but still 
maintain that the right of a woman over her body and personal choices outweighs the 
fetus‘s right to life.   
 Blackmun looks to the Constitution for an explication of the word ―person‖ and 
finds that the Constitution does not define the word.  After looking at the uses of the word 
―person‖ in the Fifth, Twelfth, Fourteenth, and the Twenty-second Amendments; the 
listing of qualifications for Presidents, Senators, and Representatives; as well as the 
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Migration and Importation provision, the Extradition provisions, and the Fugitive Slave 
Clause, Blackmun finds that in all these cases, the word is only applied post-natally.  He 
concludes that this means there is not a pre-natal application for the word.  However, 
Blackmun is not entirely correct that this precludes a pre-natal application.  Each of these 
instances restricts a broad class of persons for the particular purpose of the specific 
provision.  These instances do not define ―person‖ as a pre-natal or post-natal individual.  
For example, the qualification for being a Representative is a person twenty-five years of 
age, but this does not mean that individuals under twenty-four are non-persons nor does it 
mean that when an individual turns twenty-five he suddenly becomes a person.
408
  
Carrying Blackmun‘s argument that the Constitution applied post-natally to its logical 
conclusion, it can further be argued that the Constitution only applied to adult, white 
males since that is whom many of the framers originally had in mind when they 
discussed ―persons.‖  The use of the word ―person‖ within each of the Constitutional 
contexts does not offer any evidence for adjudicating at what particular age or stage in 
development a human being becomes a person.  The simple fact is that the Constitution 
does not define the parameters of ―person.‖  
 Blackmun then points out that exceptions exist in every state abortion law for the 
purpose of saving the life of the mother.  If the fetus was a person under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then these types of exceptions would not be allowable.  However, 
Blackmun does not take into account self defense provisions that would allow the mother 
to defend against threats to her life.   
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Blackmun correctly points out that most abortion laws charge the physician with 
the crime of abortion.  If the fetus was a person, the woman must also be charged as a 
principal or accomplice to murder.  Further, if fetuses were persons, then the penalties for 
abortion should be equivalent to the penalties for murder.  Although Blackmun does not 
address this issue, Texas is a death penalty state and if a woman were convicted of 
multiple murders of a fetal person, she could conceivably be sentenced to death.  
Blackmun‘s arguments in this vein are strong, and if the fetus was granted personhood 
and abortion made illegal, it seems that a woman violating abortion prohibitions would 
need to face penalties for murder.  
 Blackmun concludes his exegesis of fetal personhood by concluding, ―All this, 
together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th 
century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades 
us that the word ‗person,‘ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the 
unborn‖  (410 U.S. 113, 158).  A bit later in the opinion, he again states, ―In short, the 
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense‖ (410 U.S. 
113, 162). 
 Characterizing fetuses as not recognized ―persons in the whole sense‖ creates a 
list of rebuttals.  Many categories of human beings have not been recognized as ―persons 
in the whole sense‖ in that they did not have the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  Examples in American history include women, slaves, and the mentally or 
physically handicapped.  However, the law still protected the lives of these beings even if 
not everyone agreed that they were ―persons.‖  Thus, just because fetuses are not 
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―persons in the whole sense‖ does not mean that their existence can be ended through 
abortion.   
 After concluding that the fetus is not a person, Blackmun goes on to state his case 
for legality of abortion concluding that the state cannot override the rights of a woman 
concerning her pregnancy.  Blackmun argues that the right to privacy can be extended to 
cover a woman‘s decision in abortion which is a private matter.  In this regard, the 
privacy right to abortion is a penumbral right stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Ironically, the right to life for the fetus can also be seen as a penumbral right extending 
from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment‘s right to life, liberty and property.  However, 
Blackmun did not agree with this argument and thus extended the right to abortion 
through viability.  
The Supreme Court needed to come to a decision as to when the state could 
intervene in a woman‘s decision to abort in order to protect the fetus.  The Court chose 
viability and hence viability has become an important milestone.  Blackmun contends 
that viability has both logical and biological justification and is the point at which the 
fetus has the capability for meaningful life outside of the womb.  As the previous review 
of cases illustrated, viability also has justification in a long line of precedents.  However, 
viability is not a developmental milestone that is set in stone – some fetuses reach 
viability earlier than others, and advancing medical technology has also allowed earlier 
points of viability.  
As constitutional law scholar Jed Rubenfeld points out, ―To be sure, viability can 
be viewed as a point in which a ‗potential life‘ comes an important step closer to 
actuality; but a pre-viable fetus is no less a potential human being just because current 
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medical technology is not yet sufficiently advanced to allow it to continue its 
development outside the womb.‖
409
  In fact, there may come a time when artificial 
wombs are sufficiently developed so that all fetuses can be extracted from the human 
womb and placed in an artificial womb until the fetus is developed.  Already, doctors are 
able to perform artificial conception and grow a conceptus until the stage of blastocyst 
which is a mass of about 150 cells and occurs about five days after conception.
410
  If 
technology advances to the point that fetuses are viable outside the human womb 
throughout pregnancy, the Court may have to rethink its decision.  
 Further, the right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade was a right to empty the 
womb of the fetus, but necessarily to ensure that the fetus will die in the process.  If 
artificial wombs become a reality, it is conceivable that a woman would have the right to 
empty her womb but would then need to surrender the fetus to an artificial womb (or 
even a human surrogate womb) until the gestational process is finished.  Fellow 
constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe points out,  
Once the fetus can be severed from the woman by a process which enables 
it to survive, leaving the abortion decision to private choice would confer 
not only a right to remove an unwanted fetus from one's body, but also an 
entirely separate right to ensure its death.  Apart from the problematic 
character of any claim in behalf of the latter right, its recognition and 
enforcement would be indistinguishable from recognizing and enforcing a 
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Thus, the right to abortion in the sense of removing the woman‘s burden must be 
distinguished from the right to kill the fetus.  Many state laws allowing abortion do 
contain a clause concerning saving the fetus if possible.  Although Blackmun granted 
women the right to an abortion, he does concede that the state has an interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life, and this interest grows as the fetus develops.  In 
his discussion of the state interest in protecting the fetus, Blackmun creates a new 
category of being called ―potential life‖ which is the fetus in utero.  Because Blackmun 
argues that those trained in medicine, philosophy, and theology cannot agree when life 
begins, Blackmun concludes that the Court does not need to resolve the issue.  Therefore, 
Blackmun invents ―potential life‖ to refer to beings that are assuredly human life.  
However, ―potential life‖ as a new category created a whole new point of contention 
within the abortion debate.  As was argued earlier, the human fetus is a biological human 
life from conception.  However, if ―life‖ is used to mean something more, such as a 
rational being in Dennett‘s criteria, then the fetus is a potential life.  Introducing 
―potential life‖ seems to muddy the already contested terms of the debate.  It would have 
been better if Blackmun would have said ―potential person‖ since ―person‖ is already a 
contentious category in respect to fetuses and signifies the same debate.   
 Although Roe v. Wade was the seminal abortion case, when the Supreme Court 
adjudicated the case, they also included its companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973).  This was a case from Georgia where an impoverished, married, pregnant woman 
and twenty-three others including physicians, nurses, clergy, and social workers brought 
suit seeking a declaratory judgment against Georgia‘s abortion statutes.  The Georgia law 
forbade abortion except for cases of rape, fetal deformity, or severe injury to the mother.  
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It also required three physicians and a committee of the staff of the hospital performing 
the abortion to approve of the procedure.   
 In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun found that the Georgia law was 
unconstitutionally vague because the physician was not allowed to perform an abortion 
except when it was ―based upon his best clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary.‖  
The word ―necessary‖ was vague because the physician could not be certain when an 
abortion was allowed.  Blackmun further ruled that a medical judgment could be made in 
light of the following factors: ―physical, emotion, psychological, familial, and health‖ 
(410 U.S. 179, 192).  Blackmun‘s opinion essentially left the door open for the physician 
to perform an abortion for a very broad range of reasons because almost any type of 
hardship could fit into one of those categories.  Thus while Roe v. Wade opened the door 
to legal abortions, the companion case Doe v. Bolton created very liberal grounds for 
abortions.   
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas addressed the issue of fetal personhood 
arguing that ―to say that life is present at conception is to give recognition to the 
potential, rather than the actual‖ (410 U.S. 179, 217).  He continued explaining that the 
development of life takes time, and until it is present it cannot be destroyed.  He also 
pointed out that the rites of Baptism are not performed and death certificates are not 
required when a fetus dies in a miscarriage.  In an interesting side note, both Sandra Cano 
who was ―Doe‖ and Norma McCorvey who was ―Roe‖ later regretted their abortion cases 
and became activists for the anti-abortion movement.  
 The Supreme Court chose to hear Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, but another 
case concerning abortion was also presented to the Supreme Court.  Doe v. Scott 321 F. 
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Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971) was a unique case because a Chicago physician had been 
appointed guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the unborn.  Because standing 
for the fetus was recognized through a guardian, the fetus was able to ―participate‖ in the 
lawsuits.  Unfortunately for this study, the Supreme Court chose to hear Roe and Doe v. 
Bolton and passed over Doe v. Scott.  It would have been fascinating from the perspective 
of fetal personhood to hear the opinion of the Court in a case where the fetus was a direct 
party.  It is possible in future cases that a court could allow a legal guardian to be 
appointed for a viable fetus.   
 
Beyond Roe v. Wade 
 The decision in Roe v. Wade stimulated debate in both academic circles and the 
general public concerning fetal personhood.  The decision also set a precedent for fetal 
cases beyond issues of abortion.  In 1975, the Michigan Court of Appeals heard Toth v. 
Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296; 237 N.W.2d 297.  In this case, a woman who was three 
months pregnant suffered a miscarriage after an automobile accident.  The Michigan 
Court ruled that a nonviable fetus was not a ―person‖ under the wrongful death act.  
Although the Roe Court did not extend the condition of viability to cases unrelated to 
abortion, the decision set a new precedent of considering the criterion of viability even 
though past courts had often overlooked viability in wrongful injury or death cases.  In 
fact, in his dissent, Judge Mahar argued precisely that the Roe decision was not 
applicable to the wrongful death act.   
 Again in 1976, the California Court of Appeals denied a wrongful death charge 
because the fetus was only thirteen weeks along.  In this especially brutal case of spousal 
abuse, a husband said he did not want the fetus to live, and then kicked his pregnant wife 
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in the stomach and back while repeating ―bleed, baby, bleed‖ (The People v. Smith, 59 
Cal. App. 3d, 751).  The Court of Appeal held that a nonviable fetus under 24 weeks did 
not qualify for a murder charge even though the California legislature had amended the 
criminal statutes to include fetuses.  Citing Roe v. Wade, the court found that until the 
capacity for independent life is attained, there is only a potential human life.  Judge 
Fleming wrote,  
The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability is 
reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into existence.  
Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law the 
destruction of a nonviable fetus is not a taking of human life.  It follows 
that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide, 
whether committed by a mother, a father (as here), or a third person.  (59 
Cal. App. 3d, 757) 
 
However, the Roe Court did not imply that it necessarily follows that a nonviable fetus 
cannot be the victim of a wrongful death and that the woman cannot claim recompense 
on behalf of her fetus.  In this case, there was no conflict between the mother and fetus, 
and thus a harm to the fetus was also a harm to the mother who desired to give birth to 
her child.  Abortion cases and wrongful injury and death cases do not necessarily fall 
within the same category.  In fact, Roe v. Wade specifically noted that the unborn have 
certain legal rights.  The court‘s ruling in this case was a setback for battered women and 
for the protection of the fetuses that women intend to carry to term.   
This problem is addressed by theorists such as Maguire who adhere to a 
personhood through social recognition.
412
  As explained in the previous sections, when a 
woman recognizes her fetus as part of the social community, the woman acknowledges 
that the fetus is a person and desires life for the fetus.  The brutal death of the fetus by a 
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third party is a loss to the mother who has a right to recompense through punishing the 
perpetrator.  Applying Roe‘s decision that the fetus is not a person to cases not pertaining 
to abortion had deleterious effects for women who sought justice after an injury that 
caused miscarriage.   
 Other courts did not apply Roe v. Wade in fetal cases not involving abortion, but 
instead held to precedents of fetal injury cases that a pre-viable fetus could make a claim 
for injury in utero.  In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital 67 Ill. 2d 348; 367 N.E.2d 1250, 
(1977), the Supreme Court of Illinois awarded damages to a minor child who was injured 
by medical negligence to her mother.  In this interesting case, the mother, Renslow, was 
given a blood transfusion when she was thirteen years old.  The hospital gave her Rh-
positive blood when Renslow was Rh-negative which sensitized her blood.  Renslow did 
not know about the improper transfusion and first discovered the mistake when receiving 
prenatal care before giving birth to her child.  The sensitization caused prenatal damage 
to the fetus and caused the premature birth.  The minor child was born jaundiced and 
suffering from hyperbilirubinemia.  After two complete blood transfusions, the child had 
damage to various organs, brain, and nervous system.  
 Relying on Boggs‘s dissent in Bonbrest v. Kotz, the Illinois court found that an 
infant had a separate existence from the mother, and even though the fetus was not viable 
at the time of the injury, she still had a claim for her sustained injuries.  The decision is 
unique because not only was the fetus not viable, she was not even contemplated when 
the mother was injured at age thirteen.  This case expanded the ability of an individual to 
claim an injury as a fetus and even before conception.  
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 In the wake of Roe, another question concerning fetal injury is certain to arise.  
There are instances where an abortion fails and the fetus is subsequently born alive but 
with grave injuries or retardation.  Does the fetus who is subsequently born alive have a 
claim for its injuries?  It seems certain that the line of precedent would allow the person 
who was the fetus to sue the physician and the medical establishment for medical 
mistakes.  However, does the person also have a claim against the woman who authorized 
and underwent the failed abortion?  This is an issue that is yet to be settled.  
 Although some courts following Roe have limited the application of wrongful 
death statutes to viable fetuses, since the 1970s almost all states do have some type of 
protection for the fetus within their wrongful death statutes.  Other courts have taken a 
path similar to Renslow and have found that a fetus at all stages of development should be 
included under a wrongful death law.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Presley v. 
Newport Hospital 117 RI 177 (1976) found that the old precedent of Dietrich no longer 
applied and a fetus, whether viable or previable, was a person under the Rhode Island 
wrongful death statute.  Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed compensation 
for the wrongful death of a six month fetus killed in an automobile accident, 402 So.2d 
633 (1981). 
 
The Abortion Debate Continues 
 Soon after hearing Roe and Doe, the Supreme Court faced other cases concerning 
abortion.  Just three years later, in 1976, the Court decided Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth (428 U.S. 52) which challenged Missouri‘s restrictions on abortion that 
included a requirement for married women to seek their husband‘s consent before an 
abortion, for minors to have parental consent, and other women to provide their own 
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written consent; a requirement that the attending physician certify that the fetus was not 
viable; and a standard of care provision requiring the physician to take care to preserve 
the life and health of the fetus among other requirements. Finally the Missouri law 
prohibited abortions using a saline amniocentesis.   
 In his opinion, Justice Blackmun found that the viability requirement was 
constitutional since it did not violate the allowed state regulations of abortion, but the 
first sentence of Missouri‘s standard of care provision was unconstitutional because 
requiring a physician to preserve the life and health of the fetus at all stages of pregnancy 
was unconstitutional.  The restriction on saline amniocentesis was also unconstitutional 
because it failed to provide for the protection of the mother and was instead viewed as an 
unreasonable or arbitrary regulation.  The Court also found that requiring the pregnant 
woman‘s consent was not unconstitutional, but requiring spousal consent and parental 
consent were unconstitutional.   
A dissent by Justice White argued, among other things, that the standard of care 
provision was constitutional because the law simply required that in cases where the fetus 
was capable of surviving outside of the womb, the physician had a duty to try to preserve 
the life of that fetus.  This argument is similar to Tribe‘s contention that although the 
woman has a right to empty her womb through an abortion, she does not have the 
corresponding right to kill the fetus.  If the fetus is able to survive after the womb is 
emptied, then the physician must try to preserve it.   
 In Colautti v. Franklin 439 U.S. 379 (1979) the Supreme Court again upheld the 
viability criterion and ruled that Pennsylvania‘s law requiring a physician to determine 
that a fetus ―is viable‖ or ―may be viable‖ was unconstitutionally vague.  The Court also 
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ruled that neither the legislature nor the courts could proclaim a certain measure of 
viability such as weeks of gestation or fetal weight as a determining factor for viability – 
the decision must be left to the physician.  In an important change in word choice, Justice 
Blackmun said, ―the state has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus‖ as 
opposed to the potential life of the fetus.  Further, Blackmun stated that viability meant 
that the fetus had a ―reasonable likelihood of…sustained survival‖ while Roe used the 
phrase ―potentially able to live‖ (439 U.S. 379, 288).  To speak of ―surviving‖ implies 
that life exists in the womb.  This was a claim that Justice Blackmun was not willing to 
make in his Roe opinion and was a possible signal that Blackmun was reconsidering, in 
small part, his views on the fetus as being a potential human life.
413
  The state‘s interest 
in a being that is alive is stronger than its interest in a being that is potentially alive.  In 
his dissent, Justice White argued that the Supreme Court had rescinded the state‘s police 
powers to regulate abortion and protect fetal life.   
 In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 462 U.S. 416 (1983) the 
Supreme Court struck down Ohio‘s law that mandated that all second trimester abortions 
be performed in a hospital and also struck down a provision that required informed 
consent, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and ―humane disposal‖ of the fetus were 
unconstitutional.  In her dissent, Justice O‘Connor argued that the viability standard be 
replaced with an ―unduly burdensome‖ standard and argued that Ohio‘s regulations were 
not unduly burdensome.  Writing that the viability criterion was unworkable and Roe v. 
Wade was ―on a collision course with itself,‖ O‘Connor said,   
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The state interest in potential human life is likewise extant throughout 
pregnancy.  In Roe, the Court held that although the State had an 
important and legitimate interest in protecting potential life, that interest 
could not become compelling until the point at which the fetus was viable.  
The difficulty with this analysis is clear: potential life is no less potential 
in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward.  At any 
stage in pregnancy, there is the potential for human life.  Although the 
Court refused to "resolve the difficult question of when life begins," id., at 
159, the Court chose the point of viability – when the fetus is capable of 
life independent of its mother – to permit the complete proscription of 
abortion.  The choice of viability as the point at which the state interest in 
potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any 
point before viability or any point afterward.  Accordingly, I believe that 
the State's interest in protecting potential human life exists throughout the 
pregnancy. (462 U.S. 416, 460-461) 
 
 After Coullati v. Franklin, Pennsylvania passed a new abortion regulation law 
that required informed consent of the woman, dissemination of information concerning 
the risks of abortion, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability abortions 
among other regulations.  An organization of gynecologists and obstetricians filed suit in 
the case Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).  The issues involved were very similar to those 
in City of Akron, and Justice Blackmun‘s opinion followed the same line of reasoning 
that he used in the Akron opinion.  He found unconstitutional mandated standards of care 
when the fetus was viable and a requirement that a second physician be present without a 
medical-emergency exemption.  He also ruled that the informed consent requirement that 
mandate that a woman be given specified information before seeking an abortion was an 
unconstitutional barricade to her rights.  It is noteworthy that Blackmun found the 
informed consent provision unconstitutional because the clause only required that the 
doctor inform the patient that the procedure would likely destroy the fetus.  The doctor 
did not need to refer to the fetus as ―unborn child‖ or ―person,‖ nor did the doctor need to 
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describe fetal development or fetal death.  The provision did require that the woman be 
advised of possible medical assistance for childbirth, the father‘s responsibility for child 
support, and the possible psychological and physical detriments of an abortion.  Overall, 
Blackmun ruled that the Pennsylvania regulations obstructed a woman‘s right to abortion 
and therefore were unconstitutional.  He wrote, ―Few decisions are more personal and 
intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a 
woman's decision – with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in 
Roe – whether to end her pregnancy.  A woman's right to make that choice freely is 
fundamental‖ (476 U.S. 747, 772). 
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that the state‘s interest in the 
fetus ―increases progressively and dramatically as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to 
experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings.‖  In effect, Justice 
Stevens argued that the state‘s interest began when the fetus had the capacity to 
experience some of Dennett‘s criteria for personhood – consciousness and the ability to 
reciprocate.  According to the Roe Court, the state‘s interest began when the fetus had 
just one capacity – the capacity to survive independently.  Stevens‘s criteria differ in an 
important way because embryology has proven that the fetus has the capability to react to 
surroundings before viability although it is still unknown if the fetus can feel pain before 
twenty-four weeks which is the general consensus for viability age.  
 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued: 
 
However one answers the metaphysical or theological question whether 
the fetus is a "human being" or the legal question whether it is a "person" 
as that term is used in the Constitution, one must at least recognize, first, 
that the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic information 
that characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens and distinguishes 
an individual member of that species from all others, and second, that 
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there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child or, indeed, an 
adult human being.  (476 U.S. 747, 792) 
 
Burger‘s argument also employs biological criteria but he bases his reasoning on the 
continuum approach that a fetus is biologically and psychologically the same throughout 
the stages of human growth and development.  Burger boldly argued, ―In my view, the 
time has come to recognize that Roe v. Wade…departs from a proper understanding of 
the Constitution and to overrule it‖ (476 U.S. 747, 788). 
 Chief Justice Burger‘s dissenting opinion signaled that the Supreme Court‘s view 
on abortion was starting to depart from the earlier stance of Roe v. Wade.  In the same 
year that the Court decided Thornburgh, the Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 
186 (1986) which concerned Georgia‘s prohibition of sodomy.  In this case, the Court 
ruled that the right of privacy did not include homosexual sodomy because such a right 
was not ―deeply in this Nation's history and tradition‖ (478 U.S. 186, 192).
414
  The 
privacy right to abortion was not ―deeply rooted‖ either and therefore vulnerable to 
restriction or even complete reversal.  
In 1989, the Court heard Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (492 U.S. 490) 
and began to allow more restrictions on abortion rights.  This case involved a Missouri 
law with several unique provisions.  First, the preamble stated that the life of a human 
being begins at conception and that the fetus had interests in life, health, and well being 
that were protected by the law.  It also required that Missouri‘s laws be interpreted to 
provide fetuses with the rights, privileges, and immunities of other persons, citizens, and 
residents of Missouri subject to the Federal Constitution and the precedents of the 
Supreme Court.  Another section prohibited the use of public employees or facilities for 
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abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother.  Further, public funds could not be 
used to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life.  
Another provision required the physician to try to determine if the fetus was viable using 
medical examinations and tests if the woman was believed to be 20 or more weeks 
pregnant.   
Five health care professionals who worked at public facilities along with two 
nonprofits groups that provided abortions brought suit claiming that act violated the 
Constitution.  In the plurality opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that 
abortion was a liberty interest rather than a fundamental right, and that the Missouri law 
―permissibly furthers the state‘s interest in protecting potential human life‖ 492 U.S. 490, 
519.   
In a significant change from Roe v. Wade, the Court found that a compelling state 
interest began at conception rather than viability.  Because the Roe Court recognized an 
interest in protecting potential human life, the Webster Court reasoned that a pre-viable 
fetus was also a potential human life, no less than a viable fetus.  Again, if the Roe Court 
had used the words ―potential person‖ rather than ―potential human life,‖ the Webster 
Court might not have had the opportunity to alter Roe‟s doctrine of viability.  The 
Webster Court did not state that the fetus was a person at any time before birth.   
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized this change in doctrine and said that 
after viability the fetus becomes a person with protected legal rights.  This is even a more 
abrupt about face because until this dissent, the Supreme Court had never insinuated that 
the fetus, at any time, was a legal ―person.‖  Even the conservative Justices White and 
Scalia did not argue for fetal personhood.  Although Blackmun was defending abortion 
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rights, by arguing that a viable fetus was a legal person, through his own Roe argument 
that abortion of a person would not be permitted, Blackmun effectively argued that late 
term abortions of viable fetuses were not permissible.   
 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services was an important turning point for 
abortion rights, but despite the Court‘s approval of Missouri‘s restrictions and 
Blackmun‘s implication that a viable fetus was a person protected from abortion, the 
Webster opinion did not overturn Roe v. Wade.  Nor did the opinion explicitly grant fetal 
personhood.  According to the Webster plurality, the fetus, at all stages of development, 
remained a potential human life and not a person.  
 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992), the Supreme Court again affirmed its commitment to the right of abortion set 
forth in Roe v. Wade.  In the Court opinion, Justice O‘Connor stated that the abortion 
right derived from the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause‘s protection of life, 
liberty, or property.  This was a substantial change from the original position in Roe v. 
Wade that the right to abortion stemmed from a privacy right.  While in her Akron dissent 
O‘Connor spoke of ―compelling‖ state interests in potential life, in this opinion O‘Connor 
used the less powerful words ―substantial‖ and ―profound‖ to describe the state‘s interest.   
 A dissent by Justice Stevens pointed out that since Roe v. Wade, no member of 
the Court had ever questioned Roe‘s holding that the unborn are not persons in the whole 
sense.  He describes a third-trimester fetus as approaching personhood.  (This differs 
from Blackmun‘s dissent in Webster where he calls viable fetuses ―persons.‖)  Stevens 
quoted a 1992 University of Chicago Law Review article by Ronald Dworkin to drive 
home his point that fetuses are not persons.  In the article, Dworkin argued,  
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The suggestion that states are free to declare a fetus a person…assumes 
that a state can curtail some persons' constitutional rights by adding new 
persons to the constitutional population.  The constitutional rights of one 
citizen are of course very much affected by who or what else also has 
constitutional rights, because the rights of others may compete or conflict 
with his.  So any power to increase the constitutional population by 
unilateral decision would be, in effect, a power to decrease rights the 
national Constitution grants to others. …If a fetus is not part of the 
constitutional population, under the national constitutional arrangement, 
then states have no power to overrule that national arrangement by 
themselves declaring that fetuses have rights competitive with the 




Justice Stevens then reasons, taking into account Dworkin‘s arguments against fetal 
personhood, that the fetus is not a person with a right to life within the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  He argues that this premise remains a fundamental premise of our 
constitutional law governing reproductive autonomy (505 U.S. 833, 914). 
 This line of argument has come under attack particularly from African American 
anti-abortion groups such as Texas Black Americans for Life who compared Dworkin‘s 
arguments to the infamous Dred Scott opinion.  In his opinion, Taney wrote,  
It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any Act or law of its own, 
passed, since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member 
into the political community created by the Constitution of the United 
States.  It cannot make him a member of this community by making him a 
member of its own.  And for the same reason it cannot introduce any 
person, or description of persons, who were not intended to be embraced 
in this new political family, which the Constitution brought into existence, 
but were intended to be excluded from it.  (60 U.S. 393, 406) 
 
The Texas group finds that Dworkin‘s argument hauntingly familiar to that of Dred Scott 
which limited the personhood of slaves.  Further, the group argues that even the Dred 
Scott Court recognized that those who are not persons within the meaning of the 
Constitution could have certain rights under state law that the federal courts had to 
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respect.  They argue that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give the federal government 
the power to take away personhood from those who may have been conferred this status 
under state law.
416
   
 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and the other 
abortion cases that came before the Supreme Court after Roe v. Wade illustrate that fetal 
personhood was a far from settled issue.  
 
More Fetal Issues 
While the Supreme Court was facing cases concerning abortion, many state-level 
cases were being heard concerning other fetal issues.  In Georgia, the state supreme court 
adjudicated a case concerning a pregnant woman who refused to have a cesarean section 
on religious grounds.  This was not the first time such a case had come through the 
judicial system.  In an earlier New Jersey case, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial 
Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421 (1964) the court granted the hospital authority to 
administer blood transfusions to a pregnant woman who refused medical treatment on 
religious grounds.  In this case, the court stated that both the life of the unborn child and 
the mother were at stake, and thus the forced transfusion was merited.   
Georgia was facing the same type of suit in the case Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding 
Hospital 247 Ga. 86; 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).  The pregnant woman, who was thirty-nine 
weeks pregnant, refused to have the cesarean even though without it, the survival rate for 
the fetus was less than one percent and her own survival rate was less than 50 percent.  
The Georgia Supreme Court, relying on Roe v. Wade, upheld the standard of viability and 
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decided that a fetus in the third trimester had a legal right to the preservation of life that 
overrode the religious freedom of the mother.  The court opinion stated, ―the Court 
concludes and finds as a matter of law that this child is a viable human being and entitled 
to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia.‖  The Georgia court also decided 
to award temporary custody of the fetus to the Georgia Department of Human Resources 
until the child was born or until it died in the childbirth process.   
 This case is important because there was clearly a conflict between a viable 
fetus‘s right to preservation of life and the woman‘s right to religious freedom.  The court 
could have decided that when these two rights come in conflict, the rights of the mother 
take precedence.  Instead, the court decided that the woman had a legally enforceable 
duty to protect the life of the fetus at the expense of her constitutional rights.  This case 
transcends the boundaries of Roe v. Wade which said nothing about a duty on the part of 
the woman to protect the life of the fetus after viability.   
 In the late 1980s, a case came before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
that caught national and even international attention.  Angela Carder was a terminally ill 
patient with cancer who was twenty-six weeks pregnant.  Hospital attorneys sought a 
court ruling to clarify if the hospital had a duty to attempt to save the fetus‘s life when 
Carder‘s death was imminent.  A cesarean could hasten her death, but gave the fetus a 
fifty to sixty percent chance of surviving.  In 1987, a superior court judge ordered Carder 
to undergo a cesarean against her wishes and against the wishes of her physician.  A 
hastily convened panel of three judges from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
denied a stay.  The cesarean was performed, and the fetus died two hours later and Carder 
died two days later.   
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The American Civil Liberties Union requested a review, and the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals issued a new en banc decision in 1990 for the case Re A.C. 
573 A.2d 1235.  Even though Carder and fetus were both deceased, the court reversed the 
original decision and held that patient has a right to make informed decisions concerning 
her health.  If the patient is incompetent, the judge must examine previous statements of 
the patient and views of family members and family physicians to ascertain what the 
patient would want. Although the court did not say that the state could never prevail over 
a pregnant patient‘s interests, it emphasized the need to take care in overriding a patient‘s 
interests.   
The issue of forced medical intervention on behalf of a fetus is still an open 
subject in the law.  The courts have not established clear boundaries to guide when and 
under what circumstances the state can intervene in opposition to the woman‘s wishes.  
In cases where the woman objects upon religious grounds, the courts have been more 
willing to override her wishes.  On the other hand, when the mother‘s and the fetus‘s 
lives are involved, the courts have been more hesitant.  If the courts can order a woman to 
undergo a cesarean, they may also be able to order a woman to undergo other types of 
surgeries on her fetus.  As fetal surgery becomes more sophisticated and reliable, this is a 
significant issue of adjudicating the interests of the woman and the interests of the fetus.   
 Forcing a woman to undergo medical procedures on behalf of her fetus is one way 
that the state can dictate the behavior of pregnant women.  A related situation is when a 
mother engages in behavior such as drug abuse that has harmful effects on the fetus.  If, 
as many courts have ruled, the viable fetus has a separate claim against prenatal injury 
and wrongful death from a third party, it seems logical that a pregnant woman can be 
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charged with harming her fetus.  Some of the most deleterious injuries to the fetus in 
utero stem from legal and illegal chemical substances in the body.  If a woman uses 
illegal drugs knowing that they could profoundly affect the fetus, it seems logical that the 
woman should be liable for that damage.  In fact, some courts have been willing to 
disregard parent-child immunity and allow causes of action on behalf of fetuses and born 
children who were injured by negligence in utero.  These cases tend to fall within child 
abuse statutes.   
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has heard two such cases that serve as 
initial precedents in this developing area of case law.  The first, Whitner v. South 
Carolina 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997) involved a charge against Cornelia Whitner for criminal 
child neglect when her child was born with cocaine metabolites due to Whitner‘s use of 
crack cocaine during the third trimester.  The South Carolina court maintained that viable 
fetuses were persons with legal rights and privileges.  Thus, the court held, ―It would be 
absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws and 
wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse‖ (492 
S.E.2d 777, 8).  The court upheld Whitner‘s conviction of child abuse of her viable fetus.  
In 2002, the Supreme Court of South Carolina heard another case involving crack 
cocaine, but this time the fetus was stillborn due to the ingestion of the drugs.  In the case 
State v. Regina D. McKnight Opinion No. 25585 (2003), the court upheld a homicide 
conviction against McKnight citing Whitner v. South Caroline and a 2000 statute that 
stated the term ―child‖ included viable fetuses.   
 These cases raise new questions about the nature and extent of society's interest in 
fetal life.  They also illustrate a powerful claim of the fetus against the pregnant woman 
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stemming from the viable fetus‘s recognition as a separate being.  Although a woman 
does not have an obligation to allow a fetus to remain in her body and thus has a right to 
abort a fetus, once a woman forgoes the option of abortion, she assumes obligations and 
duties to the fetus that can limit her freedom and autonomy.  If a woman aborts the fetus, 
no subsequent child will be born that will suffer the consequences of her potentially 
harmful actions.  But if a woman injures the fetus in utero so that it is subsequently born 
with serious medical problems, there is a separate individual who suffers from her 
harmful actions.  Legal scholar John Robertson, who specializes in bioethical issues, 
argues,  
The mother has, if she conceives and chooses not to abort, a legal and 
moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably 
possible.  She has a duty to avoid actions or omissions that will damage 
the fetus and child, just as she has a duty to protect the child's welfare 
once it is born until she transfers this duty to another.  In terms of fetal 
rights, a fetus has no right to be conceived or, once conceived, to be 
carried to viability.  But once the mother decides not to terminate the 
pregnancy, the viable fetus acquires rights to have the mother conduct her 




If a woman takes actions that might be harmful to her fetus such as substance abuse, she 
may decide to abort the fetus rather than face criminal prosecution.  Although many 
states are prosecuting women for drug abuse while pregnant, in Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston 532 U.S. 67 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a state hospital that routinely 
tested the urine of pregnant patients for drugs violated the prohibition against 
unreasonable searches.  This has not seemingly slowed the number of prosecutions of 
women for in utero drug abuse of the fetus.  The state‘s ability to compel women to 
undergo medical procedures on behalf of the fetus and to refrain from certain harmful 
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behaviors on behalf of the fetus signify some of the ways in which a fetus is gaining 
rights and protections under the law.  This expansion of fetal rights may indicate an 
expansion of fetal personhood in arenas other than abortion.  
 In 1992, the Supreme Court of Tennessee heard a case that speaks to new legal 
issues that arise from the rapidly growing medical progress in embryology and fertility 
medicine.  The case involved in vitro fertilization (IVF).  Junior Lewis Davis filed for 
divorce against Mary Sue Davis, and they were able to agree to dissolution terms except 
for who was to have ―custody‖ of their seven frozen embryos stored at a fertility clinic.  
Extra embryos beyond those needed to induce a pregnancy are a common occurrence 
with IVF, and most fertility clinics store these embryos in a cryogenic safe for future use.  
Mary Sue Davis originally asked for control of the frozen embryos with the intent to try 
for a pregnancy after the divorce.  Junior Davis objected saying that he did not want to 
become a parent outside of marriage.  The trial court ruled that the embryos were human 
beings from the moment of fertilization and awarded them to Mary Sue Davis and 
directed that she be allowed to bring the children to term through implantation.  
 When the Supreme Court of Tennessee heard the case Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 
588 (1992), one of the fundamental issues was whether the frozen embryos were persons 
or property in the law.  The court reasoned that one extreme view was that the embryos 
were human subjects that required the rights of a person.  The opposite extreme view was 
that the embryo‘s status was no different than any other type of human tissue and no 
limits should be placed on actions with the embryos.  However, the court agreed with an 
intermediate position that the frozen embryo deserved greater respect than that given to 
human tissue because it had the potential to become a person and had symbolic value.  
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But the frozen embryo did not have the status of an actual person because it did not have 
any of the features of personhood, was not a developed individual, and may not ever 
develop biologically.  Thus, the court stated, ―We conclude that preembryos are not, 
strictly speaking, either ‗persons‘ or ‗property,‘ but occupy an interim category that 
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.‖  (842 S.W.2d 
588, 29) 
This case truly was new ground for the judicial system.  The laboratory conceived 
embryo did not pose the bodily integrity issues of a woman seeking an abortion – the 
embryo in the Petri dish was certainly not a part of any woman‘s body.  However, as the 
biological product of a woman‘s egg and a man‘s sperm, there were issues of possession 
belonging to both the woman and the man.  If possession were translated to mean 
ownership and thus the embryo was interpreted as property, the philosophical issues 
concerning human property arise.  There is a fine line between granting property rights in 
potential persons and reverting to property rights in adult persons which is essentially 
slavery.  Commodification of any human life is questionable.    
On the other hand, an embryo in the very early stages before uterine attachment 
cannot easily be considered a full fledged person.  At this stage, the stem cells are 
unspecialized and still have the potential to develop into any body part or to split through 
a process called twinning.  Those who argue for a biological continuum view that 
personhood should begin at the moment of conception might find that these embryos 
have a claim to personhood.  However, using Dennett‘s criteria for personhood or 
Rosalind‘s virtue theory of personhood, the claim of the early embryo is not very strong.   
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This is an issue of fetal personhood that is very much undecided within the law 
because the technology is relatively new and very few cases concerning frozen embryos 
have come through the courts.
418
  After Davis v. Davis, most fertility clinics began 
requiring couples to sign legally binding cryopreservation agreements that would dictate 
the disposition of unused frozen embryos should a couple divorce and disagree on the 
fate of their embryos.  In the few cases decided after Davis, the courts generally 
scrutinized the terms of the agreements based on contract law rather than delve into the 
issue of whether or not the embryos should be considered persons or property.  In Kass v. 
Kass (696 N.E.2d 174,1998), the New York Court of Appeals followed the Roe decision 
to determine that the embryos in question were not Constitutional persons but did not 
delve into the ontological issues revolving around the status of an embryo.  Instead, the 
Court simply enforced the cryopreservation agreement stating that unused frozen 
embryos would be donated to research if the couple separated or divorced.   
Two cases following on the heels of Kass v. Kass maintained the precedent that 
an embryo was not a person while avoiding an extensive discussion of the embryo‘s 
status.  In A.Z. v. B.Z., (725 N.E.2d 1051, 2000) the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts relied on Kass v. Kass to hold that an embryo was not a person.  In this 
case, the couple signed a cryopreservation contract which stipulated that if the couple 
should separate, the embryos would be returned to the wife for implant.  However, rather 
than upholding the contract, the Massachusetts Court determined that the respect for 
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liberty and privacy accorded to an individual meant that the Court could not compel an 
individual to become a parent against his or her wishes.  Therefore, the Court 
permanently enjoined the wife from ever thawing and using the embryos.  The result of 
A.Z. v. B.Z. was influential in a similar case where the wife wanted to discard the 
embryos and the husband wished to donate the embryos to another couple.  Although the 
cryopreservation contract stipulated that in the event of a divorce the embryos would be 
donated to the clinic, in J.B. v. M.B., (783 A.2d 707, 2001), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court ruled that the right to refuse procreation should not be violated even though the 
wife would not be raising the child herself.  In both of these cases, the courts relied on an 
individual‘s right to refuse procreation as opposed to allowing the other party to thaw and 
develop the embryos to term.
419
  Both cases stated that an embryo was not a person but 
did not go into a detailed discussion of nuanced dichotomies of personhood and property.  
In 2002, a case in Washington State raised these dichotomies. 
David Litowitz and Becky Litowitz used donated eggs and a surrogate mother in 
an IVF procedure that successfully produced a daughter.  Soon after, the couple separated 
and disagreed on the disposition of their remaining frozen embryos.  David wanted to 
place the remaining frozen embryos up for adoption while Becky wanted to use a 
surrogate mother to implant the embryos and then raise the resulting children as her own.  
Their cryopreservation contract stipulated that if the couple did not retrieve their embryos 
within five years, the embryos would be thawed and but not developed which would 
effectively destroy the embryos.  It also stipulated that in the event of a divorce, if the 
couple could not reach a consensus concerning disposition, the conflict would be 




adjudicated in court.  The case reached the Washington State Supreme Court in Litowitz 
v. Litowitz, (48 P.3d 261, 2002).   
The cryopreservation agreement stated that the ―legal ownership of any stored pre 
zygotes must be determined in a property settlement‖ which effectively classified the 
embryos as property rather than persons (48 P.3d 261, 524).  However, in her petition to 
the court, Becky denied that embryos were property and used the term ―child‖ to refer to 
the embryos claiming that she had a constitutional right to custody and companionship of 
a child (48 P.3d 261, 531).  Thus the Washington Supreme Court was directly faced with 
the dilemma of classifying the embryos as property or person.  Instead, the Court 
sidestepped the issue claiming ―whether a pre-embryo is a ‗child‘ is not a logical or 
relevant inquiry under the record now before this court. Besides, Petitioner has not cited 
sufficient authority to support her argument‖ (48 P.3d 261, 531).   
The Washington Supreme Court did not discuss the property classification of the 
contract and instead enforced the section of the contract that stated that unclaimed 
embryos would be thawed and not developed.  The effective destruction of the embryos 
was contrary to the wishes of both David and Becky neither of whom wanted to destroy 
the embryos but wanted the embryos to be developed albeit in different manners.  In his 
dissent, Judge Chambers criticized the decision saying that the ruling ―calls for the 
destruction of unborn human life even when, or if, both contracting parties agreed the 
pre-embryos should be brought to fruition as a living child‖ (48 P.3d 261, 530).  
Chambers likened the decision to the Biblical story of Solomon who, when faced with a 
disagreement over the true parentage of a child, ruled that the baby should be cut in half 
to appease both parties.  Becky Litowitz vehemently disagreed with the decision and tried 
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to take her case to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court denied Becky Litowitz's 
petition for a writ of certiorari (Litowitz v. Litowitz, 537 U.S. 1191, 2003).  The denial 
was unfortunate for this study because it would have given the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to clarify the personhood status of an embryo in a new context and would set 
the precedent for cases related to IVF procedures that will certainly rise in number as IVF 
becomes more popular with infertile couples.  
In the last five years, several cases have confirmed the property value of frozen 
embryos.  In Roman v. Roman (193 SW3d 40, 50 Tex App, 2006), the Texas Court of 
Appeals ruled that frozen embryos were community property and that they should be 
destroyed according to the wishes of the husband, Randy Roman, who could not be 
forced into procreation.  Again the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of 
certiorari (553 U.S. 1048, 2008).  In Dahl v. Angle (222 Or App 572, 2009), the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Oregon found that frozen embryos were marital property subject 
to contractual rights.  Writing for the court, Judge Armstrong explained, ―We 
acknowledge that there is some inherent awkwardness in describing these contractual 
rights as ‗personal property,‘ as we discuss in more detail below.  However, we 
nonetheless conclude that the right to possess or dispose of the frozen embryos is 
personal property that is subject to a just and proper division under ORS 107.105‖ (222 
Or App 572, 838).  The court followed the precedent of ruling in favor of the party that 
did not want to procreate, however the decision was groundbreaking in its categorization 
of the frozen embryo as property.  
 These cases represent the few IVF related opinions that concern the personhood 
status of frozen embryos.  However, IVF is becoming increasingly popular for couples 
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facing fertility problems and thus will soon become a mainstream issue for the courts.  
While Dahl v. Angle suggests that the embryo is property, some state legislatures have 
disagreed.  Louisiana has already passed a law stating that non-implanted embryos are 
juridical persons that cannot be destroyed.  As the courts adjudicate more cases involving 
frozen embryos, the rights of biological parents, surrogate mothers, and the medical 
laboratories the produced the embryos, many issues concerning personhood and property 
will arise.  The courts will have to revisit the issue of whether the frozen embryo is 
marital property or has an elevated status based on the criteria of personhood.  This issue 
portends to create controversy on the level of Roe v. Wade.  
  
The Continuing Issue of Abortion 
 While the state courts were navigating uncharted territory such as IVF cases, the 
U.S. Supreme Court was also entering new territory in the arena of abortion.  At issue 
was a Nebraska law that banned intact dilation and extraction, commonly known as 
partial birth abortion, without exception for the health of the mother.  Partial birth 
abortion is a controversial procedure in which the physician delivers the body of the 
fetus, except for the head, into the birth canal.  The head is then pierced with scissors and 
the brain matter is suctioned out causing the skull to collapse.  The dead fetus is then 
removed from the woman‘s body.  This procedure was contentious because a live fetus is 
partially born – thus the name partial birth abortion – and it usually involves late term 
fetuses.  Although the scientific community has differing opinions on the subject, there is 
a possibility that if the procedure is performed late enough in the pregnancy, the fetus 
will be able to feel pain during the abortion.  This possibility raises the philosophical 
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question of whether the procedure might end the life of a person.  Those who oppose the 
procedure liken it to infanticide.   
Nebraska was one of many states that had some type of restriction on this 
procedure.  Proponents of Nebraska‘s restrictions pointed out that Nebraska‘s laws 
governing human treatment of animals made it a criminal act to mistreat animals through 
maiming, disfiguring, torturing, and mutilation.  These proponents of Nebraska‘s 
restrictions compared the laws against animal mistreatment to that of partial birth 
abortion which they claimed was a similarly offensive procedure.
420
  Critics of the ban on 
partial birth abortion pointed out that a very small percentage of abortions actually use 
this method, so the ban would not save the life of any fetuses – physicians would just use 
another method that might be more dangerous to the mother.  Critics saw the Nebraska 
law as another attempt to narrow abortion rights.   
  Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who specialized in late term abortions, 
brought suit claiming that the Nebraska law violated the undue burden test in Akron and 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.  The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
sided with Carhart, and in the year 2000, the case came to the Supreme Court as Stenberg 
v. Carhart (530 U.S. 914).  In the Supreme Court opinion, Justice Breyer, citing Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, found that the Nebraska law imposed an undue burden on the 
woman and thus was unconstitutional.  Breyer also objected to the fact the Nebraska law 
failed to contain an exception for the health of the mother.  Justice O‘Connor joined the 
majority opinion, but wrote a separate concurring opinion which argued that a ban that 
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only proscribed the dilation and extraction procedure and included an exception for the 
life and health of the mother would be constitutional.   
 The Court opinion was joined by five justices, although O‘Connor‘s concurrence 
was somewhat shaky. The four justices who dissented wrote vehement and passionate 
opinions denouncing the Court decision and the Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision.  
Justice Kennedy argued that the dilation and extraction method killed the fetus outside of 
the woman where the fetus then had ―an autonomy which separates it from the right of 
the woman to choose treatments for her own body‖ (530 U.S. 914, 963).  Justice Scalia 
wrote that an opinion that stated partial birth abortion is ―a value judgment, dependent 
upon how much one respects (or believes society ought to respect) the life of a partially 
delivered fetus, and how much one respects (or believes society ought to respect) the 
freedom of the woman who gave it life to kill it.  Evidently, the five Justices in today's 
majority value the former less, or the latter more, (or both), than the four of us in dissent. 
Case closed‖ (530 U.S. 914, 955). 
 After the Stenberg v. Carhart decision, the U.S. Congress became involved in the 
debate and passed the Partial Birth Abortion Act in 2003. This law was a federal ban on 
the dilation and extraction procedure with an exception to save the life of the woman.  
Opponents of the law argued that this was a backdoor way for the Republican Congress 
to press for personhood rights for the fetus.  American public opinion seemed to back the 
new legislation.  Although most Americans thought that abortion should be legal in at 
least some instances, a 2007 Pew Research poll found that seventy-five percent of those 
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surveyed thought that partial birth abortion should be illegal.  A 2007 Gallup poll 
mirrored these results with seventy-two percent saying the procedure should be illegal.
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 The opinion polls came on the heels of a Supreme Court challenge to the federal 
Partial Birth Abortion Act.  Leroy Carhart again brought suit claiming that the law was 
unconstitutional.  The case Gonzales v. Leroy Carhart and the companion case Gonzales 
v. Planned Parenthood were decided by the Court in 2007. (550 U.S. 124)  By 2007, 
Justice O‘Connor, whose support for the majority opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart was 
shaky, was replaced by John Roberts whose political leanings were thought to be more 
conservative than O‘Connor‘s.  Thus, it was not surprising that the Court decided to 
uphold the federal law.  
 The Court opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, stressed the holding of Casey v. 
Planned Parenthood that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the health of the 
mother and the life of the fetus throughout pregnancy.  The Court found that the federal 
law did not present an undue burden to women and thus was a legitimate exercise of the 
state‘s power to protect the health of the mother and the life of the fetus.  
  Justice Kennedy then opined about the nature of the fetus subject to that type of 
abortion procedure.   
Unborn children are thus in a uniquely unprotected position.  Most other 
living beings in our society, from rabid animals to serial murderers, are 
protected from this manner of death by torture or cruelty laws.  For 
example, drawing and quartering, a method of execution eerily similar to 
D&E abortions, was banned over a century ago as inhumane for a 
civilized society to inflict on criminals.  Because unborn children do not 
have lives recognizable in a court of law, however, they are not granted 
Eighth Amendment or any other protections against cruel and unusual 
treatment. (550 U.S. 124, 27) 
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Justice Kennedy considered the fact that in a dilation and extraction abortion, the fetus is 
to some extent born which makes the deliberate killing of such an organism questionable. 
He argued that the line between being in utero and being outside the womb was the line 
separating abortion from infanticide.  His use of the term ―unborn children‖ was 
significant because it signaled his acceptance that a fetus, at least in the late stages, was a 
person.   
 Antiabortion advocates heralded the decision.  Because dilation and extraction 
involved bringing the fetus outside of the uterus, there was some argument that once the 
fetus left the uterus it had a claim to personhood because it was no longer ―attached‖ to 
the woman.  These ―unattached‖ fetuses, as persons, would have government protection 
and the right to health benefits and protective custody.  However, very few fetuses that 
are removed from the uterus are able to survive independently.  Others who opposed 
partial birth abortion argued that the method was particularly brutal and that the fetus 
may be able to feel the pain of the procedure.  They argued that if the fetus was a sentient 
being, then it could not be disposed of in this manner – even if the fetus were not granted 
full personhood status.  On the other hand, defenders of abortion saw the decision as a 
significant curtailment of a woman‘s rights.  They argued that the dilation and extraction 
method was very seldom used and banning the procedure did not save the lives of any 
fetuses.  They viewed the banning of the particular procedure as an underhanded way to 
limit abortion rights in general.  
 
Unresolved Issues Remain 
The decision in Gonzales v. Leroy Carhart (2007) demonstrates that the debate 
over abortion was just as volatile as it was in 1973 when Roe v. Wade was decided.  Since 
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the Roe decision, the Supreme Court has never overruled its initial decision that the fetus 
is not a person.  However, the Gonzales v. Carhart decision which compares the dilation 
and extraction procedure to infanticide comes closer to recognizing at least partial 
personhood rights for the fetus.  After thirty-four years, the issue of fetal personhood is 
still very much open for debate.  
 Since Roe, the Supreme Court has denied the status of person for the fetus in 
relation to abortion, and it seems unlikely that the Court will overrule that precedent.  
However, even though the Court has not granted personhood to the fetus, this does not 
necessarily mean that abortion is morally permissible.  There is still a legitimate 
argument that a being does not need to be a ―person‖ in order to have its life protected.  
In other words, personhood is not the prerequisite for a guarantee of life under the 
Constitution.  Slaves were freed under the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, but African 
Americans were not granted personhood until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 
1868.  Thus, for over two years, African Americans had some constitutional protections 
such as the right to life without being persons.  Similarly, the lives of some animals are 
protected under the law even though they are not considered persons.  The law could 
certainly grant protection of life to fetuses based on non-personhood criteria and still 
maintain that fetuses do not qualify as full persons under the law.   
 An opposing argument can also be easily argued.  If the law were to deem fetuses 
to be persons, this does not necessarily mean that abortion would be illegal.  This 
argument was made in the Roe section and bears repeating.  Abortion involves the rights 
of a woman to her bodily integrity and control over her destiny – in short the rights 
necessary for her personhood.  The rights of the woman come in conflict with those of 
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the fetus, and even if the fetus were a person under the law, the law would still need to 
adjudicate the conflict between these two opposing interests.  The courts may very well 
side with the woman and grant a right to abortion.  Given the precedent of freedom to 
abortion before viability, even if the pre-viable fetus was a person, the courts might still 
rule in favor of the woman‘s rights as a person.   
 While a precedent has been established of denying personhood to the fetus in 
cases of abortion, in cases concerning fetal injury and wrongful death, this is not the case.  
In this area of the law, there is a long line of precedent granting fetal personhood.  In 
these cases, unlike the abortion arena, there is usually not a conflict between the woman 
and fetus.  Thus, an injury or wrongful death to the fetus is a harm that is also felt by the 
woman who desires a live, healthy child.  Because this primal conflict does not exist, it is 
easier for judges to rule in favor of the fetus and the mother.  Advances in medical 
knowledge have also contributed to the injured fetus‘s claim because physicians now 
better understand how ingested substances, environmental toxins, and other potential 
threats can make a lasting impact on the life of the fetus once born.  In short, medical 
advances have helped the court prove a line of causality from in utero stimuli to ex utero 
effects.  The courts have concluded that born children who have suffered injury in utero 
due to negligence or deliberate injury must have some recourse through the law.  Thus, 
the courts are willing to grant personhood to the fetus for the purposes of seeking 
recompense for in utero damage. 
 Personhood for the fetus seems most likely to be granted in non-abortion contexts.  
Precedents establishing personhood in these contexts do not need to bleed over into the 
abortion arena.  Robert Blank, a political scientist who specializes in biomedical ethics in 
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New Zealand, argues, ―The courts should define the fetus as a ‗person‘ with protectable 
rights, at least in those cases where the fetus‘s rights will not conflict with the 
constitutional rights of other persons.  In cases where the mother and fetus are both 
victims – for instance, if someone commits a violent act on a pregnant woman – the 
rationale underlying abortion considerations no longer apply because the rights of the 
mother and the fetus are parallel, not conflicting.‖
422
  However, as the review of cases 
indicates, law concerning fetal personhood does sometimes become mixed even when the 
claims involved are vastly different.  For abortion advocates, there is a fear that granting 
personhood in injury and wrongful death cases will spill over to abortion law and 
jeopardize the right to abortion.  For those against abortion, there is a hope that spillover 
will indeed occur.  This need not occur.  Careful jurisprudence can maintain separate 
bestowals of personhood depending upon the context of the situation and the 
Constitutional rights and protections at hand.  However, if a goal of the judicial system is 
consistency, then the bestowal of fetal personhood should apply to the various legal 
situations involving the fetus.  
 This analysis has focused on the role of the judicial branch in granting or denying 
fetal personhood.  While the court system has been particularly active in this policy 
arena, the legislative branch at both the national and state levels have proposed and 
debated various bills concerning fetal personhood.  Immediately after Roe v. Wade was 
decided, Congressional leaders in both the House and Senate proposed various Human 
Life Amendments that defined the terms ―human being‖ and ―person‖ as applying to all 
humans from the moment of conception.  Constitutional Amendments that extend 
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personhood to fetuses have been proposed numerous times since 1973 but have never 
gained enough support for passage.  
 The various Human Life Amendments were primarily directed against abortion.  
However, violent crimes against pregnant women prompted legislation to include the 
fetus as a victim of violent crime.  In these instances, the fetus can be considered a person 
in order to classify the wrongful death of a fetus as a murder.  A majority of states have 
some type of legislation to this effect.  The issue of fetal murder gained national attention 
in 2002 when a California woman, Laci Peterson, who was seven and a half months 
pregnant, went missing.  Four months later, a couple walking their dog discovered the 
corpse of a well-preserved fetus in the San Francisco Bay.  Laci Peterson‘s body was 
discovered the next day.  Laci Peterson‘s husband was convicted of murder in the first 
degree for Laci and in the second degree for the unborn fetus.  
 The fury over this well known case increased support for a national law to protect 
pregnant women and their fetuses.  In 2004, President Bush signed the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act which is commonly known as Laci and Connor‘s Law.  This piece of 
legislation includes a child in utero as a legal victim when injured or killed by any of 
over 60 federal crimes of violence.  The law defines a child in utero as ―a member of the 
species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.‖  Some 
supporters of abortion opposed the legislation arguing that the fetus is not a ―person‖ and 
the legislation comes dangerously close to recognizing fetal rights that might obstruct 
abortion rights.  
 Fetal personhood was a key issue in several recent elections.  In 2008, Colorado 
citizens voted on Amendment 48 which states ―The term ‗person‘ or ‗persons‘ shall 
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include any human being from the moment of fertilization.‖  In November 2011, a similar 
ballot initiative was presented to Mississippi voters which stated, ―The term ‗person‘ or 
‗persons‘ shall include every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning or 
the functional equivalent thereof.‖  If passed, these amendments would have wide 
ranging ramifications such as a ban on abortion and in vitro fertilization which both 
involve the fetus and embryo.  It could also result in more restrictions on the behavior of 
pregnant women during pregnancy and the actions of attending physicians in their 
treatments.  However, both the Colorado and the Mississippi measures were defeated.
423
   
 These legislative issues illustrate that fetal personhood is still very much a 
controversial subject within American political society.  American citizens remain deeply 
divided on the issue.  On the one hand, a fetus is a living human being who, through the 
course of life, will become a child, adult, and finally an elder.  Proponents of fetal 
personhood argue that the fetus is no different from a human at any other stage of life, 
and thus must be considered a person.  Detractors of fetal personhood argue that the fetus 
does not have the mental and rational capacities that qualify a being to be bestowed the 
status of person.  As this chapter demonstrates, the debate over fetal personhood is more 
than just a philosophical exercise – it affects many of the rights and immunities 
guaranteed by the Constitution.  Abortion law, as well as wrongful injury, homicide, and 
murder law, all hinge on the outcome of the debate.  Further, new political controversies 
such as in vitro fertilization and cloning will be affected by decisions regarding fetal 
personhood.  The status of the fetus seems to be an issue with no definitive resolution in 
sight.  
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Analysis of Hypotheses 
 While the status of the fetus remains unresolved, perhaps by looking to the core 
theory for guidance and then comparing the personhood of fetuses to that of slaves and 
corporations, some possible resolutions can be found.  Even though fetuses, slaves, and 
corporations are vastly different types of entities, there are some similarities in the core 
theory and in the legal analysis.  My first hypothesis was that the core theory of 
personhood would influence the law.  Locke and Kant as well as theorists who follow 
their liberal tradition are often cited in discussions over fetal personhood.  Both the 
literature and cases involving fetuses reference the works of Locke and Kant to a much 
greater degree than do the chapters on slaves and corporations perhaps reflecting the 
moral and legal significance of this controversial subject.  
Locke views the human body as the private property of a person and he argues 
that a person must protect the health of his body.  Some scholars have used these 
arguments to contend that Locke would have condoned abortion as a legitimate exercise 
of one‘s property right over the body and an important step in preserving the health of a 
woman.  In an amicus curiae brief for the case Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
(492 U.S. 490), the American Public Health Association cites Locke‘s argument that an 
individual is sovereign over his own health and body, and government cannot impose 
health risks on its citizens by limiting abortion.
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However, these arguments can be turned around.  Locke argues that a person is 
bound to protect her health and cannot cause harm to herself.  If the fetus is part of the 
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self, then a woman would be obligated to protect the fetus as well.
425
  Further, much of 
Locke‘s writing concerns the parental obligation to care for and educate children which 
indicates that he believed that children had moral value.  An amicus curiae brief for Roe 
v. Wade on behalf of the Association of Texas Diocesan Attorneys quotes Locke‘s 
theories of rearing offspring to argue that the fetus, as human offspring, has moral worth 
that must be respected.
426
  As can be seen, both sides of the abortion argument have 
directly cited Locke as support for their argument demonstrating the influence of the core 
theory on the central legal issues in this line of cases.  However, since Locke has been 
used on both sides of the debate, we cannot conclude that Locke‘s works support 
personhood or non-personhood.  
Kant specifically writes that children, from the time of procreation, are persons 
with an innate right to the care of their parents.
427
  Therefore, it can be concluded that 
Kant considers the fetus, from the time of procreation or conception, to be a being that 
must be protected and cannot be aborted.  Surprisingly, given the large number of amicus 
curiae briefs for each of the Supreme Court abortion cases, these Kantian theories, which 
are strong argument against abortion practices, have not been cited in any case to date.   
 Although Kant has not been directly cited in any of the briefs or opinions I 
analyzed, the themes of distinguishing between person and property, as well as person 
and human being, which have their roots in Locke and Kant, are repeated many times in 
the fetal cases.  The criteria of rational acceptability and social acceptance are used to 
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separate the fetus as a human from the fetus as a person.  The potential property status of 
the fetus as a part of the woman‘s body versus the fact that a fetus, as a potential person 
and a human being, should not be used as a means to an end, also have their roots in the 
core theory.  In comparison to slaves and corporations, the cases concerning the fetus 
have the most direct ties to the core theory.  Therefore, my hypothesis that the core theory 
influences the law is strongly supported.   
 My second hypothesis is that fetal personhood will be discussed in terms of the 
dichotomy between person and human being, as well as person and property.  The 
analysis of cases finds support for this hypothesis as well.  The dichotomy between 
person and human being has been thoroughly analyzed by the Supreme Court justices as 
they adjudicate abortion.  Cases concerning the fetus quite often recount the biological 
progression a fetus goes through as the brain develops and organs grow culminating in 
viability and then birth.  The core theory however does not heavily rely on overall 
biological development but instead focuses on cognitive development.   
Several of the Supreme Court opinions addressing abortion mirror the core theory 
and examine the development of the fetus to see if there is a compelling point at which 
the fetus gains cognitive capabilities such as sentience, ability to interact with 
surroundings, and capacity to think in a rational manner.  However, the Court takes into 
consideration other milestones beyond cognitive capabilities as well.  For instance, in the 
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision, viability was the significant milestone.  In his 
dissent in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490 (1989) Justice 
Blackmun speaks of the capacity to feel physical pain as an important milestone.  
Sentience is an early capacity of the developing brain, and viability depends upon both 
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mental and physical abilities.  Although sentience and viability are not criteria of a 
rational person as described by Locke or Dennett, both of these milestones for bestowing 
personhood depend upon a level of cognitive capacity and are part of the sequence of 
developmental events that eventually lead to rational agency.  Overall, it seems as though 
the Court has considered the dichotomy between person and human being, and has based 
some of its important reasoning on the cognitive capabilities set forth in the core theory.    
The courts have also adjudicated the property aspects involved with a fetus 
although this subject has not been discussed in a forthright manner.  A careful analysis of 
the text of the fetus cases reveals that justices are reticent to directly analyze the reasons 
why a fetus could be deemed property.  This reticence likely stems from an unwillingness 
to compare any human entity to property in fear of resurrecting the concerns of slavery.  
However, although justices are reluctant to discuss some of the property aspects of the 
fetus, many of the amicus curiae briefs in the abortion cases discuss the issue.   
The person versus property distinction is important in the abortion cases because, 
if the woman owns her body, and a fetus is part of her body, then a woman can decide to 
remove a part of her body that she no longer desires.  Byrn v. New York City Health & 
Hospitals Corp. 31 N.Y.2d 194; 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972) was the only fetal case in my 
data set that directly addressed the property issue.  In Judge Burke‘s dissent, he argues 
that even if a woman‘s body is her private property, the fetus within her body is not part 
of that property and thus she may not destroy the fetus (31 N.Y.2d 194, 212).   
 Roe v. Wade and the subsequent Supreme Court opinions concerning abortion do 
not directly say that if the fetus is not granted personhood then the fetus can be classified 
as property.  The Court avoids the touchy issue of calling a human being a type of 
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property because the issue echoes America‘s troubled past with slavery.  Although the 
Supreme Court avoids the issue, many of the amicus curiae briefs issued in the abortion 
cases use the analogy to slavery to argue that a fetus cannot be considered property and 
thus must be a person.  For example, in an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the National 
Legal Foundation for Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (492 U.S. 490), the 
attorneys argued that the Roe Court implicitly classified a fetus as property when it 
denied the status of personhood.  Roe does not mention the fetus as property, but the 
National Legal Foundation argues that the converse of person is property and therefore if 
the fetus is not a person it must be property.  This argument is not valid because the Roe 
court classifies the fetus as a potential person rather than property.  The National Legal 
Foundation makes this faulty argument in order to draw parallels to slavery and generate 
support for its argument against abortion. Other amici echo the National Legal 




 Beyond the issues of fetal injury and abortion, the matter of the fetus and the 
embryo as property is central in disputes over frozen embryos that remain after an in vitro 
fertilization (IVF).  In the case Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992), Judge 
Daughtrey‘s opinion was that an embryo and a fetus cannot be considered property.  This 
issue is bound to arise again however as IVF becomes more widespread and custody 
battles continue over frozen embryos.  
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In summary, the analysis of cases also supports my second hypothesis that fetal 
personhood is discussed in terms of the dichotomy between person and human being, as 
well as person and property.  The law has not reached a firm conclusion on how to 
classify the fetus within these dichotomies.  In the abortion cases, the Supreme Court 
decided that, although the fetus is human, it does not qualify as a person because it is not 
yet a rational agent.  The Supreme Court has not gone so far as to classify the fetus as 
property, but the argument that a fetus could be property will continue to come before the 
law as cases concerning frozen embryos are adjudicated.   
The courts have referred to the core theory and accompanying dichotomies as 
they have wrestled with the difficult issue of fetal personhood.  The core theory has 
helped clarify some of the issues and has led to decisions in abortion and fetal injury 
cases.  However, the courts have not come to an absolute resolution on the issue of fetal 
personhood.  The fact that a firm resolution on personhood has yet to be obtained is 
demonstrated when the fetus cases are compared to the slave and corporation cases.  My 
third hypothesis is that cases I analyze should be consistent in their bestowal of 
personhood.  However, a comparison of personhood for slaves, corporations, and fetuses 
demonstrates both consistencies and inconsistencies in adjudicating personhood.  
 There are apt comparisons that can be made between the property status of the 
fetus and the property status of the slave.  Both are subject to the control of another 
human being and the personhood of both is diminished due to its property status.  As 
explained, most justices and judges are very hesitant to affirm the property status of the 
fetus because they do not want to resurrect the issues of slavery where one person could 
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hold a property right in another.  Despite the care taken by the legal system to avoid 
comparisons with the slavery issue, there are academic parallels.   
As a part of a woman‘s body, there is a sense in which the woman owns her fetus 
just as she has a type of ownership in herself.  Therefore there is a sense in which the 
fetus can be considered the property of the mother carrying it.  Although the law is 
reluctant to directly verify this property status, it is underlying the argument that the 
woman has a right to make decisions about her body and her fetus.  The fetus is also a 
human being with the potential to develop into an autonomous and rational person in the 
course of normal growth.  The fetus has the dual status of both property and 
person/potential person.  This dual status has similarities to the slave who was both 
property and person.   
As property, the slave‘s life was subject to the control of the master. So too, the 
fate of the fetus is at the hands of the mother who can decide to carry it to term or end the 
pregnancy.  So in a real sense, both the slave and the fetus have been considered human 
property.  The slave‘s status of person was denied so that the status of property could be 
upheld.  There was no doubt that the slave was a rational, autonomous individual.  
Instead of acknowledging that the slave was a person, antebellum American society 
denied the slave‘s personhood because the slave was not socially accepted as part of ―We 
the people‖ or the community of moral and legal persons. The status of person was 
wrongly denied to the slave.   
This differs from the fetus whose status as a person is questioned because the 
fetus does not qualify for personhood based on the criteria of autonomy and rationality.  
The fetus, who has the potential to develop into an autonomous and rational individual, is 
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deemed a potential person.  There is another parallel between the slave and the fetus in 
terms of being socially accepted.  Social acceptance for the fetus depends upon the 
pregnant woman who carries the fetus and can accept or reject her pregnancy.  Women 
who acknowledge their fetus and decide to carry it to term have socially accepted their 
fetus as a member of society.  Women who do not desire a pregnancy and terminate, have 
not acknowledged the fetus as a member of the community of persons.  Again, pointing 
out the similarities between slaves and fetuses along the social acceptance criterion does 
not say that women who choose to abort are on a moral par with slave owners.  Nor does 
it mean that a slave has the same moral status as a fetus.  If the fetus is not considered to 
qualify as a legal and moral person based on a host of criteria, then there may be valid 
reasons for not accepting a fetus into the social community of persons while the slave 
was wrongly denied acceptance.  However, for those who believe that the fetus has moral 
importance, the denial of personhood is akin to the denial in slave society.  Social 
acceptance is a common criterion when adjudicating the personhood of both entities.  
Demonstrating the parallels between personhood for slaves and for fetuses evokes 
the passion that exists within the fetal debate and still exists from the past mistake of 
slavery.  The parallels drawn in this study are academic and not designed to illustrate that 
abortion is a moral offense on a par with slavery.  However, some advocates who believe 
passionately that a fetus should be considered a person despite its lack of capabilities 
draw parallels to the slave debate arguing that just as slavery wrongly denied personhood 
to a subset of humans, so too does legalized abortion deny personhood to the unborn.  In 
many amicus curiae briefs for abortion cases, the subject of slavery and the Dred Scott 
case are mentioned by advocates for fetal protection.  An amicus curiae brief in Gonzales 
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v. Carhart states, ―There is no more basis to hold that a negro is not a person under the 
Constitution as there is to hold that an unborn child is not a person under the 
Constitution.‖
429
  Similar arguments have appeared in amicus curiae briefs for every 
Supreme Court cases concerning abortion since Roe v. Wade.
 430
  
In the abortion cases, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a fetus should 
have personhood simply because a fetus is human.  During the slavery debates, the 
Supreme Court also rejected the argument that a slave qualified for personhood simply 
because the slave was human.  In the same vein, the Supreme Court has granted 
personhood to other entities that are not human such as corporations as well as ships and 
other non-human entities.  Thus, it seems that the Supreme Court has been consistent in 
holding that humanity is not a decisive criterion for personhood.  The fact that 
corporations, which are not human, are granted personhood and fetuses, which are 
human, are denied personhood has been a point of contention for fetal advocates.  
Numerous amicus curiae briefs call attention to this fact and argue that if a corporation is 
granted personhood, a fetus should also be granted this status.
 431
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 The Supreme Court decided that while a fetus is a human being, it does not 
qualify as a person.  This parallels the slave cases in which the Supreme Court confirmed 
that a human being does not automatically qualify as person.  The decision to exclude 
slaves from personhood was primarily based on the fact that slaves were property and 
thus could not be persons and on the fact that slaves were not accepted into the 
community of persons.  The decision to exclude fetuses was primarily based on the fact 
that fetuses have not yet qualified for personhood based on criteria such as sentience and 
rational capability.  A secondary reason for denying personhood to the fetus is that it is 
not completely accepted into the community of persons.  In comparing the two entities, 
the law realized that slaves were rational agents and yet still denied personhood.  On the 
other hand, the law found that fetuses were not rational agents and therefore denied 
personhood.  This is an inconsistency.  Rational capability was not a strong determining 
factor for slaves, but by the time the fetal cases arose, rational capability was a significant 
determinant of personhood.  The consistency lies in the fact that social acceptability is an 
important criterion for both slave cases and fetal cases.   
The parallel between the corporation cases and the fetal cases is that personhood 
for both entities revolved around rational capabilities.  The corporation, as a collective of 
rational individuals, was allowed to qualify as a collective person based on the capacities 
of its components.  Because the fetus is not a rational agent, personhood was denied.   
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There seems to be some consistency here because the Court has relied upon rational 
agency for both entities.   
My final hypothesis was that there should be consistencies in how justices 
adjudicate various entities vying for personhood.  The analysis reveals both consistencies 
and inconsistencies.  Rational capability was a decisive factor for granting personhood to 
corporations and denying personhood to fetuses. However, the courts did not use rational 
capacity for the slave cases.  Another consistency is that social acceptability into the 
community of persons was important for the slave, corporation, and fetal cases.  With 
some consistencies and inconsistencies, it seems that the criteria of property status, 
rational capacity, and acceptance as a person by other persons are taken into 
consideration when the law adjudicates cases involving personhood, but these are not 
concrete standards.   
The next chapter concerns another entity whose status is unresolved – the great 
ape.  Using the psychological criteria of rationality and autonomy used to analyze the 
fetus, the great ape, which has advanced cognitive capacities among other animals, seems 
to qualify as a person.  However, just like the fetus, the great ape is not completely 
accepted into the realm of fellow persons.  Therefore, the legal and moral status of the 
great ape is open to question.  With that in mind, the next chapter considers the 






Where to Draw the Line – Are Non-human Animals Persons? 
 
 
 Nim Chimpsky was born on November 19, 1973 at the Institute for Primate 
Studies in Oklahoma.  He was the son of Carolyn, a full-grown chimpanzee, but was soon 
adopted by a human family who would raise the chimp and teach him sign language.  
Nim Chimpsky was part of a large experiment to prove that chimpanzees could master 
sign language and therefore communicate with the human race.  The name Nim 
Chimpsky was a gibe at Noam Chomsky who argued that only humans had the capability 
to master human language structure and grammar.  Nim‘s trainers sought to prove 
Chomsky wrong by establishing that a chimp could indeed participate in a form of human 
communication.  One of the most significant dividing lines between humans and animals 
has traditionally been drawn at the ability to communicate through language.  An 
animal‘s silence is often interpreted as an inability to think or reason which is further 
used to justify categorizing animals as property rather than persons.  If Nim Chimpsky 
could learn human sign language, Nim would demonstrate his ability to relate his 
thoughts and feelings and in this respect meet a criterion for personhood.  
Soon after he was born, an affluent couple adopted Nim into their family of seven 
human children.  They planned to raise Nim just like any other human child.  Tellingly, 
as the family was driving home after receiving Nim, his ―sister‖ Jenny asked if Nim was 
a new baby or a pet.  The response was silence – the answer to this question haunted 
Project Nim and all other studies examining the personhood of great apes.
432
  In some 
respects, Nim seemed to thrive with his adoptive family, and he mastered a large 
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vocabulary of signs.  He was even able to string three to four words together to request 
his favorite foods and often initiated conversations with humans.  Nim also had the self-
awareness to realize when his behavior was unacceptable in human terms – he would 
admonish himself when he had disobeyed rules and signed ―I‘m sorry.‖  Nim even played 
jokes on his caretakers such as hiding utensils while helping prepare dinner.
433
  Nim also 
experienced great sadness and loneliness as his human trainers entered and exited his life.  
When his chimp friend Sally died, Nim grieved for months.  When Nim was given a 
stack of photographs of chimps, including himself, as well as pictures of humans, Nim 
put his picture in the pile with humans indicating that he self-identified with humans 
rather than his own species.  One trainer remarked, ―I don't think Nim had any concept 
that he was a chimp.‖
434
  
 In many ways, Nim was like a person capable of expressing his desires, emotions, 
and frustrations.  However, Nim was not human and therefore not accepted as a person.  
Nim was very much the property of his human trainers and this made him subject to a 
series of experiments and grueling training sessions.  When his human family decided 
that they could no longer care for Nim in their New York home, Nim was moved around 
the country and placed in a series of laboratories where Nim lived in a cage and lacked 
minimal comfort items.  Each displacement was upsetting to Nim, and he signed his 
longing to return to a human home and to rejoin a family.  However, Nim was simply 
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animal property and thus was not entitled to anything more than the protections of a lab 
animal even though he had extraordinary abilities. 
 Nim Chimpsky proved that he could communicate rudimentary thoughts and 
feelings, but his project managers were not completely convinced that Nim had mastered 
human language.  Project director Herbert Terrace concluded that although Nim could 
sign a large number of words, his comprehension was relatively low.
435
  Even if Nim 
could prove a rudimentary understanding of sign language, mastering a human language 
was only one criterion of personhood.  Nim did not exhibit other capabilities such as the 
ability to form long-term plans or consider the ethics of his actions.  By the end of the 
experiment, the scientists concluded that Nim had extraordinary abilities for a non-human 
animal, but he did not reach the levels of rationality and consciousness possessed by 
humans.   
Even though Nim‘s trainers did not come to a conclusion on whether or not Nim 
should be considered a person, the very nature of the experiment called into question the 
property and personhood status of great apes.  The idea that an experiment would remove 
an ape from the traditional laboratory cage was a radical concept – even more radical was 
raising the chimp as a human child.  The experiment opened the eyes of many observers 
to the similarities between great apes and humans and endeared the chimp to humans.
436
  
When Nim was sold to a laboratory for medical experiments, his first adoptive mother 
told a reporter, ―It‘s like seeing your child sold for medical experiments.  I just don‘t 
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think Nim is going to survive.‖
437
  Indeed, the story about a chimp that was raised as a 
human child and could communicate with humans in a familiar manner caused people to 
consider that chimpanzees were sentient beings that were very closely related to humans.  
The New York Times ran a story about Nim and asked, ―Do animals suffer 
needlessly?‖
438
  Nim became the ―poster child‖ for those protesting the use of animals in 
experiments.  Although the public wanted safe vaccines for diseases such as hepatitis B, 
testing the vaccines on a chimp that grew up with an affluent family in New York and 
could communicate with sign language pushed the limits of what much of the public 
would tolerate in terms of animal experimentation.  
 Nim‘s story raised the issue of whether advanced creatures such as Nim and other 
great apes should have legal rights or at least legal protections.  Upon hearing Nim‘s 
story, Attorney Henry Herrmann offered to represent Nim in court against New York 
University which had sold Nim to be used in medical experiments.  Herrmann declared 
that Nim was sui generis or in a class by himself due to his abilities and thus could not be 
treated in the same manner as other research animals.  Herrmann prepared a habeas 
corpus petition asking, ―Does Nim feel cruelly treated?‖ and hoped to bring Nim into the 
courtroom to answer the question.  Although sign language interpreters were common in 
the courtroom, an ape in the courtroom was not common!  Herrmann planned to exact 
testimony from Nim‘s project director Herbert Terrace to bear witness that Nim‘s IQ was 
higher than that of many mentally disabled humans who had been given their day in 
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court.  Rather than requiring Nim to take the oath, Herrmann found a nineteenth-century 
precedent where a judge had personally deemed a witness reliable and waived the oath.  
Nim was prepared to have his day in court.  However, before the case was heard, 
opposing counsel called Herrmann and said, ―Tell your client he can walk.‖
439
  This was 
fortunate because the judge was reportedly overheard telling a clerk, ―If you think I‘m 




 Nim was rescued before he was injected with hepatitis B and he retired to an 
animal sanctuary in Texas.  However, even at the sanctuary, Nim suffered from 
loneliness as he was the only chimp and none of the human caretakers could speak 
American Sign Language (ASL).  Nim desperately signed to visitors hoping that 
someone would be able to reciprocate and engage him in conversation.  After realizing 
that Nim needed companionship, the sanctuary brought in several other chimps to keep 
him company.  It appeared that Nim lived out the rest of his life in relative comfort, but 
he died at a very young age of twenty-six from a heart attack most likely caused by the 
amount of stress he endured in his life.  
 The story of Nim Chimpsky raises many of the questions involved in a discussion 
about personhood for non-human animals.  The fundamental question is where we draw 
the line when distinguishing persons from all other beings.  Traditionally, persons are 
human beings and human beings are persons.  However, experiments such as Nim 
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Chimpsky which illustrated the cognitive abilities of non-human animals brought the 
traditional definition of persons into question.  Humans are part of the biological family 
Hominidae which also includes chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos, and orangutans.  The 
family Hominidae is commonly referred to as great apes, and humans are included in the 
classification of great apes.  This chapter focuses on the personhood of non-human great 
apes, and for simplicity, great apes will refer only to non-human Hominids.  Further, 
again for simplicity, non-human animals will from here out be referred to simply as 
animals.   
 The analysis of personhood for animals begins by laying some groundwork 
exploring the similarities between humans and our closest relatives, the great apes.  Great 
apes are the focus of much of this chapter because great apes have cognitive abilities 
similar to humans and therefore have a strong claim for personhood.  A review of 
foundational theories such as those of Aristotle and the Bible, as well as Locke and Kant, 
reveals that traditionally animals have had no claim to personhood and were simply 
property.  However, there were exceptions to the rule such as Bentham who argued that 
all beings that were sentient had moral worth and Darwin whose research questioned the 
absolute superiority of humans.   
The discussion then moves to modern scholarship to determine how the debate 
over personhood for animals has evolved.  The debate over animals has intensified as 
modern scholars have challenged whether all or some animals should receive greater 
protections, rights, and even personhood.  As sentient beings, many scholars argue that 
animals are morally significant beings and thus should have certain rights and 
protections.  However, other theorists disagree, arguing that animals do not have the 
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rational capacity to form preferences or life plans, and thus animals do not have any 
interests that must be protected, there is nothing for the law to guard, and creating rights 
for animals is nonsensical.  The claim that animals do not have rational capability is 
called into question by the numerous studies of great apes that demonstrate that these 
primates have cognitive skills that are not often recognized by humans.   
Numerous scholars working with great apes have discovered that these primates 
have sophisticated cognitive abilities that rival the abilities of some humans.  Using 
Dennett‘s six criteria for personhood from Chapter One, the chapter analyzes whether 
great apes qualify for personhood.  There is a significant body of literature that defends 
the status of animals as simply property while a growing body of literature challenges 
that animals, and especially great apes, should be considered as more than just objects.  
Each side of this debate is explored in detail in the upcoming pages.   
Finally, the chapter turns to the law.  There are several statutes that provide 
animal protection and these statutes are evaluated to see if they provide any type of 
recognition for animals as persons or rights-bearing-units.  In the legal realm, the courts 
have been reluctant to grant rights or bestow the status of person to animals.  The law has 
been fairly consistent in affirming the property status of animals.  A review of relevant 
cases pertaining to the legal standing and personhood of animals reveals that human 
advocates acting on behalf of animals have made little progress in securing legal 
personhood for non-humans.   
 
Non-human Persons 
There are significant biological and psychological ties between humans and their 
next of kin, the great apes.  The DNA of humans and other great apes is more closely 
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related than African elephants and Indian elephants.  The DNA of a chimpanzee is 98 
percent identical to that of humans.  Does this information mean that humans and 
chimpanzees are extraordinarily similar in biological terms or that a two percent 
difference in a DNA sequence is tremendously significant?  Customarily, metaphysical 
abilities such as the capacity to reason, emote, and plan are significant in distinguishing 
humans from all other animals.  Should great apes such as Nim Chimpsky, who are 
intelligent, able to communicate, and feel pain, be included within the realm of 
personhood?  If some animals were to be included in the realm of persons, this would 
have serious consequences because as previous chapters have illustrated, persons have 
moral and legal rights and obligations.  
Instead of classifying animals as persons, all animals are classified as property 
under the law.  The words ―cash,‖ ―capital,‖ and ―chattel‖ are all derived from the word 
cattle which calls attention to the property aspect of animals.  Because animals are 
classified as property, humans can own animals as pets, hunt them for food and pleasure, 
and in short, treat them as ends to meet human needs.  This has serious consequences 
because entities that are property do not have moral or legal considerations which 
humans must recognize.  Many animal activists charge that unless animals can overcome 
the status of property, they will never be afforded any protections or rights under the 
law.
441
  The debate concerning animals essentially involves weighing the attributes of 
animals that lend themselves to personhood and those that lend themselves to property 
and then drawing a controversial line between those who might qualify for personhood 
and those that do not. 
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 In this respect, drawing the line for the personhood of animals is similar to that of 
slaves, corporations, and fetuses.  The plight of the slave was that the law classified a 
slave as property.  Many animal rights activists compare the property status of animals to 
that of slaves to argue that animals are unjustly treated.  The corporation is another murky 
entity that qualifies as both a person and property under the law.  While the fetus is 
recognized as a human, because it does not have full cognitive abilities and the capacity 
to survive independently outside of the womb, it is not granted personhood.  Many great 
apes have the cognitive ability of a three to four-year-old child.  If children are granted 
the status of person, some animal rights advocates argue that great apes should also be 
persons based on their ability to reason.  
 Comparisons among great apes, slaves, corporations, and fetuses makes sense 
when studying meaning of personhood.  Animal rights activists have picked up upon the 
similarities in their movement and other human rights orientated movements.  However, 
comparisons between rights for animals and the movements to secure rights for African 
Americans, women, the disabled, and children are often perceived as reducing these 
groups to the level of animals.  The animal rights movement has met severe backlash for 
such comparisons.  The animal rights movement also has some features in common with 
the pro-life movement which seeks greater rights and recognition for human fetuses.  
Many activists within the animal rights movement eschew these comparisons because it 
could likely displease animal activists who are also in favor of abortion.  In terms of 
personhood, there are apt comparisons to be made among animals, slaves, corporations, 
and fetuses.  This is not to argue that African Americans are comparable to animals or 
that fetuses should be protected as pets.  The study of these entities within the context of 
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personhood simply points out the similarities and differences as each of the categories of 
beings struggle to gain legal recognition as persons.   
 The debate over the personhood of animals is unique precisely because these 
animals are not human.  To many scholars, personhood implies that the entity is human 
although there is no reason that this should be so – the law can deem any entity to be a 
person such as corporations and ships.  However, in general understanding there is a 
connection between being a human and a person, and this connection makes recognizing 
personhood in other animals almost fantastical.  Persons are often defined against what 
they are not; and persons are not animals.  However, animals and humans share many 
traits in common that would seemingly qualify some animals for personhood.  As Nim 
Chimpsky and other experiments with great apes prove, some animals have a highly 
developed ability to reason, are self-aware, have emotions, and can communicate in a 
manner recognized by humans.  Animals can feel pain which makes their use in many 
experiments questionable.  However, if animals are simply property with no 
consideration for any of these traits, then perhaps all types of animal experiments are 
justified in their benefits to humans.  Further, although animals do have some ability for 
higher order reasoning, they do not have the capability to reach that of humans.  While an 
infant and a chimp may have similar abilities when they are young, an infant soon 
surpasses the chimp who has already met his potential.  
 The issue of personhood for animals also calls into question how humans treat 
animals.  Can animals be used solely as means for human ends?  Is it justifiable to eat 
animals to fulfill the dietary needs of humans?  Most animals are active and intelligent at 
some level.  Is it therefore objectionable to deprive animals in a zoo of any type of 
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stimulation that is needed to thrive?  Libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein argues that 
in some respects, animals have more benefits than some humans.  He claims that when it 
comes to medical care, it is better to be a sick cat in a middle class U.S. household than a 
sick pauper in a Third World country.
442
   
 It is important to note that the expression ―animal rights‖ is often used 
indiscriminately to describe any position thought to reduce animal suffering.  Most 
―animal rights‖ proposals are simply regulatory or animal welfare measures and do not 
truly seek to confer rights to animals.  For example, a regulation to increase the minimum 
size of chicken cages seeks to increase the welfare of chickens, but does not grant 
chickens rights and actually assumes the legitimacy of treating animals as property.  The 
intention of the regulation is to control human ownership of animals although advocates 
may claim that the regulation is advancing the rights of animals.
443
  Similarly, ―animal 
law‖ is not equivalent to ―animal rights law.‖  Animal law regulates the use of animals as 
property and is important for commerce.  Animal rights law protects the animals 
themselves and seeks to establish certain rights and immunities for animals as sentient, 
and in some cases, rational beings.  The reality is that animal law and animal rights law 
are not strictly distinct areas of law, and the laws pertaining to animals tend to blend the 
motivations within each category.
444
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 Animals are not mentioned in the Constitution, nor do they have a Bill or Rights, 
Declaration of Independence, or an Emancipation Proclamation.  Thus, it is not readily 
apparent that animals are rights holders at all.  Many of the laws that seemingly protect 
animals really are designed to protect their value as property or human interests.  For 
instance, the law requires that all dogs are vaccinated for rabies.  Rabies is a debilitating 
and ultimately fatal disease for the animals that contract it.  However, environmental 
ethicist Jordan Curnutt argues that the intent of the rabies law is to promote human safety 
to ensure humans do not contract the disease and to protect the property value of a dog.  
The concern for the animal is a minor element.
445
   
 Despite the seemingly lack of concern for animals themselves in many federal and 
state regulations, in the last forty years there has been an increased awareness of the 
sentience and cognitive abilities of animals.  This has led many people to argue that 
animals should have some, albeit limited, legal rights that must be respected by humans.  
These rights should protect the animal itself rather than human desires connected to 
animals as property.  Deciphering just what those rights would entail is a substantial task.  
In terms of legal rights, to what types of rights would animals be entitled?  Certainly, they 
cannot vote or participate in the political process.  (And if they could, animals certainly 
outnumber humans which would be to human disadvantage in a majority rule system.)  
However, perhaps animals could have their day in court if represented by a human 
guardian.  The possession of rights and duties as a person implies that the person is 
culpable for his or her actions.  In the case of animals, it is difficult to prove guilt when a 
lion murders a deer for food.  Further, if included in the class of persons, would the state 
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owe some types of protection to animals such as basic health care?   Should highly 
intelligent animals such as great apes have at least rudimentary protections from harm 
and suffering?  These are all questions this chapter seeks to answer in the study of 
personhood for animals.  In order to delve into the subject, it is wise to start with the 
foundation grounding the previous chapters and examine the history of personhood for 
animals as well as what theorists such as Locke and Kant have to say about the subject.   
 
Foundational Theory 
In the European tradition, following that of the Greeks and Romans, great apes 
have not been recognized for their cognitive abilities until very recently.  Instead, great 
apes have been grouped with all other animals as brutish creatures meant for the use of 
humans.  Ancient Greeks and Romans were familiar with monkeys but had no contact 
with apes.  Therefore, they were not aware of the advanced capabilities of these 
nonhumans who used tools much like primitive humans.  Therefore, philosophers such as 
Plato and Aristotle were able to draw a bold line between reasoning humans and the rest 
of the animal kingdom.
446
  In this tradition, humans were the only creatures suited for 
personhood.   
 In other cultures where great apes were prevalent, a very different tradition 
developed which recognized the abilities and status of great apes.  Many African tribes 
included chimpanzees in their creation mythology.  The Oubi people of the Ivory Coast 
refer to chimpanzees in their language as the ―ugly human beings‖ and believe that 
chimpanzees are humans who disobeyed God‘s command to work and were subsequently 
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banished to the jungle.  The Oubi prohibit the killing of chimpanzees who they consider 
to be their relatives.  The Mende people of Guinea and Sierra Leone refer to the 
chimpanzee as numu gbahamisia or ―different persons‖ because they believe that humans 
and chimpanzees came from the same group of forest dwellers while the Baoulé people 
refer to the chimpanzee as the ―beloved brother‖ of man.
447
  A similar phenomenon arose 
in Indonesia whose people were very familiar with orangutan.  In the Malay languages, 
―orangutan‖ has been translated as ―reasonable being of the woods‖ or ―old person of the 
forest‖ indicating the respect the Indonesian people have for the intellect of the orangutan 




 In addition to African and Indonesian traditions, Eastern philosophies, especially 
the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, hold animals in a place of high esteem and have great 
concern over animal suffering.  These traditions did not spread to Europe and American, 
and Western tradition lacks a significant concern for animals.  European people clung to 
their established views of great apes as unfeeling, unthinking objects to be used by 
humans.  That animals should have rights under the law was an absurd idea for many 
early philosophers.  Basing their ideas on biblical passages giving human dominion over 
animals, Locke, Kant, and Descartes made strong arguments for human superiority over 
animals.  Our current understanding of the cognitive abilities of animals is much greater 
than it was in the time of Locke, Kant, and Descartes, and thus there is reason to revisit 
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their philosophies in order to determine if animals received short shrift.  On the other 
hand, the fundamentals of animal behavior, including the fact that animals feel pain, were 
well known to the people who fashioned the moral and legal order.  Despite the 
knowledge of an animal‘s capacity for physical and emotional suffering, animals were 
still denied personhood and firmly categorized as property.   
 The lack of regard for animals is rooted in both Greek philosophy and biblical 
teachings.  Aristotle studied and dissected many types of animals and chronicled his 
observations ranging from the anatomy of marine animals to the embryological 
development of chickens to the social organization of bees.  Aristotle taught that the 
world was based on a hierarchy of beings in which humans were at the top of the ladder 
and animals were considered lesser beings.  Although Aristotle thought that animals had 
sensitive souls, he believed that animals lacked a rational soul which set them apart from 
humans.  After reviewing the various types of animals and the ways in which humans use 
animals in occupations such as shepherding, fishing, and hunting, Aristotle concluded 
that it was justified that that humans use lesser animals as ends to gain food and clothing 
and therefore treat animals as property.  He wrote, ―It is evident then that we may 
conclude of those things that are, that plants are created for the sake of animals, and 
animals for the sake of men; the tame for our use and provision; the wild, at least the 
greater part, for our provision also, or for some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing 
us with clothes, and the like.‖
449
  In Aristotle‘s ―Great Chain of Being,‖ some men are 
slaves by nature and should serve free men while animals are lesser beings by nature 
existing solely for the use of humans.  Notably, Aristotle‘s teachings were in direct 
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contrast to those of Pythagoras who believed that humans and animals had similar souls 
and human souls could be reincarnated in an animal.  There is evidence that Pythagoras 
was a vegetarian or at least refrained from eating some parts of animals and encouraged 
his followers to treat animals with respect.
450
  However, Aristotle rather than Pythagoras 
was the dominant school of thought, and later philosophers followed the paradigm that 
humans were superior to animals and could use animals for their own means.    
 Animal sacrifice was common in ancient Roman culture and the spectacle of 
animal suffering was a form of entertainment for Roman citizens.  The historian W.E.H. 
Lecky recounts that in their attempt to stimulate interest in the displays of suffering, the 
Romans invented ever more elaborate and barbaric spectacles.  Emperor Caligula killed 
four hundred bear in a single day while Emperor Claudius killed another three hundred.  
Under Emperor Nero, four hundred tigers battled with bulls and elephants, and Nero‘s 
soldiers killed hundreds of bear and tigers. The Romans did not limit themselves to 
animal sacrifices.  Any being outside of the sphere of moral concern, including criminals 
and military prisoners, was subject to sport of sacrifice.
451
  
 The Romans were also innovators in using animals as research subjects.  Galen of 
Pergamon, physician to Emperor Marcus Aurelius, dissected pigs, goats, and apes in an 
attempt to better understand respiration, circulation, and the nervous system.  Galen‘s 
discoveries influenced medical studies well into the Nineteenth Century.  However, even 
Galen noted the deleterious effects of operating on live animals, and he recommended 
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that live dissection not be performed on primates because their expression during 
operations was ―unpleasant.‖  Galen‘s work, however, was not forbidden because Roman 




 Because the Romans saw animals as beings without the capacity to reason or 
exercise free will, they classified animals as res (things) rather than personae (persons.)  
Under Roman law, legal title to an animal arose when a person took possession of a wild 
animal not already belonging to someone else.  Under Justinian law, domestic animals 
and their offspring were passed down from one generation of person to the next under the 
legal rules of property.
453
   
The Old Testament of the Bible provided the most influential argument in favor 
of human dominance over animals.  In Genesis, the Bible states: 
Then God said, ‗Let Us make man in our image, according to our likeness; 
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, 
and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping thing that 
creeps on the earth.‖ So God created man in His own image; in the image 
of God He created him; male and female He created them.  Then God 
blessed them, and God said to them, ―Be fruitful and multiply; fill the 
earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds 




The fact that the Bible specifically gave humans dominion over all other animals was 
convincing evidence to most philosophers that animals could be considered property to 
be used to fulfill human needs.  For Locke and Kant who were fervent Christians, this 
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evidence was compelling. In numerous places, the Old Testament gives permission for 
man to use animals for food and even for sacrifice.  The Old Testament also cautions 
humans to treat animals with care.  For instance, Genesis forbids humans from eating live 
animals, while Proverbs states, ―A righteous man cares for the needs of his animal.‖
455
  
However, these admonitions are mild compared to the many instances where the Bible 
acknowledges man‘s right to use animals as he desires and even encourages man to 
brutally sacrifice animals in order to please God.  
 Christianity brought to biblical teachings the view that humans were special and 
above all other species because the human had an immortal soul destined for life after 
death.  The idea of the sanctity of human life was a uniquely Christian concept.  While 
human life was exalted, the New Testament does not provide any protections for animals.  
For example, in the Gospel of Mark, Jesus exorcises demons and casts themselves into a 
herd of two thousand swine that then drown themselves in a lake.
456
  The Gospel of 
Matthew proclaims that God knows when even a sparrow falls to the ground, but goes on 
to say that humans are worth much more than sparrows.
457
  
The theologian Thomas Aquinas took his cue from both Aristotle and biblical 
teachings when he wrote that there is an order of things in life, and beings in higher 
orders may use lower beings for their benefit.  Thus, Aquinas taught that plants are to be 
used by animals, and animals are to be used by man.  In respect to biblical passages 
forbidding cruelty to animals, Aquinas interpreted these passages for the benefit of 
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humans.  He wrote that their purpose was to ―turn man‘s mind away from practicing 
cruelty on his fellow-men, lest from practicing cruelties on dumb animals one should go 
on further to do the like to men…‖
458
  Thus, according to Aquinas, the real intent in 
preventing cruelty to animals was to ensure that man‘s heart did not become hardened to 
the point where man would inflict cruelty on fellow men.  
 In the 1500s, several prominent scholars proposed an elevated conception of 
animals.  Sir Thomas Moore published Utopia in 1516 and proposed a world that lacked 
hunting and animal sacrifice.  However, Moore did allow animals to be eaten as food and 
envisioned that slaves would have the unpleasant task of butchering animals.
459
  
Montaigne, in 1580, asserted that the difference between humans and animals was a 
matter of degree rather than kind.  He pointed out that animals have the ability to 
communicate and humans were impudent for considering themselves superior.
460
  
Although these scholars argued that animals should be given more moral concern, the 
dominant paradigm set in the Greek, Roman, and biblical tradition continued.   
John Locke was one of the most important liberal thinkers to base his 
understanding of the proper place of animals in society on this dominant paradigm.  
Locke accepted that humans had dominion over all the earth and because God made 
humans in his image, Locke claimed that humans could not subordinate each other or 
destroy one another for one‘s own use.  In contrast, Locke argued that humans could use 
―inferior ranks of creatures‖ as needed because he believed that God had created these 
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creatures for human use as part of their grant of dominion.
461
  Humans enjoyed rights 
over all the earth including animals because God ordained it.  
Locke established the idea that animals were the property of humans based on his 
biblical understanding of human domination over animals.  Locke acknowledged that 
God gave the natural world to all of mankind and that animals were ―produced by the 
spontaneous hand of Nature.‖
462
  Locke therefore needed to justify why animals could be 
claimed as property.  Locke argued that humans needed to appropriate animals in some 
way in order to have an exclusive property right in an animal.  Through a person‘s labor, 
such as hunting or raising livestock, a person appropriated an animal from the state of 
nature and thus acquired a property right in that animal.  Again, this property right was 
justified by God‘s will.
463
  
 Locke categorized animals with all other natural resources such as plants, trees, 
and the earth.  Therefore, Locke did not consider that animals may have any rights of 
autonomy or property rights in their own bodies even though he acknowledged that some 
animals had sophisticated cognitive abilities.  Animals, as inferior creatures, had no rights 
or protections that humans needed to observe.  Like Aquinas, Locke advocated the 
humane treatment of animals for the sake of humans, not the animals themselves.  Locke 
maintained that ―the custom of tormenting and killing beasts will, by degrees, harden 
their minds [children] even towards men; and they who delight in the suffering and 
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destruction of inferior creatures will not be apt to be very compassionate or benign to 
those of their own kind.‖
464
  Locke even went so far as to argue that butchers should not 
be jurors in capital crimes cases because their livelihoods of killing animals would harden 
their hearts towards humans.
465
  Thus, in order that humans have gentle and 
compassionate demeanors, Locke discouraged wanton torture of animals although he did 
not advocate vegetarianism.  Locke‘s views that inflicting unnecessary suffering on 
animals was wrong because of the harm that it does to humans and that humans should 
avoid wasting animals is reflected in modern legal regulations.  
 Kant‘s view on the place of animals was very close to that of Locke.  A deeply 
religious person, Kant also took his cue from Genesis and believed that humans were 
superior entities. Like Aristotle, Kant argues that humans alone are rational and self 
aware and this is what sets them apart from other animals.  Animals, which are not 
rational, do not have moral value because they cannot understand or consciously choose 
to follow moral precepts.
466
  Kant argues that animals are not self-conscious.  In his 
analysis of rational beings, he does not consider the fact that animals feel physical pain, 
experience fear, loneliness, anger, and a number of other psychological states.  Further, 
he does not consider that some animals make plans and carry out those plans – a dog 
understands what a bone is, the dog buries it in the ground for future use, and then later 
digs up that bone so he can chew it.  This type of planning does not qualify in a Kantian 
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analysis.  The critical criterion is that moral agents must be able to make rational 
decisions using Kant‘s categorical imperative.  Because animals are not capable of this 
level of rational thought, they are excluded from consideration.
467
  Because animals are 
not included in Kant‘s analysis, he permits humans to use animals as a means to an end.  
 Kant wrote, ―Beings whose existence depends, not on our will, but on nature, 
have nonetheless, if they are non-rational only a relative value and are consequently 
called things.‖
468
 Animals are such beings that are simply things that moral agents 
(rational human beings) may use as means for their ends.  Because animals do not have 
value in and of themselves, humans do not have a direct duty to treat them in the same 
way as humans must treat fellow humans.  Humans are free to eat animals, wear their 
skins, and use animals for whatever other purposes humans may desire.  In his analysis, 
children are not moral, rational agents or rights bearers because they are yet capable of 
moral decision making.  Does that mean that we can experiment on children or even eat 
them?  Surely not, but because the subject of animal rights was not an issue considered in 
academic circles during the 1700s, Kant does not address this issue.
469
  However, this is 
not beyond the realm of consideration.  Nazis subjected Jewish children to horrendous 
medical experimentations and justified their actions because Jewish children were not 
part of their moral community.
470
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 Although Kant argues that humans do not have direct duties to animals, he does 
allow indirect duties to beings that are not moral agents.  Just like Aquinas and Locke, 
Kant believes that humans should abstain from cruelty to animals because it is harmful to 
the character of the human and would lead humans to be cruel to one another.  Kant 
writes that cruelty to animals ―dulls his sympathetic participation in their pain and so 
weakens and gradually destroys a natural disposition most useful to morality in one‘s 
relation to other men.‖
471
  Thus, humans do not have any direct duties to animals 
themselves; rather the duty is to protect the human character.  Kant uses the example of a 
family‘s dog.  If the dog has served his master faithfully, when the dog grows old, the 
master should keep him until he dies.  However, if the man shoots the dog when the dog 
is old, the man does not fail in his duty to the dog because a dog does not have any moral 
claims.  The man who shoots the dog damages his own humanity that he shares with his 
fellow humans – ―tender feelings toward dumb animals develop humane feelings toward 
mankind.‖
472
 Kant states, ―Man can have no duty to beings other than man…his alleged 
duty to other beings is really a duty to himself.‖
473
  Therefore, cruelty to animals is not 
directly prohibited in Kantian ethics because animals are not included in the category of 
rational, moral agents.  If cruelty to animals did not result in cruelty to fellow humans, 
then Kant would allow humans do to anything they wished to animals.
474
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 Philosopher Charles Landesman claims that this argument leads to moral absurdity.  Landesman argues 
that animals belong to the moral community to the extent that they can suffer, and humans should have a 
445 
 
 Kant was not alone in his argument that cruelty to animals is not morally 
unacceptable due to the effects on animals; Curnutt argues that many Enlightenment 
thinkers agreed that because animals lacked rationality and a soul, animals had no moral 
importance.  For example, Nicholas Malebranche, a philosopher in the rationalist 
tradition as well as Antoine Arnauld, a theologian from the Jansenist movement were 
leading scholars who encouraged vivisection as the path to scientific discovery.  They 
saw experimentation on animals as a viable alternative to using humans and encouraged 
animal experimentation for furthering scientific exploration despite any physical 
suffering animals might feel.
475
  Although Malebranche and Arnauld were well known 
for their views promoting animal experimentation, the greatest advocate among 
Enlightenment thinkers was Rene Descartes.  
Rene Descartes strongly argued that animals had no moral importance.  Because 
Descartes believed that animals did not have a God-given soul which was required for 
consciousness, and because they did not have linguistic capability, Descartes argued that 
animals were not rational, sentient beings with moral standing.  Descartes compared 
animals to moving machines rather than sentient beings.  Thus, Descartes and his 
colleagues performed experiments on living animals without using anesthesia.  Descartes 
claimed that the cries of the animals were similar to the noise of a malfunctioning 
machine rather than the screams of sentient beings experiencing pain.  According to 
Descartes‘ reasoning, if animals are not sentient or conscious, they cannot have any 
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interests of their own and it is nonsensical to claim that humans have any moral or legal 
obligations to them.
 476
  Descartes‘ extreme views that animals had no consciousness or 
ability to feel pain gradually lost support among philosophers.  However, the view that 
God made animals expressly to serve man remained the dominant theory.  
 Locke, Kant, and Descartes argued that animals do not have interests that need to 
be protected.  Thus, there is no need for the law to even consider rights and protections 
for animals.  However, other philosophers disagreed.  One philosopher who challenged 
the dominant theory was Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham who maintained that animals do feel 
pain and suffering and thus deserve moral consideration.  Bentham argued that the ability 
to feel pain and suffering was the only requirement for moral status, and because animals 
could feel pain, they had moral worth.  In his famous passage Bentham wrote, ―[A] full-
grown horse or dog is beyond comparison more rational, as well as a more conversable 
animal than an infant of a day, week, or even a month, old.  But suppose the case were 
otherwise, what would it avail?  The question is not, can they reason?  Nor, can they talk?  
But, can they suffer?‖
477
  Bentham believed that because animals were sentient, humans 
at least had an obligation, directly to the animal itself, to refrain from causing 
unnecessary pain and suffering to animals.  Bentham included the pain and suffering of 
animals in his utilitarian calculus.  Although Bentham did not believe that animals should 
be classified as things, he did not challenge the dominant theory that animals were the 
property of humans.  Thus, Bentham agreed with Kant that animals were a means for 
human ends.  He believed that animals, because they were not rational and self-aware, 
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did not have an interest in their continued existence.  Therefore, it was permissible for 
humans to kill and eat animals.  Animals could be used as a means for human ends as 
long as they did not suffer at the hands of humans.  
 Finally, Charles Darwin began a revolution in the way humans understood their 
relationship to animals, and especially to great apes.  Until Darwin, humanity was often 
defined in relation to the negative – humans were the opposite of animals.  Darwin 
proved that humans and animals were not opposites but rather were part of an ongoing 
evolution of species.  Darwin saw the potential opportunities for scientific progress in 
studying man‘s closest relatives.  The theory of evolution taught that the differences 
between humans and animals were differences of degree rather than kind.  In his book, 
―The Expression of Emotions in Animals and Man,‖ Darwin studied the similarities in 
emotion and expression among a number of mammals.  Humans were simply evolved 
animals and not necessarily divinely ordained by God as deserving of a privileged status.  
In ―The Descent of Man,‖ Darwin wrote, ―We have seen that the senses and intuitions, 
the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention and curiosity, 
imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even 
sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals.‖
478
  Because humans are 
close relatives to their fellow great apes, some theorists interpreted Darwin‘s theories as a 
need to protect these closely related animals and provide some rights and obligations to 
animals.  At the same time, however, some theorists interpreted Darwin‘s theories in a 
very different light.  
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Evolution taught that humans were indeed superior to other animals because 
humans had reached the pinnacle of evolution.  Even though humans may not be divinely 
superior, they were certainly biologically superior and at the top of the animal hierarchy 
which justified the maltreatment of animals.  Survival of the fittest justified the 
exploitation of inferior animals for the use and benefit of humans.  During the early 
1900s, Americans went so far as to put a human pygmy from the Belgian Congo named 
Ota Benga on display next to the chimpanzees in the Bronx Zoo as an example of an 
inferior, sub-human race.  Human pygmies were viewed as genetically inferior beings 
incapable of abstract thought.  Because pygmies were seen as not sufficiently evolved to 
comprehend complex systems of laws and property, they were thought to be further down 
on the evolutionary chain, and thus more akin to an animal than a human.
479
  Similarly, 
members of other races such as Africans and Chinese were believed to be not as highly 
evolved as whites and thus were subject to subjugation.  It seemed as if exploitation of 
the ―other‖ knew no bounds.  Consequently, while Darwin caused a revolution in human 
understanding of animals in some respects, humans were able to retain their belief in their 
own superior position which justified treating animals as property.  
In 1863, biologist Thomas Henry Huxley who was a follower of Darwin, 
published ―Evidence as to Man‘s Place in Nature,‖ which studied the close anatomical 
relationship between African apes and humans.  Huxley argued that African apes should 
be placed in the same taxonomic family as humans.  Huxley was widely ignored and it 
was not until nearly a century later that Morris Goodman, a professor of anatomy at 
Wayne State University, confirmed that humans and chimpanzees belonged to the same 
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genus using molecular studies.  Goodman again proposed a reclassification of man and 
ape into the same genus Homo but was again rebuked for proposing such a close 
relationship between apes and humans.
480
  The world was not yet ready to accept the data 
linking humans and great apes.   
 The theories of Locke, Kant, Descartes, and Darwin form much of the basis of 
modern political theory on the status of animals.  Modern theorists, basing much of their 
work on these early pioneers, passionately debate the status of animals as rational, 
sentient beings that may or may not have a claim to personhood.    
 
Modern Theory 
 The theories of Locke and Kant had a profound influence on modern theory 
surrounding the personhood of animals in that it established the paradigm that humans 
are superior creatures, while the place of animals is to be used by humans.  Most modern 
scholars have moved beyond Descartes‘ teaching that animals are unfeeling autobots with 
no moral worth, scholars generally agree that animals must count for something; yet their 
moral worth is still largely debated.  On one side of the spectrum, scholars such as 
utilitarian Peter Singer charge that those who distinguish among creatures based on 
different species and discriminate against animals in favor of humans are guilty of 
―Speciesism.‖  Speciesism, according to Singer, is analogous to racism based on arbitrary 
and unjust discrimination.  Most scholars do not go to this extreme, but concede that 
some type of middle ground must be found that protects the interests of animals while 
upholding the use of animals for human needs.  Yet, very few scholars are ready to grant 
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personhood to animals.  Nonetheless, based on the criteria for personhood as covered in 
previous chapters, there is solid evidence that at least some species of animals could be 
included in the realm of persons.   
 Much of the criteria for moral personhood are based upon mental capacities such 
as rational thought, the ability to communicate, the capability to consider one‘s actions 
and desires, and social aptitude.  Although most animals do not possess all of these 
capacities, animals such as great apes do seem to fulfill these requirements giving pause 
to scholars who do not consider non-humans candidates for personhood.  Great apes have 
mental capabilities comparable or above those of young children, the mentally disabled, 
and comatose humans.  However, science has not proven that animals are self aware in a 
moral sense.  Although animals can act altruistically and even virtuously, it does not 
seem that animals are able to evaluate the ethics of their options and then deliberately 
choose to act morally.  In this sense, animals are not culpable for their actions and thus 
cannot be held accountable in the same way that humans are culpable. This raises 
problems for including animals in a legal definition of personhood.  All of these issues 
are part of the modern theoretical foundation for animal personhood.  
 Although deontologist and libertarian Robert Nozick was not an animal rights 
scholar by profession, his work provides a good starting point for delving into modern 
theories because he based his philosophy of animals on Locke and Kant.  In Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia, the subject of animal rights comes up as Nozick is explaining the 
importance of side constraints on individual rights. In the course of setting an example of 
side constraints, Nozick sets forth a lengthy discussion on the status of animals.   
451 
 
 Nozick doubts Locke and Kant‘s theories that harming animals will have a 
spillover effect on humans making them more likely to harm fellow humans.  Nozick 
presumes that harming animals is wrong in itself, and although animals do not have the 
same moral status as humans, animals must at least count for something.  However, 
Nozick admits that this is a difficult assertion to prove.
481
  The difficulty is in determining 
which animals count, how much an animal counts, and to what extent must humans 
modify their behavior so as not to violate animals.  For example, he questions the justice 
of using animals for food given the availability of healthy, inexpensive vegetarian 
options.  He does not conclude that carnivores are wrong, but merely suggests that a 
person should reflect on these considerations when deciding where to draw the line in 
respect to animals.  He does not conclude that animals have any moral significance that 
society must respect.  Instead, he holds true to his individualistic approach and advocates 
that each person must come to an individual decision whether or not to protect the 
interests of animals.
482
    
 Nozick proposes a theory he calls ―utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for 
people.‖ Under the utilitarian tenet, we should maximize the happiness of all living 
beings.  However, some living beings, namely humans, hold a special moral weight.  
Thus, under the Kantian tenet, we must place stringent side constraints on what humans 
can do to each other.  For instance, although animals may be sacrificed for the benefit of 
people if the benefits are greater than the suffering inflicted, humans may never be 
sacrificed.  After some consideration, Nozick concludes that utilitarianism is not a 
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sufficient doctrine for animals, but he does not offer an alternative solution. (Nozick is 
not an advocate of utilitarianism as any form of moral philosophy, not just in respect to 
animals.)  Instead, he raises a number of vexing questions concerning the status of 
animals.  Nozick writes,  
How much does an animal's life have to be respected once it's alive, and 
how can we decide this?  Must one also introduce some notion of a 
nondegraded existence?  Would it be all right to use genetic-engineering 
techniques to breed natural slaves who would be contented with their lots?  
Natural animal slaves? Was that the domestication of animals?  Even for 





Indeed, Nozick‘s questions concerning the level of respect humans must give to the lives 
of animals are at the heart of personhood for animals.  Should animals be given the full 
respect of persons whose lives, liberties, and pursuit of happiness must be protected?  Or 
do animals warrant the status of simply objects with little to no protection?  Or do 
animals warrant some status in between?  How should humans adjudicate this question 
and determine the appropriate status of animals? 
 Because a ―person‖ has moral significance, it is important to define persons with 
care.  Persons have a moral worth and a right to life.  If animals are not included as 
persons, then animals do not have a claim to moral worth and life that must be respected 
by humans.  Libertarian theorist and deontologist Tibor Machan argues that animals are 
not moral actors and thus do not have claims or rights.  He contends that humans and 
animals are categorically different and bestowing ―animal rights‖ is an error of treating 
two different types of entities as if they are the same.  Just because humans sympathize 
with animals does not mean that they are deserving of rights as humans are.  It is cruel 
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and inhumane to treat animals badly, but that behavior does not violate their rights 
because animals do not have rights that must be respected.
484
  
The proposal to grant rights to animals has many critics.  Another critic who 
agrees with Machan is fellow deontologist Carl Cohen who argues that the very essence 
of having a right involves the capacity for autonomy and the ability to make moral 
decisions based on free will and the ability to tell right from wrong.  This ability is 
essentially human.  Although animals have cognitive abilities and can reason, 
communicate, show emotion, and suffer, animals do not have the capacity to act morally.  
For instance, a wolf is not capable of considering the moral consequences of killing a 
sheep.  Cohen writes, ―A being subject to genuinely moral judgment must be capable of 
grasping the maxim of an act and capable too of grasping the generality of an ethical 
premise in a moral argument.  Similarities between animal conduct and human conduct 
cannot refute, cannot even address, the proud moral differences between humans and 
rodents.‖
485
  Emphasizing the similarities between humans and monkeys or humans and 
any other animals only obscures the critical fact that animals cannot be members of a 
moral community.  Cohen contends that to say that a great ape, rat, pig, or rabbit has 
rights is to confuse the moral world of humans with the amoral world of animals.   
Therefore, Cohen vehemently argues that justice demands that animals be used in 
medical experiments to help humans who are moral beings.  The vast number of medical 
advancements that have come from the use of animals in laboratories justifies their use.  
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Because animals are sentient, they must be treated with care but they do not have rights 
that protect them from being unwilling participants in experiments.  Animals do not have 
the capacity to exercise autonomy and refuse to participate in experiments.
486
  Despite 
Cohen‘s arguments that animals cannot exercise autonomy, the fact that many animals 
will try to escape the laboratory signifies their refusal to participate.  Similarly, although 
a cow cannot verbally refuse to be branded, most cows will try to flee when they smell 
burning flesh and hear the cries of their fellow bovines.  Great apes that have been taught 
sign language do have the capacity to inform humans that they do not wish to participate 
in various projects.  Some animals such as great apes might be able to exercise some 
rights in a limited capacity.   
 Political philosopher and animal activist Elizabeth Anderson maintains that 
humans and animals have their own place in the natural order based on their capabilities 
as a species.  While parrots are capable of learning a human language and seem to enjoy 
speaking a human language when rewarded with food, there is no moral obligation to 
teach parrots to speak because they do not need language to survive in their natural 
habitat.  Capacity does not necessitate a moral right.  Conversely, humans must learn a 
language in order to survive in society and so there is a moral obligation to teach human 
children to speak.  Dogs naturally eat their meals from a bowl on the floor and there is no 
obligation to set a place for the family dog at the dinner table.  Further, if we were to 
dress the dog up in human clothing, we would be making a mockery of the animal.  
However, if we were to witness an Alzheimer‘s patient eating from a bowl on the floor, 
we would we outraged because she is being treated like an animal rather than a person in 
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society.  Humans have a place within the community of persons that must be respected.  
Anderson contends that humans and animals all have their place in society and to treat 




 British philosopher and self-proclaimed polemicist Roger Scruton argues against 
animal rights contending that rights imply duties and animals do not have the capacity to 
fulfill duties.  Humans alone understand concepts such as rights, duties, justice, and 
responsibility.  He argues that the capacity to engage in rights and duties is what is 
unique about the human condition and to enlarge the scope of rights beyond humans 
jeopardizes the dignity of humans as moral beings.  Scruton regards the animal rights 
movement as the ―strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview.‖
488
  Similarly, 
libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein questions whether rights for animals entails 
corresponding duties to animals by humans.  While he acknowledges that certain animals 
such as chimpanzees have considerable rational abilities, he questions whether or not 
humans have obligations to animals to keep them healthy, fed, and happy.  If a pill is 
invented to cure a disease plaguing both humans and chimpanzees, is there a duty to 
assist chimps to the same extent that we assist humans?  This is especially critical if the 
pill was in short supply or prohibitively expensive.  Epstein doubts that that there is an 
affirmative duty to put chimpanzees above humans.  He concludes saying, ―The blunt 
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point is that we have had and will continue to have different moral obligations to 
members of our own species than we do to chimps or members of any other species.‖
489
 
Even if some animals are granted a basic right to the means for survival such as 
food, shelter, and medical care, the idea that animals have a panoply of rights is arguable.  
Taking animal rights one step further and considering legal personhood for animals is 
even more questionable within a society that has not truly considered such a proposal.  If 
animals are granted legal personhood, then animals would likely be granted certain rights 
such as the ability to bring suit with a human guardian.  Of course, the concept of rights 
for animals engenders some problems within the public perception which generally 
conceives of rights as only applying to humans.  The public often equates animal rights to 
human rights such as the right to free speech, exercise of religion, and the right to vote.  
Applying these rights to animals is absurd because they do not have the capacity for such 
rights.  This transitive type of association gives the entire movement the appearance of 
ridiculousness.  Further, the idea of rights for animals often leads to the perception that 
human rights and animal rights are in competition.  The animal rights movement is 
generally opposed to using animals for food, clothing, and experimentation which limit 
human options to use animals as they please.  This conflict of interest tends to give the 
perception that animal activists are human haters rather than animal lovers.
490
   
 On the other side of the issue, scholars who support increased respect, 
recognition, rights for animals argue that as sentient and rational creatures, animals 
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deserve to be treated with care and justice.  Humans cannot exploit animals simply 
because humans see themselves as superior beings.  To do so is unjust discrimination 
against animals.  The leading scholars advocating for animals are deontologist Tom 
Regan and utilitarian Peter Singer.   
Tom Regan argues that animals do have rights that humans must respect.  Basing 
his theories on Kant who taught that humans have individual value, Regan extends Kant‘s 
philosophy and maintains that all animals have value because they all are ―subjects of a 
life.‖  In his ―subjects of a life‖ theory, he proposes that any organism that is capable of 
having a life that is meaningful to that particular organism has moral value.  Regan 
rejects criteria based on rationality for moral consideration because he argues that 
cognitively inferior creatures still are capable of having meaningful lives.  Creatures who 
qualify under the ―subjects of a life‖ theory have perceptions, feelings of pleasure and 
pain, preferences, memory, and a sense of their own future.  These beings must have an 
understanding of their own individual welfare and must be able to initiate action in 
pursuit of their preferences and goals.  Thus, dogs, apes, and humans all qualify as 
―subjects of a life,‖ and it is morally impermissible to use them as a means to an end.  
Regan concedes that humans are cognitively superior to other animals, and thus death is a 
greater harm to humans than animals.  Humans are justified in saving the life of a fellow 
human over the life of an animal in the case of an emergency.  However, if an animal‘s 
moral rights are to be overridden, the human must present valid, moral grounds for taking 
such action rather than just appealing to favorable consequences that would result.   
Val Plumwood, an ecofeminist, criticizes Regan for not explaining when and why 
humans should intervene when animals use each other for food.  She questions whether a 
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human is obligated to intervene when a wolf attacks a sheep.  Regan claims that the wolf 
is a moral patient rather than a moral agent and thus the wolf cannot violate or respect 
another creature‘s rights because the wolf is not a responsible agent.  But Regan does not 
explain why a human, who is a responsible moral agent and can recognize a violation of 
the sheep‘s rights, does not have a duty to stop the wolf.  Surely, the human would need 
to intervene if the wolf was attacking a human baby – why is there a difference for a 
sheep?  However, if the human does not intervene, there is a possible violation of the 
wolf‘s right to its natural food.
491
  Because Regan elevates the moral worth of animals to 
that of humans, he is faced with this type of dilemma.  If humans and animals have equal 
moral worth, then problems arise when carnivores pursue their natural food source or 
when parasites feed off of their host.  The problem of animal destruction is not limited to 
humans destroying animals for food, clothing, and research. 
Regan criticizes those who take a utilitarian approach to animal rights because he 
finds that most utilitarians do not fully consider the moral importance of animals who are 
―subjects of a life.‖  He charges that this is a direct result of animals being classified as 
property because humans do not consider the moral importance of their property and do 
not recognize that moral beings should not be included in such a classification.  As 
―subjects of a life‖ with intrinsic value, Regan argues that animals have moral value and 
rights that cannot be violated.  Therefore, Regan opposes medical research on animals 
because it violates the rights of unconsenting animals.  No matter how beneficial the 
research may be for humans, humans must respect animals‘ rights to life and well-being.   
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Another animal rights scholar who demands increased respect for animals is Peter 
Singer. As a utilitarian, Singer essentially argues that humans must take animal interests 
seriously when using a utilitarian calculus.  He does not advocate that animals have 
rights, but he does argue that animals should not be treated poorly based on their species 
membership.  He argues that treating animals differently and poorly based on the 
animal‘s species is ―Speciesism,‖ and he goes so far as to charge that treating animals 
differently is akin to racism.  Just as African Americans were enslaved and not 
considered persons, animals too are victims who are not recognized as moral beings.  In 
much the same way that racism led to torturous experiments on different races under the 
Nazi regime, he argues that Speciesism is to blame for the painful experiments humans 
perform on animals.
492
  In his opinion, an experiment on animals cannot be justified 
unless the experiment is so important that the use of a brain-damaged human would also 
be acceptable.  Since very few people would consent to the use of brain-damaged humans 
for experimentation, animal experiments would also be unacceptable.  Singer does not 
argue that humans and other animals should be given equal moral weight.  He does say 
that when the interests of a human and an animal are of a similar type, such as a interest 
in life, there is no reason to favor a human over the animal – to do so would be 
speciesism.   
 Singer maintains that humans fail to recognize the importance of animal society.  
Just as humans experience love during a marriage and loss after a death, some animals 
pair for life and experience similar emotional states.  However, humans tend to attribute 
animal relationships to instinct and do not hesitate to separate paired animals when 
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capturing and hunting animals.  Nor, do we acknowledge the sadness animals experience 
when they are separated from their mothers at birth.  For example, when Nim Chimpsky 
was taken from his chimp mother Carolyn as an infant, Carolyn grieved, holding Nim 
close to her chest and then searched for her child after she was tranquilized in order to 
remove the chimp.  Stephanie, the human caretaker who came to take Nim and raise him, 
recalled looking into Carolyn‘s eyes ―mother to mother‖ and seeing rage in Carolyn‘s 
eyes, Stephanie whispered, ―She knows.‖
493
  Such evidence of the emotional pain 
experienced by animals is part of Singer‘s argument that animals must be considered as 
morally significant beings.  
 Animals have morally significant interests in not suffering and preserving their 
lives that humans must consider according to Singer.  He does not argue that it is just as 
wrong to kill a dog as it is to kill a human in full possession of her faculties.  However, 
humans cannot draw the line for the right to life strictly along the lines of the human 
species.  He concludes that all barriers that stand in the way of respect for all morally 
considerable beings, including barriers based on race, gender, and species, must be 
obliterated.   Deontologist Gary Francione challenges Singer‘s conclusion contending 
that the only way Singer can avoid charges of speciesism is to concede that under certain 
circumstances it would be permissible to use humans as well as animals for the benefit of 
others.
494
  Singer concedes that if experiments on unconsenting animals are permissible, 
then experiments on unconsenting humans should also be allowed.  Instead of this radical 
conclusion, Singer advocates that testing on animals and humans be prohibited.  
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Although Singer the utilitarian and Regan the deontologist come from very 
different philosophical paradigms, their arguments are often lumped together in the 
popular, non-academic understanding of the ―animal rights movement‖ because both 
theorists seek to end animal suffering and premature death at the hands of humans.  Both 
theories share the convictions that consumption of animal products for food and clothing 
is morally wrong and that the use of animals in experiments is unacceptable.  Singer and 
Regan are often praised together by those who agree with their outcomes or criticized 
together by those who disagree.   
 One criticism aimed at Singer and Regan is that they place humans and animals 
on the same playing field and ignore the many differences among the various types of 
animals. To even consider animal personhood offends human dignity.  In some respects, 
humans gain their elevated status as persons by comparison to lower animals who do not 
qualify for personhood.  To include animals that do not have the cognitive abilities of 
humans within the category of persons lessens the import of the classification.  
Indignation over equating the status of animals to humans is most noticeable when 
comparisons are made between racism and Speciesism or when the Holocaust is 
compared to ―animal holocausts.‖   
In 2003, PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) launched a 
campaign called ―Holocaust on Your Plate‖ in order to draw attention to factory farms 
and slaughterhouses.  The advertisements featured scenes from Nazi concentration camps 
next to pictures from slaughterhouses.  For example, a picture of a starving Jewish 
prisoner was juxtaposed against a starving cow.  According to a PETA statement, the 
advertisement campaign was designed to ―stimulate contemplation of how the 
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victimization of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and others, characterized as ‗life unworthy 
of life‘ during the Holocaust, parallels the way that modern society abuses and justifies 
the slaughter of animals.‖
495
  However, the campaign went too far in trying to raise 
awareness of animals as ―subjects of a life‖ in Regan‘s terminology.  The PETA 
campaign drew widespread criticism including a statement from the Anti-Defamation 
League.  In a press statement, Anti-Defamation League Director Abraham Foxman said, 
―The effort by PETA to compare the deliberate, systematic murder of millions of Jews to 
the issue of animal rights is abhorrent.  PETA's effort to seek approval for their 
‗Holocaust on Your Plate‘ campaign is outrageous, offensive and takes chutzpah to new 
heights.‖
496
  The outrage at the advertising campaign illustrated that much of the public 
does not view animals as the moral equals of humans, nor do they equate animal 
suffering with the atrocities committed during the Holocaust.  Although many humans 
feel sorry for the plight of animals, they do not subscribe to a full theory of Speciesism as 
advanced by Singer and Regan.
497
 
 Libertarian Loren Lomasky takes issue with comparisons to racism and sexism by 
animal rights scholars.  He writes, ―The denial of rights to animals is thoroughly 
disanalogous to the denial of rights to blacks, women, and other oft-discriminated against 
classes of human beings.‖
498
  Lomasky contends that animals cannot be discriminated 
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against as rights holders because animals, unlike humans, do not have the capacity to be 
project pursuers and they will never be able to develop such a capacity.  Humans make 
life plans such as to bear children, have careers, live peacefully, and so forth.  Animals do 
not live this way – instead animals focus on basic needs such as shelter, food, and 
companionship.  Lomasky argues that the advanced capacity to be project pursuers is 
what sets humans apart and gives humans a claim to rights that cannot be violated.  
Lomasky acknowledges that sentience and self-awareness are important traits for 
animals, and it is morally wrong to cause needless suffering to an animal.  However, 
according to Lomasky, sentience and self-awareness do not warrant rights.
499
   
 S.F. Sapontzis, whose philosophy borrows from both utilitarianism and 
deontology, agrees with Lomasky that animals are not moral agents.  Sapontzis finds that 
animals do many actions that might be considered moral by humans such as a Seeing Eye 
Dog showing responsibility and restraint, or other dogs that show courage and loyalty to 
humans even to the point of risking their lives to save the life of a human.  However, 
Sapontzis questions whether animals recognize the morality of their actions.  Can animals 
reason about the morality of their actions and then choose to act accordingly or are their 
actions based on some type of instinct?  Sapontzis concludes that animals do not act 
entirely on instinct yet they are not truly capable of moral behavior based on reasoning.  
Animals, he concludes, adjust their actions based on their environment.  They can be 
trained and disciplined but they cannot self-direct themselves to be trained and act 
ethically.  Humans, on the other hand, try to control their environments and reconstruct 
their world and themselves.  This is akin to Lomasky‘s theory of project pursuers.  
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Because animals do not have the capability to control and direct their own actions, 
Sapontzis presumes that they are not moral agents.
500
    
 Although Sapontzis concludes that animals cannot be moral agents and thus 
cannot be persons, he argues that animals are moral recipients and should be treated with 
respect.  He argues that beings that can act virtuously should be treated as ends in 
themselves.  He argues that the expression ―animal rights‖ should really be changed to 
―sentient rights‖ and ―animal liberation‖ to ―interest liberation‖ in order to reflect the fact 
that all beings that are sentient and have interests should be protected.  He does admit that 
changing these slogans would be practically detrimental to the animal rights 
movement.
501
  Sapontzis believes that animals should not be used in experiments because 
they cannot give an informed consent and to coerce animals into research violates the 
respect they deserve as sentient, moral recipients.  He also calls for greater moral and 
legal protections for great apes.  Even though he states that great apes do not have a 
moral claim on personhood, he argues that emphasizing the human-like qualities of great 
apes is an astute way of securing greater protections for such animals.  He finds that 
people tend to characterize the world as ―us versus them‖ in black and white terms.  If 
humans see the similarities between great apes and humans and feel empathy for animals 
they perceive as kin, it might help great apes secure more legal protections from 
exploitation.  Therefore, Sapontzis argues for personhood for great apes as a shrewd 
method to protect the species rather than morally obligatory.
502
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 One of the reasons some scholars and animal rights activists call for greater rights 
and protections especially for great apes is that great apes have demonstrated impressive 
cognitive and rational abilities.  These capacities are similar to those of humans, and 
scholars who work with great apes argue that these capacities warrant considerations of 
personhood.  An assessment of some the more prominent great ape studies demonstrates 
these cognitive abilities.   
 
Cognitive Abilities of Animals 
 Until the 1960s, anthropologists continued the tradition of emphasizing the unique 
mental capabilities of humans and downplaying the abilities of non-human animals such 
as great apes.  Typical of scholars during his time, Leslie White, an extremely influential 
anthropologist at the University of Michigan stated, ―Because human behavior is symbol 
behavior and since the behavior of infra-human species is non-symbolic, it follows that 
we can learn nothing about human behavior from observations upon or experiments with 
lower animals.‖
503
  Most anthropologists followed White‘s lead and limited their studies 
of non-human animals to simple observations designed to confirm human superiority.  It 
was not until scientists in the field began to publish reports of their interactions with great 
apes that the dominant paradigm was challenged.  The most well-known scientist to begin 
tearing down walls between humans and great apes was Jane Goodall who spent forty-
five years observing chimpanzees in Tanzania.  Goodall documented chimpanzees 
making tools and interacting in a social environment.  Unlike other researchers who 
assigned numbers to their ape subjects, Goodall gave the animals human names in 
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recognition of their human-like capacities.  Goodall revolutionized the world of 
anthropology, biology, and language studies with her studies of great apes.   
 Great apes are a unique family of animals because their cognitive abilities are 
such that they can think rationally, communicate in a method understandable to humans, 
and according to some researchers, are capable of second order volitions.  In short, great 
apes seem to qualify for personhood according to metaphysical criteria.  Once again 
returning to the six conditions of personhood from Daniel Dennett, great apes meet five 
of the conditions and possibly meet the sixth condition as well.  According to Dennett, 
the six conditions are:  1) persons are rational beings, 2) they are conscious and they are 
intentional, 3) they are considered persons by others, 4) they can reciprocate, which refers 
to the ability to formulate second order volitions or to have a belief about a belief, 5) they 
have the capacity for verbal communication, and 6) they are self-consciousness or self-
aware.  If a being meets these conditions, Dennett contends that the being is a conscious, 
intelligent agent who can make independent decisions and is culpable for the 
consequences of those decisions.
504
  The being is a person.   
 Scientists who study and train great apes have found that these animals readily 
meet conditions one, two, and six.  Many great apes have mastered American Sign 
Language which is an accepted form of human communication.  Condition three, being 
accepted as a person by other persons is more difficult to meet.  Although not many 
persons are willing to consider animals such as great apes as persons, there is a small 
minority of people who are pressing for legal personhood for great apes and thus great 
apes fulfill condition three with at least a small number of fellow persons.  Great apes 
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seem to be able to meet all conditions except condition four, and scholars continue to 
debate whether great apes are capable of second order volitions.  Conditions one, two and 
six, that persons must be rational, conscious, intentional, and self-aware are rather easily 
affirmed for great apes.  Numerous scholars have studied the abilities of great apes and 
have concluded that that these animals have cognitive abilities that are far superior to 
what is commonly recognized.   
 Researchers who study the behavior of great apes tend to study these animals 
because they appreciate the abilities of the animals.  This leads to some bias in the 
analysis as these researchers seek to prove the skills of great apes rather than approach 
the studies in a completely unbiased manner.  Many researchers form warm and even 
family-type attachments to their primate subjects which prevent the objective detachment 
that is typically required in a scientific discipline.  These researchers typically avoid 
potentially more scientifically rigorous experiments that might be less humane.
505
  This is 
certainly true of the famous research conducted by Roger Fouts who worked with the 
chimpanzee Washoe.  By his own account, Fouts is now as much or more an activist for 
the protection of chimpanzees as he is a scientist.  His close bond with Washoe and other 
chimpanzees along with his compulsion to convince the public of the human-like status 
of chimpanzees compels Fouts to highlight the achievements of great apes rather than 
their failings.  However, despite the apparent bias in his work, the results of many years 
of study are compelling evidence that chimpanzees are rational agents and can learn 
human skills such as sign language.   
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Animal studies present a difficult methodological issue in that the research 
designs usually involve a single or very small number of subjects due to the difficulty in 
caring for a large group of animals.  This prevents proper control procedures.  Further, 
maintaining standard environmental variables is difficult due to the costly nature of 
maintaining these types of animals.  Very few animal laboratories exist that have the 
caging systems needed to provide a hospital living environment, and these laboratories 
and the caretakers do not have standardized methods.
506
  Despite these methodological 
problems, numerous scientists have conducted cognitive and language studies in the last 
thirty years, and their research overwhelmingly points to the advanced abilities of great 
apes.   
Examining Dennett‘s conditions one, two, and six, researchers have found that 
great apes are indeed rational, conscious, and intentional and have the capacity for self-
awareness and intentionality – all higher order cognitive abilities.  As stated previously, 
Goodall documented chimpanzees making tools and employing the tools to solve 
problems which are indications of rationality and intentionality.  She also observed that 
chimpanzees could recognize the mental capacity of fellow chimpanzees within the social 
community and could also reflect on their own experiences.  The ability to recognize that 
others have mental states and the capacity to reflect demonstrates self-consciousness and 
self-awareness.
507
  Further proof that chimpanzees are self-aware came from experiments 
first done by biopsychologist Gordon Gallup in which he demonstrated that chimpanzees 
                                                 
506
 Herbert Roitblat, Heidi Harley, and David Helweg, ―Cognitive Processing in Artificial Language 
Research,‖ in Language and Communication: Comparative Perspectives, Herbert L. Roitblat, Louis M. 




 Lee Hall and Anthony Jon Waters, ―From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart,‖ Seton Hall 




could recognize themselves in a mirror.  Most animals react to their images in a mirror as 
if the image were another animal rather than recognizing themselves.  Gallup sought to 
prove that chimpanzees could recognize their reflection as their own.  After placing a 
mirror in the cage, Gallup soon observed the four chimpanzees using the mirrors to 
groom themselves in areas that were difficult to see such as the teeth and nose.  Next, 
Gallup marked the animals with an odorless red dye over one ear and above the opposite 
eye when they were asleep. When the animals awoke, they used the mirrors to examine 
the painted areas.  They even inspected the fingers that touched the painted areas.  The 




 A chimpanzee‘s capacity for long-term memory was observed by Gloria Grow 
who ran the Fauna Foundation sanctuary for fifteen chimpanzees who were released from 
a New York laboratory.  On one particularly compelling occasion, Grow used a trolley 
from the laboratory to haul a shipment of wood pellets to her gas stove.  When 
chimpanzees Tom and Pablo saw the trolley, they both started to shriek.  Within seconds, 
all fifteen chimpanzees were clinging to the bars of their cages, rocking back and forth 
and screaming aggressively at Grow.  Grow then recalled that the New York laboratory 
used this trolley to transport unconscious chimpanzees from their cages to the surgery 
room.  The chimpanzees remembered the piece of equipment and associated it with the 
trauma they endured earlier in their lives. This was startling evidence of a chimpanzee‘s 
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capacity for memory and emotion.
509
  Nim Chimpsky demonstrated his ability to 
remember past caretakers when they returned to visit him.  Nim sometimes reacted with 
pleasure but other times reacted with anger towards caretakers who had abandoned him.  
The silverback gorilla Koko used sign language to communicate her memories of past 
emotions.  For example, she signed ―sad‖ when her pet cat died and also signed ―sad‖ 
again when asked to recall how she felt about the loss.
510
   
 Washoe the chimpanzee seemed to demonstrate the ability for strategic planning 
when her trainers put a new doormat in front of her trailer.  Washoe spotted the doormat 
and jumped back in terror while issuing alarm calls.  Then Washoe grabbed one of her 
toy dolls and threw the doll on top of the mat.  After watching the doll for several 
minutes to see what would happen, she crept up to the doormat and snatched the doll to 
safety.  Washoe then inspected the doll to see if she was harmed, and upon seeing that the 
doll was intact, Washoe started to calm down.  She then approached the doormat with 
hesitation but without fear.  After a couple of days, Washoe was entering and exiting her 
trailer without a problem.
 511
  Using the doll to test the waters was a strategic move that 
required foresight and cunning.  Rational abilities of this level contradict the teaching of 
Descartes that animals did not possess cognitive abilities beyond instinct.   
 Anthropologist Mary Lee Abshire even demonstrated that chimpanzees have the 
capacity to engage in imagination.  She found that chimpanzees would treat their toys as 
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if they were alive.  Her videotape captured a chimpanzee playing Peek-a-boo with a 
teddy bear.  In all, Abshire recorded six instances of imagination during her fifteen hours 
of videotape.
512
 Imagination is a higher cognitive capability generally thought to only 
occur with humans.  The capacity of great apes to engage in this activity sheds light on 
their mental faculties.  Great apes seem to have mental capacities that far exceed other 
species of animals although elephants have demonstrated strong memory skills and the 
capacity to experience strong emotions.  Research indicates that elephants mourn their 
dead and remember deceased family members for years after a death.
513
  However, these 
animals do not seem to have the general mental acuity of great apes such as the ability to 
deliberate and be introspective.  One animal whose mental abilities come close to those 
of apes is the dolphin.  Studies of dolphins reveal that these animals also have superior 
cognitive abilities.  Dolphins build sophisticated social networks, teach skills to their 
young, and seem to pass on forms of culture.  In experiments, dolphins are able to match 
shapes through vision and echolocation.  They also pass the same mirror experiments that 
chimpanzees complete and are able to recognize their own reflection.  Finally, dolphins, 
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 Dennett‘s fifth condition for personhood is the capacity for verbal 
communication.  Linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky is perhaps the most vocal 
critic of studies linking language skills with non-human animals.  Chomsky argues that 
language is a capacity apart from all other forms of communication and thought.  
Humans, he argues, have the unique ability to form the syntactical structure in language.  
He believes that the same underlying structure is found in all human languages and it 
derives from a uniquely human intelligence that is biologically inherent in humans.
515
  
Thus, Chomsky scoffs at the idea that other animals such as dolphins or great apes might 
be able to engage in human language. 
Neither dolphins nor great apes are able to speak an audible human language.  
However, both families of animals are able to learn sign language.  Humans who are deaf 
or mute are still considered fully rational and communicative persons if they can express 
themselves through sign language.  Therefore, sign language is an accepted human 
language and form of communication.  Dolphins use whistles as their primary form of 
communication with other dolphins and use pulsed sounds to convey emotional states 
such as pleasure or distress.  Studies by psychologist Louis Herman and the Dolphin 
Institute reveal that dolphins are able to learn some symbols and hand gestures from an 
artificial sign language that trainers created to test the dolphins‘ abilities.  Their 
experiments revealed that dolphins could comprehend the meaning of the words taught 
and understood proper sentence structure including syntax and semantics.  The dolphins 
understood commands from two to five words in length.
516
  While dolphins exhibit basic 
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skills for understanding simple human sign language, many great apes have mastered 
American Sign Language and can communicate at sophisticated levels.  
 Numerous studies of various types of chimpanzees and orangutans have shown 
that these animals can learn and use human sign language.  A quick review of some of the 
more notable language studies of great apes reveals both successes and questionable 
results.  The bonobo Kanzi is one of the most successful studies of language 
comprehension.  The bonobo was trained by primatologist Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, head 
scientist at the Great Ape Trust in Iowa.  Savage-Rumbaugh used a keyboard to train the 
bonobos, and Kanzi began his journey of learning language by watching fellow apes 
rather than direct instruction.   
After recognizing the learning potential of the bonobo, Savage-Rumbaugh 
assimilated the animal into an everyday living environment rather than use classroom 
teaching.  Soon, Savage-Rumbaugh claimed that Kanzi could understand human 
language and was responding accordingly.  To test her claims, Kanzi took several 
scientific language tests during which Savage-Rumbaugh wore a mask so Kanzi could 
not pick up clues from her facial expressions and did not gesture.  She asked Kanzi to 
perform strange tasks such as putting pine needles in the refrigerator – Kanzi understood 
almost every task.  Kanzi also used language creatively.  Kanzi was anticipating a visit 
from a visiting research Par Segerdahl who was supposed to bring Kanzi bread to eat.  
Because his keyboard did not have a symbol for Par Segerdahl, he had to improvise.  He 
pointed to the symbol ―bread‖ and the symbol for the fruit ―pear.‖  When questioned 
about the use of ―pear,‖ Kanzi pointed to Par.  Kanzi had made a logical substitution for 
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Par Segerdahl by using a word with a similar human pronunciation.  This showed 
advanced rational skills as well as mastery of his symbolic language.
517
   
 Psychologist and primatologist Roger Fouts tested his chimpanzee Washoe using 
a double blind examination to ensure that his results were not the consequence of 
unintentional cueing.  Washoe sat behind Plexiglas while a researcher placed objects such 
as a brush, bib, or soda can in a box in front of her without allowing Washoe to see the 
researcher presenting the objects.  A second observer, who did not know what the object 
was, asked Washoe to name the object.  Washoe managed to give correct answers 
approximately 86 percent of the time.  At the height of her training, Washoe had a large 
vocabulary of over 250 signs and demonstrated the capacity to string these signs together 
to make explanatory phrases.  Other chimpanzee language studies reveal that 
chimpanzees also engaged in private signing which researchers compare to overt human 
thought or thinking out loud.  Fouts claims that the language abilities of chimpanzees, 
orangutans, and gorillas are at the level of a two to three-year-old human child.
518
   
However, some scientists remain skeptical of a chimpanzee‘s ability to use human 
language.  One such scientist was Nim Chimpsky‘s project director, Herbert Terrace.  
Although Nim mastered approximately 125 signs, Terrace concluded that Nim could not 
understand human grammar.  Nim could string together numerous signs to make 
rudimentary ―phrases‖ or sequences of signs such as ―me hug cat‖ or ―eat drink eat 
drink.‖  However, Nim‘s lengthy sequences did not have the syntactic structure of the 
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human language, and he did not develop this capability over time unlike a human child 
who begins language development uttering simple words but gradually learns to string 
sentences together using proper syntax.  Therefore, Terrace concluded that Nim could not 
form actual sentences and his abilities were well below those of a child.  Moreover, Nim 
did not use sign language to express his thoughts or ideas.  Most of his signs were 
demands to attain some type of reward such as food.  Nim did not learn to participate in 
the give and take of a conversation which is a skill that most human children learn 
relatively early in their development.  Nim‘s trainers concluded that Nim‘s language was 
purely pragmatic and they also questioned Washoe‘s ability to ―speak.‖
519
 
Terrace argued that Washoe‘s ability to construct sentences and novel phrases 
was exaggerated, and he criticized Fouts and the other Washoe trainers for excessive 
prompting rather than allowing Washoe to independently sign.  For example, Fouts 
claimed that Washoe invented a novel combination of signs to describe a swan upon 
seeing it for the first time.  Washoe signed ―water bird‖ which Fouts argued was 
meaningful and creative.  Terrace contested this claim arguing that Washoe was not 
trying to say ―bird that inhabits the water.‖  Rather, Washoe saw a body of water and a 
bird and in response to the question ―what that?‖ Washoe simply responded by 
identifying the water and the bird in that order.  Terrace argues that there is no evidence 
that Washoe understood syntax and semantics and therefore truly had a grasp of the 
English language.
520
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While Terrace may have been correct in that Washoe did not truly understand 
syntax, Washoe certainly did use sign language to communicate and even taught her 
adopted son Loulis to sign without any instruction from human trainers.  In videotapes, 
Fouts observed Washoe, Loulis, and the three other chimps in the sanctuary signing to 
each other without prompting from humans.  The chimpanzees even signed to each other 
when arguing which Fouts claimed demonstrated the extent to which the chimps used 
sign to communicate.   
Terrace was a well-known expert in chimpanzee language studies, and his 
pessimistic assessment of their capabilities was especially hard hitting for those who 
claim that great apes have language abilities.  However, although great apes may not be 
able to construct elaborate sentences to express complex thoughts and ideas, great apes 
have proven that they can express simple emotions and desires.  Great apes can 
communicate at a rudimentary level and this level is more than the capacity of some 
humans with brain damage or other afflictions.  The fact that great apes can communicate 
with humans in their own language, even though at a rudimentary level, is arguably 
grounds for qualifying for personhood based on Dennett‘s fifth condition of 
communication.   
Dennett‘s condition assumed that communication would be in a form of human 
language.  Ludwig Wittgenstein famously wrote, ―If a lion could speak, we could not 
understand it.‖
521
 Wittgenstein was referring to the fact that humans understand the 
language spoken by their own kind and because lions are radically different, humans 
would not understand them.  Wittgenstein‘s quote has been used to argue that the natural 
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sounds of lions are valid forms of speech within the lion community, but not within the 
human community nor within the community of persons.  Deontologist Gary Francione 
disagrees with Wittgenstein‘s quote and argues that to deny the significance of natural 
animal communication is inherently biased because it assumes that human language is 
superior.  He points out that many animals can communicate in sophisticated ways with 
members of their own species, and it is incorrect to assume that using human words and 
symbols is the only method that counts for moral worth or personhood.  He claims that 
the fact that many animals can ―speak,‖ albeit in their own ―language,‖ should carry 
weight when assigning personhood.
522
  Francione‘s argument in favor of granting great 
apes personhood is explored in detail in the next section.  
Even though animals do have the capacity to ―speak‖ in their own ―language,‖ the 
fact that animals have a ―language‖ that is completely different and unintelligible by 
humans is important when assigning personhood.  Dennett‘s third condition is that beings 
are persons when they are considered persons by other persons.  The fact that animals 
communicate in ways that are completely foreign to human beings is an important factor 
in why most persons do not consider animals to be fellow persons.  Animals are generally 
not accepted by most human persons into the category of fellow persons.  However, as 
humans learn more about the capabilities of great apes, there seems to be some 
movement toward greater acceptance of great apes as deserving of personhood.   
The fact that great apes can experience emotion and even perhaps empathy 
towards animals of their own kind gives pause to the consideration that these animals 
should be part of the community of persons.  In an experiment conducted by Jules 
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Masserman, et.al, rhesus monkeys were allowed to earn food by pulling one of two 
chains.  However, when the operator rhesus monkey pulled one of the chains, a second 
stimulus monkey, who was hidden behind one-way glass, would receive a painful shock.  
The operator monkey could witness the physical pain experienced by the stimulus 
animal, and after a few tries, the operator would generally stop pulling the chain that 
produced the painful shock.  Masserman concluded that a ―majority of the rhesus 
monkeys will consistently suffer hunger rather than secure food at the expense of the 
electroshock to a conspecific.  One possible interpretation of the results is that rhesus 
monkeys can appreciate the points of view of conspecifics.‖
523
 
Great apes have also demonstrated the ability to empathize with humans.  Fouts 
reported a profound incident of social understanding and compassion.  Washoe gave birth 
to two chimpanzees that did not survive, and Fouts reported that Washoe felt the loss 
deeply.  When another trainer miscarried her own child, she explained to Washoe that her 
child died.  Washoe looked into the woman‘s eyes and signed ―cry.‖  When the trainer 
prepared to leave for the day, Washoe signed, ―please person hug.‖
524
  
The ability to put others needs before one‘s own desires and to sympathize with 
the pain of others, is powerful evidence that great apes may be able to empathize.  
Empathy is a critical component for group membership.  It seems that chimpanzees feel a 
bond with their human trainers and accept these humans into their social groups.  
However, if humans do not reciprocate with empathy or at least an affinity for great apes, 
there is little chance that humans will include animals in their bestowal of personhood.  
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History has shown that humans are usually reluctant to include new categories of beings 
when conferring personhood.  For instance, during our nation‘s founding and through the 
period of slavery, White Americans had ascriptive conceptions of personhood that 
excluded Blacks, Indians, and all other groups that were considered ―other.‖  Fetuses are 
another category of beings that are not fully accepted into the community of persons.  
Pregnant women who gladly anticipate the birth of their child socially accept their fetus 
as part of the community of persons.  On the other hand, women who do not desire their 
pregnancy and seek abortion reject that the fetus should be included as a person with the 
right to live.  As a being that is hidden from sight until birth, it is difficult for the 
community of persons to recognize the growing and developing fetus as a viable person 
until the fetus emerges upon birth. 
Great apes suffer from a similar problem of non-inclusion in the community of 
persons which makes it difficult for great apes to meet the criterion of social recognition.  
Animals are considered to be the ―other‖ and the converse of human persons.  It is 
inconceivable to many humans that a great ape, or any other animal, should be considered 
a person.  However, inclusion within the community of persons is a controversial matter 
and various societies have included animals within their protections while excluding 
certain humans.  A prime example of this was in Nazi Germany where the Nazi party 
enacted numerous animal welfare statutes to protect animals from pain and suffering.  
Among these statutes was a prohibition against animal vivisection as well as endangered 
species protection measures.
525
  A thorough analysis of Nazi views of the moral, 
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biological, and legal status of animals versus humans is beyond the scope of this study.  
Boria Sax and Arnold Arlucke, who study the contradictions of human treatment of 
animals and Nazi theories, offer a summary of Nazi views on the status of animals.  Nazis 
saw human and animal life as part of a larger biological order where humans were a type 
of animal without moral distinctions setting humans apart.  Aryans were seen as the 
highest order of animals while other animals such as dogs and horses were valued for 
their loyalty, strength and fearlessness – qualities upheld for the Aryan race.  Because 
there were no moral distinctions between humans and other animals, it was possible to 
treat certain animals considerably better than many devalued humans such as Jews, 
gypsies, and other humans who were persecuted by Nazis while animals were protected.  
Once animals were protected, the German scientists needed new subjects for their 
medical research.  The Nazis looked to the bottom of the chain of beings and offered 
Jews, gypsies, and prisoners-of-war.  Within Nazi society, these humans did not qualify 
for the community of persons and thus were subject to horrendous experimentation.
526
 
Nazi Germany is an example of ascriptive policies towards humans and rather 
liberal policies towards animals.  Generally, the opposite is true – societies have inclusive 
grants of personhood to humans but are restrictive of animals.  Most Americans would 
agree that animals of any kind are not included in the ―We the People‖ of the 
Constitution.  Although the animal rights movement is growing and humans are 
becoming more environmentally conscious, including an animal within the community of 
persons is still too farfetched for many American citizens.  On the other hand, there is a 
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growing movement in a few European countries to include great apes in the community 
of legal persons.   
In 2008, the Association Against Animal Factories based in Vienna petitioned the 
Austrian court to grant legal personhood to a chimpanzee named Matthew Hiasl Pan.  His 
advocates insisted that they had formed bonds of friendship with the animal that qualified 
Hiasl as a member of community of persons.  In their opinion, Hiasl was so similar to 
humans that he deserved protection as a person, and they argued that a large portion of 
the Austrian public agreed with their assessment.  Hiasl‘s lawsuit was rejected by the 
Austrian Supreme Court which declared that a chimpanzee cannot be a person.  However, 
the case raised awareness of the issue, and as of 2009, the Association planned to take 
their case to the European Court of Human Rights.  
Environmental ethicist Peter Wenz argues that the strong social bonds that 
animals form with humans and other animals are important to consider.  He contends that 
these bonds are a type of social recognition and could satisfy the criterion for 
personhood.
527
  The numerous people who worked with Nim Chimpsky developed deep 
empathetic bonds with the chimp.  If asked, some of these trainers might be willing to 
consider Nim as a fellow person.  Dennett does not specify that recognition must be 
unanimous – perhaps if a segment of the population were willing to grant personhood, 
then great apes would qualify.  
 Great apes face the biggest challenge in meeting Dennett‘s condition four which 
is the ability to have second order volitions or to reciprocate.  Recalling Chapter One‘s 
discussion, Harry Frankfurt argues that what sets persons apart from animals is the 
                                                 
527




capacity to be self reflective and evaluate first order desires.  A person is able to assess 
his or her desires and then form preferences about these desires – in other words, the 
person can reflect and rank her volitions which is equivalent to a second order volitions.  
For example, a person might desire to eat meat but is able to realize that eating that 
particular food might violate ethical concerns about harm to animals and so he chooses 
not to eat meat.  Conversely, a lion does not stop to evaluate the consequences of killing a 
deer to eat.  Scientists who study animal behavior are still trying to determine if great 
apes or any other animals have the capacity for second order volitions.   
 Dennett assumes that most animals do not have this capacity.  He gives the 
example of his friend‘s dog that wants to sit in the chair her owner is currently 
occupying.  The dog ―pretends‖ that she needs to go outside by scratching on the door.  
As soon as the owner reaches door, the dog races back to the room and climbs into the 
vacated chair.  Dennett argues that the dog did not have a sophisticated thought pattern of 
trying to deceive her owner so that she could steal the chair.  Rather, the dog believes that 
scratching on the door will condition the owner to go to the door.  After applying the 
stimulus and getting the response, the dog takes the chair.  Similarly, a low-nesting bird 
will feign a broken wing in order to lure a predator away from the nest.  Dennett contends 
that this is not an ingenious display of deception.  Rather, it is an instinctual behavior that 
is genetically wired in the bird‘s brain and is not learned or invented.
528
  Perhaps Dennett 
is correct in that dogs and birds are not capable of reciprocity.  But what about animals 
with more sophisticated capacities such as great apes? 
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 Scientists have not found any evidence that apes living in the wild have any 
ethical systems.  Further, there is no evidence that apes have any understanding 
concerning the beliefs and mental processes of animals of their own kind – they do not 
have a theory of the mind.  Instead, apes in their natural habitat tend to be opportunistic, 
egocentric and pragmatic instead of empathetic.
529
  Great apes in the laboratory seem to 
be an entirely different matter.  Silverback gorillas Koko and Michael, who 
communicated through sign language, exhibited basic forms of self-awareness in their 
ability to use personal pronouns and convey emotional states such as humor, deception, 
and embarrassment.
530
  Washoe signed ―dirty monkey‖ to a rhesus monkey who bared his 
teeth and threat-barked when Washoe came near.  Soon, Washoe used the word ―dirty‖ as 
an adjective to describe any person who threatened or resisted Washoe‘s demands.  She 
even signed ―dirty Roger‖ when Fouts refused to let her go outside after Washoe signed 
―Roger out me.‖
531
  Another chimpanzee Fouts trained, Lucy, also used the word ―dirty‖ 
to signify her own bad behavior.  After Fouts caught Lucy defecating in the living room, 
Fouts had the following conversation with Lucy: 
Roger: What that? 
Lucy: What that? 
Roger: You know. What that? 
Lucy: Dirty dirty. 
Roger: Whose dirty dirty 
Lucy: Sue (A graduate student) 
Roger: It not Sue. Whose that? 
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Roger: No! Not mine. Whose? 




This conversation demonstrated that not only did Lucy recognize that certain actions 
were socially unacceptable, but she was able to evaluate her own actions and try to blame 
her bad behavior on someone else.  If Fouts is correct, Lucy was able to reflect on her 
actions, admit her guilt, and apologize.  This seems to be an instance of a second-order-
volition.  The orangutan Chantek, trained by anthropologist Lyn Miles, also demonstrated 
elementary self-reflection.  Chantek learned that some forms of behavior are 
unacceptable to his trainer, and signed ―bad‖ after such behavior.  He was even observed 
signing ―bad‖ to himself, which Miles found particularly interesting because it suggested 
that Chantek was reflecting on his simple values.  Miles conceded that Chantek‘s ability 
for self-reflection was nascent and immature, but she argued that Chantek had been able 
to internalize and exhibit some of the ―morals‖ of his foster culture.
533
   
However, neither Miles nor Fouts proved that Chantek and Lucy truly understood 
why certain behaviors are morally unacceptable.  Signing ―bad‖ after an action that the 
trainer has repeatedly taught is unacceptable could simply be awareness that a certain 
action has the label ―bad.‖  It does not demonstrate that the chimpanzee understands why 
a behavior is bad, the ethical standards that a certain behavior violates, and why violating 
such ethical standards is unacceptable.  Self-reflection of this higher order is what 
                                                 
532
 Roger Fouts, Next of Kin, [William Morrow and Company, Inc. New York, New York, 1997]: 156. 
 
533
 H. Lyn White Miles, ―Language and the Orang-utan: The Old ‗Person‘ of the Forest,‖ in The Great Ape 
Project: Equality beyond Humanity, Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, Editors, [St. Martin‘s Press, New 




Dennett seems to imply in his third condition.  Mirror tests, expressing emotions, and 
labeling actions are too simplistic to truly qualify as second order volitions.   
 Psychologist Robert Mitchell disagrees that great apes have the capacity to truly 
self-reflect in a meaningful way.  Although apes can pass simple mirror tests and 
seemingly use sign language to convey when they have engaged in disapproved behavior, 
Mitchell doubts that great apes can truly evaluate their behavior based on their own self-
assessment.  He argues that apes do not form an ideal image of themselves that they 
strive to achieve in order to be morally sound beings.  Nor do apes consider how other 
moral beings perceive of the morality of their behavior.  He argues that humans alone 
―can ponder past and future and weigh alternative courses of action in the light of some 
vision of a whole life well lived.‖
534
  According to Kant‘s criterion for moral agency, 
persons must be able to make rational decisions using the categorical imperative, ―Act 
only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.‖  So far, scientists have not found that great apes are capable of 
this level of evaluating their actions, and thus according to Kant‘s criterion, must be 
excluded from personhood.  Great apes can formulate a plan to use a tool in the future 
and can even teach tool using skills to their offspring which demonstrates some future 
vision.  However, great apes cannot formulate a master plan or ethic to guide their entire 
lives.  Or, in Lomasky‘s terms, great apes are not project pursuers.   
The capacity for self-reflection and second order volitions allows beings to make 
choices and be responsible for actions and life plans.  The ability to self-reflect upon 
one‘s actions and intentions is necessary for a being to be culpable for his or her 
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  Since animals do not have this ability, they are not culpable for their actions.  
A lion is not guilty of an offense when he attacks and eats the deer.  The ability to self-
reflect and form second-order volitions is the essential component needed to be a moral 
actor.  The ability to reflect on one‘s actions, decide the morality of those actions, and 
then refrain from engaging in unethical behavior is what qualifies a being as a moral 
agent.  It seems that animals do not have this ability.  Even great apes do not have the 
ability to self-reflect at this level.  This is the heart of the arguments made by Lomasky, 
Machan, and Cohen.  Great apes are not project pursuers in Lomasky‘s terms, and thus 
they are not moral actors who have claims and rights that must be respected by humans.  
For scholars such as Lomasky, Machen, and Cohen, this inability effectively excludes 
great apes from personhood.  
The previous chapter pointed out that young children face the same dilemma in 
that they are not the subjects of blame or innocence, and thus they are not moral agents 
and their personhood is questionable.  Because they are not capable of second order 
volitions, many scholars are reluctant to confer personhood on children who are not 
moral agents in the full sense.  These scholars only acknowledge children as potential 
persons.  Similarly, the early U.S. court system had a difficult time deciding if slaves, 
who were not considered persons, could be culpable for crimes.  Usually, the courts did 
find the slave accountable, but in a handful of cases, the courts held the slave owner 
responsible for his human property.  
 This section has shown that great apes have impressive mental capacities.  Great 
apes are rational, self-aware, and able to communicate with humans.  Their abilities rival 
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those of young children, and surpass the cognitive abilities of humans who are comatose 
or Alzheimer‘s patients.  Because of these abilities, some scholars claim that great apes 
should be given consideration as persons or at least potential persons.  However, great 
apes are not moral agents because they cannot evaluate the morality of their actions and 
choose to act according to an ethic.  Thus, they are not culpable for their actions.  
Animals, including great apes, can learn certain behaviors and can act altruistically, but 
they cannot truly act morally.  Therefore, their claim to personhood is questionable.   
Even though many animals have remarkable intellectual abilities, because animals 
are not legal persons with moral standing, they do not have any rights of persons under 
the law that humans must respect.  Instead, humans have classified animals as property to 
be used to satisfy human needs.  Humans can buy, sell, use, and destroy animals as they 
see fit with very little protection for these sentient beings under the law.  The status of 
property has also prevented animals from being plaintiffs in lawsuits, a crucial 
requirement to increase their protections under the law.  Humans who advocate for 
animals have had to adopt creative strategies to include animals within the legal realm 
because animals, as objects of property, do not currently qualify for legal standing.  
 
Animals as Property 
The classification of animals as property resurfaces the dilemma discussed in 
previous chapters – that which is property cannot be a person under the law.  Slaves were 
bought, sold, and abused because their claim to personhood was overridden by their 
classification as property.  The fetus is often categorized as the property of the pregnant 
woman and therefore is not considered as a person with rights or protections.  Many 
animal rights activists argue that as long as animals are classified as property, they will 
488 
 
never receive the protections they need and deserve as sentient, thinking, social beings.  
However, animals have been classified as property throughout much of recordable 
history, and changing that status would be extremely difficult.   
A shift from property to person would require a wholesale paradigm shift in the 
way society views animals as objects.  As discussed previously, persons tend to define 
themselves in relation to that which is other.  White, male colonists who designed the 
American system of government defined their personhood in comparison to what they 
were not – they were not slaves who were seen as primitive and intellectually inferior.
536
   
Adult persons also define themselves in comparison to what they are not – they are not 
the developing fetus that is hidden away in the womb and is not part of the active 
community of person.  Similarly, human persons know what they are not – they are not 
unthinking, brutish animals.  Overcoming this mentality and accepting that animals, or at 
least some animals such as great apes, should be granted personhood will be difficult at 
best.   
 Under the law, humans own animals just as they own cars, furniture, and 
corporations.  Humans own animals for the purposes of food, clothing, beasts of burden, 
entertainment, experiments, and product testing among many other uses. The human 
owner is entitled to the exclusive use of the animal for economic gain, can make contracts 
with other persons with respect to the animal, and can use the animal as collateral for a 
loan.  The human can sell, loan, bequeath, or give the animal away.  The human can also 
kill the animal at will.  In short, human ownership over animals is complete.  Wild 
animals are generally considered as owned by the state and held in trust for the benefit of 
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the people, but humans can take ownership of animals through hunting, taming, or 
confining.
537
   
 Deontologist Gary Francione argues that to classify an animal as chattel property 
is saying that in the law, the animal has no value and no interests apart from the value 
accorded to the animal by the individual property owner.  In other words, the animal is 
simply a Kantian means to an end.  Francione contends that animals are different from 
other forms of inanimate property because they are thinking, sentient beings, and he 
claims that most of the public agrees that animals should be treated humanely and have 
some protections under the law.  However, he argues that the law does little to provide 
protections or rights to animals.  Although there are criminal and civil laws that regulate 
animal use, these laws do not create rights for animals in the same way they create rights 
for human persons because articles of property cannot have rights of their own.  This is 
similar to the situation of slaves who could not have rights of their own apart from the 
rights of the master.  As in the case of slaves, any rights under the law primarily serve to 
facilitate the property‘s use for the owner.  Because Francione believes that animals 
should have rights under the law, Francione is one of the most vocal contenders for 
abolishing the property right in animals.
538
  
 Francione blames the theory of legal welfarism for allowing the law to treat 
animals as property without recognizing any rights that humans must acknowledge to 
protect the well-beings of animals.  According to Francione, legal welfarism is the 
doctrine that laws are created to maximize wealth and this includes maximizing the use of 
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animal property.  Therefore, the law only proscribes uses of animals that decrease the 
overall social wealth of humans or uses of animals that are inefficient.  If infliction of 
great pain and suffering on animals is necessary to maximize wealth, then exploitation of 
animals is permitted.  Property owners may not inflict gratuitous suffering on animals 
because this has no social benefit and does not increase wealth.  For example, ranchers 
are allowed to castrate and brand their animals without any pain relief because these 
practices are considered necessary and facilitate the use of animals for food which 
increases social benefit and wealth.  However, the rancher is not allowed to starve his 
animals simply because he does not wish to feed them.  This treatment of animals does 
not exploit animals for food or any other purpose and therefore is against the law.
539
   
According to Francione, legal welfarism subscribes to the idea that the welfare of 
animals should be understood as the level of care that maximizes the value of the animal 
as property.  The law can best assure this interpretation of welfare by deferring to the 
property owner to determine what will maximize the value of the property.
540
  In short, 
legal welfarism with respect to animals generally holds that all interests of animals, no 
matter how painful or injurious to the animal, can be overridden if the consequences are 
sufficiently beneficial to human beings.  Even a trivial human interest can override an 
animal‘s fundamental interest in avoiding pain and death.
541
 
 Francione argues that the crux of the problem for animals under legal welfarism is 
the absolute classification of animals as chattel property.  When determining what is 
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inhumane, the interests of the animals are balanced against the interests of the human 
property owners.  Unnecessary pain and suffering and the requirement to treat animals 
humanely are interpreted in light of the importance human society places on maximizing 
property.  The result is that animals are rarely given priority over human interests.
542
  He 
uses the federal Animal Welfare Act as an example to illustrate that the primary source of 
regulation for laboratory animals is by the researchers who own and use the animals.  
Because they have the greatest interest in producing solid scientific data, the law 
presumes that they will be motivated to ensure an appropriate level of animal wellbeing is 
provided.  However, what laboratories consider appropriate can differ significantly from 
what the general public interprets as appropriate animal wellbeing.  Hence, the public is 
often shocked and abhorred when laboratory conditions are revealed.    
 Francione maintains that just as eighteenth and nineteenth century courts decided 
slavery cases without discussing the underlying issue of the justice of the institution of 
slavery, today‘s courts do not examine the fundamental issues of justice underlying the 
exploitation of animals.  The difference between animals and humans is one of degree 
rather than kind, and animals are sentient beings just as humans.  However, as property, 
animals are treated as simply a means to an end with their worth measured in their 
usefulness to humans.  Animals are not considered as beings with values and interests.  
The law does not address the fact that statutes and regulations affecting animals are 
applied by an empowered group (human owners) to a disempowered group (animals.)  
The disparity in power is manifested in the law which does not adequately protect 
animals.  If these issues were recognized, Francione contends there would be a paradigm 
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shift.  He advocates replacing the paradigm of legal welfarism with a new theory that 
abolishes the property right in animals and allows animals to claim rights under the 
law.
543
  He argues that as long as animals are classified as property to be used by humans, 
they will not have any true rights because the so called rights will always be balanced 
against human interest and subject to overrule by human needs.  Abolishing the property 
status of animals would allow the law to recognize the inherent value of animals rather 
than just the instrumental value.  However, Francione admits that his proposal is radical 
because much of the present world economy depends on the exploitation of animals.  To 
fundamentally alter this paradigm would involve dramatic consequences.
544
  Challenges 
from scholars who deny that animals can have rights, such as Tibor, Cohen, and Scruton, 
raise a host of questions that Francione does not address.  Should an animal‘s rights be 
limited in accordance to the ability to act upon these rights?  Children do not have the 
ability to exercise all rights that adults have. Thus, children do not enjoy the full spectrum 
of rights until they reach adulthood.  If animals were granted rights, these rights would 
need to be limited based upon the capacities of each type of animal.  Adjudicating this 
would be very difficult.   
 Law professor David Favre offers an alternative to abolishing the property right in 
animals by proposing a new legal paradigm in which animals have property rights to 
themselves while humans retain a legal title to animals.  This concept asserts that an 
animal should have the right of self ownership.  Favre envisions a status for animals 
much like that of newborn humans.  Although parents have obligations to their infants, 
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parents do not own their children – they cannot sell or trade their children nor can they 
kill or enslave their offspring.
545
  Favre proposes that animals could have a similar type of 
limited self-ownership right as newborn humans.   
 Favre uses the example of a housecat names Zoe.  Title to Zoe rests in her human 
owner Mr. Willard.  Mr. Willard is liable for any harm that Zoe may cause to other 
persons and property, and Mr. Willard is responsible for obeying anti-cruelty laws.  Zoe 
has self-interests which can be attached to a concept of self-ownership.  Currently Mr. 
Willard‘s duty to avoid cruelty to animals is a duty owed to the state.  If Zoe had self-
ownership, then the obligation would be both to the state and Zoe herself.
546
  This would 
bring additional protections to the animal in instances such as abuse.  For instance, if Mr. 
Willard abuses the cat by putting out cigarettes on Zoe‘s skin, the state can currently 
bring a criminal action against Mr. Willard, but any punishment he receives would not 
help pay for the veterinary bills incurred during Zoe‘s recovery.  If Zoe had a legal self-
ownership right, Zoe could sue to obtain an injunction against batter and to recover 
damages for veterinary care, emotional distress, pain, and suffering.
547
 
 Favre‘s concept is ground-breaking in that he is asserting that animals should be 
considered legal persons.  Included in the right of legal persons, Favre asserts that 
animals should be able to sue and be sued in cases arising from injury.  In addition, 
animals should be able to hold assets.  Favre proposes that an animal would be able to 
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have an equitable interest in a bank account, could collect earnings from personal labor, 
and inherit property or other assets through a will.
548
  Favre‘s concept stimulates a huge 
number of further questions concerning animals as legal persons.  For instance, how 
would an animal demonstrate standing?  How would an animal exercise its right to bring 
suit; who would voice the need on behalf of an animal?  Would a legal guardian be 
appointed and is so, would animals be entitled to a legal guardian in all cases?  Would an 
animal have unlimited property rights?  How would the relationship between animal and 
human owner change?  To what other legal rights would animals be entitled beyond those 
listed by Favre?  These are just a few questions that immediately come to mind with 
Favre‘s proposal of legal personhood for animals.  Favre acknowledges that his proposal 
will require the writing of many books to iron out the details.  However, Favre is not 
alone in asserting that animals, or at least some animals, should be considered legal 
persons.   
Constitutional and environmental law scholar Cass Sunstein agrees that the 
rhetoric of property in animals does mask the fact that animals are sentient, rational, and 
communicative beings that should not be treated as a mere means for human ends.  
However, he questions whether the property right in animals should be abolished.  He 
disagrees with Francione that the status of property destines animals to be treated as 
disposable, unfeeling objects subject to domination by humans.  He points out that some 
inanimate objects such as houses or fine art have protections against destruction under the 
law.  Likewise, although animals are legal property, they do have some protections under 
the law.  It is possible to further modify the law to create more protections from injury, 
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abuse, neglect, and death without completely abolishing the status as property.  On the 
other hand, the property right in animals could be abolished and animals could have a 
status similar to that of children – humans would still have a great deal of control over 
them just as parents have control over their children.  He concludes that the debate over 
whether or not animals are property really involves a set of specific issues concerning the 
rights and protections needed for animal welfare and this debate could be settled without 
resorting to completely overhauling the concept of property in animals.
549
    
Sunstein believes that animals cannot be given full legal rights as persons because 
clearly animals cannot vote or run for office.  However, Sunstein believes that animals 
should be granted a limited legal personhood so that animals can be party to a lawsuit in 
cases of torture, battery, and undue confinement.  Because animals do not have the 
capacity to file a lawsuit or testify on their own accord, human representatives would 
have to act on their behalf.  Sunstein argues that animals should be granted legal 
personhood to help enforce existing statutes protecting animal welfare such as the Animal 
Welfare Act (AWA).
550
  Sunstein further argues that statutes such as the AWA must be 
overhauled because these statutes have odd patterns of inclusion and exclusion of various 
animals and are irregularly enforced.
551
  In order to fully understand the protections 
animals currently have under the law and the potential to grant further rights such as legal 
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standing and personhood, it is necessary to briefly review existing animal welfare 
regulations.  
 
ANIMAL WELFARE STATUTES 
 Laws protecting animal welfare are a relatively new occurrence.  Early writers 
such as William Blackstone and James Kent subscribed to the Roman and biblical 
concept that animals were legal property and had no rights or protections.  Early laws 
involving animals were designed to protect the property rights of owners and cruelty to 
animals was generally not a criminal offense except in situations where property values 
were at stake.  If a person abused an animal owned by someone else, the person could be 
prosecuted for damaging property, and the owner could receive financial compensation.  
Little to no concern was given to the animal itself that suffered.  The animal laws 
imposed indirect legal duties to treat animals a certain way, but the real subjects of the 
law were the owners to whom a direct obligation was owed.
552
   
 On the other hand, an elaborate structure of liability laws governed an owner‘s 
liability for wrongs committed by his animals.  When deciding cases of liability due to 
injury caused by animals, the court often tried to adjudicate the mental states of both the 
animal and the owner.  Whether the animal committed a deliberate or accidental injury or 
if the animal was provoked or acted in self-defense were critical factors in a case.
553
  
Although animals were considered strictly property, their cognitive abilities were taken 
into consideration in cases where it suited human plaintiffs much like the slave cases 
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discussed in Chapter Two where the rational abilities of non-person slaves were 
considered when it suited the court.  Early malicious mischief statutes were intended to 
protect the property value of animals rather than protect animals from suffering.   
 Based on a Western and biblical tradition of little regard for the wellbeing of 
animals, the U.S. did not enact comprehensive statutes to protect animals until relatively 
recently.  Because early Americans considered animals to be simply chattel property, 
there was no need to enact anti-cruelty laws to protect animals from their human owners.  
According to animal law scholars David Favre and Murray Loring, society had little 
desire to interfere with the property rights of owners.  The only time animal protection 
became a societal concern was when an animal was of economic value to the community 
as well as the owner.  Animals that were deemed valuable, such as livestock, received the 
most consideration, whereas dogs which were deemed economically worthless received 
little to no protection.
554
  Such concepts as anti-cruelty protection were heterodox and 
rarely voiced.  A notable exception to mainstream consideration of animals was a Puritan 
law enacted by Reverend Nathanial Ward who compiled a list of statutes to govern 
colonial Massachusetts called ―The Body of Liberties.‖  Under Liberty 92, Ward wrote, 
―No man shall exercise any tirrany of crueltie towards any bruite creature which are 
usuallie kept for man‘s use.‖
555
  However, Ward‘s law did not gain popularity with the 
other colonies and anti-cruelty laws were not considered.   
 In 1791, a lesser-known American writer Herman Daggett proposed a bold 
assertion – that animals have rights just as humans.  He wrote, ―I know of nothing in 
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nature, in reason, or in revelation, which obliges us to suppose that the unalienated rights 
of a beast, are not as sacred, as inviolable, as those of a man; or that the person, who 
wantonly commits an outrage upon the life, happiness, or security of a bird, is not as 
really amenable, at the tribunal of eternal justice, as he who wantonly destroys the rights 
and privileges or injuriously takes away the life of his fellow creatures of the human 
race.‖
556
  Although Daggett argued passionately for animal rights, his argument was 
radical for his time and did not gain acceptance with fellow scholars or the general 
public.   
 About this time, the Industrial Revolution was beginning, and steam powered 
machines began to replace animals in agriculture, manufacturing and transportation.  As 
animals became less necessary for economic progress, attitudes toward the treatment of 
certain species, especially horses and cattle, began to soften.  England began to consider a 
limited body of laws to protect certain animals.  In 1822, Parliament passed Martin‘s Act 
or the ―Ill Treatment of Horses and Cattle Bill‖ which prohibited the beating, abuse, or 
ill-treatment of animals such as horses, mares, ox, cows, steer, sheep, and other cattle.  
Punishment was a fine not to exceed forty shillings.  This law was widely considered to 
be the first animal protection law in the world.
557
 
 After the passage of Martin‘s Act, a concerted effort took shape in England to 
advance the wellbeing of animals.  Numerous publications critiqued the prevalent cruelty 
to animals including the sport of cock throwing and mistreatment of cattle and horses.  
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Writers advanced the idea that humans had a duty to treat animals with kindness.  By the 
1860s, the movement in England expanded its focus from domesticated animals to 
animals used in scientific experimentation.  In 1867, England passed a bill to safeguard 
laboratory animals, and by the turn of the century, antivivisection groups began to form 
across Europe.
558
  Despite the progressive nature of England‘s anticruelty statutes, 
enforcement of these statutes often failed to live up to the intent of the law.  For example, 
in 1887 the English court heard the case Lewis v. Fermor (18 Q.B. 532, 534) which 
involved a veterinarian named Fermor who was prosecuted for performing a 
hysterectomy on sows without painkillers.  The court found that although Fermor likely 
caused the sows tremendous pain and possibly even torture, he did not violate the 
anticruelty statute because his intention was to benefit the owners of the sows by 
increasing their weight and development.  Thus, the court ruled that inflicting extreme 
pain was legitimate when it increased the property value of the animal.
559
   
 Animal protection was a minimal concern in the U.S., but as fervor increased in 
England, momentum began to pick up within the states.  In 1866, New York passed an 
anticruelty statute which was proposed by animal activist Henry Bergh.  The law made it 
a criminal offense to treat animals cruelly, regardless of ownership.  However, the law 
limited the list of animals that were protected under the law and qualified the provisions 
of the law so that malicious intent had to be proven before violations could be prosecuted.  
Still, the passage of the New York law was a significant event for animal advocates.  
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Henry Bergh went on to form the New York Society for the Prevention Cruelty to 




 Another concern prompted further animal protection statutes.  By the turn of the 
twentieth century, U.S. lawmakers realized that many animal species, and in particular 
the bison, were in danger of extinction due to over hunting.  California and New 
Hampshire both enacted conservation statutes in 1878 to control over hunting and 
provide sustained yield.  Soon other states followed suit and began to require licenses for 
hunting in order to pay for administrators, law enforcement, and development of animal 
populations and their habitats.
561
  National laws such as the 1929 Migratory Bird 
Conservation Act and the 1940 Bald Eagle Protection Act similarly protected endangered 
species.  These laws were not enacted to protect the lives and welfare of animals 
however.  Instead, their purpose was to maintain the economy of animal hunting, 
preserve certain species that were symbolic to the United States, and secure a future of 
animals for food, sport, and aesthetics.  The state‘s initiative to control animals in the 
wild also signified that even wild animals are property with the state acting as the owner 
until another person assumes ownership through hunting.  The purpose of early American 
conservation laws was clearly to serve human interests of property ownership.   
With the advent of the two World Wars and rapid industrialization, attention was 
drawn away from animal protectionism.  The humane activism in England and the U.S. 
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weakened, and antivivisection movements lost momentum.  It was not until the 1960s 
that concern for animals resurfaced.
562
  In 1966, Congress passed the Endangered Species 
Preservation Act which authorized the Fish and Wildlife Service to spend up to $15 
million per year to protect endangered wildlife and fish listed by the Secretary of Interior.  
Federal land agencies were directed to preserve habitats for endangered animals, while 
other agencies were encouraged but not required to protect endangered animals.  This 
first protection act was limited in scope and only protected native animals.  While the 
federal government began protecting endangered animals, the public began to notice the 
abuse of commercial and laboratory animals.   
The February 4th, 1966 edition of Life magazine featured an exposé of the 
conditions at dog dealerships.  Titled, ―Concentration Camps for Dogs,‖ the article 
contained graphic photographs of the animals destined for scientific laboratories.  The 
article ignited outrage.  More than 80,000 letters of protest flooded Congress, eclipsing 
the volume of mail received over issues of civil rights and the Vietnam War.  Other 
publications, including Sports Illustrated, Reader‟s Digest, and prominent newspapers 
jumped on the bandwagon covering animal abuse.
563
  Along with the public awareness 
generated by these articles, Dr. Frank Mulhern, then Director of the Animal Health 
Division, contended that the humanization of animals by Walt Disney characters played a 
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role in increasing empathy for animals.
564
  By the 1960s, animal welfare had become a 
political issue.   
 Goaded into action by the public outcry at the abuse of animals, especially dogs, 
Congress passed the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act in 1966.  This first animal 
protection act was limited in its funding and covered only cats, dogs, primates, guinea 
pigs, hamsters, and rabbits.  It also limited its coverage to animal dealers and research 
programs that crossed state lines and involved government funding.
565
  Although limited, 
this first statute was important in making animal welfare a public issue under 
governmental control.  Throughout the 1970s, the statute was amended to increase the 
number of animals covered to include all warm-blooded animals used in research, 
exhibition, or as pets in a wholesale market.  Further, jurisdiction no longer depended on 
animals crossing a state line which increased the USDA‘s responsibility for monitoring 
animal commerce.  The 1976 amendments added control over transportation of animals 
after several graphic incidents of animal death were reported due to a lack of ventilation 
and extreme temperatures.  Further the 1976 Animal Welfare Act (AWA) prohibited dog 
fights and other types of animal fighting for sport after public outrage over the welfare of 
dogs mangled in these brawls.
566
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 In 1985, the AWA was amended again, and some of the noteworthy changes 
included new standards for research facilities, limits on survival surgeries, psychological 
well-being programs for primates, exercise for dogs, and a public information center at 
the National Agricultural Library.  In 1990, the law was supplemented by the Pet Theft 
Act which attempted to prevent dealers from stealing cats and dogs for sale to research 
facilities.  The amendment required that all cats and dogs be held at shelters for at least 
five days before they are sold to laboratories.  In 2002, the AWA was again amended, but 
this time it was not expanded.  The AWA did not cover rats, mice, and birds, and thus the 
USDA was sued because it did not protect all warm blooded animals.  The 2002 
amendment redefined the word ―animal‖ to officially exclude birds, mice, and rats so that 
these animals were exempt from protection.  Finally, in 2007, the Animal Fighting 
Prohibition Act amended the AWA to prohibit the selling and transporting of any knife or 
sharp instrument that is attached to a bird‘s leg for animal fighting.
567
   
 In 2000, Congress passed the Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, 
and Protection Act (CHIMP) which authorized the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to establish federally supported sanctuaries for the care of chimpanzees formerly 
used in federal research facilities.  The law also prevented euthanasia of chimpanzees 
except when afflicted with an intractable illness.  However, the law was limited be the 
fact that federal laboratories had complete discretion to decide when a chimpanzee was 
ready for retirement without a set of objective criteria.  The laboratories could also pull a 
―retired‖ chimpanzee back into service.  A 2007 amendment prohibited returning retired 
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chimpanzees to the laboratory.  Despite these limitations, CHIMP was a step forward for 
animal rights activists seeking better treatment of laboratory animals.   
 The history of animal welfare regulations demonstrates progress but also 
highlights much needed reform.  In forty years since the AWA‘s passing, the law has 
made some steps forward in protecting animals, but still leaves much to be desired by 
animal advocates.  The law regulates the housing and maintenance standards for 
laboratory animals but does not prohibit any type of experiment no matter how painful.  
There are no regulations that control the conduct of an experiment, and laboratories can 
withhold anesthetics whenever ―scientifically necessary‖ which gives experimenters wide 
latitude to determine if anesthetics would interfere with the results of an experiment.  The 
AWA does not apply to farm animals used for food or fiber, nor does it apply to 
entertainment events such as rodeos, state and county fairs, and cat and dog shows.  Even 
more importantly, the law excludes retail pet stores.
568
  The Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act (HMSA) was passed in 1958 in response to overwhelming public outcry at 
the treatment of slaughter animals.  The law mandates that animals be unconscious before 
slaughter to ensure a painless death.  However, since its passing more than fifty years 
ago, the law still excludes chickens which are the most common slaughter animals.  Nor 
does it cover the branding, dehorning, or roping of other animals. 
The final problem with both the AWA and HMSA is that enforcement by the 
USDA is very weak.  The one comprehensive assessment of the USDA‘s role in 
monitoring research facilities was done more than twenty years ago in 1985 by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO).  Already then, the report found problems with facility 
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oversight testifying that the USDA was lax in its role as inspector of animal research 
facilities.  The GAO reported that many inspectors were not adequately trained, and the 
USDA did not have the resources to inspect all facilities, nor were they able to follow the 
prescribed inspection timeline.
569
  A 2008 GAO report found problems with the USDA‘s 
implementation of the HMSA, specifically citing ineffective stunning of animals making 
them vulnerable to pain during slaughter.
570
 
 Anticruelty laws were designed to protect and benefit animals as sentient beings 
and as such are important in their recognition of animals as beings of worth.  It sets a 
standard that humans have at least some limited obligations owed directly to animals to 
refrain from imposing unnecessary suffering.
571
  However, the AWA does not imply an 
elevated status for animals and certainly does not even hint that animals could be 
considered legal persons for any reason.  Francione contends that the shortcomings of the 
AWA reflect the fact that the law still considers animals as simply the property of 
humans and therefore subject to exploitation.  For instance, there are very few regulations 
on farm animals used to provide meat and clothing for humans.  The courts have 
followed this pattern and read into the laws exemptions for most animals that are used by 
humans.  The law presumes that human owners will keep their own economic interests in 
mind and will not inflict more suffering on an animal than necessary because to do so 
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would diminish the monetary value of the animal.  However, this is not necessarily the 
case, and humans may have extreme views on the extent of suffering acceptable for their 
property.  Finally, Francione argues that there is a social stigma against imposing 
criminal liability on property owners for what they do with their own property.  Instead, 
the norm is noninterference in what is considered a private matter.
572
 
  The reality is that animal activists have limited avenues to legally ensure the 
well-being of animals.  As was already explained, regulations such as the AWA have 
weak enforcement measures and are not aggressively pursued by agencies such as the 
USDA.  Police and local enforcement agencies are often too busy with other matters 
involving humans or are uninterested in pursuing violations of animal cruelty laws.  
Thus, private parties such as animal activists may try to step in and invest their own 
resources to bring suits on behalf of animals.  The next section traces the ways animal 
activists have tried to use the judicial system to gain increased rights and protections for 
animals through a detailed analysis of the important cases pertaining to animals and 
personhood.   
 
ANALYSIS OF CASES 
Humans acting on behalf of animals face a significant obstacle when trying to 
adjudicate animal welfare through the judicial system.  Constitutional and statutory limits 
based on legal standing often limit their access to the courts.  Locus Standi or simply 
standing is the ability to demonstrate that the party is directly harmed by a law or 
controversy.  Since private parties acting on behalf of animals often cannot demonstrate a 
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personal injury, the courts deny their standing.  Standing has become a huge obstacle 
preventing humans from acting as guardians for animals in court.  The largest and 
arguably impenetrable obstacle preventing animals from entering the legal system is that 
animals simply are not humans and thus are not granted access.   
The legal system was designed for and utilized by humans; animals are not 
considered subjects of the law.  Legally, animals are considered property, and disputes 
concerning these beings are generally considered simple property claims.  The courts 
generally do not consider the sentience or familial attachments many people have to 
animals.  Therefore, most court cases concerning animals are cut and dry property 
matters that do not discuss personhood in any way.  There are countless cases pertaining 
to property disputes concerning animals.  There are extremely few, however, that concern 
the possibility that animals might have rights or might be considered as persons.     
 Although there are thousands of cases concerning animals, very few discuss the 
personhood of animals or the possibility of standing for humans who represent animals.  
Since there are so few, an analysis of these relevant cases is possible.  The first three 
cases in this section are property disputes, but in each case the judge addressed the issue 
of animals as sentient beings capable of forming relationships with humans.  These 
opinions are important because they offer an alternative paradigm to animals as simply 
property.  Unfortunately for animal rights activists, these cases are the rare exception.  
The next set of cases involves humans seeking to protect animals through the legal 
system and the struggle to prove that humans have standing when animal welfare is at 
stake.  Finally, the last four cases covered are rare instances where the courts have 
specifically addressed the personhood of animals.  The Hawaiian case Palila v. Haw. 
508 
 
Dep't of Land & Natural Res. (853 F.2d 1106, 1988) proposes that an animal might be 
able to be party to a lawsuit just as a human is.  However, the cases following Palila 
firmly squash this idea, effectively ending the debate over animal personhood until a 
future case boldly raises the issue again.   
 
Animals are More than Property 
 Historically, the courts have awarded damages for the loss of an animal based on 
fair market value and have ignored the intrinsic value of an animal as a sentient, rational 
creature or the emotional distress an owner feels when a pet dies.  A case in point was the 
circumstances of two teenage boys who broke into an animal shelter in Iowa and brutally 
beat sixteen cats to death with baseball bats.  The jury found the boys guilty of offenses 
against the animal shelter and criminal trespass, but because the market value of the cats 
was less than $500, the boys were not convicted of a felony.  The boys argued that the 
cats in a shelter had no market value because no humans wanted them, and the jury 
accepted that argument.  The case prompted outrage, and many citizens expressed 
indignation that the cats were regarded as worthless.
573
  However, the decision was 
consistent with the characterization of animals as property.   
A few cases have gone beyond the simple market value of animals and have taken 
into account the loss of companionship and distress experienced by human owners.  In 
most respects, Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc. was a typical personal 
property dispute regarding a pet dog (415 N.Y.S.2d 182; 1979). However, this case is 
unique in that when the judge was evaluating the damages sustained by a pet owner, he 
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opined that a family pet is much more than property and occupies a special status above 
ordinary property.  Kay Corso brought her poodle to the Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital 
for treatment, and the veterinarians recommended that the dog be euthanized.  Corso 
asked the hospital give the corpse to Bide-A-Wee, an organization that performed 
funerals for dogs.  Corso planned an elaborate funeral with attendance by several people 
as well as burial with a headstone.  The hospital did not follow Corso‘s orders and instead 
delivered a casket with the body of an unknown dead cat.  Corso sued for compensation 
of the elaborate funeral she planned as well as the mental anguish she experienced when 
finding the corpse of another animal.   
 Overruling years of past precedent that established a pet as an object, Judge 
Friedman stated, that ―a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in 
between a person and a piece of personal property‖  (415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 531).  Although 
past precedent allowed certain pieces of property such as heirlooms to be treated 
differently than ordinary property, Friedman argued that classifying the pet as an 
heirloom was not appropriate either.  Instead, Friedman pointed out that animals were 
animate creatures that respond to humans and have a special place in the emotional lives 
of humans.  Based on this reasoning, Friedman ruled that Corso was entitled to more than 
the market value of the poodle and should be compensated for her mental suffering. 
 Another case which has become well-known for pointing out that animals should 
be treated differently than ordinary personal property is Bueckner v. Hamel (886 S.W.2d 
368; 1994).  In this case, a hunter, Bueckner, witnessed two dogs chasing some deer, and 
he shot the two dogs.  Bueckner was charged with cruelty to animals and order to pay 
$325 in restitution for destruction of Hamel‘s property.  Hamel then filed a civil lawsuit 
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against Bueckner for damages both to his property and his mental wellbeing.  The court 
acknowledged that Hamel suffered financially due to the value of dogs and the value of 
future puppies.  Further the court granted that Hamel suffered a loss of companionship 
and the loss of loved pets.  Thus, the value of the dogs must be both personal property 
and intrinsic worth.  The concurring opinion by Eric Andell is noteworthy because he 
elaborated on the intrinsic value of domestic animals.  He argued that the general rule of 
market value for lost pets was inadequate.  He wrote, ―A domestic pet with no breeding 
potential might be worth only $10 in the market to someone else who wants it as a pet.  
But the animal could be a highly valued companion whose loss would be deeply felt. 
People who love and care for animals should not be forced to accept as compensation for 
their loss the amount that the animal would bring in the market‖ (886 S.W.2d 368, 374).  
Since the publication of this opinion, animal law books frequently cite this case as setting 
the precedent that some animals have both pecuniary and intrinsic value.  Lawyer and 
activist Derek W. St.Pierre applauds decisions such as Corsco and Bueckner v. Hamel as 
questioning the status quo of animals as property.  He says that recognition of the 
intrinsic value of animals under tort law can help drive legal discourse forward toward 
recognition of the rights and personhood.
574
  Despite St.Pierre‘s optimism, a decision that 
recognizes that pets have value to their owners does not go the next step and recognize 
that all animals have a value beyond their simple market value as property.   
 Finally, the case Petco Animal Supplies, Inc v. Schuster (114 S.W. 3d 554, 2004) 
is not noteworthy for the decision which confirmed the personal property value of a pet.  
Rather, the case is significant for the dicta that describe the intrinsic importance of a 
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family pet.  In this case, Carol Schuster successfully sued the store Petco after her 
miniature schnauzer ran away from a groomer and was killed by traffic.  The trial court 
awarded Schuster replacement costs for the dog, costs for training and microchip 
implantation, lost wages while searching for the dog, and damages for mental anguish, 
emotional distress and counseling as well as damages for the loss of companionship.  
Petco appealed the awards for counseling, mental suffering, and intrinsic damages.   
 Schuster as well as an amicus brief from the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) 
urged the court to refer to Bueckner v. Hamel as precedent for awarding damages for 
intrinsic value.  Instead, Judge Pemberton, writing for the Texas Court of Appeals, 
affirmed Petco‘s claim that Texas law only classifies dogs as personal property for 
damage purposes and not as persons or any extension of their owners.  Further, there was 
no precedent in Texas law for awarding mental anguish damages.  Thus Pemberton 
reversed the award for mental anguish and counseling expenses.  In his opinion, 
Pemberton spends some time recounting the closeness many Americans feel towards 
their dog.  After recounting the results of several public opinion polls in which 
Americans reveal that they would be likely to risk their lives for their pets, Pemberton 
concludes, ―These statistics indicate that companion animal owners view their pets as 
family members, rather than personal property‖ (114 S.W. 3d 554, 564).  Despite 
Pemberton‘s conclusion that many Americans view their pets more as persons than 
property, Pemberton decided that he must follow Texas precedents and only consider the 
pet as personal property.  Consequently, he reversed the award for the intrinsic value of 
companionship.   
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 These cases are among the very few that recognize the intrinsic value of animals 
beyond their replacement cost or market value.  Yet, as Petco v. Schuster illustrates, 
courts are still reluctant to award damages for the emotional distress owners experience 
when their animal property is injured or killed.  These three property cases involved 
circumstances where the owner was trying to win damages for his or her own suffering.  
Far more complex issues arise when humans are trying to protect animals from suffering.  
As has already been mentioned, humans have a difficult time proving standing when they 
are trying to prevent harm to animals or the environment.  Because it is the animal or the 
environment that suffers, the human who is bringing the suit has a difficult time 
demonstrating an injury in fact.  This next section covers lawsuits involving standing.   
 
Standing to Protect Animals 
 Numerous lawsuits have been initiated by animal rights groups against the 
government and other institutions for violations of the AWA.  Although many times the 
violations against the AWA are egregious and there is concrete evidence of illegal animal 
suffering, the animal rights groups do not succeed.  The merits of the case are sufficient, 
but the groups fail due to jurisdictional challenges to third parties.  Animal rights groups 
lack standing. 
 According to the Supreme Court, the rules of standing are ―threshold determinants 
of the propriety of judicial intervention.‖
575
  Thus, if the plaintiff cannot prove standing, 
the case must be dismissed.  The plaintiff must prove that he or she has a case or 
controversy under Article III of the Constitution.  In addition, the plaintiff must show that 
there is a causal relationship between the illegal action and the alleged injury, and that a 
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court decision can redress the injury.  If an animal was allowed to enter the court as a 
plaintiff, it would be relatively easy to prove how a violation of the AWA or similar 
statute is causing an injury in fact to the animal.   However, because animals are not 
persons with the right to be plaintiffs in a lawsuit, humans must initiate the lawsuits to 
rectify violations of AWA.  The problem is proving that an injury to an animal or the 
environment is also a concrete harm to the human is very difficult.  Humans have 
resorted to claiming aesthetic and educational injuries.  This section traces how animal 
activists have sought standing in some key court cases dealing with animal issues.   
 The first important case decided by the Supreme Court in respect to standing did 
not involve animal rights or the personhood of animals.  Rather, Sierra Club v. Morton 
405 U.S. 727 (1972) concerned a controversy over environmental issues involved with 
developing a parcel of land in Sequoia National Forest.  The case is important because it 
was one of the first major cases to argue that humans have an interest in protecting the 
environment including land and animals, and thus should have standing to sue to protect 
that interest.  The Court ruled that although an environmental group did not have standing 
to sue for general interests, individuals who had a particular interest in a natural entity did 
have standing to sue to protect their interest.  Moreover, in his dissent, Justice Douglas 
used arguments made famous by Christopher Stone in his paper ―Should Trees Have 
Standing,‖ to maintain that the natural entities such as trees, parks, and streams have 
interests of their own and should be considered juridical persons in cases concerning 
direct harm to the environment.  Although Justice Douglas‘s argument did not gain much 
traction, the idea, put forth by a Supreme Court Justice, that natural entities could be 
considered persons was groundbreaking for animal rights activists who picked up on the 
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argument to contend that animals should also be considered juridical persons with human 
guardians when issues concerning animals were at stake.   
 In the case Sierra Club v. Morton, the conservation group the Sierra Club brought 
suit to stop the Disney Corporation from developing a large ski resort within the Mineral 
King Valley of the Sequoia National Forest.  Members of the Sierra Club sought an 
injunction to restrain federal officials from approving the development claiming that a 
development within a national park would adversely change the land‘s aesthetics and 
ecology.  When the Supreme Court heard the case, Justice Stewart found that the Sierra 
Club did not sufficiently prove that the development would affect activities of the club or 
specifically harm its members.  Because the Sierra Club did not prove that its members 
would be adversely harmed in a concrete way, Justice Stewart ruled that the Sierra Club 
lacked standing to sue and dismissed the case.  However, Justice Stewart held that the 
individual members of the Sierra Club did have standing to sue if the development 
affected their aesthetic or recreational interests.  This set an important precedent that 
persons with a particular interest in a natural resource did have an injury in fact and thus 
had standing to bring suit in environmental cases.  By the time the Sierra Club re-filed 
their complaint to prove injury to specific members, Congress had passed the 
Environmental Policy Act which required Disney to file an environmental impact 
statement (EIS).  The EIS found that the development would severely impact the 
environment, and the project was cancelled.   
 Justice Stewart‘s ruling that persons who are impacted by environmental issues 
had standing to sue was significant for future cases involving persons suing based on 
harm caused to animals and natural entities.  However, Stewart ruled that the person 
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himself must be personally harmed in a concrete way – a person cannot sue on behalf of 
the forest itself claiming that the harm to the forest is an injury in fact.  The forest itself 
had no claim of injury or right to sue with a human representative or guardian ad litem.  
Justice Douglas wrote a compelling, and now famous, dissent arguing that the forest itself 
should have standing to sue.    
 Justice Douglas picked upon Christopher Stone‘s article in a Southern California 
Law Review, published just before the Sierra Club decision was reached.  In his article, 
Stone argues that just because trees, forests, and streams do not have a human voice to 
speak their concerns that does not mean that these natural objects should be excluded 
from the judicial system.  He contends that corporations, infants, incompetents, and 
universities cannot speak, but human lawyers are allowed to speak for them.   In the same 
way, Stone advocates for guardians for natural objects that are endangered.
576
  Justice 
Douglas agreed with Stone‘s argument in his influential dissenting opinion.  He argued 
that just as a ship or a corporation has legal personality as a legal fiction, inanimate 
natural objects too should be granted legal personality in order to protect these objects 
from harm (405 U.S. 727, 743).  He wrote that these objects must be protected ―before 
these priceless bits of Americana (such as a valley, an alpine meadow, a river, or a lake) 
are forever lost or are so transformed as to be reduced to the eventual rubble of our urban 
environment, the voice of the existing beneficiaries of these environmental wonders 
should be heard‖ (405 U.S. 727, 749).  He further opined, ―Those inarticulate members of 
the ecological group cannot speak. But those people who have so frequented the place as 
to know its values and wonders will be able to speak for the entire ecological 
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community‖ (405 U.S. 727: 750-2).  In fact, Justice Douglas suggested that the Mineral 
King Valley itself, as a tract of public wilderness, had legally protected interests that 
would be harmed by the development, and the Mineral King Valley should have standing 
to protect those interests.   
 Justice Douglas‘s opinion was groundbreaking in its suggestion that the 
environment could be represented by a guardian ad litem and that natural beings could be 
artificial persons for judicial purposes.  However, this argument did not catch on with 
fellow justices or with the lower courts, and this opinion was the first and only time such 
a concept was seriously considered.  The opinion did not set a precedent extending legal 
rights and standing beyond human persons to other animals or natural objects.  Even 
though the opinion did not gain momentum, it resounded with environmental advocates 
who feared that, without a broader definition of injury in fact and standing, natural 
entities would be in grave danger.  For instance, in their amicus curiae brief, the 
Wilderness Society, Izaak Walton League of America, and Friends of the Earth argued 
that, if only persons with direct use of natural resources are granted standing, there is no 
way to protect entities such as animals in danger.  Because humans have no direct use for 
eagles in the wild, humans cannot bring suit to prevent chemical poisoning of these 
animals that occurs with many pesticides.
577
   
The majority opinion in Sierra Club confirmed that animals remained at the 
mercy of the court only able to be helped when human litigants proved they had standing 
to bring suit.  Interestingly, Sierra Club v. Morton and Roe v. Wade were originally 
brought before the court during the same term.  If Roe had not been postponed for re-
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argument until the next term, the Supreme Court may have been faced with both issues of 
personhood at the same time.  Could the concept of personhood for natural objects 
influence the decision on personhood for unborn humans?  Both cases employed 
arguments demonstrating that other entities such as corporations had legal personhood.  
Since the Court denied personhood to both natural objects and the unborn, it is likely that 
hearing the two cases back-to-back would not have influenced the Court.  However, 
spectators and scholars of the judicial process may have drawn many more parallels.   
 The courts used Sierra Club v. Morton as the model for deciding cases concerning 
standing for animals.  In 1977, the Washington D.C. Court of Appeals heard The Animal 
Welfare Institute v. Kreps 561 f.2d 1002.  This was an important case because the Court 
of Appeals followed the reasoning of Sierra Club and further explained the conditions 
under which humans could claim an injury for environmental harms.  At issue was a U.S. 
government decision to waive a moratorium on sealskin importation from South Africa.  
A coalition of animal protectionist groups challenged this decision claiming that it was a 
violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and that the members of the 
groups had a personal interest in the protection of seals.  At the district court, the suit was 
dismissed because the organizations lacked standing.  However, on appeal the Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision and agreed that following the precedent of Sierra Club, the 
organizations did have standing and that the government had violated the MMPA.   
 The plaintiff protectionist groups claimed that their interests lay in a safe and 
productive environment for marine animals for the recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and 
educational interests of their members.  The higher court agreed.  In Judge Wright‘s 
opinion, he outlined three requirements for standing in the absence of a statutory grant: 1) 
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there was an injury in fact; 2) there was a causal connection between the injury and the 
defendant‘s action; and 3) an injury within the zone of interests protected by the statute.  
Wright found that the environmental groups did have an injury in fact because they 
submitted affidavits proving that members traveled to South Africa to observe, 
photograph, and learn about the seals.  The defendants claimed that there was a no causal 
connection between the challenged act and the alleged injury because the MMPA did not 
have a direct effect on the actions of South Africa and an importation ban would not stop 
South Africa from killing seals.  However, Judge Wright disagreed, citing evidence that 
South Africa did respond to strict enforcement of the MMPA.  Finally, Wright ruled that 
the MMPA was enacted in response to public outcry against the exploitation of young 
seals.  Violations of the MMPA impaired the members‘ interests in ensuring that the 
provisions of the MMPA were followed.  Judge Wright wrote, ―Where an act is expressly 
motivated by considerations of humaneness toward animals, who are uniquely incapable 
of defining their own interests in court, it strikes us as eminently logical to allow groups 
specifically concerned with animal welfare to invoke the aid of court in enforcing the 
statute‖ (561 F.2d 1002, 1007).  Wright opened the doors for humans to take up the 
interests of animals within the legal system.     
 The Washington D.C. Court of Appeals again followed the Sierra Club precedent 
when deciding Humane Society of the US v. Hodel 840 F.2d 45 (1988).  In this case, the 
Humane Society challenged the Department of Interior‘s decision to allow hunting on 
national wildlife refuges.  The district court denied standing to the Humane Society 
arguing that the emotional injuries suffered by members of the Humane Society were not 
constitutionally recognizable and that recreational interests were not germane to the 
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mission of the organization.  On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and granted 
standing to the Humane Society.  Judge Wald upheld the district court‘s ruling that 
emotional distress is not a recognized injury and a ―strong interest‖ in enforcing 
environmental statutes is not sufficient for standing.  On the other hand, Wald followed 
the precedents of Sierra Club and The Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps to rule that 
recreational and aesthetic interests could be the basis for standing.   
 The court then adjudicated the germaneness test associated with the Humane 
Society‘s claim.  The court ruled that an organization had standing to bring suit on behalf 
of its members when the members would otherwise have standing to sue on their own, 
the interests it sought to protect were germane to the organization‘s purpose, and the 
neither claim asserted nor the relief requested required the participation of the individual 
members.  Judge Wald found that the district court had mistakenly classified the Humane 
Society‘s interests as recreational when, in fact, the injuries suffered were to their 
aesthetic interests, which are recognized injuries under Sierra Club.  Wald ruled that the 
members of the Humane Society had a germane interest in preventing hunting on 
protected land and that the goal of both the Humane Society and of the lawsuit were to 
protect the lives of animals and birds.  This ruling was important because the review of 
germaneness further opened the gates for environmental groups to assert an interest in 
protecting animals.   
 While the D.C. District Court was adjudicating these claims by environmental 
groups, the Supreme Court was also immersed in a similar lawsuit.  In the early 1980s, 
the international community set quotas to control whale harvesting.  The U.S. enacted 
several policies that allowed U.S. officials to impose sanctions on nations who violated 
520 
 
international fishing quotas.  Because the sanctions would cost Japan millions in fishing 
revenue, Japan negotiated an executive agreement with the U.S. Secretary of Commerce 
to a limited level of whaling without being reported as violating the international 
agreements.  The American Cetacean Society along with several other conservation 
groups brought suit claiming that the Secretary of Commerce should have certified that 
nationals in Japan were violating the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling.  The Supreme Court‘s opinion in Japan Whaling Association v. American 
Cetacean Society 478 U.S. 221 (1986) revolved around the authority of the Secretary of 
Commerce and only tangentially covered the conservation of wildlife.  However, in 
footnote four, Justice Byron White provided insight on the standing of environmental 
groups.  White acknowledged that the American Cetacean Society would suffer injury in 
fact, because continued whale harvesting hurt the members‘ ability to engage in whale 
watching and study.   
 These three cases set a standard for cases involving animal protection 
organizations.  First, the courts did not even consider the possibility that the animals 
themselves might have standing to claim injury.  The courts were only willing to 
entertain the possibility that humans who belong to environmental organizations could 
suffer an injury when harm was done to an animal.  Although the courts took a narrow 
view in not even considering the harm done to the actual animal, the courts took a more 
expansive view when outlining what constitutes harm to humans.  Aesthetic interest in 
wildlife is legally protected and therefore humans or organizations of humans can sue 
when the government violates these interests with improper hunting.  Overall, the courts 
were willing to protect the interest humans have in avoiding the death of animals but the 
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courts were not willing to protect the interests of the animals themselves.
578
  These cases 
set the stage for important cases in the next decade. 
The Supreme Court case, International Primate Protection League v. 
Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund 500 U.S. 72 (1991), is interesting for this 
study primarily due to the irony surrounding the determination of ―persons‖ with 
standing.  The case involved the International Primate Protection League‘s attempt to 
rescue several monkeys from the National Institute of Health and the Tulane Educational 
Fund.  The Primate Protection League claimed that they should gain custody of the 
monkeys and act as legal guardians for the animals who were being abused and had no 
voice in the legal system.  The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring the 
National Institute of Health (NIH) from euthanizing or performing any more research on 
the monkeys.  The Court of Appeals vacated the injunction and dismissed the case 
finding that the Primate Protection League lacked standing.  At the Supreme Court, the 
matter of the NIH‘s ability to remove the case from a state court to a federal court was 
also at issue.  The NIH claimed to be a corporate ―person‖ and thus able to remove a case 
to federal court under 28 U.S. Code § 1442.  The irony of this case was that the real issue 
at hand was the fate of several monkeys who were in danger of abuse and death but had 
no recourse to the legal system because they were not persons.  However, the case barely 
touched on the plight of the monkeys.  Instead, it revolved around the standing of both 
the Primate Protection League and the personhood of the NIH to remove the case to 
federal court.   
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 At the level of Circuit Court, the majority found that the Primate Protection 
League did not have standing to sue on behalf of the monkeys even if the monkeys were 
left unprotected.  Quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), the court said, ―The assumption 
that if respondents have no standing to sue, ‗no one would have standing, is not a reason 
to find standing…‘‖ (895 F.2d 1056, 1061).  Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall 
delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.  Marshall‘s opinion revolved around the 
narrow jurisdictional issue of removing the case to the Federal District Court, and the 
Court found that the Primate Protection League did have standing to challenge the 
removal of the case because their injury was the loss of the right to sue in the forum of 
their choice.  Further, the language of the U.S. Code did not imply that the NIH could 
remove the case.  The Supreme Court held that the case must be remanded to the state 
court.  Despite the publicity of a Supreme Court ruling, the Silver Spring monkeys were 
largely left out of the decision.  The welfare, rights, and any claim to standing or 
personhood of the monkeys was not considered by the Court.  By the time the Supreme 
Court issued its decision, all of the Silver Spring monkeys had died from injuries 
sustained during the experiments or were euthanized.   
 In 1992, the Supreme Court heard Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 
which involved a controversy over the Endangered Species Act of 1973.  This statute 
required the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to ensure that government agencies do 
not jeopardize the habitats of endangered or threatened species.  While the Secretaries 
initially agreed to a joint regulation extending the statute‘s coverage to foreign nations, a 
subsequent ruling confined the statute‘s scope to the U.S. and high seas.  In response, the 
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Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations brought suit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the new regulation erred in limiting the scope of the Endangered Species 
Act.  Secretary of Interior Manual Lujan objected that the environmental organizations 
lacked standing.   
 This case provided the Supreme Court opportunity to adjudicate what conditions 
must be met for an organization to claim standing in respect to a harm done to animals or 
the environment.  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, clarified what must be 
established in order to claim an injury in fact.  He held that an injury must be concrete 
and particularized as well as an actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected 
interest.  The party must have evidence of the injury to support the claim.  Further, there 
must be a causal relationship between the claimed injury and the actions of the accused – 
i.e. the person named in the lawsuit must be the individual responsible for the injury.  
Finally, there must be a high probability that a favorable decision for the plaintiff would 
remedy the harm.   
 In this case, Scalia found that the plaintiff environmental organizations did not 
have an injury in fact.  They did not show that their members would be directly affected.  
Affidavits from members claiming to visit foreign nations with endangered species 
sometime in the indefinite future did not constitute an imminent injury.  Scalia opined 
that a plane ticket proving that one of its members had planned to visit an affected area 
would have been sufficient to prove injury in fact.  Further, Scalia wrote that general 
grievances about the government should not be adjudicated in a federal court – rather that 
is the role of Congress and the President 
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Scalia‘s decision was considered a defeat for animal advocates who hoped to use 
a broad definition of standing to protect animals who had no hope of entering the 
courtroom themselves.  Again, the possibility that animals themselves may have standing 
was not considered.  The Defenders of Wildlife organization decided to defend their own 
human rights rather than the riskier proposition of defending the animals involved.  In 
Justice Stevens‘s concurring opinion, he wrote that humans do have standing to protect 
the animals and the habitat of animals that they enjoy observing and plan to observe in 
the future.  Stevens wrote, ―Congress has found that a wide variety of endangered species 
of fish, wildlife, and plants are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people‖ (504 U.S. 555, 585).  This 
statement is powerful in what it does not say – Congress has not found that endangered 
species have value on their own accord.  According to this statement, Congress decided 
to protect certain living beings due to their usefulness to humans.  Additionally, in a reply 
brief for the petitioner, the Departments of Justice and Interior argue that it is ―quite odd‖ 
to recognize a risk to animals as an actual injury to a human.  Further they argue that 
expanding the class of plaintiffs able to bring suit beyond the normal strictures of Article 
III is a ―bizarre view of injury.‖
579
  These federal agencies suggest that the only true 
value of animals was their use to humans and to suggest including them as plaintiffs in a 
lawsuit was ―bizarre.‖  This did not bode well for animals to gain personhood.  
The setting for Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy 23 F.3d 496 (1994) was 
again the D.C. Circuit Court.  In 1994, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) and the 
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Humane Society brought suit against the Secretary of Agriculture because they felt that 
the department was allowing an unduly narrow definition of ―animal‖ under the AWA.  
The AWA‘s definition excluded birds, rats, and mice which meant that research facilities 
did not have to report laboratory conditions for these animals.  The plaintiffs asserted that 
this exclusive definition undermined their attempts to gather and disseminate information 
concerning the wellbeing of these animals for the education of their members.  Further, 
an ALDF member, Dr. Patricia Knowles, claimed that as a researcher working with rats 
and mice, the agency‘s failure to define these creatures as animals rendered her unable to 
control the wellbeing of the rats and mice and that inhumane treatment impaired her 
ability to perform her work duties.  The District Court held that the ALDF was stretching 
the imminence requirement ―beyond the breaking point‖ with their request for standing 
for Knowles.  Notably, Judge Williams dissented with this part of the decision.  Williams 
argued that following the spirit and principles of The Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 
Humane Society of the US v. Hodel, and Japan Whaling Association v. American 
Cetacean Society, there was a recognizable aesthetic interest in seeing animals treated 
humanely.  Therefore, Williams argued that Knowles did have standing to claim an injury 
in fact.   
Despite the disagreement over standing for Knowles, the Circuit Court 
unanimously agreed that that the ALDF and the Humane Society did not have standing 
based on an informational injury because an informational injury did not fall within the 
zone of interests for the AWA.  Because the organizations were simply trying to educate 
their members but not protecting the members‘ legal rights, they did not have an injury.  
The District Court suggested that Congress could explicitly grant humans standing to 
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receive information about animal welfare, but until Congress did so, the organizations did 
not have standing.   
For the last and arguably most interesting case concerning standing, we remain 
with the D.C. Circuit Court which heard Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman 154 
F.3d 426 in 1998.  In this case, Marc Jurnove, a member of the ALDF, claimed that he 
was injured due to having to witness the inhumane living conditions of the primates at the 
Long Island Game Farm Park and Zoo.  The ALDF, having learned from the previous 
cases concerning standing, took a strategic approach to this case.  Jurnove really was 
seeking relief for injuries suffered by the animals at the Long Island Zoo.  However, the 
ALDF knew that litigating on behalf of animals was futile; therefore, they brought a case 
on behalf of a human who empathized with the animals.   
Jurnove was also an employee and volunteer for rescue organizations and could have 
claimed that he was injured during the course of his work.  Again, however, the ADLF 
realized that their best chance for gaining standing was to claim that Jurnove suffered an 
aesthetic injury during his regular visits to the zoo as a customer.  Jurnove‘s injuries truly 
were more morally or ethically based rather than aesthetic in the traditional meaning of 
aesthetic referring to beauty.  Moral and ethical harms had not been attempted and proven 
successful whereas aesthetic injury had a line of precedents to support standing.  Thus, 
the ALDF took the proven route of claiming aesthetic injuries to a patron.  This strategy 
proved successful.    
 The court was sharply divided on whether the ALDF could claim standing, but the 
majority decided in favor of Jurnove and his fellow plaintiffs.  Judge Wald followed the 
line of precedents from the D.C. District Court that an aesthetic injury is an injury in fact, 
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and Jurnove suffered from the quality and condition of the environmental area.  Because 
USDA failed to enact standards to meet the guidelines of the AWA, Jurnove‘s injury was 
due to government inaction and therefore Jurnove had causation.  More stringent 
regulations would redress the issue and relieve Jurnove‘s suffering and thus Jurnove also 
satisfied redressibility requirements.  Because Jurnove‘s aesthetic interest was legally 
protected under the AWA, the majority found that Jurnove did have both standing and 
causation.   
The dissent, led by Judge Sentelle, found issue with granting the ALDF standing.  
Sentelle argued that standing on aesthetic grounds was limited to ―diminution of the 
species‖ and Jurnove‘s injury was ―a matter of individual taste.‖  Jurnove‘s claim would 
allow standing for anyone seeking to view animals in a way that does not comport with 
his or her individual taste.  The dissent reasoned that ―a sadist with an interest in seeing 
animals kept under inhumane conditions‖ would also have standing to sue (154 F.3d 426, 
448). 
 Jurnove claimed a personal injury in order to bring a lawsuit ultimately designed 
to change the way animals were treated.  His aesthetic injury of observing the ill-treated 
primates was really secondary to the primary injury to the animals.  Jurnove had to resort 
to this strategy because direct victims, the primates at the Long Island Zoo, were not able 
to bring a suit on their own behalf.  Obviously, primates do not have the mental and 
physical capabilities to articulate rights and initiate a lawsuit independently.  But it is 
conceivable that primates could be party to a lawsuit if a human such as Jurnove acted as 
a guardian and initiated the lawsuit.  As previous chapters have illustrated, this is quite 
common in cases involving children, the mentally incompetent, and even slaves.  
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Currently, U.S. policy does not allow court-appointed guardians to initiate lawsuits on 
behalf of animal subjects for violations of the AWA, ESA, or any other animal protection 
act.  Francione argues that it is unlikely that Congress will amend current policy and 
allow animals to be represented by guardians.  He claims this is because as property, 
animals are the object of legal claims and not the subject.  Children and the mentally 
incompetent are not property and therefore are subjects of legal claims rather than 
objects.  They have legal rights whereas animals, as property, do not have legal rights that 
a guardian can help protect.
580
   
 Another option to gain some legal protections for animals that does not conflict 
with the status of property is to allow animals to be considered persons as legal fictions in 
situations where their well-being is at stake.  This would be similar to the status of 
corporations which are still considered property but are persons under the law in certain 
situations.  As legally fictitious persons, animals would be allowed to enter a lawsuit in 
their own name (with a guardian) but would not necessarily gain all the rights and 
privileges of human persons.  If a legal person is defined as simply what the law says it 
is, then there is no real obstacle for allowing animals, or at least primates, to be 
considered legal persons for limited issues.  This was suggested by Justice Douglas in the 
Sierra case.  Despite the options of allowing guardians or granting personhood through 
fictions, there does not seem to be much movement toward either of these alternatives.  
The final, and most radical option, is to allow animals to enter a lawsuit just as human 
persons do.  The next section explores the few cases that entertain that option and then 
ultimately reject granting personhood to animals.   
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The Concept of Animals as Persons 
Humans face an extremely difficult challenge in gaining standing to sue in cases 
concerning injury to animals.  The preceding cases represent the very rare exceptions to 
the rule where human standing was considered.  In the vast majority of cases, the issue of 
standing for humans is not even considered or is denied.  Further, because standing is 
difficult to prove, most injuries to animals do not even reach the court system because the 
battle seems futile.  If humans cannot gain standing to represent animals it is even more 
unlikely that animals themselves will ever have their day in court.  Although animals 
sometimes appear in the names of cases as plaintiffs, it is very rare that the animals are 
truly considered as a party to the case.  Even if represented by human guardians, the idea 
is simply too farfetched for most courts.  However, there are a handful of cases that 
represent exceptions.  These cases present claims under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) and are brought forward with the species of animals itself as the plaintiff.  Cases 
such as Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D.Wash. 1988), Mt. 
Graham Squirrel v. Yeutte 930 F2d 703 (1991), American Bald Eagle v Bhatti 9 F.3d 
163, (1993), and Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County 307 F.3d 1318 
(1995) involved violations of the ESA to the specified animal.  Although each of these 
cases had a species of animal as the plaintiff, the courts did not address the legality of an 
animal as plaintiff or the issue of standing for the animal.  There are, however, four 
notable cases that directly address the issue of a species of animals serving as a party in a 
case and the related issue of legal personhood.  Because these cases are so rare, it is 
worth examining them in some detail. 
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One of the most well known cases involving animal personhood is State of 
Hawaii v. Kenneth LeVasseur 1 Haw. App. 19, (1980).  Kenneth LeVasseur was an 
undergraduate student at the University of Hawaii who worked as a research assistant in 
the university‘s marine laboratory.  His job was to repair and clean the dolphin tanks as 
well as feed and swim with the dolphins.  After two years of working with the dolphins, 
LeVasseur determined that the dolphins were in danger due to their confinement in the 
laboratory tanks.  LeVasseur and several other people decided to ―rescue‖ the dolphins 
and release them into the ocean.  LeVasseur was arrested and convicted of first-degree 
theft.   
 LeVasseur appealed his conviction claiming a choice-of-evils defense under 
Hawaiian law which allowed that certain criminal actions can be justified if the actor 
believes the conduct will avoid a greater harm or evil to another.  According to the court, 
LeVasseur ―contended that he chose to commit the lesser harm of theft in the first degree 
in order to avoid greater harm either to the dolphins or to the statutorily expressed policy 
(AWA) of the United States‖ (1 Haw. App. 19, 24).  LeVasseur‘s defense hinged on the 
word ―another‖ in the choice-of-evils defense.  LeVasseur claimed that dolphins should 
be included in the term ―another.‖  The appellate court rejected this argument, saying that 
the Hawaiian legislature specifically defined ―another‖ as a person which included 
natural persons, corporations, and unincorporated associations.  Under this definition, 
dolphin was not ―another.‖   
LeVasseur also claimed that ―another‖ included the United States as a corporate 
person, and his actions were designed to protect the laws of the United States under the 
AWA.  The court agreed that the AWA was designed to protect animals such as 
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laboratory dolphins, but found that LeVasseur still acted improperly because he did not 
contact the federal government to report conditions before taking action.  In the choice-
of-evils defense, the court had to adjudicate whether the crime of theft was a greater evil 
than the evil LeVasseur sought to prevent – violation of U.S. policy for the protection of 
laboratory animals.  The court decided that the crime of theft committed by removing the 
dolphins and releasing them into the ocean was as great an evil as the violation of the 
AWA.  Therefore, the court upheld LeVasseur‘s conviction.  Francione argues that the 
court‘s decision is understandable because the fundamental premise of the AWA and 
other legislation is that ―nonhumans are the property of humans and can exploited for 
human benefit.‖
581
  The researchers at the university were simply exercising their right of 
private property in keeping the dolphins in the tanks.  LeVasseur‘s attempt to stop the 
evil of inhumane treatment of animals was not a greater evil than the violations of the 
university‘s property rights.
582
    
 The next case concerning personhood also comes from a Hawaiian court.  In 
1988, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case involving the endangered bird 
called the palila which is only found on the slopes of Mauna Kea on the Island of Hawaii.  
The Hawaiian Department of Land and Resources allowed feral sheep and goats to also 
occupy Mauna Kea, causing the destruction of the palila‘s habitat.  The Sierra Club, 
Audubon Society, and other environmental groups brought suit against the Department of 
Land and Resources under the ESA.  Circuit Judge O‘Scannlain delivered the opinion in 
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the case Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 853 F.2d 1106, (1988).  The case is 
important for this study due to a striking opening statement by Judge O‘Scannlain:    
As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act ("Act"), 16 
U.S.C. § 1531-43 (1982), the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member of the 
Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into 
federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. The Palila (which has earned 
the right to be capitalized since it is a party to this proceeding) is 
represented by attorneys for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other 
environmental parties who obtained an order directing the Hawaii 
Department of Land and Natural Resources (―Department‖) to remove 
mouflon sheep from its critical habitat. (853 F.2d 1106, 1107) 
 
O‘Scannlain affirmed the district court‘s finding that habitat degradation was a harm that 
could result in extinction and that the sheep were taking the habitat from the palila.  He 
sustained the order to remove the sheep.  While the decision was a victory for the palila, 
the broad victory was for animal advocates who saw O‘Scannlain‘s opening statement as 
a breakthrough in allowing animals to be represented in court.  Although this case did not 
shift the paradigm, and very few cases allowing animals as litigants followed, the case is 
often cited by advocates seeking increased legal protections for animals.   
 The next noteworthy case involving a species of animal as a party to a case also 
originated in Hawaii.  Hawaiian Crow („Alala) v. Lujan 906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Hawaii, 
1991) involved the ‗Alala bird which was also protected by the ESA.  As of 1991, 
approximately twenty-one ‗Alala birds survived on the Hawaiian Islands, and nine of 
those birds lived in the wild on property known as the McCandless Ranch.  Audubon 
Society adopted an ―Alala Recovery Plan‖ which required the owners of the McCandless 
Ranch to take active steps to preserve the ‗Alala.  When the McCandless Ranch refused 
entry to the land, the Audubon Society took legal action.  In their suit, the Audubon 
Society named the ‗Alala as the plaintiff.  The McCandless defendants then took action 
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claiming that because the ‗Alala was not 
a person, the bird did not have standing to sue, could not be a plaintiff, and must be 
removed from the title of the case.   
 District Judge David Ezra adjudicated whether the ‗Alala could be a plaintiff.  
The ESA authorized enforcement by ―any person‖ and specified that ―person‖ was an 
individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity.  Ezra 
was breaking new ground because no court had expressly ruled on whether an animal 
could be considered a private entity and thus a person under the ESA.   The Audubon 
Society relied on O‘Scannlain‘s opening statement in Palila to argue that the ‗Alala 
should be considered a person.  However, Judge Ezra pointed out that this statement was 
dictum and Palila did not truly address the issue of standing for an animal.  Ezra ruled 
that the ‗Alala was not a person with standing to sue under the ESA and therefore he 
granted the McCandless defendants‘ motion to dismiss the ‗Alala as a plaintiff and strike 
‗Alala from the name of the case.  However, the court declined to impose sanctions 
against the Audubon Society for improperly naming the ‗Alala in the case.   
 Two years after the Hawaiian court handed down the „Alala decision, the District 
Court for Massachusetts affirmed the decision that only ―persons‖ could bring lawsuits 
and animals did not qualify as persons.  The case Citizens to End Animal Suffering & 
Exploitation v. New England Aquarium 836 F. Supp. 45 (1993) was brought by Citizens 
to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation (CEASE), the Progressive Animal Welfare 
Society, Inc., (PAWS) the ALDF, and a dolphin named Kama.  The defendants moved 
for dismissal and summary judgment on several grounds including the argument that 
Kama the dolphin lacked standing.  On the issue of standing, the plaintiffs again relied on 
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O‘Scannlain‘s statement in Palila to argue that Kama was a legitimate plaintiff.  
However, Judge Mark Wolf followed the precedent of „Alala that O‘Scannlain‘s 
statement was just dictum and that animals were not ―persons‖ that could be party to a 
lawsuit.  Wolf wrote, 
The MMPA (Marine Mammal Protection Act) does not authorize suits 
brought by animals. … This court will not impute to Congress or the 
President the intention to provide standing to a marine mammal without a 
clear statement in the statute. If Congress and the President intended to 
take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people and 
legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly. (836 F. 
Supp. 45, 49) 
 
Judge Wolf effectively ended the hope of animals gaining standing in their own right.  In 
November 2011, PETA initiated another suit designed to secure more rights for animals 
as persons.  PETA claimed that five whales owned by Sea World marine parks were 
enslaved and that their treatment represents a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Even though the whales were not human, PETA charged that the text of the Thirteenth 
Amendment does not refer to human beings or persons and therefore slavery does not 
depend on species any more than it depends on gender, race or religion.
583
  PETA 
planned to present their case to a California judge.  The critical questions will be whether 
the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to humans or if it is broad enough to encompass 
other animals.  David Steinberg, a professor of law at the Thomas Jefferson School of 
Law contends that the Amendment was never intended to apply to animals and it was so 
obvious that slavery meant humans that it was unnecessary to explicitly state.  However, 
because it is not explicit, there may be room for PETA to argue on behalf of the whales.  
This will be an interesting case to watch in terms of animal personhood. 
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Where to Draw the Line? 
 Although there is a large body of law addressing the personhood of slaves, 
corporations, and fetuses, as these cases illustrate, the law has very rarely dealt directly 
with the issue of personhood for animals.  The law addresses issues concerning persons 
and because the law generally only accepts humans and certain groups of humans such as 
corporations as persons, animals have not had their day in court.  Further, when humans 
attempt to address animal exploitation through the court system, they often are rebuffed 
because they do not have standing to sue.  Within the law, an animal as property is firmly 
established while an animal as a person is radical.  With these obstacles, it is very 
difficult to find an answer from the judicial system to the question ―where to draw the 
line‖ when deciding which humans and animals qualify for personhood.  
  Making the move from moral rights to legal rights is an even thornier 
proposition.  The Constitution and Bill of Rights do not mention animals and give no 
indication that these creatures were intended to be part of the political community.  There 
were however numerous laws during the founding of the nation pertaining to animals as 
simple property.  The legal tradition in respect to animals remains that they are simply 
property that humans should treat with appropriate care in respect to their economic 
value.  Francione seems to be correct that the property classification of animals is the 
biggest obstacle in granting animals more protections, rights, or claims to personhood.  
Property does not have rights or claims – it is something to be used to advance human 
interests.  
Even laws such as the AWA or ESA that endeavor to protect some types of 
animals are often loosely enforced or are allowed exceptions for animals that are 
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important in human economic commerce.  For instance, poultry are excluded from the 
AWA and Humane Slaughter Act even though approximately 9 billion birds are 
slaughtered each year in the U.S. for human consumption.  The review of the very few 
cases that mention animal rights or claims to personhood reveals that animals do not have 
standing and cannot even be represented by a human guardian ad litem in order to claim 
injury.  This leaves very little room for animals to be protected under the law.  Granting 
animals full legal personhood is an even more radical proposal that would require more 
than just procedural laws that affect standing.  It would require changing the substantive 
laws concerning how humans may treat animals who are fellow persons.  Concerns such 
as utilizing animals for food, clothing, experimentation, amusement, and so on would be 
challenged.   
It seems that most humans have a mixed conception on how humans should treat 
animals.  Most people profess to be against animal torture and have tender and even 
loving feelings towards animals.  On the other hand, the majority of Americans support 
animal experimentation, hunting, and eating animals.  A 2003 Gallup poll revealed that 
fully 96 percent of Americans felt that animals deserve some protection from harm and 
exploitation while only 3 percent felt that animals do not need protection ―because they 
are just animals.‖  Twenty-five percent of those surveyed even said that animals deserve 
―the exact same rights as people to be free from harm and exploitation.‖
584
  However, of 
those surveyed who called for giving animals the exact same rights as humans, 44 percent 
opposed banning medical research on animals and 55 percent opposed banning all types 
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  This reveals that Americans have mixed and even confused views on how 
they feel animals should be treated.  Further, despite claiming to have tender feelings 
towards animals, only about 2.5 percent of Americans are vegetarians regardless of the 
fact that a vegetarian lifestyle is not more expensive and arguably healthier than a 
carnivorous lifestyle. 
 If animals truly have a claim to personhood that humans must respect, animals 
cannot be used as a food source.  In civilized society, humans do not allow cannibalism 
because humans cannot eat other entities that have moral worth and moral rights.  If 
animals were persons, they too would have moral worth that would prevent their 
consumption by fellow persons.  This does not seem to be a step humans are willing to 
take.  Experimentation on animals is another area that is fraught with difficulty.  Only 
about 52 percent of the public supports animals in scientific research, but among 
scientists, an overwhelming 93 percent favor animal experimentation.
586
  There is little 
doubt that research on animals has led to medical breakthroughs that have saved millions 
of lives.  Advances in fighting diseases such as Alzheimer‘s, polio, childhood leukemia, 
and diabetes were all made due to research on animals.   
The large majority of research subjects are rats and mice, and because humans do 
not feel an affinity towards these animals, there is very little protest when rats and mice 
must suffer for human benefit.  On the other hand, some treatments must be tested on 
primates such as strains of the HIV-AIDS virus that are tested on chimpanzees due to 
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their genetic similarity to humans.  Humans must adjudicate whether they are willing to 
forgo potentially life-saving treatments in order to protect animals that are their next of 
kin.  This is a difficult situation and the debate concerning primates in research is intense.   
 A focus of this chapter was chimpanzees and other great apes that have cognitive 
abilities that rival those of humans.  Numerous studies prove that great apes can 
communicate in a human language, are rational, and are emotive.  However, the lynchpin 
seems to be the ability for second order volitions or the ability to evaluate first-order 
desires and then choose to engage in these desires.  This is what sets moral beings apart 
from all others.  A human can choose to act in accordance to set of ethical principles 
rather than wantonly following his or her desires.  Apes in the wild do not seem to have a 
set of principles that they follow in order to guide their society.  More research remains to 
be done on laboratory great apes to see if their cognitive abilities surpass simple emotions 
and self-chastisements to truly understanding a moral code.  The present research seems 
to indicate that humans are the only beings who are self-legislative and morally 
autonomous agents.  Thus, under most philosophical criteria for personhood, humans are 
the only beings who qualify.     
 The problem with this argument is that it allows humans carte blanch to be 
classified as persons but still subjects animals to a cognitive screening test.  Why must 
animals prove their qualifications?  Further, great apes are so close to passing the 
screening test that a valid argument could be made that they should be given the benefit 
of the doubt and granted some rights and protections.  Some humans recognize that 
certain animals such as great apes are beings so similar to humans that they too deserve 
protections.  Fouts found that of all the people who visited the chimpanzee Washoe, deaf 
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children were the first to recognize the chimpanzee as next of kin.  He writes, ―To see a 
deaf child, who struggles daily to be understood by follow humans, talking animatedly in 
sign with a chimp is to recognize the absurdity of the age-old distinction between 
―thinking human‖ and ―dumb animal.‖  When deaf children look at Washoe, they don‘t 
see an animal.  They see a person.‖
587
   
 This story illustrates the fact that what counts as a person is often a matter of 
perception.  The deaf children recognized that the chimpanzees were similar to them and 
they felt a kinship to the animals.  Many of the scientists working with great apes also 
develop bonds with the animals and begin to identify great apes as persons.  However, 
most humans do not have this type of affinity with great apes and thus do not see the need 
to include these animals within the realm of persons.  Despite the numerous studies that 
reveal the capabilities of great apes, they remain elusive animals that are sometimes 
hauntingly similar to humans but not persons.  When humans draw the line for 
personhood, animals are excluded. 
 
Analysis of Hypotheses 
 The animal rights movement to bestow legal personhood upon animals is a 
relatively new cause in the American political sphere.  Although the matter of animals 
holding legal rights is a relatively new topic for discussion, the issue of whether animals 
have moral rights has been debated by theorists for centuries.  The review of ancient 
Greek, Roman, and Biblical views on animals reveals that the majority these ancients 
viewed animals as simple property to be used at will by humans.  Aristotle believed that 
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animals had sensitive souls, he did not believe that animals had rational souls. Because 
animals were not rational, Aristotle concluded that animals were property to be used to 
fulfill human needs. Similarly, under Roman law, animals were classified as things rather 
than persons because animals did not have the ability to reason or exercise autonomy.  
The most influential statements on the status of animals came from the Bible which 
specifically gave humans dominion over animals and provides many examples of humans 
using animals as property for human needs.
588
  Prominent theorists such as Locke and 
Kant followed this tradition and believed that humans were divinely superior to animals, 
injury to animals was wrong because it harmed the sensibilities of persons, and humans 
were justified in using animals as a means for human ends.   
 The core theory defends the concept that animals are property with little to no 
claim to personhood.  My first hypothesis is that the core theory will be reflected in the 
cases concerning animals.  A text analysis of the animals cases reveals no instances in 
which Locke or Kant are mentioned in opinions or in amicus curiae briefs.  However, the 
concept of animals as property is confirmed repeatedly in the law.  Very few cases 
consider personhood for any animals and to date, no case has allowed any type of 
personhood or potential personhood for a nonhuman.  Therefore, my first hypothesis is 
supported, as the core theory which traditionally considers animals to be property is 
reflected in the law.   
 My second hypothesis is that the dichotomies distinguishing persons from 
property and persons from human beings will be reflected in the core theory and the law.  
These dichotomies are discussed to a great extent in modern theory as theorists and 
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researchers try to determine if the cognitive qualities of certain primates can qualify them 
as persons.  The dichotomy between person and human being does not truly arise in 
respect to animals because animals are not human beings.  Instead, animal rights scholars 
have tried to prove that some animals have the same capacities as human beings and 
therefore should be treated as if they are human beings and persons.  The courts, 
however, have rejected this argument and have not contemplated the fact that animals 
such as great apes should qualify as persons based on their capacities.  Animal anticruelty 
laws such as the AWA designed to benefit animals as sentient beings.  However, the 
AWA does not challenge the property status of animals and does not consider that 
animals could be legal persons in any sense.   
In fact, the concept of animals as property is so entrenched in the law that animals 
do not have standing to bring suit for violations of animal anticruelty laws.  If animals 
were able to bring suit as a plaintiff, it would be fairly easy to prove violations of animal 
welfare acts. Animals, with perhaps the exception of great apes, do not have the cognitive 
capacity or ability to communicate to initiate legal action, but human guardians could do 
so on their behalf.  However, the legal system does not recognize animals as litigants and 
has not granted standing to animals with a human guardian.  The review of cases 
demonstrates that even human persons usually are not allowed standing because humans 
cannot prove that harm to an animal is an injury to the human.  Therefore, although the 
courts have heard thousands of cases involving animals in some ways, there are very few 
cases that speak to the personhood of animals or the possibility of animals being 
represented by a human guardian.  As beings outside the sphere of human persons, the 
status bestowed upon animals remains that of property. 
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 In respect to my hypothesis that the dichotomies would be reflected in the law, I 
have not reached a definitive conclusion because the law has not yet truly considered the 
dichotomies between person, human, and property.  The law holds animals to be property 
with very little argument otherwise.  These dichotomies will not be analyzed in the law 
until animal personhood is truly considered by judges and justices.    
 If the concept of personhood for animals gains credibility in the law, judges and 
justices will be able to draw upon some of the lessons learned from the debates 
concerning slaves, fetuses, and corporations.  Singer and Wise point out the similarities in 
denying personhood to slaves and animals.  Slaves were regarded as chattel property and 
therefore had very few rights and protections under the law.  Their owners had fairly 
wide latitude to treat their human property as they wished.  This analogy points out that 
as a class of beings, animals like human slaves, are a class that is discriminated against by 
unjustly denying personhood.  Critics of this argument point out the fact that animals 
simply are not humans despite their capacities.  Only humans qualify as persons and thus 
to compare animals to an unjustly discriminated against class of persons is nonsensical.   
 Although Singer and Wise point out the parallels between denying personhood to 
slaves and animals, the law has not recognized the similarities in the debates.  My text 
analysis revealed no references to slaves or slavery in any of the documents for the 
animal cases.  The reasoning within the law has been fairly consistent however.  In 
antebellum America, judges and justices were fairly consistent in ruling that slaves were 
property rather than persons.  In modern debates over animals, the law has been even 
more unswerving. The law has declared that animals are property and the legal battle has 
not progressed much further. 
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The fact that animals are not human sets them apart from the other entities, but 
there are still similarities between the arguments for fetal personhood and animal 
personhood.  Much of the abortion debate revolves around when a fetus gains sentience 
and when it has rational capacity.  These criteria have been extensively used to determine 
when the life of a fetus should be protected.  Animal rights activists use the same strategy 
to demonstrate that great apes are sentient, rational, and communicative and therefore 
should have the same rights and protections as human persons.  Currently, animal welfare 
laws protect some animals from pain and injury at the hands of humans.  The fetus, as a 
sentient being, may have a similar claim to the avoidance of pain and injury.  The 
previous chapter pointed out that the fetus has brain activity by eight weeks of gestation 
and may be able to feel pain as early as six weeks.  The timeframe for fetal sentience 
ranges from six to twenty-six weeks.
589
  If animals are protected from undue pain by 
legislation, then the fetus, even though not a person, has a claim as well. Certainly, if 
late-term abortion methods can be proven to cause pain to a sentient fetus, then these 
methods could be ruled unlawful under a fetal welfare law.  Further, many the lives of 
some species of animals are protected through various endangered species laws.  An 
argument could be made that the life a fetus should also receive some protection.  Like 
the fetus, most animals are not rational agents and therefore do not qualify for 
personhood through cognitive criteria.  However, scientists who work with great apes 
argue that some primates have cognitive abilities that rival those of young children.  If 
young children qualify as persons, so too they argue, should great apes.  The similarities 
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among some animals, fetuses, and children are germane and could be called upon for 
greater protections for both animals and the fetus. 
Another criterion that is common among slaves, fetuses, and animals is social 
acceptability as persons.  Slaves were not considered part of ―We the People‖ and 
therefore were not included in the community of persons.  Similarly, a fetus is not yet an 
active part of the community of persons and therefore is excluded by those who do not 
feel that the fetus is an accepted person.  The divide between animals and humans is 
arguably the greatest of all.  Human persons know what they are not – they are not slaves, 
they are not fetuses, but most certainly, they are not animals.   
 Because the law has not seriously considered the possibility that certain animals 
could be anything more than property, the personhood of animals has not been 
adjudicated by the law.  My third hypothesis is that the law should be consistent in 
adjudicating the personhood of slaves, corporations, fetuses and great apes.  This is very 
hard to prove in respect to great apes because there is no personhood law to compare to 
that of the other entities.  If and when the courts begin to consider personhood for 
animals, I will be able to compare those decisions for consistency.  However, a 
comprehensive analysis of the four entities in this study does reveal some consistencies 
as well as inconsistencies in both the core theory and the law of personhood.  The next 
chapter brings the analysis together to determine what can be concluded about 
personhood from this study.  
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 This study concerns a fundamental contest of ideas about what it means to be a 
person, what qualifies an entity as a person, and what role the law plays in bestowing this 
status.  It is about who and what the law should recognize as a legal person, who or what 
should be excluded from this status, and why.  Thus, I have conducted an in-depth study 
of four diverse entities vying for personhood to determine what criteria are associated 
with the confirmation of personhood and what criteria are associated with the exclusion 
of personhood.  In order to understand the nuances of each entity‘s pursuit of legal 
personality, a core body of political theories and philosophical ideas of personhood was 
applied to each entity to determine the extent to which they measured up to established 
concepts.  The history of each entity‘s bid for personhood was also examined to trace the 
development of the laws and political thought pertaining to the entity.  Finally, the study 
completed a detailed analysis of the important court decisions concerning personhood 
that effectively established or denied that entity‘s personhood.   
 After this detailed examination, this final chapter brings the analysis together by 
comparing and contrasting the entities to develop a more robust concept of legal 
personhood.  A comparison of the pursuit of personhood for each entity reveals both 
consistencies and inconsistencies in the bestowal of personhood.  It also brings to light 
fundamental concepts that are common in the understanding of personhood.  Finally, it 
provides key findings and possible methods of expanding the bestowal of personhood to 
other entities.   
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 In order to explicate the important findings in this study, I begin with a review of 
the three hypotheses that were established in the first chapter.  The first hypothesis 
concerns how the development of a core theory of personhood would illuminate the 
understanding of personhood for each of the four entities.  This chapter analyzes how 
well the respective jurisprudence reflects the core theory and how well the core theory 
explains the law‘s bestowal of personhood.  The second hypothesis states that 
personhood can be conceptualized in terms of the dichotomies between person and 
property, as well as person and human being.  How these dichotomies were applied is 
compared and contrasted.  Finally, the third hypothesis posits that the law pertaining to 
personhood for each of the entities should be consistent.  This claim is tested to see if it is 
indeed true and if a more robust concept of personhood can be established.  This 
comprehensive review and analysis reveals a number of findings concerning moral and 
legal personhood.  The analysis questions whether the law should be more consistent or 
even more expansive in its bestowal of personhood.  These lessons learned can be used to 
help determine the status of future entities who will come before the courts in the pursuit 
of personhood.  
 
Analysis of the First Hypothesis – The Core Theory 
My first hypothesis is that a core body of political theory concerning personhood, 
rooted in the liberal tradition as established by John Locke and Immanuel Kant, 
influences the law.  Each of the previous chapters concludes with an analysis of whether 
this hypothesis is supported in respect to each entity.  I will now analyze this hypothesis 
to see how the relationships differ in each area.  Because I grounded the core theory 
primarily in the works of Locke and Kant, it makes sense to begin with a comparison of 
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the Lockean and Kantian views of personhood.  This Lockean and Kantian foundation is 
not concrete however, because although the Lockean and Kantian conceptions of 
personhood are consistent for several of the entities, there are variations in the theories as 
well that can lead to different outcomes depending upon the interpretation taken.  
Likewise, scholars who study and expand upon Locke and Kant provide their variations 
of the core theory, and some scholars take these theories in new directions which lead to 
vastly different conclusions about personhood.  A review of the principles of this core 
theory in respect to each of these entities illustrates that there are many variations which 
can lead to very different arguments in respect to personhood.  This review sets the stage 
for a comparison of how the law reflects the concepts presented in the core theory.   
Both Locke and Kant wrote against slavery with Locke arguing that slavery was 
contrary to human nature, and Kant arguing that it violates the maxims of a just and 
moral society in which one person cannot be used as an end for another person‘s 
purposes.  According to Kant, persons are beings whose interests cannot be sacrificed for 
someone else‘s ends and are distinguished from property which is simply a tool.  As 
rational agents, Kant believed in a person‘s autonomy, and he therefore concluded that 
slavery violates the autonomy of a person.  According to Kant, slavery, which subjects 
one person to the domination of another, violates the maxim that a person or rational 
agent cannot be used as an end.   
Locke also writes against slavery and considers a person to be an autonomous 
agent, which suggests that he would be opposed to the American slave trade.  However, 
Locke‘s biography reveals otherwise – he wrote colonial documents that condoned 
slavery and was an investor in a slave trading company.  Although Locke does not 
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explicitly say that slaves are not persons, his actions within the slave industry 
demonstrate that he was not completely opposed to slavery.  It is implied that he did not 
think that slaves were persons on a par with white, male persons.  Therefore, Locke‘s 
conception of slavery is contradictory to his own actions.  So too, the Founding Fathers, 
who were familiar with Locke‘s writing, were conflicted in their conceptions of liberty 
and freedom.  While many Founding Fathers protested against the tyranny of England‘s 
rule and complained that they were ―enslaved,‖ they tolerated or turned a blind eye to the 
real enslavement that was occurring in America.  
Many early American leaders conveyed their inner turmoil over slavery but 
ultimately, these officials condoned denying personhood to African slaves.  For example, 
James Madison faced an inner conflict concerning a slave‘s status as both property and 
person.  Madison treated his slaves benevolently as appropriate to their status as human 
beings.  However, he did not waver from his views that slaves were legal property and 
that masters needed to be compensated for any loss of property through manumission.  
James Madison, writing as Publius in the Federalist Papers, wrote, ―The Federal 
Constitution ... decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them 
in the mixt character of persons and of property.  This is in fact their true character. It is 
the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live.‖
590
  On the other 
hand, fellow Founding Father Thomas Jefferson did not seem to be bothered as much 
about this dual identity.  Jefferson firmly categorized slaves as property and did not 
acknowledge their personhood status.  
Pseudo-scientific anthropology demonstrating the Africans were not rational 
agents provided another justification for denying personhood to African slaves.  The core 
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theory in respect to slaves is therefore mixed with arguments both for and against 
granting personhood to slaves.  The law of slavery echoed the views of Locke and the 
Founding Fathers while virtually ignoring the liberal positions of Kant who argued that 
rational agents are persons and, as such, cannot be treated as property.  Many judicial 
opinions in slave cases bemoan the fact that slavery violates liberal principles but hold 
fast to the concept that a slave is not a person.  An example of this is seen in Judge 
Ruffin‘s opinion in State v. Mann 13 N.C. 263 (1829).  Ruffin wrote that the slave was 
―doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the 
capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits‖ (13 N.C. 
263, 266).  This statement echoes the liberal arguments against slavery in that it objects 
to the domination of a human being by another person.  Ultimately Ruffin accepted 
slavery because he found that the property status of the slave overrules personhood.  The 
core theory stemming from Kant and abolitionist writers that condemns slavery is 
generally ignored, while the core theory stemming from Locke and the Founding Fathers 
that allows slavery despite the principles of freedom and equality is upheld.   
Locke and Kant were primarily interested in the personhood of rational 
individuals and therefore did not heavily discuss the possibility that a collective, such as a 
corporation, could be a person.  Inferring from their writings, we can reach some 
tentative conclusions about corporate personality.  Locke speaks of the social contract, 
and in some ways, a social contract is similar to a corporation in that it is a covenant 
agreed upon by the individual members.  But it is the individual members forming the 
contract who are the persons, while the corporation is the outcome.  In Locke‘s view, a 
corporation would not likely qualify as a person.  A modern scholar, Loren Lomasky, 
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who builds his theory of personhood on Locke‘s understanding of rational agency, argues 
that a person is a project pursuer who has the rational capacity to identify various courses 
of action, has the autonomy to make such a decision, and then is responsible for his 
actions.  Lomasky concludes that a corporation is not a person.   
Like Locke, Kant did not speak directly to the personhood of the group or the 
corporation, but he did argue that that the whole cannot be greater than the sum of its 
parts. Therefore, Kant would likely assess the personhood of the individuals who 
comprise the corporation, but would not consider the personhood of the corporation itself.  
Further, in order to qualify as a person with moral agency in Kant‘s ethics, an entity must 
have a rational nature and consciousness to determine its own ends.  A corporation has 
ethical policies to guide behavior but it is not clear that a corporation itself can have 
desires or moral principles apart from the motives and goals of its constitutive members.  
The other argument against corporate personality that stems from Kantian ethics follows 
from Kant‘s argument concerning means versus ends.  The corporation can be considered 
a means to achieve human ends such as wealth, scientific progress, status, and other 
goals.  The corporation, which is a type of property to be used at the will of human 
persons, cannot be considered a person in and of itself because it is simply a tool or a 
means for achieving progress.  
A few modern scholars have criticized the Kantian argument that a corporation 
does not qualify as a moral agent in its own right.  Ethicist Peter French argues that 
corporations have an internal decision-making structure that produces corporate 
outcomes that are not dependent upon one manager or group of managers.  Through this 
process, which French contends is not reducible to one human actor within the 
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corporation, the corporation demonstrates a form of rationality and intentionality that is 
similar to that of an individual human person.  Thus, French argues that a corporation can 
be considered a rational agent and a person.
591
 
A strict reading of Locke and Kant leads to the conclusion that a corporation 
cannot be a person because a) the individuals within the corporation are the rational 
agents rather than the corporation itself, and b) a corporation is a means to an end and is 
therefore property not a person.  Personhood is reserved for individual rational agents.  
Despite the consistency in the Lockean and Kantian view that corporations are not 
rational agents, some modern scholars such as French have pointed out that corporations 
do have some capacities of moral and rational agents and should be considered as such.  
Although the corporate person is a collective rather than an individual rational agent, it is 
still understood that qualities such as negligence, deception, or even good will can be 
ascribed to a collective.  A corporation can speak through its spokesperson.  Corporations 
can be considered guilty of a crime and can own property in their own right.  Therefore, 
although Locke and Kant would have most likely concluded that a corporation is not a 
person, based on rational agency there are grounds to consider the corporation as a 
person.  The cases I analyzed involved rational agency, and although the law decided that 
corporations are persons, the works of Locke and Kant did influence the debate.   
Lockean and Kantian theories of rational agency are also relevant to the debate 
over fetal personhood.  Locke considers the human body to be a person‘s private 
property, but rather than argue that a person can treat this property in any way one 
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desires, he argues that a person must protect the health of one‘s body.  In the 1600s, it is 
likely that Locke would have considered the fetus as part of a woman‘s body before 
quickening as taught by Thomas Aquinas.  If the fetus is a part of the woman‘s bodily 
property, then it seems that a woman would have the right to decide whether to keep or 
terminate a fetus as part of her right to a healthy body.  On the other hand, as part of his 
argument that a person must protect his or her health, Locke argues that one cannot harm 
oneself.  If the fetus is part of the self, then a woman is bound to protect that part of 
herself as well.  Another indication that Locke may have believed that a fetus was worthy 
of protection comes from his writing on education in which he argues that children have 
moral value and parents are obligated to care for their children.  As a scholar of Aquinas, 
Locke likely would have argued that a fetus beyond quickening had moral value and 
should be protected.  Overall, it is difficult to determine exactly what protections Locke 
would have granted to a fetus at any particular stage of development. 
Kant is more forthright in his opinions on the fetus arguing directly that children, 
from the time of procreation, are persons with an innate right to the care of their 
parents.
592
  Even though the fetus is not yet a rational being, Kant makes an exception to 
this requirement for personhood in the case of the fetus and children.  His stance on fetal 
personhood also makes an exception for his theories that a person cannot be used as a 
means to an end.  If a woman can be forced to undergo a pregnancy, then it can be argued 
that a woman is forced into being a means or fetal container for the end of procreation.  
Kant seems to allow this subjugation of women in order to preserve a fetus, which he 
considers to be of moral value.   
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Despite Kant‘s explicit statements that a fetus should be considered a person and 
Locke‘s inferred argument that he would grant some type of fetal protection, some of the 
most cogent arguments against fetal person stem from the Lockean and Kantian 
arguments that a person must be a rational agent.  A fetus does not qualify as such.  This 
study has relied extensively on Daniel Dennett‘s understanding of personhood as a 
rational agent who is self conscious, can evaluate his or her actions, take actions to reach 
goals, and can communicate to other persons through language.  Under these criteria, 
both a fetus and a young child do not qualify for personhood.  Most children begin to 
acquire language skills and act with a limited amount of autonomy only after their first 
birthday.  Therefore most humans do not qualify for personhood until well into their first 
or second year of life. 
Philosopher Michael Tooley takes rational capabilities at face value and 
concludes that fetuses and newborns under three months old are not persons, and 
infanticide of these humans is not morally wrong.
593
  Using this logic, infanticide of 
children up to age two might be acceptable as well since young children are not fully 
rational agents.  Tooley‘s view is extreme, and most scholars are willing to grant some 
consideration to potential persons.  Legal scholar Ronald Dworkin considers the ability to 
experience physical pain an important criterion.  Because a fetus is likely to experience 
pain at twenty-six weeks, he considers abortion before that point to be morally 
acceptable.
594
  However, the ability to experience pain is just one of many important 
milestones in the development of a fetus and an infant that begins at conception, goes 
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thru birth, and reaches until an age when a child has some rational autonomy.  Although 
many volumes have been written about the cognitive ability of fetuses and infants and the 
relationship to personhood, the fact remains that modern scholars have not agreed upon a 
defining moment when a potential person can be considered a full moral and legal 
person.  
Rational agency is a hallmark of personhood for both Locke and Kant.  By this 
standard, a fetus would not qualify for personhood.  However, Kant makes an exception 
to this rule and states that all humans, from procreation, are persons.  Locke‘s 
admonishments that a person cannot cause harm to his or her own body combined with 
his works concerning education lead to the conclusion that Locke would likely provide 
some protection to a fetus and possibly a limited personhood.  Modern theorists who 
endorse the rationality standard have challenged the exception made for a fetus arguing 
that a fetus and even a young child do not qualify for personhood.  Therefore the 
arguments concerning fetal personhood are mixed with Kant arguing for personhood, 
Locke not providing a definitive answer, and some modern scholars arguing that the fetus 
is not a person.  The law has struggled with the question of fetal personhood for the last 
decades and has considered the rationality criteria set forth by Locke and Kant.  In Roe v. 
Wade, the Supreme Court decided that a fetus was not a rational agent and denied Kant‘s 
exception granting personhood to the fetus.  As the law of abortion has developed, the 
Supreme Court has followed modern theorists in considering cognitive criteria as crucial 
but choosing the earlier milestone of viability as the compelling point at which a fetus 
can be considered a potential person.   
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The case for considering some animals such as great apes as persons does not 
have a strong foundation in the core theory.  Most of the early scholarship I reviewed 
does not consider an animal to be more than simple property.  This notion has its 
foundation in both Greek and biblical philosophy.  Aristotle wrote that animals had 
sensitive souls but not rational souls and therefore animals were the property of 
humans.
595
  Similarly, Roman law classified animals as things based on the inability to 
reason or exercise autonomy.
596
  The Bible teaches that humans have dominion over 
animals and lists many examples of animals being used for food, clothing, and 
sacrifice.
597
  Locke and Kant followed this paradigm of treating animals as property and 
not contemplating that some animals may have a claim to moral or legal personhood. 
Based on his biblical understanding of human domination of animals, Locke 
wrote that humans could use ―inferior ranks of creatures‖ as property, and animals did 
not have rights that humans needed to observe.
598
  Kant too used Genesis to argue that 
humans alone are rational and self-aware and therefore it is justified that animals be used 
as ends to fulfill human needs.  Kant warns that cruelty to animals is wrong because 
cruelty destroys the moral disposition of humans. However, Kant does not consider the 
pain and suffering that cruelty inflicts upon the animals themselves.  Both Locke and 
Kant are concerned with moral status of humans and do not consider that animals could 
by anything more than objects.  Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham challenged the 
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notion that animals have no moral status by arguing that the ability to feel pain merits 
some type of moral worth.  Bentham argued that humans had an obligation to animals 
themselves to refrain from causing them undue suffering.  However, Bentham did not 
challenge the fact that animals were property. 
Although both Locke and Kant are quite clear in describing animals as property 
with no moral value, modern scholars advocating increased recognition of animals have 
reinterpreted some of their theories to argue for animal rights and personhood.  Tom 
Regan, who is a noted philosopher of animal rights theory, argues that just as Kant 
recognized that all humans have value, animals too should have intrinsic value because 
animals have lives that are meaningful.  Regan argues that animals are sentient, have 
memory, have a sense of their own future, and they initiate actions in pursuit of their 
welfare and goals.  Because of these capacities, Regan argues that animals should have 
moral worth and should not be considered property.   
Both Locke and Kant classify animals as simply property based on the fact that 
animals are not rational agents.  The capacities of great apes were not well known during 
their time, but it is unlikely that Locke and Kant would have been swayed to consider 
personhood for any type of animal.  Modern studies have shown that certain animals such 
as gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos have significant cognitive capacities that might 
qualify for personhood.  Thus far, however, the law has not truly considered personhood 
for animals beyond human beings.   
This analysis of the core theory involving four diverse entities is complex in the 
amount of material that is analyzed and the range of arguments presented.  For each of 
the four entities, there is core theory that can be interpreted in several ways.  To recap, in 
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respect to slavery, Kant argues vociferously against a denial of personhood, but the 
analysis stemming from Locke and the many of the Founding Fathers is indecisive as 
they championed freedom but were involved in the slave economy.  Locke and Kant 
would likely agree that a corporation is not a rational agent itself and therefore not a 
person.  However, modern scholars have demonstrated that corporations do have 
intentional decision making systems, a corporate voice, and are culpable for their crimes.  
Even though these modern theories came after the time when most of the corporate 
personality cases were decided, the concept that a corporation was more than the sum of 
its parts was understood by lawmakers in the 1800s.   
Locke argues that a person cannot cause harm to herself and that parents must 
provide proper care to their progeny.  The conclusion can be reached that Locke would 
have granted the fetus some type of protection as a person.  At the same time, Locke‘s 
arguments that a person is a thinking, intelligent being preclude personhood for the fetus.  
Kant argues that a person is a rational agent but he makes an exception to this rule for the 
fetus who he states is a person despite a lack of rational capacity.  He also argues that a 
person cannot be used as a means to an end but makes an exception to this rule because 
he allows pregnant women to be used as a fetal container to produce a child.  Modern 
scholars, using Locke as a basis, have argued that a fetus is not a person because it is not 
a rational agent.  Other modern scholars employing Kant have argued that limiting a 
woman‘s right to choose an abortion limits her autonomy as a person.  In respect to 
animals, Locke and Kant agreed that animals were not rational agents and therefore 
should not qualify as anything more than property.  Some modern deontologists disagree, 
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arguing that as sentient creatures with fairly high cognitive abilities, some animals should 
be allowed a type of personhood.   
As can be seen, within the core theory, arguments can be found supporting 
personhood for each of the entities, as well as arguments against personhood.  Therefore, 
when analyzing how well the law reflected the core theory, it is possible to find pieces of 
the core theory within most legal interpretations of personhood.  In respect to slavery, the 
law reflected the core theory as provided by Locke and allowed the denial of personhood 
in order to uphold the economic system of slavery.  In corporate law, the courts 
considered that a person is a rational agent as described by Locke and Kant, and have 
decided that a corporation qualifies as a rational agent in a collective form.  The Supreme 
Court, after taking into consideration rational agency and a woman‘s autonomy as a 
person, decided that a fetus is not a person because it is not a rational agent but is a 
potential person once the fetus reaches viability.  Further, a woman cannot be used as a 
means to end for birthing children because this violates her personhood.  In respect to 
animals, the law has mirrored Locke and Kant in concluding that animals do not qualify 
as persons.   
 My hypothesis that there is a core body of political theory concerning personhood 
that influences the law has proven to be basically correct.  Although the law has not 
followed the prescriptions of Locke and Kant to the letter, their theories have been useful 
in conceptualizing personhood.  Even though Locke and Kant are not often quoted by the 
Supreme Court, the spirit of their arguments is felt in many decisions.  At the same time, 
it is difficult to prove a strong causal relationship between the core theory and the law 
because the philosophy of personhood is vast and various scholars working within the 
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liberal paradigm have reached different conclusions concerning personhood.  As the 
summary of the core theory demonstrates, many conclusions about personhood can be 
reached using the core theory.   
It is little wonder then, that the law‘s conclusions on personhood are also varied.  
The law‘s conclusions on personhood are diverse just as the concepts within the core 
theory are diverse.  There are some general consistencies between the core theory and the 
law, but that is not an especially noteworthy finding.  The fact that the core theory is 
taken into consideration by justices and judges is too vague to be a truly significant 
finding.  Therefore, this analysis needs to dig deeper into the core theory to some of the 
fundamental ways a person is conceived in order to discover whether and to what extent 
the law follows the patterns presented in the core theory.  This is the purpose of my 
second hypothesis.   
 
Analysis of the Second Hypothesis – The Dichotomies of Personhood 
 While the core theory on its own does not clarify the issue as much as I hoped, my 
second hypothesis is that the core body of political theory conceptualizes ―person‖ by 
distinguishing ―person‖ from ―human being‖ and ―property.‖  This is a more specific 
expectation because it adds definition to the nebulous concept of person.  By 
conceptualizing a person as an either or category – either a person or property; either a 
person or human being – the core theory provides a more concrete definition of 
personhood that can be applied to each of the four entities.  Accordingly, I expected that a 
review of judicial opinions concerning the slave, corporation, fetus, and animals will also 
reveal the tendency to define ―person‖ in opposition to both human being and property.   
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Much of the core theory defines a person as a rational and autonomous agent as 
opposed to a human being, which in this type of comparison is considered a lesser entity 
without rational capacity.  The other way of defining a person is to demonstrate that a 
person is an entity that cannot be considered an object, a means to an end – in other 
words a person cannot be property.  As I conducted my analysis, I discovered that there 
was a third important way of defining a person.  Personhood is a socially bestowed status 
and a person is an entity that is either rejected by other persons or is accepted into the 
community of persons.  By focusing the core theory on these three conceptualizations of 
personhood, a clearer understanding of personhood can be gleaned and applied to the 
law.   
 The first dichotomy that is manifest in the personhood discussion for each chapter 
is that of person versus human being.  Recall Locke‘s conceptualization of a person as a 
mental being who possesses self awareness, acts with volition, and has a memory of past 
actions.  Locke defines a person as a ―thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, 
as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without 
perceiving that he does perceive.‖
599
  For Locke, a person is an elevated status from that 
of a human being.  A human being is one who genetically qualifies as homo sapiens and 
has the human body but does not necessarily have the cognitive abilities that Locke 
describes.  Only rational agents can hold the status of person.   
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This study also employed the work of Daniel Dennett concerning the philosophy 
of the mind which confirms Locke‘s characterization of the rational person.  Dennett‘s 
six conditions of personhood, based on the mental capacities, are frequently cited as 
criteria for personhood.  His conditions include 1) persons are rational beings, 2) they are 
conscious, 3) they are considered persons by others, 4) they can reciprocate, 5) they have 
the capacity for verbal communication, and 6) they are self-consciousness or self-aware.  
These criteria have been important in assessing each entity‘s capabilities as a rational 
agent.   
Taken together, a rational being is conscious of his or her decisions, can evaluate 
his or her decisions, and then choose an action that best accords with one‘s goals.  Self-
awareness and self-evaluation allow one to be responsible for one‘s actions and culpable 
for violations of ethical codes.  This brings a moral component to personhood.  Locke 
argues that only those who remember their actions can justly be held accountable.  Kant 
writes that a moral agent must be able to make rational decisions based upon the 
categorical imperative and this capacity is what sets persons apart from all other humans 
and other creatures.  An important aspect in assessing the rational capacity of each entity 
is determining whether the entity can be held culpable for its actions.   
If it can be demonstrated that an entity is not a rational agent, then the case for 
personhood is much harder to prove.  The attributes of each of the four entities in this 
study have been carefully analyzed to discover whether it qualifies as a rational agent and 
therefore a person.  Examining the dichotomy between person and human being for each 
entity reveals that the law has used rational ability as a criterion for determining the 
personhood of some entities, but has ignored this factor for other entities.  Therefore, the 
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law has both consistencies and inconsistencies in bestowing personhood based on rational 
criteria.    
The definition of a person as a rational agent was devastating for the institution of 
slavery because it led to the obvious conclusion that slaves, as rational beings, must be 
accorded personhood and therefore should not be enslaved.  In order to counter the 
argument that slaves as rational beings should be valued as persons, some early American 
―scientists‖ such as anthropologist George Morton tested theories to prove that Africans 
were inferior intellectual beings who did not qualify as persons based on rational ability.  
Some proponents of slavery, desperate to defend the institution of slavery against rational 
agency arguments, used this pseudo-scientific evidence to demonstrate that African 
slaves did not meet the cognitive criteria of persons.
600
  Ultimately, these studies were 
shown to be false but they are evidence of the lengths advocates of slavery would take in 
order to demonstrate that a slave should not qualify as a person.   
Some court cases acknowledged the rational capacity of slaves, but rather than 
interpreting rational ability as a criterion of personhood, judges reasoned that qualities 
such as intelligence simply added to the monetary value of a slave – an intelligent slave 
had a higher property value to the master.  For the most part, the law tended to ignore the 
fact that slaves were rational agents and withheld personhood in order to maintain the 
slave system.  The mind and volition of the slave were disregarded and the preferences 
and decisions of the master were the only components of rational agency taken into 
consideration by the law.  Only in criminal matters was a slave deemed competent to 
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think about his actions and act according to his will. Thus, the slave could have a guilty 
mind and therefore could be held culpable for his actions just as any other rational 
person.  
Overall, the courts tended to disregard the fact that slaves were rational agents, 
and by Lockean standards, should be accorded personhood.  Therefore, the law of slavery 
did not follow the standard that rational agents were an elevated status above human 
being that were deserving of personhood.  This dichotomy was not a compelling factor in 
determining the personhood of the slave. 
In contrast, the criterion of rational agency was a significant factor when 
adjudicating whether a corporation should be bestowed the status of person.  Locke‘s and 
Kant‘s discussion concerns the rational agency of an individual.  In the application of this 
dichotomy to the corporation, the analysis changes because the critical question is 
whether a collective is eligible for personhood through cognitive criteria just an 
individual human being.  The question is not whether the individuals who comprise the 
corporation have rationality and volition but whether the corporation itself has a 
collective rational mind and a collective will that could qualify the corporation for 
personhood. 
As Chapter Three explained, it is common to hear statements such as British 
Petroleum Corporation was negligent in its drilling practices in the Gulf Coast or that 
British Petroleum deceived the public in its cleanup efforts.  But what do such statements 
really mean?  When a statement says that British Petroleum was negligent, who exactly is 
at fault?  British Petroleum has tens of thousands of employees ranging from the 
company‘s CEO to the laborers who worked in the Gulf region.  Perhaps it was the 
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CEO‘s decision to employ faulty drilling practices or perhaps the fault lies with a series 
of middle-managers who modified practices to save money.  Perhaps some fault lies with 
the well workers who may have witnessed problems but failed to report them.  Or, maybe 
the fault lies with one of the sub-contracted corporations that provided equipment or did 
safety testing for British Petroleum.  Most likely, the blame lies with a whole host of 
people who were involved in some small way and whose collective actions led to the 
spill.  It is difficult to determine which individuals within the corporation are really to 
blame.  
The same problems arise when saying British Petroleum deceived the public.  To 
be devious requires a rational mind that can choose among alternative courses of action 
and deliberately choose to act in a certain way.  Does British Petroleum have this type of 
rational mind?  These questions are not easily answered.  The actions taken by a 
corporation are more than the sum of its parts and it does seem that in many instances, 
such as the British Petroleum oil spill, the corporation itself has rights and duties as an 
agent.  Through a decision-making process involving numerous actors, none of which can 
be isolated, the corporation itself comes to make decisions.  Furthermore, through official 
spokespeople, the corporation can speak.  Corporate speech is not the opinion of the 
laborers, management, stockholders, or any other individual within the corporation; the 
corporate view is the view of the collective as obtained through corporate policies and 
decision making processes.  The corporation has many of the qualities of Locke and 
Kant‘s rational agent.  This is essentially the argument made by Peter French that was 
mentioned in the previous section.   
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Yet, to personify a corporation seems to be stretching the limits of personhood by 
attributing a status to a collective that should only belong to an individual rational agent.  
The individuals behind the corporate veil are really the rational agents who make 
decisions and can act with deceit or malice.  Is the corporation as a person simply a 
metaphor to facilitate the fact that a corporation bears resemblance to the rational 
individual within the law?  Or, can the collective corporation itself deceive the public, act 
immorally, and have a guilty mind? These are the questions with which the justices 
wrestled as they tried to decide if a corporation could be considered a person in the sense 
of having a rational mind.  
The difference between a corporation as a person and an individual, rational agent 
as a person arose in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux 9 U.S. 61 (1809) when the 
Supreme Court argued, ―a corporation aggregate is an artificial, invisible body, existing 
only in contemplation of law.  It has no analogy to a natural person.  It has no organ but 
its seal.  It cannot sue, or be sued, for a personal injury.  It cannot be outlawed. It never 
dies. …‖ (9 U.S. 61, 86).  The Court was comparing the corporation to a human 
individual and found that the corporation does not qualify because it does not have a 
human body, it cannot receive personal injury, and is not mortal. Thus, in this early case, 
the Supreme Court found that the corporation was not a person in the same way that a 
human being can qualify for personhood.   
In his opinion for Rundle v. Delaware Raritan Canal Co. 5 U.S. 80 (1852), 
Justice Daniel argues that if a corporation is to be considered a citizen or a person, then 
the corporation must be able to take part in all political functions of a person such as 
serving as a U.S. President.  Daniel‘s point is that only rational and autonomous 
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individual humans have rights and duties within the political system as persons.  Justice 
Black echoes this argument in his dissenting opinion for Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Company v. Johnson 303 U.S. 77 (1938) in which he argues that persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment are counted for representation and can hold political office or 
serve in the military.  Black argues that a corporation does not fit this description of a 
person and therefore does not qualify for personhood.  Black concludes that only the 
individual human being that has autonomy and rationality can qualify as a person.  In a 
modern opinion, Justice Rehnquist neatly sums up the arguments against corporate 
personhood based upon the rational mind.  In Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities 
Commission, Rehnquist writes, ―Extension of the individual freedom of conscience 
decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking 
point.  To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‗intellect‘ or ‗mind‘ for freedom of 
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality‖ (475 U.S. 1, 34). 
This brief review of some of the cases analyzed in Chapter Three demonstrates 
that there is a line of judicial reasoning concluding that a collective such as a corporation 
is not a rational agent and therefore should not be bestowed personhood.  On the other 
hand, there are Supreme Court opinions that argue just the opposite: that a corporation 
does not need to have a rational mind in order to gain personhood or that a corporation 
does in fact have a mind and moral agency.  In Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston 
Railroad Co. v. Letson 43 U.S. 497 (1844), the attorney for the railroad argued that 
corporations ―stand in this respect precisely in the same category with minors, lunatics 
and idiots‖ (43 U.S. 491, 522), meaning that just as minors and lunatics do not possess a 
rational mind and yet are considered persons, so too should a corporation be granted 
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personhood even though it is not clear that a corporation has a rational mind.  Some 
Court opinions considered the possibility that a corporation has a form of rational mind 
and volition.  In his tirade against corporations, Justice Campbell characterizes 
corporations as having a ―display a love of power, a preference for corporate interests to 
moral or political principles or public duties, and an antagonism to individual freedom, 
which have marked them as objects of jealousy in every epoch of their history‖  Dodge v. 
Woolsey (59 U.S. 331, 376, 1855).  Campbell is attributing moral capacities to a 
corporation that are only possible with a rational mind, autonomy and volition.  This line 
of reasoning refutes the previous arguments that a corporation cannot qualify as a rational 
agent.   
The capacities for moral agency and volition take center stage when a corporation 
is accused of a crime.  In order to be found guilty, an entity must have motive and 
malicious intent which requires a rational mind with which to plot and weigh options.  In 
the slave cases, the courts found that a slave did have a rational mind when it came to 
violations of the law.  Similarly, the courts have found that a corporation does have the 
capacity to commit crimes and have assigned motive and blame to many corporations in 
decisions where corporations have been found guilty of a crime.  As Justice Day ruled in 
New York Central R.R. v. United States 212 U.S. 481 (1909), a corporation, just an 
individual moral agent has the capacity for intention and moral action, and to give 
corporations immunity from punishment would take away the means of controlling 
corporate behavior. 
The Santa Clara opinion, which granted corporate personhood, did not delve into 
the criteria needed for personhood.  Subsequent cases building on the corporation‘s 
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bestowal of personhood have assumed that as a person, a corporation should have rights 
and protections that are generally thought to apply only to individual agents such as 
protection from search and seizure, the right to remain silent, and free speech.  This is an 
expansive interpretation of corporate personhood because it argues that a corporate 
person has autonomy, privacy, and a right to be heard even though the corporation does 
not have a corporal body to search or a mouth with which to speak.  In a recent corporate 
free speech case, Justice Kennedy writes ―Corporations, like individuals, do not have 
monolithic views.  On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving 
them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the 
speech of candidates and elected officials‖ (Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876, 91).  Kennedy is essentially saying that a corporation has the 
ability for rational thoughts and the volition to use that rational ability through speech 
designed to influence other persons.   
The dichotomy between person and human being plays a central role in 
determining the personhood for corporations.  The analysis demonstrates the many 
debates that occurred and continue to take place regarding whether a collective entity can 
qualify as a person under the same criteria as an individual human being who has rational 
capacity and volition.  Some Supreme Court Justices have presented solid arguments 
disputing the fact that a corporation can be a rational agent worthy of personhood.  
However, there are also many arguments by Justices demonstrating that a corporation can 
demonstrate preferences, speak, and have a guilty mind just as an individual rational 
agent.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that a corporation does have rational 
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agency and followed the standard that an entity with a rational mind should be accorded 
personhood.   
As with corporations, the distinction between a person as a rational agent and a 
human being is important in determining the status of the fetus.  The fetus is biologically 
a human being but lacks many of the criteria defined by the core theory as necessary for 
personhood such as rationality, autonomy, language, or culpability.  Infants and young 
children also do not possess these capabilities.  Likewise, Alzheimer‘s patients and the 
comatose are human beings, but do not possess these criteria for personhood.  The law 
grants personhood to infants, young children, Alzheimer‘s patients, and the comatose 
even though they do not qualify for personhood based on rational capacity.  However, the 
law does not grant the fetus personhood but instead declares that the fetus is a potential 
person who will develop the necessary criteria of personhood with time.   
As the judicial system struggled to sort out the many complicated moral and legal 
issues involved in the debate over fetal personhood, it relied upon the dichotomy between 
human being and person to decide if and when a fetus could qualify as a person whose 
life and liberty was protected by the state.  Justices had to decide if a fetus, who is 
biologically a homo sapiens and a human being, could qualify as person; and if so, what 
criteria were necessary for a fetus to be granted personhood.  Cases concerning the fetus 
quite often recount the biological progression a fetus goes through as the brain develops 
and organs grow culminating in viability and then birth.  The core theory however does 
not heavily rely on overall biological development but instead focuses on cognitive 
development.  Several of the Supreme Court opinions addressing abortion mirror the core 
theory and examine the development of the fetus to see if there is a compelling point at 
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which the fetus gains cognitive capabilities such as sentience, ability to interact with 
surroundings, and capacity to think in a rational manner.  However, the Court takes into 
consideration other milestones beyond cognitive capabilities as well.  For instance, in the 
Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision written by Justice Blackmun, viability, or the 
point at which the fetus can survive outside the womb, was the significant milestone.   
In a later dissent for Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490 
(1989) Blackmun argued, ―[T]here is obvious difference between the state interest in 
protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-month-
gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth‖ (492 U.S. 490, 569).  He goes on to 
argue that a newly fertilized egg does not experience physical pain or mental anguish 
because these capacities do not yet exist.  He concludes that a fetus without the ability to 
suffer does not have a valid interest in continuing life whereas the state does have an 
interest in protecting a more developed fetus with the ability to experience physical and 
mental pain.  Although the ability to feel pain is not one of the conditions of a rational 
person as described by Locke or Dennett, sentience is an early capacity of the developing 
brain.  Blackmun chose an earlier milestone than rationality, but still relied upon a mental 
capacity for his bestowal of personhood.  
In a concurring opinion for Thornburgh, Governor of Pennsylvania v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), Justice Stevens argues 
that the state‘s interest in protecting an embryo and fetus increases as ―organism's 
capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings 
increases day by day‖ (476 U.S. 747, 778).  Stevens‘s milestones are based on the mental 
capacities of consciousness and the ability to reciprocate.  However, not all justices 
571 
 
agreed with the determination of Justice Blackmun and Stevens that the qualifying 
criteria for personhood should be based on cognitive capacities.  In his dissent in 
Thornburgh, Chief Justice Burger provides a biological argument that a fetus is a homo 
sapiens throughout its development just like a child or adult human being and that alone 
is enough to warrant state protection.  Burger does not take a further step and argue that 
all homo sapiens are persons. 
Despite the large body of literature considering the rational criteria for 
personhood, in several opinions, Supreme Court relied on sentience as a critical milestone 
which is an earlier cognitive milestone than rationality.  It seems that the Court was 
conceding that cognitive ability had something to do with personhood but was not willing 
to draw the line at the late milestone of rationality which is not achieved until sometime 
after birth.  And even the milestone of sentience is not set in stone.  Viability, the 
milestone set in Roe and still commonly considered as compelling, depends upon both 
physical and mental development.   
Overall, the Court has carefully considered the dichotomy between person and 
human being, and has based some of its important reasoning on the cognitive capabilities 
set forth in the core theory.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that a fetus did not 
have the necessary capacities for personhood and has not overruled this precedent.  
However, cases concerning the personhood of the fetus continue to face the Court as 
issues such as abortion, fetal injury, and emerging issues in embryology are adjudicated.  
Just as fetal personhood remains a salient issue among theorists who continue to debate 
when a fetus has interests as a person and not just as a human, the Court continues to 
adjudicate this sensitive matter. 
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The dichotomy between person and human being does not truly arise in the cases 
concerning animals because animals are not human beings.  Instead, animal rights 
scholars have tried to prove that some animals have cognitive capacities that rival human 
beings and therefore should be treated as if they were human beings and persons.  Great 
apes, the nearest biological relative of humans, have demonstrated the ability to think 
rationally, communicate in sign language, and according to some researchers, are self-
aware.  Many animal rights activists argue that based on these abilities, great apes are 
moral creatures just as human persons.  At the very least, they argue that these animals 
should be given the same legal protections as young children and mentally disabled 
adults who do not have full rational capacities.   
Despite the remarkable abilities of some great apes, researchers have not 
conclusively proven that great apes have second order volitions or the capacity to 
evaluate actions, rank desires, and then act based upon this evaluation.  This is a 
significant stumbling block because this is the necessary capacity to make moral 
decisions as a rational agent.  A human person can evaluate his desire to eat meat based 
upon various concerns such as the pleasure gained from consuming meat versus the harm 
that will come to the animal he chooses to eat.  He can then choose to refrain from eating 
meat.  A lion does not stop to evaluate the ethics of eating a deer.  Scientists working 
with great apes are still trying to prove whether any great apes have the ability for such 
ethical considerations.  There is no evidence that a great ape can engage in rational 
thought at this level.  Thus, a great ape cannot be culpable for its actions in the same way 
that a human person is accountable for his actions because the great ape cannot ethically 
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evaluate its choices.  Without this capacity, it is very difficult to award full legal or moral 
personhood to great apes. 
Scholars have debated the significance of a great ape‘s rational capacity to a great 
extent.  However, the law has not issued a verdict on this issue primarily because the law 
simply has not contemplated the fact that animals such as great apes should qualify as 
persons based on their capacities.  An animal does not have standing to bring suit which 
precludes most cases that concern personhood from even reaching the court system.  
Because animals do not have the capacity to bring suit with a guardian, animal rights 
advocates have not had a large opportunity to present evidence of an animal‘s cognitive 
capacity in a court of law.  Within the law, an animal has no rights as a person based on 
any type of rational or cognitive capacity.   
The cases concerning animals are few in number and generally focus on the 
standing of an individual human being rather than broach the topic of personhood for 
certain animals.  The similarities in the arguments for personhood based on rational 
ability between great apes and fetuses are therefore not well discussed in the law.  There 
are no references to the cognitive abilities of fetuses in any of the cases concerning 
animals. In fact, there are very few cross-comparisons in the animal rights literature 
except by scholars considered particularly bold such as Singer and Wise.  Although such 
comparisons might illuminate the discussion of personhood, pointing out the similarities 
is almost taboo.  Comparing the animal rights movement to movements seeking increased 
rights for humans is often considered as reducing these humans to the level of animals.  
Advocates for fetuses avoid any insinuation that a fetus could be compared to the family 
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pet even though such comparisons might illuminate the fact that the lives of many 
animals are protected while the life of a fetus remains unprotected.   
In comparing the dichotomy between person and human being across all four 
entities, a couple findings come to light.  First, the capacity to morally evaluate one‘s 
actions and to be culpable for wrongdoings is an important criterion for personhood for 
all four entities.  Legal scholar Arthur Machen argues that the essence of legal personality 
lies with legal duties and the ability to exercise a will, obey commands, and experience 
punishment.
601
  This conception of legal personality excludes infants and the mentally 
disabled who he argues are persons in form only.  This exclusion would include the fetus 
and animals that are not capable of performing legal duties.  Fetuses, which do not have 
the capacity to commit offenses or engage in moral actions within the womb, are not 
counted as moral or legal persons.  Animals too are not able to ethically evaluate options 
and choose to act in a moral manner.  Machen reasons that the exclusion of slaves in 
Southern law was only in respect to rights; with respect to duties and punishment, the 
slave was a person.  Therefore, the only consideration for personhood that the law 
granted to slaves was in culpability for their crimes.  One of the reasons corporations 
were granted personhood was because the courts realized that corporations, just like 
individuals, had to be accountable and punished for offenses against the law.   
The second finding is that the amount of emphasis the court places on rational 
capacity varies by entity.  Despite pseudo scientific studies claiming otherwise, it was 
well understood by lawmakers that slaves had the cognitive capacities to qualify as 
rational agents.  The law however, chose to overlook this significant fact.  The courts do 
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not spend a considerable amount of time dwelling on the argument that rational capacity 
leads to personhood because this would undermine the institution of slavery.  By giving 
very little emphasis to rational agency, the court was able to brush aside this argument for 
the personhood for slaves.  Rational capacity has not been a pressing issue for animal 
personhood either.  The law has given very little import to research demonstrating some 
great apes have advanced mental abilities.  The courts have not allowed animals to be 
represented by a guardian ad litem who could present this evidence.  There is some 
flexibility in deciding who or what is considered in court.  If the mental capacities of 
some animals were a compelling issue for the Supreme Court or a lower court, there are 
ways for admitting this evidence.  The fact that the court has not considered the rational 
capacity of great apes speaks to the insignificance of the issue to the law. 
In contrast, the courts have spent a considerable amount of time poring over the 
rational abilities of corporations and the fetus.  Many of the cases concerning corporate 
personhood considered whether a corporation as a collective could qualify as a person in 
the same way an individual qualifies.  The Supreme Court decided that a corporation is a 
person and has continued to build upon this personhood by granting free speech 
protections to the corporation, which is a protection generally thought to apply to 
rational, communicative agents.  Although a fetus is not a rational agent, the Supreme 
Court has spent a significant amount of time analyzing the mental and cognitive 
capacities of a fetus.  Ultimately, the Court cited this as evidence in deciding that a fetus 
is not a person until birth.  The Court also took into consideration both mental and 
physical capacities when deciding that viability and sentience are critical milestones in 
determining when a fetus can qualify as a potential person.   
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The dichotomy between person and human being has been considered in the law 
pertaining to each of the entities, but has not been consistent in holding rational agency 
has a hallmark of personhood.  Similarly, the analysis of the dichotomy between person 
and property reveals that this dichotomy is utilized in analyzing the legal definition of 
personhood but is not absolute.   
 
Person or Property 
The second method that is employed in both the core theory and judicial opinions 
to clarify the meaning of person is to describe a person in contraposition to property.  The 
concept that a person cannot be property has its origins in Kant‘s writing.  According to 
Kant, what is a person cannot be property by definition.  Kant writes, ―A person cannot 
be the property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned for it is impossible to be a 
person and a thing, the proprietor and the property.‖
602
  This is a useful definition because 
if scholars determine that an entity is property, such as an animal, then by definition the 
animal cannot also qualify as a person.  This is the crux of Kant‘s argument condemning 
slavery.  Persons, as Kantian ends in themselves, cannot be owned by another person.  
Each of the entities in this study is involved in a dual person/property status that the law 
must sort out when bestowing personhood.   
Both Kant and Locke argue that a rational agent is a person.  Therefore, according 
to Kant‘s theories, a rational agent cannot be property.  The last section covered the 
pseudo-scientific studies that were conducted to prove that the slave was not a rational 
agent.  Of course, most lawmakers and Southern slave owners knew that their slaves were 
cognitive, rational beings.  Therefore, the law needed to determine how the slave could 
                                                 
602




be both property and person at the same time.  Most judges and justices followed the 
example of the Founding Fathers and Locke who simply denied personhood to the slave 
in order to classify slaves a property to be used by white owners. 
Antebellum writer and judge George Stroud explained how the law classified a 
slave writing, ―The cardinal principle of slavery – that the slave is not to be ranked 
among sentient beings, but among things, as an article of property, a chattel personal – 
obtains as undoubted law, in all these [slave-holding] States.‖
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  This was the reality of 
the southern institution of slavery in which slaves were considered the chattel property of 
their owners.  The slave was a tool to be used at the discretion of the owner to fulfill the 
owner‘s financial goals.  The personhood of the slave was denied or ignored in order to 
maintain the property status of the slave.  Several antebellum cases illustrate this fact.   
In the case Allen v. Freeland 24 Va. 170 (1825), Judge Brook argued that 
although slaves are rational beings they are classified as property.  He wrote, ―Slaves are 
not only property, but they are rational beings, and entitled to the humanity of the Court, 
when it can be exercised without invading the right of property...‖ (24 Va. 170, 178).  
Brooks stresses the primacy of the property status over any concerns of humanity.  
Similarly, on the North Carolina Supreme Court, Judge Nash described the status of the 
slave as, ―He is, in contemplation of law, not a person for that purpose.  He has no legal 
capacity to make a contract.  He has no legal mind.  He is the property of his master‖ 
(Batten v. Faulk, 49 N.C. 233, 2331856).  In the Supreme Court decision Dred Scott v. 
Sanford 60 U.S. 393 (1856), Justice Taney‘s opinion resolved the conflict between a 
slave‘s status as both person and property by ruling that the property claim outweighed 
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any claim to personhood.  In most of the cases analyzed in this study, the courts 
consistently denied personhood to slaves and allowed slave property to be taxed, sold, 
traded, and abused just like any sentient property such as horses.  Many of the opinions 
refer to laws pertaining to livestock rather than reflecting a slave‘s human nature.   
On the whole, the dichotomy between person and property was very influential in 
determining the legal status of the slave but instead of following the standard of Kant, the 
law confirmed the slave as property.  Many decisions provided elaborate justifications as 
to why a slave should be considered property rather than a person.  The law primarily 
concluded that the slave was not a person in order to confirm the slave as property.  There 
are some cases which acknowledge that a slave is a person, but in these instances, the law 
ignores the fact that an entity cannot be both person and property, and instead allows both 
statuses with the property status prevailing.  
Just as the slave was a human being that was the legal property of another person 
and straddled the divide between person and property, so too the corporation is 
considered both person and property.  As a person, the corporation is the subject of 
property rights as the corporation owns assets.  As property, the corporation is the object 
of property rights as investors own the corporation.  Therefore, the corporation violates 
the Kantian rule that a person cannot be property.  Kant would likely see a corporation as 
a means to an end and therefore simply property with no claim to personhood.  The 
Supreme Court ruled differently and decided that the corporation is a person.  However, 
the cases I analyzed did not evaluate whether the corporation could hold this dual status.  
Whereas in the slave cases the division between property and person is considered at 
579 
 
length, with corporations, the Court seems to have accepted that a corporation is both 
person and property with no argument.   
The dichotomy between person and property is an important part of the debate 
concerning the status of the fetus.  As a part of a woman‘s body, there is a sense in which 
the woman owns her fetus just as she has a type of ownership in herself.  Therefore, there 
is a sense in which the fetus can be considered the property of the mother carrying it.  
The fetus is also a human being with the potential to develop into an autonomous and 
rational person in the course of normal growth.  The fetus has the dual status of both 
property and person/potential person.  The idea that a woman owns her fetus is fraught 
with potential moral concern because it echoes some of the discussions involved in 
slavery where one person could own another.  The parallels with slavery are a primary 
concern for justices who have been careful to avoid defining fetal personhood in terms of 
property rights.  Although much of the core theory concerning the dichotomy between 
person and property is quite applicable to the fetus, the law has studiously avoided using 
the language of property in decisions concerning abortion or fetal welfare.  The potential 
negative backlash of a justice‘s decision echoing the decisions of slavery is a quagmire 
that most justices seek to avoid.   
The distinction between person and property arose early in judicial history as the 
courts had to decide if a fetus was a person or simply the property of the woman carrying 
the fetus.  The issue first arose in cases where an infant was injured in utero.  In Dietrich 
v. Inhabitants of Northampton 138 Mass. 14 (1884), Judge Holmes ruled that a fetus was 
part of the mother and an injury to the fetus was simply an injury to the mother‘s body.  
Holms did not use the word ―property‖ to describe the fetus, but he speaks of ―trespass‖ 
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against a woman‗s body and implies that the fetus is part of the body that is in a sense 
owned by the woman.  This precedent stood for many years until Bonbrest et al. v. Kotz 
et al. 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946) overruled this decision.  In Bonbrest, the federal district 
court ruled that a fetus is not part of the mother.  Again, Judge McGuire did not speak of 
the fetus as property or the woman‘s body as property.  However, he did speak of the 
sacrosanct right of an individual to possess and enjoy his life, limbs, and body (65 F. 
Supp. 138, 8).  Judge McGuire found that a viable person was such an individual with a 
right to possess his body, and thus McGuire found that the fetus was a person who could 
recover from injuries sustained in utero.   
The person versus property distinction is also relevant in the abortion cases 
because if the woman owns her body, and a fetus is part of her body, then she may do 
what she wishes with respect to the fetus.  This was the argument addressed in the only 
opinion I analyzed that directly confronted the issue of whether a fetus is property.  Byrn 
v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. 31 N.Y.2d 194; 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972) set 
the stage for the Supreme Court cases on abortion that began with Roe v. Wade.  In his 
dissent, Judge Burke spoke to the property issue.  He argues that even if a woman‘s body 
is her private property to use as she wishes, the fetus within her body is not part of that 
property and thus she may not destroy the fetus (31 N.Y.2d 194, 212).  Roe v. Wade and 
the subsequent Supreme Court opinions concerning abortion do not directly say that if the 
fetus is not granted personhood then the fetus can be classified as property.  Rather, the 
Court avoids the sensitive issue.  Although the Supreme Court avoids the issue, many of 
the amicus curiae briefs issued in the abortion cases use the analogy to slavery to argue 
that a fetus cannot be considered property and thus must be a person.   
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The person versus property dichotomy is central for other issues beyond abortion 
such as the disputes that arise in battles over frozen embryos that are produced during the 
in vitro fertilization (IVF) process.  In the seminal case involving frozen embryos, the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled that an embryo was not a person and yet was not 
property either.  In Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992), Judge Daughtrey found that 
although an embryo was not a person, it was bodily tissue of special moral worth and 
neither party in the case had a property right to the tissue.  Subsequent cases relied on this 
precedent and the provisions of cryopreservation contracts to determine the disposition of 
embryos when a conflict between a couple arises.  Recent cases including Roman v. 
Roman (193 SW3d 40, 50 Tex App, 2006) and Dahl v. Angle (222 Or App 572, 2009) 
determined that an embryo does have a property value that is subject to contractual rights.  
However, the issues surrounding IVF technology are fairly new and the status of frozen 
embryos has not been systematically adjudicated by the courts.  Beyond these two recent 
cases, the property status of fetal tissue has not been thoroughly discussed in terms of 
custody or ownership.  The property aspects of a fetus or embryo are bound to arise with 
increasing frequency as IVF becomes more widespread and more disputes arise over 
frozen embryos.   
Although not explicitly discussed, the dichotomy between person and property 
lies beneath much of the legal debate concerning the status of the fetus.  Judges are loath 
to equate a human fetus with property because such a comparison would certainly cause a 
public backlash.  But the dichotomy is present as the fetus is considered to be part of the 
mother‘s body and subject to the mother‘s decisions as an autonomous agent.  The 
Supreme Court has not gone so far as to classify the fetus as property, but the argument 
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that a fetus could be property will continue to come before the law as cases concerning 
frozen embryos are adjudicated.   
The dichotomy between person and property is the essence of argument that 
animals are property and not persons.  Following the paradigm established in Greek, 
Roman, and biblical culture, and continued by scholars such as Locke and Kant, the 
animal remains chattel property in both common understanding and the law.  The animal 
is a Kantian means to an end and can be used as food, clothing, or experimentation for 
human benefit.  Animal anticruelty laws such as the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) 
designed to benefit animals as sentient beings establish limited obligations owed directly 
to animals to avoid unnecessary animal suffering.  However, the AWA does not 
challenge the property status of animals and does not consider that animals could be legal 
persons in any sense.  The idea that animals are simply property is entrenched in the law. 
In his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727 (1972), Justice Douglas suggests 
that natural entities such as trees and parks should be considered juridical persons who 
suffer direct harm.  Douglas argued that natural beings could be represented by a 
guardian ad litem and could be considered artificial persons just like corporations.  This 
is the only Supreme Court opinion that suggests that a natural object, which would 
arguably encompass animals in the wild, should have a claim to personhood.  Although 
animal rights activists applauded this dissent, Douglas‘s opinion did not influence future 
cases.   
In the case State of Hawaii v. Kenneth LeVasseur. 1 Haw. App. 19, (1980), 
LeVasseur released dolphins into the wild claiming that he committed the theft in order to 
avoid a greater harm to ―another‖ which in this case was a dolphin.  The Hawaiian court 
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disagreed and ruled that ―another‖ only included human persons and LeVasseur‘s choice-
of-evils defense failed because he was not protecting a human person.  In Hawaiian Crow 
(„Alala) v. Lujan 906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Hawaii, 1991), the judge ruled that the ‗Alala bird 
could not serve as a plaintiff claiming injury under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
because the ESA authorized enforcement by any person and specified that a person meant 
an individual, corporation, or other private entity.  An animal did not qualify.  Finally in 
Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New England Aquarium 836 F. Supp. 
45 (1993), Judge Wolff followed this precedent stating that animals could not bring suit 
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.  Another case with an animal as plaintiff has 
not yet been attempted.  
Even if scholars could successfully argue that some animals should have moral 
rights that ought to be respected, granting animals legal rights is a step further.  
Documents such as the Constitution and the Bill of Rights give no indication that animals 
could be anything more than property.  The law has held steadfast to the concept that 
animals are property rather than persons and as such animals can be used to fulfill human 
needs.  The fact that the dichotomy between person and property could be crossed by 
some intelligent animals has not been seriously contemplated in the law.   
Animal rights advocate Marjorie Spiegel wrote a book comparing slavery abuses 
to animal abuses.  Spiegel titled her book ―The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal 
Slavery‖ to illustrate how controversial such a comparison is.
604
  The reason such a 
comparison is controversial is that the wounds inflicted by antebellum America which 
included slaves with chattel animals are still too fresh and any comparison between the 
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personhood of the two entities is often met with outrage.  It is considered derogatory to 
equate the moral, rational person of the African slave to a brutish, unintelligent animal.  It 
is true that the two entities are vastly different.  Animals are generally considered lesser 
beings because they lack the capacity to act rationally, morally, and pursue their life 
goals.  A comparison between slaves and animals does not imply that slaves were lesser 
beings not worthy of personhood.  A comparison simply points out that the designation of 
property for slaves and animals are noteworthy for academic exploration.  In 2005, PETA 
created a campaign called ―Are Animals the New Slaves?‖ which juxtaposed pictures of 
animals alongside pictures of enslaved Africans.  The campaign created anger among 
civil rights activists.  John White, an NAACP spokesman stated, ―They're comparing 
chickens to black people?‖  Mark Potok, director of the Intelligence Project with the 
Southern Poverty Law Center stated, ―Black people in America have had quite enough of 
being compared to animals without PETA joining in.‖
605
  PETA campaigns such as this 
which are designed for shock value detract from serious academic discussions over the 
division between property and person because they create fear among legal scholars that 
drawing such parallels might be seen as equating African Americans with animals.  It is 
not likely that the law will consider the parallels in the property status of animals with 
any other human entity.   
 An exception to the restriction on comparing animals to other entities is made 
with respect to corporations.  Corporations are property but have managed to straddle the 
person/property divide.  Perhaps because corporations are not human, the comparison is 
not so offensive.  The similarity between personhood for animals and corporations is that 
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the personhood for both entities could be based upon a legal fiction.  Although 
corporations are collectives of humans, they are not human themselves.  Therefore, their 
personhood is often considered a fiction and is granted in order to ease business and legal 
transactions for groups of persons.  It is possible to grant animals a similar limited legal 
personhood to allow animals to serve as plaintiffs with a human guardian.  This would 
ease the problems of standing animals face and could arguably simply be interpreted as a 
device to facilitate legal transactions.  This was suggested by Justice Douglas in the 
Sierra case.  Despite the options of allowing guardians or granting personhood through 
fictions, the law has not widely considered this possibility. 
In comparing the dichotomy between person and property across all four entities, 
a couple of conclusions arise.  The first is that in the past, the law has allowed some 
violations on the seemingly strict divide between person and property.  Corporations 
violate the division, but the Supreme Court did not consider this violation to be important 
when granting personhood.  Modern cases concerning corporate personhood have not 
resurrected the issue, so in the case of corporations, the law has accepted that an entity 
can be both person and property.  The law also violated the dichotomy in upholding 
slavery.  This violation produced public outcry at the time when the cases confirming the 
slave‘s property status were decided, and in historical analysis, this violation continues to 
haunt legal history.  Entire volumes have been written analyzing court decisions to allow 
a slave to be both person and property.   
This leads to the second finding which is that the violation of the divide between 
person and property that was allowed in the slave cases continues to influence judicial 
decision making concerning other entities.  The reluctance of justices to delve into 
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property issues in the fetal cases proves how wary modern lawmakers are to rehash the 
dichotomy between person and property in modern cases.  Animal rights activists 
sometimes claim parallels between slavery and abuse of animals but are careful to not 
raise public ire with their comparisons.  The abuses of human dignity and personhood 
that were allowed by the law with slavery prevent serious academic comparison among 
the personhood of slaves and other entities. 
 
Membership in the Community of Persons 
As I was researching my hypothesis that the core theory and the cases would 
reflect the dichotomies between person and property and between person and human 
being, I discovered that there was a third dichotomy.  This dichotomy involves being 
socially accepted into the community of persons and is an either or classification – either 
an entity is accepted into the community or an entity is not accepted.  This classification 
draws from Daniel Dennett‘s third condition of personhood which states ―Whether 
something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a 
stance adopted with respect to it.‖
 606
  The criterion of social acceptance is present in all 
four entities in this study.   
The chapter on slavery concludes with an analysis of whether slaves and African 
Americans were truly included in the phrase ―We the People.‖  While it was difficult to 
prove that slaves were not worthy of personhood based on cognitive criteria, white 
Americans were very effective in denying personhood to slaves based on inclusion within 
the community.  To many white leaders in colonial and antebellum America, blacks, as 
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well as Native Indians, the Chinese, and member of other non-Anglo races, were a 
separate and degraded caste of persons who were not included within the ―We the 
People‖ for whom the country was founded.   
Orlando Patterson, who has extensively studied slavery, calls this phenomenon social 
alienation and finds that it exists in almost all slave-holding societies.  By alienating the 
slave from his homeland, his parents, and his children, he is deprived of any social 
relationships that bind him to society.  The slave is denied a position within the social 
order and is an excluded being or a non-person.
607
  By denying the slave a place within 
the social community, the master is able to objectify the slave and treat him as property 
rather than a person.    
In early American society, differences in race were used to demonstrate that 
blacks differed significantly from whites and should not be included within the 
community.  The law reinforced this concept by accepting this exclusion as fact.  
Historian Paul Finkelman explains, ―If blacks could be perceived as inferior, basically 
uneducable and inherently venal, it might be intellectually less self-condemnatory to 
relegate them because of their ‗lower status‘ to a subordinate role – either for their own 
good or as one judge had the audacity to express it, for the good of the total society, 
whites and blacks alike.‖
608
   
One of the most notorious examples of denying the slave‘s position in the social 
community is found in Justice Taney‘s Dred Scott v. Sanford opinion 60 U.S. 393 (1856).  
Taney argues that when the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were 
written, slaves and freed blacks were ―considered a subordinate and inferior class of 
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beings‖ and were purposefully excluded from the community of persons served by these 
foundational documents (60 U.S. 393, 404-405).  Because slaves were not considered 
part of the community of fellow persons, Taney argued that he could legitimately deny 
freedom to the slave Dred Scott and could solidify the precedent that slaves were simply 
property and not persons.  The ―We the People‖ of the United States did not includes 
slaves and even after slavery was abolished, did not fully include African Americans 
which is a struggle that continues to the present day.  Social inclusion was a significant 
obstacle in recognizing the personhood of the slave.   
 The social recognition criterion also plays a role in the personhood of the 
corporation.  In its Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. 118 U.S. 394 (1886) 
opinion, the Supreme Court states, ―The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.‖  The Court does 
not elaborate on this point and seems to assume that corporate personhood is a concept of 
general consensus.  At the time of this decision, big businesses such as railroads were 
strongly arguing for corporate personhood.  Perhaps the voices calling for corporate 
personhood were strong enough to create the impression that corporate personhood was a 
generally accepted idea.  The Court might also have valued the opinions of those arguing 
for corporate personhood and reasoned that if these authorities accepted corporations as 
persons, then the Supreme Court should honor the status.   
 Since the 1886 decision, the Supreme Court has not rescinded this status which 
also lends itself to the argument that corporations are now established persons.  Pundits 
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remain who protest corporate personhood on websites and articles, but the majority of the 
legal community has accepted the status or is apathetic to the issue.  The lack of large-
scale public protest over the issue has led to corporations slipping into the realm of 
personhood with general social acceptance.  Social and political recognition has played a 
significant role in allowing corporations to retain their status after the 1886 decision.   
 Dennett‘s criterion of social recognition has played a significant role in 
conceptualizing personhood for the fetus.  Just as slaves were not considered part of the 
community of persons, the fetus too is generally not considered to be part of the social 
community.  Hidden from view and unable to interact with its surroundings, the fetus 
remains isolated from the world until birth.  In thought experiments conducted by 
metaethicist Roger Wertheimer, subjects are asked to imagine that a woman‘s womb was 
transparent and the woman was wearing mid-drift bearing clothing so that the womb was 
visible to the public.  He asked his subjects to also imagine that they could remove the 
fetus, cuddle it, and then return it to the womb.  He found that subjects who imagined the 
public exposure of the fetus were more likely to consider the fetus to be part of the 
community.
609
  Some medical experts who specialize in obstetrics and prenatal care and 




 Technology such as advanced ultrasounds have allowed a woman to view the 
fetus at all stages of a pregnancy which can strengthen the bonds between the woman and 
fetus and thus further the social recognition of the fetus as a person.  Ultimately, it is the 
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woman who decides if the fetus is socially accepted.  A woman who greets a wanted 
pregnancy with happiness and goes through with her pregnancy until birth has accepted 
her fetus as an entity with moral worth.  This explains why society feels outrage and 
seeks punishment when third-party violence causes a woman to miscarry a fetus that has 
been welcomed into the community.  A woman who does not desire a pregnancy does not 
welcome her fetus and rejects it through abortion.  A woman who does not desire her 
pregnancy has not accepted her fetus into the community of persons and therefore, 
society does not have protective measures for the unwanted fetus.   
 A dilemma associated with the criterion of social acceptance is that the mother is 
the sole moral arbitrator able to decide if the fetus is accepted or rejected into the social 
community.  Should the mother, even though it is her body in which the fetus resides, 
have exclusive determination in this important matter?  The Roe v. Wade decision 
confirms that until the point of viability, the woman is the sole arbitrator.  In the case of 
slavery, the master class had complete control over the slave and with respect to the fetus, 
the mother has complete discretion.  This is not to equate pregnant women with slave 
owners but only to say that there are parallels between the discretion both sets of people 
had in determining who is or is not part of the social community of persons.  Nor does it 
mean that a slave has the same moral status as a fetus.  If the fetus is not considered to 
qualify as a legal and moral person based on a host of criteria, then there may be valid 
reasons for not accepting a fetus into the social community of persons while the slave 
was wrongly denied acceptance.  At the same, the analysis provided in this thesis 
demonstrates that there are myriad factors that are important in considering who belongs 
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to the moral, social, and political community and there could be negative consequences 
when excluding an entity that may have moral weight.  
Finally, social acceptance is a significant factor preventing animals from gaining 
any type of recognition by human persons.  Most human persons simply do not consider 
even sophisticated animals like great apes to be anything like a person.  Just as persons 
know what they are not: they are not slaves, they are not fetuses, and they certainly know 
that they are not animals.  The human/animal divide is arguably the greatest barrier 
among the four types of entities being compared.  Slaves and fetuses at least qualify as 
humans.  Human persons have a very difficult time considering the status of an entity that 
is outside the realm of humanity.  While big businesses were successful in convincing the 
courts and the general public that corporations should be accepted as persons, animal 
rights advocates who call for animal personhood do not have the political or economic 
power to successfully persuade society to include animals as persons.   
 Overall, social acceptance is demonstrated to be a powerful criterion for 
personhood.  Either an entity is in or it is out.  Slaves were out; animals are out; 
corporations are in; and the fetus is out but there is a fierce public debate over this 
exclusion.  It may seem surprising that corporations, which are a unique form of person 
due to their collective nature and their differences from the rational agent that usually 
occupy personhood studies, are the entity that is given the greatest recognition as persons.  
Perhaps that is a large part of the reason why – corporations are not as morally 
contentious as the other categories and their acceptance has slipped by without much 
protest by the rest of the members in the community of persons. 
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 My second hypothesis, which is that the core theory and the law would 
conceptualize personhood in terms of the person/human dichotomy and the 
person/property dichotomy, is proven to be correct.  I also discovered a third influential 
dichotomy which characterizes a person as an entity that is either accepted or rejected by 
the social community of persons.  These three dichotomies explain much of the basis for 
whether an entity is considered a person.  With this foundation, I can then focus my 
analysis on the ways in which the law has been consistent in applying these dichotomies.  
For instance, I examined whether the emphasis placed on each of the three dichotomies 
varied among the four entities in this study.  I also conducted a rigorous text analysis to 
determine important terms employed in the court documents for each of the entities to 
detect similarities.  Finally, I searched for cross-references among the four entities to see 
where and how the courts have applied personhood doctrine developed for one entity to 
other entities involved in the personhood debate.   
 
Consistencies and Inconsistencies among the Four Entities 
My third hypothesis held that there should be consistencies in how justices 
adjudicate personhood for slaves, corporations, fetuses, and great apes.  The preceding 
analysis of the dichotomies of personhood demonstrated that how the law interpreted 
these dichotomies varied among the four entities leading to both consistencies as well as 
some inconsistencies in the law‘s interpretation of personhood.  This section will evaluate 
this third hypothesis to further determine where the consistencies in interpreting 
personhood lie and where the law has been inconsistent.   
 Comparing how the dichotomies were employed for each of the four entities 
results in one of the inconsistencies in the law‘s construction of personhood.  The law did 
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not prioritize one dichotomy over the others when interpreting personhood.  Instead, the 
law elevates the person/property dichotomy for some entities and the person/human 
dichotomy for others.   
In the slave cases, the convention that developed was for justices to consider the 
humanity of the slave but ultimately deny these human qualities and rule that the slave 
was property rather than a person.  In respect to corporations, the law accepted that 
corporations were property and did not debate the point to a great extent.  Instead, the 
courts focused on whether a collective could qualify as a person in the same way a 
rational individual could qualify.  The courts ruled affirmatively and granted corporate 
personhood.  In the fetal cases, the law examines both the distinction between person and 
property and the distinction between person and human being, but the emphasis is on 
ensuring that the fetus has capacities such as sentience and viability.  The priority is with 
the dichotomy between person and human being.  The discussion of dichotomies is 
limited in the animal cases but the law is steadfast in defining the entity as property.  For 
the corporate, and fetal cases dichotomy between person and human being was 
paramount and the priority was placed on ensuring that the entity had cognitive or 
rational capacities.  In the slave and animal cases, the emphasis was on the dichotomy 
between person and property as the law defended its classification of these entities as 
property.  Across all four categories, the priority is inconsistent.  The law has not set one 
dichotomy as paramount over the other but instead has emphasized the dichotomy that 
the justices feel is the best suited to the entity at hand. 
Insert Table A About Here 
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In both the corporation cases and fetal cases the Court relied upon rational agency 
as a determining factor.  The corporation, as a collective of rational individuals, was 
allowed to qualify as a collective person based on the capacities of its components.  
Because the fetus is not a rational agent, personhood was denied.  There seems to be 
some consistency here because the Court has relied upon rational agency for both entities.  
The inconsistency is that slaves too were rational agents and they were denied 
personhood in order to preserve the economic institution of slavery.  Therefore, the 
finding is that rational agency is an important consideration when it suits the goals of a 
politically powerful segment of society.   
An interesting analogy can be drawn between the claim of personhood for animals 
and that of mentally disabled humans.  Like animals, many mentally disabled humans 
have some cognitive abilities but do not fully qualify for personhood as rational agents.  
Some theorists accordingly deny these mentally disabled humans from the classification 
of person.  Other theorists, however, claim that the fact that the disabled are humans 
gives them an automatic grant of personhood.  This also seems to be the consensus of the 
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general public who favor treating the mentally disabled with a certain amount of respect 
due to persons.  The mentally disabled also have a strong claim to certain rights and 
protections based on sentience.  Humans do not like to see fellow humans suffer from 
physical and psychological abuse and therefore grant increased protections to their own 
kind.  Moral philosopher Carl Cohen argues that comparing animals to mentally disabled 
children misses the point completely.  He says that rights are not doled out to humans 
based on their cognitive capabilities – there is no screening test.  Rather, rights are given 
to humans simply because they are human.  Rights are in the realm of humans who are 
moral agents and thus are persons.  Animals simply do not belong in this realm.
611
 
It seems to be true that mentally disabled humans are granted personhood simply 
based on their humanity and acceptance into the social community of persons.  However, 
this study reveals that personhood based simply on humanity is an exception rather than 
the rule.  The Supreme Court decided that while a fetus was a human being, it did not 
qualify as a person.  This parallels the slave cases in which the Supreme Court confirmed 
that a human being does not automatically qualify as person.  Corporations and other 
entities such as ships are granted personhood even though they are not human.  
Therefore, a finding of this study is that humanity is not a guarantee of personhood 
although the fact that an entity is human is a factor in favor of an entity seeking 
personhood and non-humanity is a factor against personhood.  Arguably the greatest 
obstacle to personhood for any animal is the fact that animals are not human.   
The dichotomy between person and property was paramount for both slaves and 
animals.  The debate over the property versus person status for slaves was fierce and 
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ultimately violent in antebellum America.  However, within the law, judges and justices 
were fairly consistent that slaves were property rather than persons.  The law has declared 
that animals are property and held steadfast to this categorization.  The classification of 
both of these entities as property has had some strikingly similar results.  As property, 
slaves could be bought, sold, and even abused at the whim of their owners.
612
  Similarly, 
animals can be bought and sold by their owners.  There are some animal protection laws 
in place to prevent abuse of animals, but animal rights activists argue that these are not 
enough.  This is not to argue that African slaves are in any way similar to animals but 
only to argue that a classification as property led to similar abuses.  Whether one believes 
that these abuses are of the same scale depends upon the moral value you place on each 
entity.  The vast majority of the human population places human beings of all races on a 
higher moral plane than any animal and therefore the abuse of the human slave is a much 
greater moral tragedy than the abuse of an animal.  However, there is a small group of 
people who truly believe that all living, sentient creatures are equal in the need to lead 
lives free of pain.  To this group of people, the abuse of an animal is on a moral level as 
the abuse of a human.  Some animal rights activists contend that as long as animals are 
considered legal property, animals will be abused just as slaves were wrongfully 
abused.
613
   
The dichotomy that is consistent across all four entities is social acceptance in the 
community of persons versus social rejection.  Slaves were not considered part of ―We 
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the People‖ and therefore were not included in the community of persons.  (Although 
freedmen were granted personhood, while slavery was Constitutional slaves were never 
granted personhood.)  Similarly, a fetus is not yet an active part of the community of 
persons and therefore is excluded by those who do not feel that the fetus is an accepted 
person.  The divide between animals and humans is arguably the greatest of all as most 
human persons do not perceive animals as similar beings.  The corporation is the only 
entity that has been accepted into the community of persons and this is despite a 
modicum of protest that corporations should not be considered persons.  It seems the 
arguments of the politically powerful business community in favor of corporate 
personhood combined with public apathy have convinced the law that corporations are 
acceptable persons.   
 
Text Analysis of Documents 
One of the methods I used to identify consistencies and inconsistencies in the 
concept of personhood is an automated text analysis of the cases to determine if there are 
cross references among the four entities within the court opinions – i.e. did the fetus cases 
ever mention any of the slave or corporation cases and so on.  I also analyzed the key 
terms such as ―person,‖ ―property,‖ and ―human‖ to see if these terms occurred 
repeatedly in all four categories of cases in order to verify my analysis of key concepts of 
personhood.  Automated text analysis allows an unbiased review of the terms that reoccur 
among the various cases in order to examine the frequency with which justices and 
judges employ certain terms within the court documents.  Text analysis has been 
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successfully employed by scholars to identify key concepts within a series of documents 
that otherwise might not be recognized.
614
 
The automated text analysis does not reveal the context of the terms and therefore 
the text analysis must be accompanied by a more careful examination of how the terms 
are employed to ensure that the meaning of the word is consistent among all the cases.  
Therefore, when examining key terms such as ―property‖ or ―human,‖ care must be taken 
to ensure that these terms were used in the appropriate context of personhood.  After 
identifying the key terms, I reviewed each instance where the term appeared to verify that 
the word was being used in the relevant context.   
The text analysis of the court documents for my cases helped me pinpoint where 
the courts have perceived overlapping concepts of personhood.  Through word frequency 
testing, I was able to calculate which terms arose repeatedly in my data set of cases.  My 
first test was for the word ―person.‖  ―Person‖ appeared in 80.7% of all my opinions and 
court documents and the percent of documents including ―person‖ was over 70% in each 
of the categories.  Variations of the word ―person‖ also appeared in many of the 
documents.  The analysis of the word ―persons‖ revealed that 65% of cases contained the 
term while 65.7% contained the word ―people.‖  Overall, the high frequency of ―person,‖ 
―persons,‖ and ―people‖ confirms that this concept was important in these cases. This is 
not unexpected however, because I purposefully selected cases that concerned the 
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meaning of personhood.  This result confirms that I chose cases that revolved around the 
meaning of ―person.‖  (See Appendix A for a full frequency table.)  
On the other hand, ―personhood‖ appeared in only 13.6% of my cases.  However, 
―personhood‖ is not a common word in the English vernacular, so it is not surprising that 
this variation of the word ―person‖ does not appear as frequently.  With one exception, 
―personhood‖ appears only in the fetal cases.  By the time the fetal cases reached the 
courts, ―personhood‖ was becoming a common legal and judicial term whereas in the 
slave and most of the corporation cases, ―personhood‖ was not yet a readily used word.  
The slave and corporation cases are more likely to employ the word ―person‖ or 
―personality.‖  The one corporate case in which ―personhood‖ appears is a recent case 
from 2010.  In the animal cases, the issue of personhood is not generally discussed, and 
therefore it is not surprising that ―personhood‖ does appear, although I did expect at least 
a couple references. The fact that ―personhood‖ does not appear in the animal cases 
attests to the fact that the concept of personhood is not generally considered applicable to 
animals. 
Within the fetal cases, when ―personhood‖ is used, the Justices are specifically 
referring to the concept of personhood and what is included within the concept under the 
law.  For instance, in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun mentions ―personhood‖ saying that 
if the ―personhood [of a fetus] is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses for 
the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment (410 U.S. 113, 157).  ―Personhood‖ is a word of importance in the fetal 
cases.   
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My next test was for ―human‖ and this search revealed that 62.5% of the 
documents contained the word, but the frequency by category varied immensely.
615
  
Within the corporation cases, human was only mentioned in 32% of the documents 
revealing that the law involving corporate personhood did not heavily depend upon 
whether the corporation was a human being.  Although my study of the person versus 
human dichotomy demonstrated that this dichotomy was important in formulating the 
personhood of the corporation, the law‘s formulation did not revolve around humanity 
but instead involved whether a collective could act as an individual human.  For example, 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Justice Powell argued that speech was an 
indispensible part of a democracy ―and this is no less true because the speech comes from 
a corporation rather than an individual‖ (435 U.S. 765, 777).  On the other hand, in Bellis 
v. The United States, Justice John Marshall argued that the Constitutional protection 
against self disclosure applied only to individual persons rather than corporations (417 
U.S. 85, 91).  In both these instances, ―individual‖ was an important term used to 
distinguish the concept of a human person from a collective person.  Accordingly, 
―individual‖ was a central term in the corporations cases appearing in 77.3% of the 
documents.   
 ―Human‖ was not an important term in the animal cases appearing in any 40.4% 
of the animal documents which is expected since animals are not human and therefore the 
law would not spend a great deal of time analyzing how humanity applies to an animal.  
In actuality, the frequency is less than 40.4% because many times when ―human‖ is used 
it is referring to the human guardians of an animal rather than the animal itself.  There are 
some comparisons between the qualities of an animal and a human in the law such as 
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Judge Friedman‘s comparison of the love and affection a dog is able to provide in Corso 
v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc. (415 N.Y.S.2d 182; 1979). However, such 
comparisons between the qualities of an animal and a human are not frequent in the cases 
I studied.  Other instances of ―human‖ occur when justices specify animals as ―non-
human‖ beings.  For example, in Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New 
England Aquarium 836 F. Supp. 45 (1993), Judge Wolf defines entities who are able to 
be parties in a lawsuit by specifically excluding ―non-human entities or forms of life‖ 
(836 F. Supp. 45, 12).  In this opinion, Wolf used ―human‖ to specifically exclude 
animals from the realm of legal consideration.  
―Human‖ appeared in only 47.9% of slave documents which is surprising since 
slavery involves the moral controversy of enslaving a human being.  However, true to my 
previous findings, the law did not center on the humanity of the slave but instead 
concentrated on the slave‘s property status.  The absence of the word ―human‖ could be 
deliberate in that the judges and justices did not want to draw attention to the humanity of 
the slave.  The other explanation is that the law simply did not fully discuss the humanity 
of the slave because judges and justices did not find it relevant to their decisions.   
Finally, ―human‖ was used in 81.3% of the fetus cases.  The high frequency with 
which ―human‖ appears in the fetus documents signals that the human versus person 
dichotomy was the critical issue when deciphering the status of the fetus.  This high 
percentage is again expected because the crux of the abortion cases is whether a fetus, as 
a human being, can be aborted or must be respected as a person.  ―Life‖ is also a 
commonly used term appearing in 95.1% of fetal documents which reveals the 
deliberations of the courts as they tried to decide if a fetus was a human life or a life that 
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deserved protection.  Appendix A provides a table delineating the frequencies for each of 
these variables.  
―Property‖ appears in 53.8% of the documents I analyzed and is most frequently 
found in the slave and corporations cases.  ―Property‖ appears in 79.2% of the slave cases 
which is expected since the law was adamant in confirming the slave‘s status as property.  
The higher frequency of the word ―property‖ as compared to ―human‖ within the slave 
cases strengthens my finding that the person/property dichotomy was more important in 
these cases as compared to the person/human dichotomy.  ―Property‖ is also prevalent in 
the corporation cases appearing in 78.1% of documents.  Although I did not conclude that 
the person/property dichotomy was dominant in the corporation cases, many of these 
cases concern business transactions which include property concerns.  A closer analysis 
of the context for ―property‖ within the corporation cases reveals that the term generally 
refers to the property owned by the corporations or other parties and with little exception 
does not refer to the corporation‘s status as property.  The high percentage of corporation 
documents that contain the word ―property‖ does not refute my finding that the 
person/property dichotomy was not central to the law‘s bestowal of corporation 
personhood.   
―Property‖ is mentioned in 43.1% of fetal documents, and this low percentage is 
expected given the hesitancy in the law to talk about the fetus as property.  Examining 
each of the times ―property‖ is used in the fetal cases reveals that when property is 
mentioned it is usually in the context of the property rights of the unborn.  Rarely is the 
fetus referred to as property which confirms my finding that the law is extremely hesitant 
to declare that the fetus is a type of property.  Finally, in the animal cases, ―property‖ 
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only comes up in 40.4% of the documents.  This is a surprising finding since the law has 
been unwavering in declaring the animal to be property.  However, almost all the times 
that ―property‖ is used in the animal cases it is in reference to the animal‘s status as 
property.  For example, Petco v. Schuster, Judge Pemberton wrote, ―[The law] classifies 
dogs as personal property for damage purposes, not as persons, extensions of their 
owners, or any other legal entity whose loss would ordinarily give rise to personal injury 
damages‖ (114 S.W. 3d 554, 12).  However, after acknowledging that dogs are property, 
Pemberton goes on to analyze the nature of this property to see the dog‘s owner could 
recover personal damages stemming from the death of this animal/property.  An 
examination of the context of the term ―property‖ in the animal cases reveals that even 
though ―property‖ does not occur as many times as I‘d expect, when it does appear, it is 
in the context of declaring the animal to be property.   
The text analysis of key words reveals that certain terms relating to personhood 
including ―person,‖ ―property,‖ and ―human‖ are commonly used in the opinions 
pertaining to all four entities.  It seems as if the courts were using the same language and 
concepts to determine the personhood of these entities even though the entities are 
diverse in scope.  The text analysis supports the conclusion that by analyzing personhood 
in an inclusive manner across many types of entities, a more comprehensive 
understanding of personhood can be gleaned.  It seems logical to employ the 
understanding of personhood gained from the slave and corporation cases to more 
modern cases pertaining to fetuses and animals. With this in mind, my next step was to 
conduct a text analysis of the cases to pinpoint cross-references where the court 
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documents for one entity refer to another of the entities I analyzed in order to create a 
comprehensive understanding of personhood.   
I searched every case for cross-references to cases in the other categories.  I 
presumed that some of the later cases concerning personhood would reference previous 
cases concerning other entities where personhood was a primary issue.  Despite my 
finding that key concepts are used in the documents for all four entities, I found very little 
overlap in the court opinions, concurrences, and dissents among the four clusters of cases.  
It seems that the court opinions for each entity are mutually exclusive.  In other words, in 
the fetal cases, there were very few references to the personhood decisions made in the 
corporation or slave cases and in the corporation cases there were very few direct 
references to the slave cases.  This was surprising given the overlap in the key concepts.  
Either the courts did not recognize or did not want to call attention to the coinciding 
themes among the entities. While court opinions did not contain numerous cross-
references among the entities, there was significant cross-referencing in the amicus 
curiae briefs in the fetal cases.  Because the amicus curiae briefs provide the most data, 
my analysis begins with the cross references in the amicus curiae briefs.  
Many of the amicus curiae briefs for the abortion cases discuss the parallels 
between the property classification for both slaves and fetuses.  Dred Scott is the case 
most often cited by the fetal amicus curiae.  For example, in an amicus curiae brief from 
attorney Ronald W. Meyer for Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, (2007), Meyer cites 
the Dred Scott decision that a slave was property and writes, ―There is no more basis to 
hold that a Negro is not a person under the Constitution as there is to hold that an unborn 
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child is not a person under the Constitution.‖
616
  Similarly, another amicus curiae brief 
for Gonzales v Carhart filed on behalf of the Legal Defense for Unborn Children argues 
that Dred Scott wrongly denied personhood to Blacks which violated a universal 
guarantee of life to all persons which includes fetuses.
617
  Arguments such as those 
proposed in the amicus curiae for Gonzales v. Carhart have been used by amicus curiae 
briefs in virtually every important abortion case following Roe v. Wade.
618
 
Some critics of the Court‘s denial of personhood for the fetus have criticized the 
Court for granting personhood to the non-human corporation while denying personhood 
to the fetus.  An amicus curiae brief for Gonzales v. Carhart from the Right to Life 
Advocates calls this ―invidious discrimination.‖
619
  An amicus curiae brief from Right to 
Life Advocates for Webster calls the Court‘s willingness to grant personhood to an 
artificial entity but not a human ―a crazy-quilt interpretation of the word person.‖
620
  
Another amicus curiae brief filed for Webster by the Knights of Columbus criticizes the 
Roe decision as Orwellian saying, ―something can be a person without being human, and 
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can be human without being a person.  If the word ‗person‘ can be extended to embrace a 
corporation, it surely must include living human beings, like the unborn, whom it meets 
along the way.‖
621
  These are just a few examples of amicus curiae briefs that express 
dismay that corporations qualify for personhood but the fetus does not.
622
  
The amicus curiae briefs in the fetal cases argue the point that a fetus, as a human 
being, should be considered a person.  These briefs reference the slave cases to point out 
the injustices of denying personhood to this set of persons, and they reference the 
corporation cases to point out the injustices of granting personhood to this set of non-
persons.  The petitioners in amicus curiae briefs are advocating for the Supreme Court to 
amend the legal definition of personhood to include all human beings regardless of 
cognitive ability or level of development.  Despite the urgings of these petitioners, the 
Supreme Court has not created a universal definition of personhood based on humanity.   
While there are many amicus curiae briefs in the fetal cases that cross-reference 
the slave and corporation cases, my text analysis revealed only three instances of cross-
referencing in court opinions.  Since the slave cases were decided first, I did not expect to 
find significant references to other types of cases because these cases were decided at a 
later date.  I also did not expect to find many instances of cross-referencing in the animal 
cases simply because there are so few animal cases that speak to the issue of personhood.  
However, I did expect to find significant reference to the slave cases in the corporation 
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cases as well as significant mention of slave and corporation cases in the fetal cases.  
Surprisingly, my analysis revealed only one reference to the issues of personhood in slave 
cases among the corporation cases and two cross-references among the fetal cases.   
Although the corporation cases concerning personhood occurred during the 
approximate time frame that the personhood of slaves and freed Blacks was being 
decided, there is very little overlap between the two sets of cases.  The only corporation 
case in my data set that mentions slavery is a dissent for Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Company v. Johnson 303 U.S. 77 (1938), in which Justice Black argues that 
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to grant rights to newly freed slaves and it 
was not meant to apply to corporations.  Justice Black was reflecting on the similarities 
between the two types of cases, but coming some 100 years after the abolition of slavery, 
his dissent did not have an influence on slave cases adjudicating personhood.  Given the 
parallels in the property and personhood arguments that apply to both slaves and 
corporations, I would expect that there would be more than just this one cross-reference 
among the two types of cases.  Perhaps the justices adjudicating the two entities did not 
recognize the similarities.  The debate concerning personhood for slaves primarily 
concerned confirming the slave‘s property status where as the debate over corporations 
concerned the corporation‘s status as a rational agent.  The debates were centered in two 
different dichotomies and therefore the debate did not overlap to a great extent. 
 There is only case in my data set that explicitly applies the lessons of personhood 
gleaned in the slave cases to the fetus.  In Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals 
Corp. 31 N.Y.2d 194; 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972), Judge Breitel observed that not all human 
beings qualify as persons as he cites the example of slaves.  He uses this observation to 
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rule that just because the fetus is human does not guarantee personhood.  Judge Breitel‘s 
opinion is a very appropriate use of past personhood doctrine to contemporary issues, and 
exactly the type of overlap I expected to find.  However, Byrn is the only case I analyzed 
where the personhood doctrine is developed through an inclusive study of entities vying 
for personhood.  Justice Scalia‘s dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) references Dred Scott as a poorly decided 
Supreme Court decision, but he does not delve into the personhood issues that exist in 
both the slave and fetal cases.   
The fact that there is very little cross-referencing among the various types of 
personhood cases is a significant finding.  As this study has demonstrated, there are 
several important concepts that apply to all four entities and these concepts could be used 
to form a more coherent definition of legal personhood.  The question then is why do 
judges and Justices refrain from employing the concepts of personhood from early slave 
and corporations cases to the later fetus and animal cases?  A possible answer is that the 
Supreme Court simply has not recognized the similarities among the cases.  While it may 
seem unusual to compare a fetus to an animal or a slave, this answer is not satisfactory 
because many theoretical studies make these comparisons and amicus curiae briefs also 
discuss the overlapping concepts of personhood.  There must be another explanation.   
Another possible explanation is that Justices purposefully avoid comparisons 
among the entities.  Adjudicating personhood is a highly political issue and one with 
which the courts do not want to become embroiled. This explanation has some validity 
because, as has been demonstrated, comparison among the entities is controversial in 
several ways.  Demonstrating the parallels between personhood for slaves and for fetuses 
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evokes the passion that still exists from the past mistake of slavery.  The idea that a 
human fetus could be considered property is a risky proposition because commodification 
of a human being is reminiscent of slavery.  Further, comparing an animal to a human 
fetus or a human slave also evokes passion among those who disagree with any type of 
comparison between humans and what are considered lower animals.  Perhaps Justices 
purposefully avoid bringing up the past atrocities of slavery or comparisons of human 
persons with animals.  By avoiding the issue, the courts maintain their distance and leave 
this highly political and sensitive issue to the other branches of government to arbitrate.  
The other possible explanation is that the Supreme Court does not think that 
comparisons among the entities are relevant.  The entities are very diverse and perhaps 
the Court does not feel that the personhood of the slave applies to corporations, fetuses, 
or animals.  Rather than build a comprehensive understanding of legal personhood, the 
Court feels that is it better to define personhood in isolation with each entity so that the 
understanding of personhood is tailored to that particular entity.  This seems plausible 
with the slave and corporation cases.  Slavery involved human rights, racial 
discrimination, and other deeply divisive social issues.  Corporate personhood was a 
more mundane legal designation to facilitate business transactions.  It is likely that the 
Court did not see the two issues as similar.  This explanation is also plausible given the 
disputes over the abortion issue.  Many pro-life groups are pressing for a firm definition 
of personhood that includes the fetus.  In several states, advocates are pushing for 
personhood amendments that define person from the moment of conception.
623
  By 
defining personhood for each entity in isolation, the Supreme Court has better control 
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over the meaning of personhood as it applies to relevant social issues.  A broad definition 
that encompasses many entities could limit the Court‘s abilities to sanction or prohibit 
social policies involving any type of personhood issue.   
Although there are a couple of plausible explanations for the lack of cross 
referencing among personhood cases, I was not able to confirm any one explanation.  
Unfortunately, there is very little scholarship concerning the Supreme Court‘s definition 
of personhood as it applies to numerous issues.  Most of the legal personhood scholarship 
applies to one entity and while other entities might be mentioned, the scholarship does 
not provide a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court opinions.  Further, I was not able 
to find any discussion of personhood in memoirs or interviews with past or current 
Justices.  I am left to conclude that the Court‘s unwillingness to apply personhood 
doctrine across a spectrum of entities stems from either a hesitancy to become embroiled 
in highly political issues, a reluctance to resurrect controversial issues, or a determination 
that personhood should not be decided in a broad manner.  Either way, the fact that the 
Supreme Court has not cross-referenced the various cases is a significant discovery.  It 
seems as though the courts have not completely embraced the idea that certain concepts 
of personhood are universal among various entities and using common themes, the law 
can develop a more systematic concept of personhood.  Instead, the courts have largely 
decided the personhood of the three entities in isolation of each other.   
The analysis of my third hypothesis, which held that there should be consistencies 
among the personhood cases for slaves, corporations, fetuses, and great apes proved to be 
partially correct.  The text analysis revealed key terms that were consistently employed in 
the court documents for all four entities.  Another important consistency was that the 
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three dichotomies I identified were influential in the case law across all the entities.  
However, the analysis also revealed some notable inconsistencies.  The emphasis placed 
on the dichotomies varied by type of entity.  Although I expected numerous cross 
references among the decisions for each entity, I only discovered three.  The law has not 
developed a comprehensive legal definition of personhood that has been applied to a 
number of entities and can be applied to future entities for personhood.   
This study provided an in-depth look at the political theory of personhood in 
conjunction with court decisions dealing with issues of personhood.  Through this 
comprehensive exploration of the issue, several findings concerning how the law 
conceptualizes personhood have come to light.  The analysis proved my thesis which was 
that integrating a comprehensive study of the core political theory concerning personhood 
that informs judicial decision making as well as an in-depth look at many of the court 
decisions dealing with issues of personhood will yield a more meaningful understanding 
of personhood.  A review of the significant findings in this study reveals the evidence 
supporting this thesis. 
 
Summary of Findings 
Of the four entities in this study, the courts have only bestowed personhood on the 
corporation.  Ultimately, America‘s lawmakers realized their mistake in denying 
personhood to slaves; slavery was abolished; and personhood was granted to freedmen.  
However, slaves were never considered to be persons.  Fetuses and animals remain 
outside the scope of personhood although the status of these two entities is the subject of 
much current discussion.  The fact that three out of the four entities in this study have not 
been granted personhood indicates that personhood is not a status automatically given but 
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is a status that is granted by the law to certain entities that the courts deem worthy.  This 
thesis studied four diverse candidates for personhood in order to determine what factors 
the law uses in this calculation of worthiness.  By comparing these four entities to a core 
theory of moral and legal personhood and also comparing the four entities to each other, 
this study sought a more comprehensive understanding of personhood.    
A significant finding of this study is that the courts do not often reference the 
personhood doctrine formulated for one entity to other entities vying for personhood.  
Except for the amicus curiae briefs, there are very few cross-references to the other 
entities.  The four entities in this study were adjudicated in isolation from one another and 
the courts have avoided creating a comprehensive definition of personhood that could be 
used as a concrete standard for deciding if an entity qualifies or is rejected as a person.  
Instead, the courts have retained a large measure of flexibility to decide personhood on a 
case-by-case basis.  Although the law did not design a concrete definition of person, 
many of the concepts used in adjudicating personhood are the same across each entity.  
These concepts are found in the core theory as articulated in this study.   
The core theory of personhood revolves around the concepts of rational ability, 
property status, and inclusion in the community of persons.  This core theory influences 
the law, but at the same time is so expansive in its considerations of personhood that 
many definitions of a person can be accommodated within the theory.  Within this core 
theory, there are various criteria of personhood that stem from the dichotomies of 
person/human, person/property, and inclusion within the community of persons.  This 
structure gives some coherence to the understanding of personhood because the courts 
have by and large used these dichotomies to formulate grants of personhood.  However, 
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this analysis revealed that the criteria used to acknowledge one entity as a person may not 
be the same as the criteria used in arbitrating the status of another entity.  Further, the 
dichotomies of personhood may be applied with varying emphasis depending upon the 
entity under consideration.  Therefore, while there is a general framework for considering 
legal personhood, there is not a concrete definition that is applied to all entities vying for 
the status.   
A large component of this study was to first present a core theory of personhood 
which outlined various criteria that scholars found necessary for personhood and then to 
compare how the courts have used those criteria when determining personhood.  I found 
that although the courts consider these criteria, they do not always follow these criteria to 
the letter.  Judges and justices allow themselves a great deal of flexibility when using the 
standards stemming from the person/human dichotomy and the person/property 
dichotomy.   
Much of the moral theory of personhood relies on the rationalist ideal of a person 
as an autonomous, thinking agent.  While this paradigm has been important in 
influencing the courts, the criterion of rational capacity has not been definitive.  Rational 
capacity was an important factor in determining the personhood of corporations and 
fetuses and promises to be critical determinant if animals ever have their day in court.  
On the other hand, rational capacity was not a strong determining factor for the slave 
cases as the law largely ignored the slave‘s intelligence in order to deny personhood.  
This is also true for the mentally disabled who the law still considers to be persons even 
though they lack full rational capacity.  Legal scholar Ngaire Naffine reasons that 
although jurists frequently expound the importance of autonomy and rational capacity, 
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the law is not consistent in demanding that all persons exhibit a rational will.  She argues 
that the law is versatile in its conceptions of legal personality and uses this flexibility to 
both deny and grant personhood to entities that are not included as rational agents.
624
  In 
employing this flexibility, the law has demonstrated that although rational capacity is an 
important consideration when considering personhood, it is not absolute.  Therefore, 
rational capacity is not a concrete standard for the bestowal of personhood. 
The courts have also been flexible when distinguishing between person and 
property.  Naffine argues that there is a moral freight in the both the concepts of person 
and property, and that entities that are considered to be less than a person can be stripped 
of moral status and considered property.
625
  This assessment certainly seems to be true for 
slaves and animals which were both considered to be less than persons and therefore 
relegated to the status of property.  However, the courts made an exception for the 
corporation which was granted personhood even though it is a form of property.  The 
same can be said of ships which are often considered as legal persons.  Therefore, the 
perception that property and person are mutually exclusive has been influential in judicial 
decision-making but again has not been a concrete standard for the bestowal of 
personhood.   
The one criterion that was consistent across all four entities was that of social 
acceptability.  Whether society considers an entity to be ―one of us‖ or part of ―We the 
People‖ seems to carry significant weight in influencing the law to bestow personhood.  
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Slaves were not part of accepted political society and therefore were excluded.  So too, 
animals are too different from human persons to be considered.  The final verdict 
concerning the fetus is still pending because the debate over abortion and fetal 
personhood is still embroiled in a fierce public debate.  For now, the fetus is not included 
but advocates are arguing vociferously to change this status.  Corporations, with the 
backing of big business, have been accepted into the community of legal persons but the 
growing public outcry on Wall Street from grassroots organizations may eventually be 
strong enough to challenge this status.   
Another significant finding is that humanity is not a prerequisite for personhood.  
Slaves and fetuses are human, but the law rejected these entities as persons.  Corporations 
have qualified as persons, but they are not human, although they are composed of 
humans.  This indicates that animals, even though they are not human, have a chance at 
gaining some type of personhood-related recognition.  The law‘s rejection of humanity as 
a sine qua non of personhood is somewhat controversial among some theorists such as 
legal and moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum who argues that the capacity for moral 
judgment and reason makes humans morally ―special.‖  She contends that animals can 
never be included with humans in this realm of morally ―special‖ entities.
626
  Naffine 
argues that there is something to be said for considering humans as a special class 
because if the law completely loses the sense of humans as a valuable type of being, 
society might lose its moral concern over what can be ethically done to a person.
627
  By 
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retaining a foundational concept of the person as a moral as well as legal being, the law 
can use the moral language of human dignity when discussing the rights and protections 
of a person.  If humans are not an elevated moral class, then society might lose its 
prohibitions on causing suffering to fellow humans.   
Although humanity is not a determining factor for the law‘s bestowal of 
personhood, there is something about human suffering that gives pause when considering 
who is in or out of the community of persons.  What makes Americans cringe when 
considering our history of slavery is the amount of human suffering slavery caused.  
Opinion polls consistently find that a majority of Americans are against late-term 
abortion and cite the potential that the fetus will experience pain during the procedure as 
part of the explanation for this opinion.
628
  Sentience is also a consideration for non-
humans.  What makes most people cringe when an animal is beaten is not the abuse of 
property but the suffering the animal experiences.  Many advocates for slaves, fetuses, 
and animals see a bestowal of personhood as a legal protection from physical suffering 
and therefore argue vociferously for personhood.  In reality, greater protections from 
suffering would often satisfy these advocates. 
Similarly, many advocates for personhood for the fetus and animals use legal 
personhood as a vehicle to ensure greater protections for the lives of these entities.  It is 
commonly understood that life has value.  For many opponents of abortion, this is the 
crux of their argument – the fetus has a moral value and should not be destroyed.  A grant 
of personhood would protect the life of the fetus and therefore is an expedient way to 
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prevent abortion.  However, many opponents of abortion would be satisfied if the 
abortion were outlawed to protect human life even if personhood was not granted to the 
fetus.  Similarly, many animal advocates would be appeased with greater protections for 
the lives of animals even if the animal was not given consideration as a person.  This is 
especially true for endangered species whose lives are based upon their rarity.  Most 
people would agree with legal scholar Ronald Dworkin who argues that just as a priceless 
work of art should not be destroyed whimsically, neither should a fetus or an endangered 
animal be destroyed with caprice.
629
     
If preventing suffering and preserving the sanctity of life is a positive outcome, 
perhaps the law should be more liberal in bestowing personhood in order to protect more 
entities from harm.  Before agreeing with this statement it is important to determine the 
full implications of a moral liberal grant of personhood.   
 
A More Liberal Grant of Personhood 
The abolition of slavery and granting of personhood to the freed slaves was a 
victory for American rights and freedoms.  The transformation of slaves as property to 
freedmen as persons laid the foundation for much of America‘s human rights.  Modern 
capitalism has been greatly enabled by the personification of the corporation as the 
bestowal of personhood simplified contracts and facilitated business transactions.  Other 
expansions of personhood include the recognition of women as persons, which doubled 
the population of Americans participating in the political community and the recognition 
of other groups including Native Americans, Chinese immigrants, and other racial and 
ethnic groups whose personhood was often denied.  These expansions are viewed as 
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salutary developments in the entities included under personhood.  Can it then be inferred 
that greater expansions to include entities such as animals and fetuses would be 
worthwhile?   
Many animal rights activists answer ―yes‖ and encourage the law and society to 
accept intelligent animals as persons.  Stephen Wise argues that as the law has steadily 
expanded its circle of persons, it is now time to include great apes and possibly other 
non-human animals.
630
  Wise‘s argument has gained traction with many animal 
advocates, but it is necessary to consider the effects of including animals as persons.  
Allowing great apes to be persons would affect whether humans could imprison primates 
in zoos and could also affect the duties that are owed to these animals.  If a primate was 
consumed as food or imprisoned as a family pet, that animal, as a person, could have 
recourse to the law and fellow persons may have an obligation to protect these animals.  
Altering the status of animals would have many affects that could cause alarm among 
human persons.   
As Chapter Five pointed out, many of the discoveries in health and medicine are 
attributable to experiments done on animals and particularly primates.  If these animals 
were elevated to the status of person, then it would be difficult to justify why one 
person‘s life could be sacrificed to benefit another.  Forcing a chimpanzee to undergo 
medical experimentation would be on the same moral level as forcing a human to 
undergo experimentation.  The most vulnerable humans would likely be young children 
or mentally impaired adults who cannot be considered rational agents.  Because these 
humans lack the rational capacities of personhood, they could be considered inferior to 
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some great apes.  They might then be used aggressively has human research subjects or 
sources of organs.   
Most of society is not willing to go this far in granting an equal personhood 
among intelligent animals and non-rational humans.  Most human persons have an 
understanding that there is something sacred about humanity that separates the most 
intelligent animal from the least intelligent human.  Margaret Somerville, a professor of 
law, medicine, and ethics, voices a concern that an extension of personhood to animals 
could confuse the idea that humans are persons because they deserve special respect 
above and beyond other animals.
631
  This echoes Nussbaum‘s argument that humans are 
―special.‖  Both of these scholars argue that an extension of personhood to animals would 
result in putting both sets of interests on the same level and could undo the achievements 
of the human rights movement which has used the distinction between humans and 
animals as the basis of their message of human rights.  Nussbaum contends that 
preserving the uniqueness of the human person is essential in maintaining human rights 
protections.  She argues that humans and animals cannot be equated ―lest we lose our 
moral footing utterly.‖
632
   
It is unlikely that the law will acquiesce to granting personhood to any non-human 
animals in the near future, and therefore animal rights activists are left to argue that 
animals at least deserve increased protections against harm as sentient beings.  Another 
possible avenue for an expansion of personhood is for the fetus but this too would have 
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effects on society.  Personhood for the fetus would effectively outlaw abortion because 
abortion would end the life of a person.  Banning abortion would have great consequence 
for women as persons.  As Chapter Four demonstrated, an essential part of a woman‘s 
personhood is her ability to make and carry out decisions concerning her body.  A ban on 
abortion would limit this personhood and therefore limit her autonomy.  Therefore, the 
expansion of personhood to the fetus would in effect contract the personhood of women.   
On the other hand, there is an argument to be made that humans have an elevated 
status that merits protection from harm, and as humans, the fetus is entitled to this 
protection.  At the least, it can be argued that a fetus with the capacity to feel pain should 
have the same protections as an animal.  Within the window of six to twenty-six weeks, 
most physicians agree that the fetus can feel pain.
633
  Therefore it seems equitable that 
there would be some type of protection, similar to endangered species law, which would 
protect a sentient fetus.  A grant of personhood need not accompany greater protections 
for the life and well-being of a fetus.  Just as many animal rights activists press for 
personhood for great apes in order to protect the lives and well-being of these animals, 
many advocates for the fetus also request personhood for the protections personhood 
confers.  Greater protections for the fetus could be accomplished without a corresponding 
expansion of personhood.   
The study of slave law revealed that many judges viewed slavery as regrettable 
but nevertheless an accepted pillar of the social order.  These judges voiced their personal 
objections to slavery as immoral but continued to condone the institution as part of the 
law.  A comparison can be made with abortion.  Many Americans claim that they do not 
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personally approve of abortion and an abortion would be morally wrong for them, yet 
they support permissive abortion laws claiming that they cannot limit the abortion rights 
of others.
634
  Slavery was eventually found to be an extreme violation of human rights 
and an offense against personhood.  Recent surveys have found that the American public 
is less supportive of abortion than it used to be.
635
  Perhaps at a future date, the tide will 
turn against abortion and Americans will decide that abortion is a violation of personhood 
just as slavery once was. 
Expansions of personhood are quite controversial due to the implications for the 
current holders of personhood, and the courts, being cognizant of these controversies is 
reticent to abruptly alter the existing boundaries of personhood.  This study has 
demonstrated that the courts are not consistent in applying standards of personhood 
across a number of entities.  Perhaps rather than requesting that the courts should expand 
personhood, the more suitable demand might be that the courts are at least more 
consistent in their bestowals of personhood.  In order to evaluate the soundness of such a 
request, it is necessary to understand some of the possible ramifications of a standard 
application of personhood.    
In his dissent in Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949), 
Justice Douglas argues that the meaning of ―person‖ in the Constitution should be 
interpreted consistently.  He states, ―it requires distortion to read ‗person‘ as meaning one 
thing then another within the same clause and from clause to clause‖ (337 U.S. 562, 579).  
Despite Douglas‘s appeal for consistency, the Supreme Court and lower courts have not 
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been completely consistent in their standards for personhood.  If the courts were constant 
in upholding the criteria of rationality and autonomy, slaves would have been declared 
persons rather than property.  The corporation as property and a collective would most 
likely have been declined personhood.  The fetus, which does not qualify as a rational 
agent, would likely remain a non-person or a potential person.  Finally, great apes, which 
have some capacities as rational agents would be at least considered as persons.   
Rather than applying a strict conception of personhood to entities to determine 
which entities qualify and which entities do not qualify as persons, the courts have taken 
a more flexible approach in deciding the fate of each entity separately in the context of 
that entity‘s particular circumstances.  Judges evaluate each entity‘s suitability as a 
person based on a number of considerations stemming from science, religion, and history.  
Justices seek answers from the classic works of Locke and Kant for guidance.  They also 
look to the dominant culture, and the understanding of what it means to be a person that 
they hold in their own personal worldview.  The views of the dominant political elites are 
taken into account.  Rationality, property status, and acceptability into the community of 
persons are all considerations.  The law absorbs and reflects each of these considerations 
in its judgments concerning personhood and does not necessarily strive to be consistent in 
its ruling across a number of issues.  This dynamic process allows the law to respond to 
the particularities of the unique entities vying for personhood rather than trying to refer 
back to a fixed idea of what it means to be a proper person. 
At the same time, the flexible approach the courts have taken in respect to 
personhood results in a very nebulous understanding of both legal and moral personhood.  
The meaning assigned by the law to personhood seems to drift from one entity to another 
623 
 
and important concepts are applied differently.  Justices and judges sometimes appear to 
adjudicate disputes of personhood without a firm understanding of the core theories that 
could provide guidance.  These justices are wading in a sea of controversy because 
questions concerning an entity‘s status as a person are part of the basic nature of the law.  
The diverse meanings of ―person‖ as assigned to various entities lead to an unstable 
understanding of the term.  The vagueness and inherently contestable nature of 
personhood leads to an insecure conception of one of the most important concepts in 
political society.   
An understanding of personhood is the heart of what it means to comprehend 
one‘s own worth, rights, and duties within a community.  Through its power to define 
legal persons within the moral and political community, the law determines who matters.  
If an entity is a person, it counts in its own right.  If an entity is not a person, its legal 
protections are dramatically diminished.  Life and death issues are at stake because 
entities who are considered persons have much greater protections for life and wellbeing.  
Providing some structure to the concept of personhood provides guidelines to those who 
wonder if an entity is part of the community of persons.  With such an important concept, 
it is necessary to have some structured guidelines for adjudicating the issue.  If not, 
atrocities such as the genocides may be more likely to occur. Native American scholar 
Ward Churchill argues that the United States experienced the genocide of many Native 
American tribes which were brutally decimated as Europeans conquered American soil.  
Churchill attributes this genocide to the belief held by the Europeans that the Native 
Americans were less than persons who lacked moral value worthy of respect.
636
  Without 
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an understanding of personhood, such atrocities are more likely to occur because there 
are no standards for declaring that these individuals are autonomous, rational agents in 
the moral community of persons and therefore cannot be killed.   
This study has shown that although the law maintains its flexibility in 
adjudicating personhood, some standards do exist.  A person can be considered a rational, 
autonomous agent; a person is distinct from property; and a person is a member of the 
community of persons.  In defining legal personhood, the courts have the ability to pay 
close attention to these standards while still maintaining some flexibility to respond to the 
particularities of a certain case.  This method would likely produce a basic conception of 
legal personhood but maintain the dynamism needed in the law.  By looking to the core 
theory established in this study and the dominant concepts this analysis revealed, judges 
could formulate a more consistent understanding of personhood to be applied as new 
entities enter the legal arena vying for personhood.   
The issue of personhood involves the law‘s deepest assumptions about the nature 
of moral existence.  It questions for whom the law is created as well as the basic priorities 
and functions of the law.  It involves hierarchies of beings imposed by the law and who 
gets to decide who is included within the community of persons and who is excluded.  It 
considers who or what can be treated as a means to an end.  It questions why 
psychological or biological criteria matter for a person.  It concerns who or what matters 
and why.   
Through the concept of a person, the law develops the order of beings in the 
moral, social, and legal world.  This study has demonstrated that this world is complex 
and involves diverse entities with an important element in common – the quest for 
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personhood.  The fact that the law and the greater political society still turns to the 
concept of personhood to serve as an arbiter of justice reveals the importance of this 
concept in juridical, moral, and social realms, and also reveals that the concept is less 
definitive than we may believe.  The construction of legal personhood continues, but this 
study reveals that there are certain concepts that solidify the meaning of personhood and 
can provide guidance for adjudicators as they face new entities seeking personhood.  
Through this study and future analysis on this subject, the concept of legal personhood 
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